Republic Vrs Edina Traditional Council- Ex-Parte; Yahaya and Another (E10/01/2024) [2024] GHAHC 46 (22 April 2024)

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUCICATURE, IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, HELD IN CAPE COAST ON 22ND APRIL, 2024, BEFORE HIS LORDSHIP JUSTICE JOHN-MARK NUKU ALIFO “J” IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW ORDER 55 SUIT NO. E10/01/2024 RULE 1& OF C.I 47 -AND- AND IN THE MATTER OF THE REPUBLIC VRS. THE EDINA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL - RESPONDENT EX-PARTE; SARKI SALIHU YAHAYA & ALHAJI IBRAHIM YAHAYA - APPLICANTS MUSA DAWDA & MUSTAPHA MAAMAH - INTERESTED PARTIES RULING The eminent Jurist N.A. Ollennu in his work on “Chieftaincy under the law” published in Essays in Ghanaian Law page 52 described chieftaincy in such hallowed and respected terms as follows: “Chieftaincy is an ancient institution, the centre of rich culture, an object of awe and reverence as the active possessor of state power and possessor of the spirit of the ancestors of the state.” 1 It is however sad to observe that this sacred institution has by acts of commission and omission by its own principal actors brought the said institution into some disrepute. There is therefore the need to restore the past glory and dignity of the chieftaincy institution. See Republic Vrs. Central Regional House of Chiefs, National House of Chiefs, Chieftaincy Secretariat; Ex-parte Nana Ehunubobrim Idun Gyan IX Vrs. Nana Idanandoh X (A.KA. Albert Gabby Taylor) (2013) 66 GMJ 1 SC. The Applicant has invoked the Supervisory Jurisdiction of the High Court praying for prerogative writs of A. CERTIORARI to quash: i. The letter of the Respondent dated 18th day of August 2022, to the effect that the 1st interested party is the substantive chief of the Zongo Community of Elmina. ii. The purported installation and swearing of the 1st interested party as the Elmina Zongo Chief by the Respondent; and iii. All proceedings that have taken place in the Judicial Committee of the Edina Traditional Council in respect of Suit No. ETC/1/2022 and titled ABUSUAPANYIN MUSTAPHA MAAMAH & ANOR VRS. ALHAJI IBRAHIM YAHAYA alias DR. YAHAYA & ANOR right form issuing the writ of summons all the way to the hearing notice issued on the 3rd day of July, 2023. B. PROHIBITION to restrain the Respondent from continuing to hear Suit No. ETC/1/2022 and titled ABUSUAPANYIN MUSTAPHA MAAMAH & ANOR VRS. ALHAJI IBRAHIM YAHAYA alias DR. YAHAYA & ANOR. SCOPE OF THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURT. 2 Article 141 of the Constitution 1992 provides: “The High Court shall have supervisory jurisdiction over all lower Court and any lower adjudicating authority and may, in the exercise of that supervisory jurisdiction, issue orders and directions for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory jurisdiction.” Section 16 of the Court Act, 1993 (Act 459) provides also provides: “The High Court shall supervisory jurisdiction over all lower Courts and any lower adjudicating authority, and may, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, issue orders and directions including orders in the nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto for the purpose of enforcing or securing the enforcement of its supervisory powers.” The term “Lower Courts” has been defined in the Courts (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 620), section 39 (d) to include; The National House of Chiefs, Regional House of Chiefs, and every Traditional Council, in respect of the jurisdiction of any such House or Council to adjudicate over any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy”. Order of prohibition or certiorari are means for ensuring that the machinery of public administration works properly and that justice is done. In the case of Republic Vrs. Korle Gonno District Magistrate Grade I; Ex parte; Ampomah (1991) GLR 535 SC, it was held that an applicant for orders of certiorari or prohibition need to show that some personal legal right of his was at stake. All questions and doubts about the principles of judicial review were effectively answered and set to rest in the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Republic Vrs. High Court, Accra; Ex-parte Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (Addo Interested Party) (2003-2004) 1 SCGLR 312; known as (Ex parte CHRAJ case). In the case of Republic Vrs. Fast Track High Court, Accra; Ex-parte Electoral Commission (Mettle Nunoo and Others Interested Parties) (2005-2006) SCGLR 514, 3 the Supreme Court held that the intervention powers of the Court are to be used to prevent plain illegality or injustice and also to ensure fairness. What is important is that there is some legal or constitutional basis for the action. Therefore, to succeed in an application for an order of Certiorari, the Applicant must establish at least one of the following grounds. 