DIEDONG VRS DIEDONG (W/WA/HC/E12/15/2021) [2024] GHAHC 341 (18 April 2024)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE HELD AT WA ON THURSDAY 18TH APRIL 2024 BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE A. YUSIF ASIBEY HIGH COURT JUDGE ----------------------------- SUIT NO. UW/WA/HC/E12/15/2021 MARY SAAN DIEDONG VRS. MUAMAR HARDI DIEDONG PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION By a Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim dated 11th May, 2021, the Plaintiff herein instituted the instant action against the Defendant, praying this Court for the following reliefs: a. A declaration that the parties jointly own the matrimonial home at Wa, situate at Konta, Napogbakole Extension Residential Area and b. c. on Plot 125 Block “C”; A declaration that the parties jointly own the residential dwelling building at Nadowli; A declaration that parties jointly own the Pontiac vibe and Kia Sorento vehicles with Registration numbers UW-56-12 and UW-93- 13 respectively; 1 d. A declaration that any purported sale of the said properties together with their fixtures and fittings and movables is null and void at law and until this Honourable Court determines as such the status quo ante must be preserved; e. An order for interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendant by himself, his assigns, agents, representatives from dealing with the matrimonial home and the residential dwelling building at Nadowli pending the final determination of this Honourable Court; f. An order for interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendant by himself, his assigns, agents, representatives from removing the fixtures and fittings, movables, equipment from the residential dwelling house in Nadowli pending the final determination of this court; g. An order for the sharing of the matrimonial home in Wa, Konta- Napogbakole Extension Residential Area as well as the residential dwelling building at Nadowli and the vehicles which are currently on road between the parties; h. An order that the following properties be settled in favour of the Plaintiff. a. b. The matrimonial home situated at Konta, Napogbakole Extension Residential Area and on Plot 125 Block “C”. KIA Sorento car with registration No UW-93-13 Defendant entered appearance on 24th May, 2021 and filed a Statement of Defence on 7th June, 2021. Defendant in his Statement of Defence, counterclaims for the following; 2 a. Property described as Plot 125 Block C situate at Konta, b. c. d. e. Napogbakole Residential Area be settled on the children of the marriage namely; Salim Diedong and Salima Diedong. KIA Sorento vehicle with registration number UW-93-13 in the name of the Defendant be settled on the Defendant. Pontiac vibe with registration number UW-56-12 registered in the name of the Plaintiff be settled on the Plaintiff Baspio Pharmacy located at Kabanye registered in the name of the Plaintiff as Sole Proprietor be settled on the Plaintiff 3 plots of land (2 plots situate at Nakoripaani and 1 plot situate at Kambalikori) all located in the Wa Municipality registered in the name of the Plaintiff be settled on the Plaintiff. On 20th October, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Reply and Defence to Counterclaim pursuant to leave granted by this court. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM Plaintiff sued as the ex-wife of the Defendant. Plaintiff says she and Defendant were married under customary law in 1993. At that time, Plaintiff was a pharmacist and the Defendant was a clerical officer with Veterans Association of Ghana (VAG). Plaintiff says that during the subsistence of the marriage, the parties cohabited in Wa and exchanged visits when plaintiff was transferred to Sunyani. Parties have two children, Salim Diedong and Salima Diedong. Plaintiff avers that she virtually cared for the children by paying their school fees and providing them with other necessaries of life. Plaintiff says that during the marriage, parties acquired, two residential properties, one in Wa and another in Nadowli. Plaintiff asserts that the house in Nadowli is built on land gifted to parties in the matter by one STEHEN KUKURI who is the head of family for 3 Defendant’s family. The house in Wa is built on land given to the parties herein by the landlords of the area; Konta-Napogbakole Extension Residential Area. Plaintiff says she funded the lease documentation for this property which bears the Defendant’s name. Plaintiff says that the funds for the construction of the two properties came from her salary and loans she contracted. Plaintiff asserts that during the subsistence of the marriage, parties acquired 5 vehicles. Three out of these five vehicles have been disposed of, leaving the Pontiac vibe and KIA Sorento which are the subject matter of this suit. Pontiac vibe is in the name of the Plaintiff whereas the KIA Sorento is in the name of the Defendant. The KIA Sorento is currently being used by the Plaintiff whereas the Pontiac Vibe is being used by the Defendant. Plaintiff says that she made substantial and extensive contribution to these properties with the belief that they would be jointly held by parties. Parties had been separated for about 5years when the Writ of Summons was issued. Plaintiff says the Defendant has repossessed the dowry and the marriage is thus dissolved per customary law. DEFENDANT’S CASE In his Statement of Defence, Defendant admits that the property in Konta Napogbakole Extension Residential Area is jointly owned by him and the Plaintiff and registered in his name. Defendant also says that he lives in the house with current spouse and daughter from his marriage with the Plaintiff. 