Mintah v Yirenkyi (A4/11/2024) [2025] GHADC 66 (4 June 2025)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT B, SITTING AT KOFORIDUA ON WEDNESDAY THE 4 TH DAY OF JUNE, 2025, BEFORE HER WORSHIP YVONNE NELLY AMA ADJADI. SUIT NO. A4/11/2024 TIME: 9:52HRS SALOMEY OYE MINTAH : PETITIONER V. GEORGE AKOTO YIRENKYI : RESPONDE NT JUDGMENT The parties herein were married under the ordinance on 24th September, 2019 at the District Court B, Koforidua in the Eastern Region of the Republic of Ghana. A little over three years later, the Petitioner herein came back to where the law cleaved them together, for them to be put asunder. The union was not blessed with issues. On 19th February, 2024 exactly five days after Valentine’s Day, the Petitioner set into motion the proceedings which have led parties to this day. Her case can be summed up thus: The Respondent was a resident of Stockholm, Sweden at the time the marriage was contracted. He left Ghana two weeks after the marriage ceremony with the promise of making all necessary arrangements to assist the Petitioner join him abroad. He failed to do so and neglected to visit the Petitioner in Ghana during the pendency of the marriage. She also alleged the existence of a mystery woman who picked up her phone calls to the Respondent to verbally abuse her. When she reported this to the Respondent, he sided with the mysterious interloper. Adding to his list of growing sins, the Respondent irregularly maintained the Petitioner with the amount of GH₵300.00 monthly. Again, the Petitioner complained and was told to fend for herself because she worked as a nurse. These actions of the 1 | P a g e Respondent led her to file for dissolution of the marriage and any other order deemed fit by the court as her reliefs. The Respondent tersely answered the Petition in five paragraphs. In paragraph two, he admitted all the averments made by the Petitioner. He further admitted that the misunderstanding in the marriage was due to lack of trust and incompatibility. His cross-petition was for the dissolution of the marriage so the parties were on the same page regarding the dissolution of the marriage. At the hearing, the parties relied on their respective witness statements as their Evidence-in-Chief. They opted not to cross-examine each other. The Respondent called on a witness, Ohene Adi Kwasi, whom the Petitioner did not cross-examine. No evidence was adduced by parties. The only new fact introduced was the Respondent’s claim of maintaining the Petitioner with the amount of GH₵2,000.00 monthly in paragraph 6 of his witness statement. In paragraph 9 of the witness statement he stated that he “compensated” the Petitioner with the amount of GH₵20,000.00 after their customary marriage was dissolved by their families. COURT’S ANALYSIS AND OPINION Section 1(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) provides that the sole ground for granting a petition for divorce shall be that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. Section 2 (1) of Act 367 again provides that for the purpose of showing that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation, the petitioner shall satisfy the court of one or more of the following facts: (a) That the Respondent has committed adultery and that by reason of the adultery the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the Respondent. (b) That the Respondent has behaved in a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. 2 | P a g e (c) That the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. (d) That the parties to the marriage have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the respondent consents to the grant of a decree of divorce provided that the consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and where the court is satisfied that it has been withheld the court may grant a petition for divorce under this paragraph despite the refusal. (e) That the parties to the marriage have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least five years immediately before the presentation of the Petition. (f) That the parties after diligent efforts have been unable to reconcile their differences. Section 2(3) provides that although the court finds the existence of one or more of the facts specified in (1), the court shall not grant a petition for divorce unless it is satisfied, on all the evidence that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. From the scanty evidence and facts before the court, the Petitioner based her allegations for the breakdown of the marriage on the unreasonable behaviour of the Respondent. To succeed under the fact of unreasonable behaviour, the petitioner must first establish unreasonable conduct on the part of the Respondent and secondly, she must establish that as a result of the bad conduct, she cannot reasonably be expected to live with him. 3 | P a g e At page 123 of the book, At a Glance! The Marriages Act and the Matrimonial Causes Act Dissected by Mrs Frederica Ahwireng-Obeng, the writer on unreasonable behaviour stated; “Unreasonable behaviour has been defined in English law as conduct that gives rise to life, limb or health or conduct that gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger”. See