1. Breach of Natural Justice, which has two legs; a. The requirement of fair hearing and the right to be heard before a Court; Republic Vrs. High Court, Accra; Ex-parte Salloum (Senyo-Coker- Interested Party) (2011) 1 SCGLR 574. b. The rule against bias. See Republic v High Court, Denu, Ex parte Agbesi Awusu II (No. 1) Nyonyo Agboada Sri III Interested Party) (2003-2004) 2 SCGLR 864. If any of these grounds are breached, the applicant may be granted an order of certiorari. 2. Excess or lack of jurisdiction; a Court or tribunal or administrative body that improperly assumes jurisdiction over a matter can be supervised by an order of certiorari. See Republic Vrs. High Court, Accra; Ex-parte Asakum Engineering and Construction Ltd & Others (1993-94) 2 GLR 643. 4 3. Patent or fundamental error on the face of the record. See Republic v High Court (Commercial division) Accra; Ex-parte the Trust Bank Ltd (Ampomah Photo Lab. Ltd & Three Others (Interested Parties) (2009) SCGLR 164. 4. Wednesbury Principles of unreasonable. The Court in making that decision; i. Must have taken into account factors that ought not to have been taken into account; or ii. Failed to take account of factors that ought to have been taken account into account; or iii. The decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person would ever consider imposing it. It is trite law that for the purposes of lower courts which includes Traditional Councils as stated above in this judgment, the principle is that where the court makes an error of law patent on the face of the record in in such a way as to make the decision a nullity, the decision is amenable to judicial review, in this case Certiorari will be used to correct the error, by removing it and quashing it. In the case of Republic Vrs. Court of Appeal, Accra; Ex-parte Tsatsu Tsikata (2005- 2006) 612, the Supreme Court explained the type of error that will attract the use of judicial review at page 619 as follows: “The clear thinking of this Court is that our supervisory jurisdiction under Article 132 of the 1992 Constitution should be exercised only in those manifestly plain and obvious cases, where there are patent errors of law on the face of the record, which errors either go to jurisdiction or are plain as to make the impugned decision a complete nullity. It stands to reason then, that the error(s) of law alleged must be fundamental, substantial, material, grave or so serious that it goes to the root of the matter. 5 The established rules in the application of Certiorari regarding error of law apparent on the face of the record were summed up as follows in Republic Vrs. Court of Appeal; Ex-Parte Bediako IV (1994-95) GBR 566 in holding (1): “Certiorari would issue to quash the record of an inferior tribunal for error or law apparent on the face of the record where such inferior tribunal had acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or had abused its powers.” FACTS OF THE CASE The 1st Applicant, Sarki Salihu Yahaya deposed to the affidavit and states that he was duly nominated, selected, turbanned and unveiled leader of Elmina Zongo Community, widely known as ‘Sarkin Zongo’ of Elmina in the Islamic parlance on 14th day of August 2022. That a letter from the National Council of Zongo recognizing him as the ‘Sarkin Zongo’ of Elmina is also annexed to this affidavit in support and marked as exhibit SSY-03. Also, the 1st Applicant states that the National Council of Zongo Chiefs is an incorporated company in Ghana Limited by guarantee. The 1st Applicant attached exhibits SSY-02 Series to that effect. According to the 1st Applicant, he was taken through the required Islamic rituals of turbanning and subsequently unveiled as ‘Sarkin Zongo’ by the elders and Imams of Elmina Zongo at an official gathering of all relevant stakeholders with the leadership of National Council of Zongo Chiefs in attendance. It is the case of the 1st Applicant that he had been duly recognized as the ‘Sarkin Zongo’ of Elmina by the National Council of Zongo Chiefs, an umbrella body all leaders of Zongo Communities of Ghana. 