4 Save the assertion that the properties were acquired largely on the strength of the Plaintiff’s earnings, the Defendant admits that parties acquired 5 vehicles during the marriage, three of which have been disposed of. Defendant says that the Pontiac Vibe Vehicle was acquired solely by him though registered in the name of the Plaintiff. In respect of the Nadowli property, Defendant says that the property is the bona fide property of the Diedong family which was given to the Defendant’s family by the Late Stephen Nuo Beblah. Defendant says that being the eldest of his siblings, he was given the land to possess and develop for the benefit of his siblings and relatives. Defendant says that he and the Plaintiff have held the property in trust for themselves and his family. Defendant denies that Plaintiff made any contribution to the Nadowli property because she packed out all the materials including kitchenware, they had agreed to send there saying she was not going to contribute to the construction. Defendant admits that the marriage has been dissolved by tradition and custom. Defendant lists the following as property jointly acquired during the marriage; 1. KIA Sorento with registration number UW-93-13 2. Pontiac Vibe with registration number UW-56-12 3. Baspio Pharmacy located at Kabanye registered in the name of the Plaintiff as sole proprietor 4. Uncompleted Residential Property, Plot 125 block C, Konta Napobakole Residential Area, registered in the name of the Defendant. 5. 3 plots of land (2plots situate at Nakoripaani and 1 plot situate at Kambalikori) all located in the Wa Municipality registered in the name of the Plaintiff PLAINTIFF’S REPLY TO DEFENCE 5 In her Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, Plaintiff denies all assertions made by the Defendant and says that the Defendant’s counterclaim is based on the Defendant’s knowledge that he contributed meagerly to property acquired during marriage. Plaintiff also says that the plots of land at Nakoripaani and Kambalikore as well as Baspio pharmacy were all acquired solely by her from her own money. ISSUES SET DOWN FOR TRIAL The following issues were set down for trial: a. Whether or not the properties acquired during the subsistence of Plaintiff’s marriage to the Defendant are jointly acquired properties; b. Whether or not the Plaintiff contributed substantially and largely to the acquisition of all the properties acquired during the subsistence of her marriage to the Defendant; c. Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to an equal and fair share of the properties jointly acquired during the subsistence of her marriage to the Defendant; d. Whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to all her reliefs which she is seeking; e. Any other issues arising out of the pleadings; BURDEN OF PROOF What is the burden of proof that the Plaintiff in this case has to establish? 6 On the burden of proof in civil cases, the Supreme Court in Poku v. Poku [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 996 at 1022 per Georgina Woode CJ stated the statutory duty on a party in a civil suit to discharge the burden of proof when it held as follows: “It raises the legal question of who bears the burden of persuasion in such civil matters, …….. Who has the onus of proof and what degree or standard of proof? Generally speaking, this depends largely on ……. The facts averred and therefore the facts in issue……Generally, the burden of proof is therefore on the party asserting the facts, with the evidential burden shifting as the justice of the case demands. The standard of degree of proof must also necessarily be proof on the preponderance of the probabilities within the meaning of Section 12(2) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323)”. In the case of GIHOC Refrigeration and Household Ltd v Hanna Assi [2007-2008] 1 SCGLR1, Akuffo JSC explained that the standard of proof in all civil matters is …based on a determination of whether or not the party with the burden of producing evidence on the issues has, on all the evidence satisfied the judge of the probable existence of the fact in issue. The principle as stated in the Poku v. Poku case (supra) is based on Sections 10, 11, 12 ,14 and 17 of the Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) which states as follows: Section 10(1) “For the purposes of this Decree, the burden of persuasion means the obligation of a party to establish a requisite degree of belief