the case of GOLLINS V GOLLINS [1964] A. C 644. The principle of law is that, the bad conduct complained of must be grave and weighty and must make living together impossible. It must also be serious and higher than the normal wear and tear of married life. In Knudson v. Knudson [1976] 1 GLR 204, Amissah J. A stated that “the question therefore, is whether the Petitioner behaved in such a way that he could not be reasonably expected to live with her. Behaviour of a party, which would lead to this conclusion would range over a wide variety of acts. It may consist of one act if of sufficient gravity or of a persistent course of conduct or of a series of acts of differing kinds none of which by itself may justify a conclusion that the person seeking the divorce cannot reasonably be expected to live with the spouse, but the cumulative effect of all would do so.” Whether or not the Petitioner cannot be reasonably expected to live with the Respondent is a question of fact for the court to decide. In Mensah v. Mensa [1972] 2 G. L. R 198 the court stated that: “In determining whether a husband has behaved in such a way as to make it unreasonable to expect a wife to live with him the court must consider all circumstances constituting such behaviour including the history of the marriage. It is always a question of fact”. It is trite that any claim not traversed is admitted. See the case of Fori v. Ayirebi (1966) GLR 627 SC. The court therefore finds the claim of the Petitioner that the Respondent reneged on his promise to help her join him in Sweden to be true because he did not deny this. Respondent again did not deny the assertion that another woman who is not his wife lives 4 | P a g e with him abroad. The respondent once again, did not deny that after the marriage, the only time he visited Ghana after the marriage was contracted was when the two families met to dissolve the customary marriage of the parties. The only claim he sought to rebut was the claim that he maintained the Petitioner with GH₵2,000.00 instead of the GH₵300.00 she claimed. It is the court’s view that by refusing to assist the Petitioner join him in Sweden, and by his further refusal to visit the Petitioner in Ghana he behaved unreasonably. Can the marriage be dissolved based on the fact of unreasonable behaviour? In the court’s opinion, the answer is in the negative. This is due to the fact that the party pleading this fact must find it intolerable to live with the other party due to the alleged stated behaviour or misbehaviour. In this case, the parties have not lived together as husband and wife for more than two weeks after the marriage was celebrated. This court therefore finds and holds that the marriage between the parties has broken down beyond reconciliation based on section 1(2)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367) which provides that the parties to the marriage should have not lived as husband and wife for a continuous period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition and the respondent consents to the grant of a decree of divorce provided that the consent shall not be unreasonably withheld and where the court is satisfied that it has been withheld the court may grant a petition for divorce under this paragraph despite the refusal. In the case of Kotei v. Kotei [1974] 2 GLR 172, Sarkodee J. held as follows; “The sole ground for granting a petition for divorce is that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. But the petitioner is also obliged to comply with section 2(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1971 (Act 367), which requires him to establish that at least one of the grounds set out in that section… proving one of the provisions without more is proof of the breakdown of the marriage beyond reconciliation… It is accepted that proof of one or more of the facts set out in section 2(1) is essential, and 5 | P a g e that proof of one of them shows that the marriage has broken down beyond reconciliation. It is also conceded, that notwithstanding proof, the court can refuse to grant the decree of dissolution on the ground that the marriage has not broken down beyond reconciliation. It will be noted that the discretion given to the court is not a discretion to grant but to refuse a decree of dissolution, this means that once facts are proved bringing the case within any of the facts set out in section 2(1) of Act 367, a decree of dissolution should be pronounced unless the court thinks otherwise. In other words, the burden is not on the petitioner to show that special grounds exist justifying the exercise of the court’s power.” (Emphasis mine). The parties who were married in the year 2019 have lived together for two weeks only. The Petition having been filed in 2024 puts the parties squarely under section 1(2)(d) of the Matrimonial Causes Act. The court is satisfied that the Respondent consents to the dissolution of the marriage due to his cross-petition which asks the court to dissolve this marriage. The court hereby decrees that the ordinance marriage celebrated between the parties on 24th September 2019 is dissolved today the 4th day of June, 2025 forthwith. (SGD) H/W YVONNE NELLY AMA ADJADI MAGISTRATE 6 | P a g e