1st Applicant states in paragraph 13 of his affidavit in support that all leaders of various Islamic groups and tribes in the Zongo communities are members of the Council of Zongo Chiefs. The interested parties unhappy about the 1st Applicant’s status as ‘Sarkin Zongo’ of Elmina brought an action against the 1st and 2nd Applicants at the Judicial Committee of the Edina Traditional Council on 22nd day of 6 September, 2022. The 1st Applicant further avers that the Paramount Chief of Edina Traditional wrote him a letter stating that the 1st interested party is the substantive chief of Elmina Zongo Community. The letter is attached to the affidavit in support as exhibit SSY-05. It is further the contention of the 1st Applicant that the leadership of the Zongo Community is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy and cannot be the subject of proceedings at the Judicial Committee of the Edina Traditional Council. The 1st Applicant is of the view that the Respondent is not clothed with jurisdiction to determine who the substantive leader of Elmina Zongo Community is, since the leadership of the Zongo Community is not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. The 1st Applicant finally depose that since the leadership of the Zongo Community is cause or matter affecting chieftaincy, the purported installation and swearing of the 1st interested party by the Respondent and the subsequent letter by the Respondent is null and void and it is a clear case in which the Honourable Court can exercise its discretion to quash by way of certiorari and prohibit the 1st interested party from holding himself up as the chief of Elmina Zongo. CASE OF RESPONDENT AND INSTERESTED PARTIES It is obvious from the depositions in the affidavits in opposition the Respondent and the Interested Parties that their case are aligned and woven as a beautiful tapestry telling the same story that the Chief of Edina Aisa community is not just a leadership position but a chieftaincy position a preserve of the Dawda Family of Elmina through patrilineal inheritance. The Respondent and the Interested Parties denied all the averments stated in the affidavit in support and avers that the 1st interested party is the legitimately installed ‘Sakiri’ of the Edna Aisa community hailing through the royal lineage of Musa Dawda, the 1st Chief of Edina Aisa community and a member of the Dawda Family of Elmina Zongo. 7 The Respondent and the Interested Parties aver that the Chief of Edina Aisa Community is not a leadership position available to all members in the community but the preserve of the Dawda Family of Elmina through patrilineal inheritance. The Respondent and the Interested Parties further say that by custom and tradition of the people of Edina Aisa community upon the death of the 1st Chief, Musa Dawda I, he was succeeded by his son Abubakar Dawda as Sarkin Abubakar Dawda I. Upon the death of Sarkin Abubakar Dawda he was also succeeded by his son Ahmed Dawda as Sarki (Ahmed) Dawda II. Also upon the death of Sarki Ahmed II he was succeeded by his son Amadu as Sarki (Amadu) Dawda III. Sarki Amadu III was succeeded by the 1st interested party Sarkin (Musa) Dawda IV. The Respondent and the Interested Parties went on further to state that per the custom and tradition of the Edina Aisa Community, the Chief of the community is not just a tribal chief or leader of a community but enskinned by hereditary and that the position of the Sarki of Edina Aisa is a chieftaincy position recognized and assimilated into the Edina Traditions and customs. According to the Respondent, classification of chiefs is by law not limited to recognition by the National House of Chiefs and by the revered tradition and customs of Elmina, the position of the Sarki of Edina Aisa is not just any tribal chief but an inherited position which had been the preserve of the Dawda family of Elmina since time immemorial. The Respondent and the Interested Parties further contend that the Sirki of Edina Aisa community is a chieftaincy position and that the Judicial Committee of the Edina Traditional Council has jurisdiction to entertain same. In view of this, the Respondent and the Interested Parties state that the instant application is premature as the Edina Traditional Council is clothed with jurisdiction to determine whether or not per the custom and practice of the people of Edina Aisa, the position