concerning the fact in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court.” Section 10(2) “The burden of persuasion may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or non-existence of a fact or that he establish the existence or non-existence of a fact by a preponderance of the probabilities or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Section 11(1) and (4) of NRCD 323; 7 (1) “For the purposes of this decree, the burden of producing evidence means the obligation of a party to introduce sufficient evidence to avoid a ruling against him on the issue.” (4) “In other circumstances the burden of producing evidence requires a party to produce sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact was more probable than its non-existence. Section 12 of NRCD 323 (1) “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities. (2) “Preponderance of the probabilities” means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence.” Section 14 of NRCD 323 “Except as otherwise provided by law, unless and until it is shifted a party has the burden of persuasion as to each fact the existence or non-existence of which is essential to the claim or defence he is asserting.” Section 17 of NRCD 323 (1)“Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is on the party against whom a finding on that fact would be required in the absence of further proof.” (2) “Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of producing evidence of a particular fact is initially on the party with the burden of persuasion as to the fact.” 8 It is trite law that the matters that are capable of proof must be proved by producing sufficient evidence so that on all the evidence a reasonable mind could conclude that the existence of the fact is more probable than its non-existence. In the case of Takoradi Flour Mills v. Samir Faris [2005 -2006] SCGLR 882, it was held that when the plaintiff has been able to discharge the burden of proof on him, and has by his evidence established facts from which an inference can reasonably be drawn in his favour, then the onus would shift on the defendant. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the legal burden/burden of persuasion at all material times lies with the Plaintiff to prove its case; however, the burden to produce evidence may shift where necessary to the Defendant. See the case of Sumaila Bielbel (No. 3) v Adamu Dramani & Attorney -General [2012]SCGLR 370 at 371 which states ‘the distinction between the two burdens of proof, namely, the “burden of persuasion” as defined in section 10(1) and the “burden of producing evidence” as defined in Section 11(1) of the same Act, is important because the incidence of the burden of producing evidence can lead to a defendant acquiring the right to bring leading evidence in a trial, even though the burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff. Ordinarily, the burden of persuasion lies on the same party as bears the burden of producing evidence. However, depending upon the pleadings or what facts are admitted, the evidential burden can move on to a defendant.’ Further reference is made to pages 29, 74 and 75 of Essentials of the Ghana Law of Evidence by S.A. Brobbey JSC where the learned author state as follows, ‘when it is said that the burden of proof shifts, what is meant is that after one party has adduced sufficient evidence to prove his point, the burden will move to the opposing party to adduce more cogent evidence which will disprove the opponent’s case and induce the Court to believe him and rule in his favour. The shifting of the burden applies only to the burden to produce evidence’ 9 It is thus trite that where the Plaintiff produces evidence to prove any fact in issue, the burden of producing shifts to the Defendant to produce such relevant evidence to disprove the Plaintiff’s case. Holding 5 of the Takoradi Flour Mills case (supra) states that; “……. this being a civil suit the rules of evidence require ……..that in assessing the balance of probabilities, all the evidence, be it that of plaintiff or the defendant, must be considered and the party in whose favour the balance tilts is the person whose case is the more probable of the rival versions and is deserving of a favourable verdict……..” In respect of the counterclaim, the same standard of proof discussed above would be used in evaluating and assessing the Defendant’s case. See JASS CO LTD AND ANOR V. APPAU AND ANOR. [2009] SCGLR 265. EVIDENCE FILED BY PARTIES In proving its case, the Plaintiff in accordance with the High Court (Civil Procedure) (Amendment) Rules, 2014 C.I. 87,(C.I.87) and the orders of this Court filed her Witness Statements on 12th January, 2022. The following documents attached to the Plaintiff’s Witness Statement were admitted into evidence and marked as follows; EXHIBIT A series- Plaintiff’s pay slips EXHIBIT B- Deed of Gift EXHIBIT C series- Pay slips with indication of loans EXHIBI D- Documents covering Kia Sorento EXHIBIT E series- Pharmacy business operating license documents The following witness statements were