of Sirki of Edina Aisa Community is by inheritance and thus chieftaincy position or just a 8 leader selected among the membership of the community as alleged by the Applicants. I am of the considered view that the facts in the instant case are simple and it admits of no controversy. LEGAL ANALYSIS AND COURT OPINION Before I will resolve the matter to its finality, I need to discuss the intricacies of who a Chief is under the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) and relate same to the facts and decided cases to determine whether the Applicants pray is worthy of being upheld. DEFINITION OF A CHIEF Article 277 of the Constitution 1992, defines a ‘Chief’ as: “A person who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a Chief or queen mother in accordance with relevant customary law and usage.” In addition, the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) also repeats verbatim the said definition of a ‘Chief’ in section 57(1) thereof. It follows therefore from the definition above that for person to qualify as a chief, these essential ingredients and pre- requisites must be present. Firstly, the person must qualify to be a Chief. In that, he or she must hail from the appropriate lineage. In other words, to qualify to be a Chief, you must be royal to start with. Secondly, the person must have been nominated as a Chief. Thirdly, the person must have elected or selected as a Chief and finally, the person must have been taken through the ceremony of enstoolment, enskinment or installation as a Chief according to the relevant customary practices. See In the Matter of Atta Yeboa-Kodie Asare II (Yonsohene & Benkumhene of Jamase) Vrs. Nana Kwaku 9 Addai (Bedomase Bretuo Abusuapanyin of Yonso) (2014) 79 GMJ 1 SC, Per Dotse JSC. In, In re Wenchi Stool Affairs; Nketia & Others Vrs. Sramangyedua III & Others (2011) 2 SCGLR 1024, the Supreme per Brobbey JSC held stated: “Article 277 of the Constitution 1992 underscores the requisites to be satisfied when considering the making of a chief. They are simply, nomination, election/selection, enstoolment/enkinsment and installation”. According to the learned jurist, the satisfaction of these requirements should be in accordance with the peculiar customs and usages of the people in the area for whom the chief is being considered. This applies, of course, to areas where nomination is an essential requirement before settling on a person to be considered as a chief. Essentially, nomination boils down to naming or declaring a person who according to Brobbey JSC, “…is considered by the queen mother as the rightful person to be made a chief”. Section 58 of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759) provides categories of Chiefs in the country as follows: a. The Asantehene and Paramount Chiefs; b. Divisional Chiefs; c. Sub-divisional Chiefs; d. Adikrofo and; e. Other Chiefs recognized by the National House of Chiefs. Justice S. A. Brobbey gave the meaning of Adikrofo. He wrote at pages 50-51 of his book, ‘The Law of Chieftaincy in Ghana’ as follows: “Below the sub-divisional Chiefs are Adikrofo. ‘Adikrofo’ is alleged to have originated from the concept of getting a caretaker to oversee the lands and properties of the divisional chiefs.” See also Nana Obengakrofi Vrs. Nana Asante Ampadu (2013) 67 GMJ 189 CA, Per Mariama Owusu J.A (as she then was). 10 The High Court has no jurisdiction in a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy. It is trite learning that it is only in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court conferred by Article 141 of the 1992 Constitution and Section 16 of the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459) (as amended) over all lower courts and any lower adjudicating authority like the Judicial Committees of the Traditional Council, Regional and National Houses of Chiefs that the High Court can have jurisdiction over Chieftaincy matters. Section 57 of Act 459 provides as follows: “Subject to the Constitution, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, a Regional Tribunal, a Circuit Court and a District Court shall not entertain either at first instance or on appeal a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.” See the Case of In Re Nungua Chieftaincy Affairs, Odai Ayiku IV Vrs. Attorney General (Borketey Laweh XIV Applicant (2010) SCGLR 413 at 416, where the apex Court speaking through ANSAH JSC, held that, “It required no authority to be cited in support of the preposition that the High Court, Regional Tribunal, Circuit Courts and District Courts lacked jurisdiction to try a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy”. Article 273 and 274 of the Constitution of Ghana, 1992 confers original jurisdiction in any “cause or matter affecting chieftaincy” in the various Judicial Committees of the Houses of Chiefs, but reserves the final appeal from decisions of the Judicial Committees of the National House of Chiefs to the Supreme Court. See the case of Republic V. Conduah: Ex Parte AABA substituted by Asmah (2013-2014) SCGLR 1032. Akamba JSC. This case re-echoes the fact that the High Court has no jurisdiction in chieftaincy matter. In its ruling, the Supreme Court held that the result of the ruling of the High Court Cape Cost granting the injunction was to breach the Constitutional provisions in articles 273 (1) and 274, granting original jurisdiction in causes and matters affecting 11 chieftaincy to the Judicial Committees of the Houses of Chiefs. The Court held that the High Court Cape Coast could not pretend to be ignorant of these very fundamental limitations to its jurisdiction. It could equally not feign ignorance of the fact that the application before it related to cause or matter affecting chieftaincy in view of the depositions in the supporting affidavits quoted above admitting this before the Court. In the case of Nana Agyare Bofour IV Vrs. Joseph Adade Mensah & 3 Ors (2020) Unreported SC, Chieftaincy Appeal No. J2/01/2020 (11th November 2020), Doste JSC made a profound statement of Chieftaincy as follows: “Article 270 of the Constitution 1992 guarantees and preserves the institution of chieftaincy as established under customary law and usage and protects it from any control such a recognition of a chief, by any organ of state or individual”. The issue in the instant application is whether or not the 1st interested party’s installation by the Respondent as Sarki of the Edina Aisa and the purported letter to that effect can be quashed by certiorari the 1st interested prohibited from holding himself as the chief in the Elmina Zongo or Aisa Community. In this application the Elmina Zongo Chief`s title has been referred to by all parties as “Sariki”, “Sarkin”, “Sarki” and “Sirki”. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE From the evidence before the court, the applicant went through a valid nomination, selection, turbaned and unveiled by the leadership of Elmina Zongo Community widely known as ‘Sarkin Zongo’. The 1st Applicant exhibited the said ceremony to his affidavit as exhibits SSY-01 Series. The National Council of Zongo Chiefs who installed the 1st Applicant is 12 registered under the laws of Ghana. This is evidenced to his affidavit as exhibit SSY- 02 Series. The 1st Applicant has been duly acknowledged and recognized as Sarkin Zongo of Elmina. Again, the affidavit evidence reveals that the National House of Chiefs does not recognize tribal chiefs. This is evidenced in the 1st Applicant’s affidavit in support and is labelled as exhibits SS-07, which letter was addressed to the 2nd Applicant when he sought to caveat the registration of the 1st Interested party into the Register of the National House of Chiefs. The Respondent and the Interested Parties failed to refute these assertions. I would like to reproduce the content of exhibit SS-07 as follows: “Re: Letter of Caveat: Registration of Sariki Musa Dawuda IV into the Register of the National House of Chiefs- I acknowledge receipt of your (sic) with no date on the above subject matter and hereby wish to inform you that the National House of Chiefs does not recognize tribal chiefs of which the Sariki falls under as such has no intention of registering anybody under that title” . The Respondent and 1st Interested Party however, merely denied this assertion and stated in paragraph 10 of their affidavit in opposition as follows: “That in response to paragraph 19 of the affidavit in support of the application, I am advised by the lawyer for the traditional council and verily believe same to be true that the classification chiefs is by law not limited to recognition by the National House of Chief’s and that by the revered traditions and custom of Edina Oman, the position of the Sariki of Edina Aisa is not just any tribal chief but an inherited 13 position which has been the preserve of the Dawda family of Elmina since time immemorial.” The Interested Parties also merely denied this