filed in support of the Plaintiffs case: 1. Witness statement of Siddique Mohammed Lamin 2. Witness statement of Mahama Inusah 3. Witness statement of Fred Kangberinye 10 During trial, the Plaintiff witness statement was adopted as her evidence in chief on 5th April, 2022 and was cross-examined by counsel for the Defendant. Fred Kangberinye testified on 27th October, 2022 as PW1 and was cross-examined by Counsel for the Defendant. Mahama Inusah testified on behalf of the Plaintiff as PW2 on 21st February, 2022 and was examined by Counsel for the Defendant. Siddique Mohammed Lamin testified as PW3 on 1st June 2023 and was cross- examined by Counsel for the Defendant. The Defendant filed his witness statement on 4th January, 2022. No documents were attached to his Witness Statement. His Witness Statement was adopted as his evidence in chief on 21st November, 2023 and he was cross-examined by Counsel for the Plaintiff. DETERMINATION OF ISSUES The Court will now proceed to determine the issues set down for trial; Whether or not the properties acquired during the subsistence of Plaintiff’s marriage to the Defendant are jointly acquired properties. From the pleadings of the parties, it is contended that the following properties were acquired during the subsistence of the marriage; 1. KIA Sorento with registration number UW-93-13 2. Pontiac Vibe with registration number UW-56-12 3. Baspio Pharmacy located at Kabanye registered in the name of the Plaintiff as sole proprietor 4. Residential Property , Plot 125 block C, Konta Napobakole Residential Area, registered in the name of the Defendant. 5. Residential dwelling building at Nadowli 6. 3 plots of land (2plots situate at Nakoripaani and 1 plot situate at Kambalikori) all located in the Wa Municipality registered in the name of the Plaintiff 11 The court’s duty is to determine if all these properties were jointly acquired by the parties. In PETER ADJEI V. MARGARET ADJEI (2021) JELR 109034 (SC), the supreme court held in detail as follows, ‘The decisions of this Court, dating back to the case of MENSAH v. MENSAH [1998-1999] SCGLR 350, per Bamford-Addo, JSC, which we shall term the first Mensah case, then to Boafo v. Boafo (supra); then the second Mensah v. Mensah, (supra) per Dotse, JSC; Quartson v. Quartson (supra); Arthur v. Arthur (supra) and Fynn v. Fynn (supra), have set out the parameters for determining which properties could be termed as ‘jointly-acquired marital properties’ and the criteria for the distribution of such properties…The combined effect of the decisions referred to supra is that; any property that is acquired during the subsistence of a marriage, be it customary or under the English or Mohammedan Ordinance, is presumed to have been jointly acquired by the couple and upon divorce, should be shared between them on the equality is equity principle. This presumption of joint acquisition is, however, rebuttable upon evidence to the contrary – What this means, in effect is that, it is not every property acquired single-handedly by any of the spouses during the subsistence of a marriage that can be termed as a ‘jointly-acquired’ property to be distributed at all cost on this equality is equity principle. Rather, it is property that has been shown from the evidence adduced during the trial, to have been jointly acquired, irrespective of whether or not there was direct, pecuniary or substantial contribution from both spouses in the acquisition. The operative term or phrase is; “property jointly acquired during the subsistence of the marriage”. So where a spouse is able to lead evidence in rebuttal or to the contrary, as was the case in Fynn v. Fynn (supra), the presumption theory of joint acquisition collapses.’ [Emphasis mine] From the above decisions the properties acquired during the marriage between the parties are deemed jointly acquired unless there is evidence to the contrary. The Court will consider the evidence adduced in respect of each property. 12 The Court finds from paragraphs 13 and 16 of Plaintiff’s witness statement and paragraph 12 of Defendant’s witness statement that both parties agree that the following properties were jointly acquired during the subsistence of the marriage; 1. KIA Sorento with registration number UW-93-13 2. Pontiac Vibe with registration number UW-56-12 3. Residential Property , Plot 125 block C, Konta Napobakole Residential Area, registered in the name of the Defendant. Further to the above the Defendant admitted during cross-examination that the property at Konta Napgbakole Extension Residential Area was largely financed by the Plaintiff. (See Record of Proceedings of 24th November, 2023). The presumption of joint acquisition therefore will apply to all the above properties in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In respect of the residential dwelling building at Nadowli, whereas Plaintiff says it is jointly acquired property, Defendant denies same. In one breath Defendant says parties held the properties in trust for themselves and his siblings. In another breath, Defendant says the property belongs to the Diedong family. Plaintiff’s Exhibit B is a Deed of Gift in respect of the Nadowli property. The property was gifted to both the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Deed of Gift does not indicate that the property was to be held in trust for the Defendant’s siblings. The Court finds that the Defendant is a party to Exhibit B. During cross examination of the Defendant, he admitted that the land on which the Nadowli property was built was gifted to him and the Plaintiff (See record of proceedings for 23rd November, 2023.) The Court takes note of the Supreme Court’s decision in ARTHUR (No.1) v. ARTHUR (No. 1) [2013-2014] SCGLR 543 that, ‘if a spouse acquires property by gift from a donor or through succession (either intestate or testate), the other spouse who was not a beneficiary in any way under any of the circumstances, cannot be described as a joint or part owner just because the 13 donation, bequest or devise was made during the subsistence of the marriage between the donee or successor and his/her partner.’ The instant case can however be distinguished because the land was gifted to both parties. Subsequent to the gift, PW1, who worked as a mason for the construction of the property testified that the Plaintiff always sent cement for the construction of the Nadowli property. Beyond stating in his witness statement that the Nadowli property was family property, the Defendant did not produce any evidence to contradict the presumption that the property at Nadwoli was jointly acquired property. The case of Majolagbe v Larbi [1959] GLR 190 says that “Proof in law is the establishment of facts by proper legal means. Where a party makes an averment capable of proof in some positive way, e.g. by producing documents, description of things, reference to other facts, instances, or circumstances, and his averment is denied, he does not prove it by merely going into the witness-box and repeating that averment on oath, or having it repeated on oath by his witness.He proves it by producing other evidence of facts and circumstances, from which the Court can be satisfied that what he avers is true.” In this case the Defendant failed to produce other evidence to support his averment that the Nadowli property is his family property. In the circumstances, the Court finds EXHIBIT B and the testimony of PW1 to be overwhelming evidence in support of Plaintiff’s assertion that the Nadowli property is property that was jointly acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. In respect of the Baspio Pharmacy located at Kabanye registered in the name of the Plaintiff as sole proprietor, Defendant identifies it as a jointly acquired property whereas Plaintiff says she acquired it by herself. In paragraph 21 of her Witness Statement, Plaintiff says that she fully established the pharmacy with her personal money without the contribution of the Defendant. She attaches Exhibit E series as proof of her sole contribution. I find that the Defendant has made no contribution either financially or in kind or by the provision of marital services (as is required by the authorities) to warrant 14 the consideration of this property as jointly acquired by the parties. In the circumstances, the Court finds that Baspio Pharmacy was not jointly acquired by the parties. It was solely acquired by the Plaintiff Further, the Defendant says that the 3 plots of land (2plots situate at Nakoripaani and 1 plot situate at Kambalikori) all located in the Wa Municipality and registered in the name of the Plaintiff is jointly acquired property. Plaintiff says it is not. Plaintiff testified during cross examination that the two plots at Nakorpaani were acquired by her when she was separated from the Plaintiff. Another plot with uncompleted building was acquired by Plaintiff when she was remarried to her second husband (See record of proceedings of 5th April, 2022). The Court finds no evidence that contradicts this evidence of the Plaintiff. I therefore find that the 3 plots of land were solely acquired by the plaintiff and was acquired at a time where she was no longer together with the Defendant. These plots of land are therefore not jointly acquired property. In view of the above, the properties deemed jointly acquired by the court are as follows; 1. KIA Sorento with registration number UW-93-13 2. Pontiac Vibe with registration number UW-56-12 3. Residential Property , Plot 125 block C, Konta Napobakole Residential Area, registered in the name of the Defendant. 4. Residential dwelling building at Nadowli The Court shall now proceed to address the second issue; Whether or not the Plaintiff contributed substantially and largely to the acquisition of all the properties acquired during the subsistence of her marriage to the Defendant. 15 As stated above in this judgment, the Defendant has already admitted that the Plaintiff largely financed the property at Konta Napobakole Residential Area (See record of proceedings of 24th November, 2023). Defendant also states during cross examination that after parties bought the pontiac vibe, the Plaintiff sold her saloon car to enable him the Defendant buy a car of his choice. The testimony of the Defendant supports the case of the Plaintiff herein that she largely contributed to the acquisition of the property at Konta and the two cars. See the case of Asante v Bogyabi and Others [1966] GLR 232 where the Supreme Court held that ‘Where admissions relevant to matters in issue between parties to a case are made by one side, supporting the other, as appears to be so in the instant case on appeal, then it seems to me right to say that that side in whose favour the admissions are made, is entitled to succeed and not the other, unless there is good reason apparent on the record for holding the contrary view.’ The defendant’s admission supports the plaintiff’ case and so the Court finds that the Plaintiff largely and substantially contributed to the acquisition of the property at Konta and the two cars. What about the property at Nadowli? Is there evidence that the Plaintiff substantially and largely contributed to the acquisition of same? The evidence of PW1, that the Plaintiff provided cement for the construction of the house at Nadowli is an indication that the Plaintiff contributed to the construction of that house. Unlike the other properties however, the Court does not find evidence that convinces it that the Plaintiff’s contribution to the construction of this house was large and substantial. In any case, that property remains uncompleted. In the circumstances the Court finds that the Plaintiff substantially and largely contributed to the acquisition of the Konta property as well as the two cars. Her contribution towards the Nadowli property is evident, however there is no proof that, that contribution was substantial. 16 The third issue for determination is; Whether or not the Plaintiff is entitled to an equal and fair share of the properties jointly acquired during the subsistence of her marriage to the Defendant Article 22 of the 1992 Constitution provides as follows; 1) A spouse shall not be deprived of a reasonable provision out of the estate of a spouse whether or not the spouse died having made a will. (2) Parliament shall, as soon as practicable after the coming into force of this Constitution, enact legislation regulating the property rights of spouses. (3) With a view to achieving the full realisation of the rights referred to in clause (2) of this article (a) spouses shall have equal access to property jointly acquired during marriage; (b) assets which are jointly acquired during marriage shall be distributed equitably between the spouses upon dissolution of the marriage.(emphasis supplied). In Adjei v Adjei supra the Supreme Court held that property jointly acquired must be distributed based on the equality is equity principle. Having hereinabove found that the Plaintiff and Defendant jointly acquired property during the subsistence of the marriage, the Plaintiff is entitled to an equal share of the properties jointly acquired during the subsistence of their marriage. The Court therefore holds that the Plaintiff is entitled to an equal and fair share of all the properties jointly acquired during the marriage. The final issue for consideration is Whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to all her reliefs which she is seeking. In addressing this issue, the Court shall consider if the Defendant is entitled to his counterclaim. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s issue (d) (e) and (f) are prayers for interlocutory reliefs and at this point, those prayers have become moot to be determined by the court. 17 In respect of reliefs (a), (b) and (c) this Court finds that, the properties listed therein were jointly acquired by the parties herein. In the circumstances the Court proceeds to distribute the properties jointly acquired by the parties as follows; 1. The property situated at Wa, Konta-Napogbakole Extension Residential Area to be settled on the Plaintiff 2. Residential dwelling building at Nadowli to be settled on the Defendant 3. Pontiac Vibe, which is currently in the Defendant’s possession, with registration number UW-56-12 to be settled on the Defendant 4. KIA Sorento, which is currently in the Plaintiff’s possession with registration number UW-93-13 to be settled on the Plaintiff Defendant’s prayer for the property in Wa to be settled on the children of the marriage is alien to the practice of the courts and can thus cannot be granted by this Court. Having regard to all the evidence adduced, the Court finds that the Defendant is not entitled to his counterclaim. CONCLUSION In view of the above, the Plaintiff’s claim succeeds. Defendant counterclaim fails. COST: Taking into account, the number of years the case travelled and the industry put in, the Court will award cost of THIRTY THOUSAND GHANA CEDIS (GHC 30,000) against Defendant in favour of Plaintiff. 18 HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE A. YUSIF ASSIBEY HIGH COURT JUDGE CC: Crispin W. Ziekah Esq. for Plaintiff. Abu Juan Esq. with him Dominic Paaga Esq. for Defendant. 19