assertion and stated also in paragraph 10 of their affidavit in opposition as follows: “That in response to paragraph 19 of the affidavit in support of the application, we are advised by the lawyer and verily believe same to be true that the classification chiefs is by law not limited to recognition by the National House of Chief’s and that by the custom the position of the Sirki of Edina Aisa is not just any tribal chief but an inherited position which has been the preserve of the Dawda family of Elmina since time immemorial.” These denials in my opinion is not convincing because the Act 759 has clearly stated in section 58(e) that other chiefs not mentioned expressly should be recognized by the National House of Chiefs. It is only the recognition of such “omitted” by the National House of Chiefs that give them legal status as Chiefs under Act 759 and not more. The 1st Interested party attached as exhibit SS-07, which is the official letter from the National House of Chiefs. It was written to the 2nd Applicant on 23rd March, 2023 issued on 8th November 2022. It categorically denied the recognition of the 1st interested party’s chiefly status. It categorized the Sariki as a tribal chief that is not recognized by the National House of Chiefs and will not register anybody with such title in the Register of Chiefs of Ghana under Act 759. The letter is on the letterhead of National House of Chiefs and had its logo. It is therefore presumed to be genuine and authentic under sections 148 and 162 of NRCD 323. It is also an official document and therefore presumed to have been properly done under section 37 of NRCD 323. 14 See: JOHN DRAMANI MAHAMA v ELECTORAL COMMISSION AND NANA ADDO-DANKWA AKUFO-ADDO [2021] 171 GMJ 473 SC BROBBEY & OTHERS v KWAKU [1995-96] 1 GLR 125 SC. Exhibit SS-07 therefore raises a presumption of regularity in favour of the Applicants against the Respondent and the Interested Parties to the extent that they claim the 1st Interested Party is the subsisting Sariki (Chief) of Elmina Zongo Community as per exhibit SSY-05, addressed to the Elmina Police Command. It therefore imposes a burden against the party on whom it operates, in this case the Respondent and the Interested Parties, to produce evidence and the burden of persuasion to rebut the authenticity or legality of Exhibit SS-07 under section 20 of NRCD 323. However, the Respondent and the Interested Parties, failed miserably to do this in this case and only sought to trivialize the statutory provision in Section 58(e) of Act 759 and to water it down by alleging a prevailing custom in Elmina, which for them supersedes the statutory provision. See: Mary Akyaa Boakye (Substituted by Yaw Boakye Adjei) Vrs. The Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of Ghana & 3 Others Civil Appeal No J4/14/2021, Dated 31st March 2021, SC. The National House of Chiefs is a creature of statute, the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759). The Act in Section 58 (e) is clear. Therefore, the act of Respondent and the Interested Parties, to nominate a chief not recognized by the National House of Chiefs is a clear error which breaches an Act of Parliament. In Republic Vrs. High Court, Accra; Ex-Parte National Lottery Authority (2009) SCGLR 390, the applicant prayed the Supreme Court to quash a decision of the High Court on ground of error of law in that the trial judge granted an order of interlocutory injunction which had the effect of allowing the Appellants to carry on lotto business in violation of provisions of the National Lottery Act, 2006 (Act 722). The Supreme Court unanimously quashed the order of the High Court. In two 15 powerful opinions Atuguba and Date-Bah, JJSC declared the law in very definite terms. At page 397 of the Report, Atuguba JSC said as follows: “It is communis opinion among lawyers that the courts are servants of the legislature. Consequently, any act of a Court that is contrary to a statute such as Act 722…is unless expressly or impliedly provided, is nullity.” Then at page 405 of the Report, Dr. Date-Bah JSC added that: “I agree that the order made on 1st April, 2009 by his Lordship Asante J granting the interested parties an Interlocutory Injunction pending an appeal should be brought to this court and be quashed. The learned judge acted in obvious excess of his jurisdiction. No judge has authority to grant immunity to party from the consequences of breaching an Act of Parliament. But that is the effect of the order by the learned judge. The judicial oath enjoins judge to uphold the law, rather than condoning breaches of Acts of Parliament by their orders. The end of the judicial oath set out in the Second Schedule of the 1992 Constitution is as follows: ‘I will at all times uphold, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Ghana.’ This oath is surely inconsistent with any judicial order that permits the infringement of an Act of Parliament.” By these authorities, I will not hesitate to say that the 1st interested party’s pronouncement as Sariki was without jurisdiction. This is because the Respondent could not discredit the letter dated 23rd March, 2023 (exhibit SS-07) from the National House of Chiefs. As stated above in this Judgment, acts performed by the National House are presumed to be true and official because they derive their authority from statute. Instead of the interested party make a strong case against the letter from the National House of Chiefs, they rather made a very simple assertion in paragraph 10 of their affidavits in opposition that: “…the classification of chiefs is by law not limited to the recognition by the National House of Chiefs….”. I dare ask which law are they talking about, in the legal system of Ghana? 16 With all due to respect to learned Counsel, this argument is misplaced and flies in the face of an Act of Parliament. Whether or not the position of Sariki Zongo of Edina Asia community is a mere leadership position of a chieftaincy position cannot be determined by affidavit evidence but must be interrogated by ascertained the custom, traditions and practices of the people of Edina Aisa in particular and Elmina in general and the Edina Traditional Council is the forum for such determination not this Court as it is deemed as a cause of matter affecting chieftaincy. Articles 273 (1) and 274 of the 1992 Constitution grants original jurisdiction in causes and matters affecting chieftaincy to the Judicial Committees of the Houses of Chiefs. From my rendition above it is established that the act of Respondent constitutes an error of law patent on the face of record amounting lack of jurisdiction when it wrote the letter of 18th August, 2022 announcing to the whole world that the 1st Interested Party is the substantive chief of Zongo Community of Elmina, in breach of the statutory provision of section 58(e) of Act 759. This Court would exercise its supervisory powers and grant the Applicant`s Application only in part by bring forth and hereby accordingly quash the letter of the Respondent dated 18th August, 2022 (exhibit SSY-05) as it had no jurisdiction to pronounce any person as a Chief in breach the provisions of the Chieftaincy Act, 2008 (Act 759). I shall not grant the order of certiorari to quash the purported installation and swearing of the 1st Interested Party as the Elmina Zongo Chief because who is a Chief within the provision of Act 759 and the determination of whether the 1st Applicant or the 1st Interested Party is a Chief properly so called lies at the door step of the Respondent not this Court which has no jurisdiction over chieftaincy matters. 17 The Respondent’s lofty discussion in respect of the meaning of cause or matter affecting chieftaincy in his statement of cause with great deference to Learned Counsel is needless, as it has no bearing on the case before this Court and would lead us into the temptation of entering into the restricted garden and to eat the forbidden tree of chieftaincy. I am of the view the issue whether or not the position of Sariki Zongo is just a leadership position or a chieftaincy position within the context of the legal frame work of Ghana is a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy that must be determined by the Respondent therefore the suit pending at the Judicial Committee of the Edina Traditional Council is appropriate and ought to stand and not quashed. Flowing form the above the application for an order of prohibition to restrain the Respondent from hearing the case of Suit No. ETC/1/2022 and titled ABUSUAPANYIN MUSTAPHA MAAMAH & ANOR VRS. ALHAJI IBRAHIM YAHAYA alias DR. YAHAYA & ANOR is accordingly refused as Respondent has jurisdiction to determine cause or matters affecting chieftaincy. (SGD) JOHN-MARK NUKU ALIFO “J” (JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT) COUNSEL: RAPHEAL B.K. ABOAGYE ESQ. FOR APPLICANTS DR. KWADWO ADDO TUFFOUR ESQ. FOR RESPONDENT DANIEL ARTHUR ESQ. FOR INTERESTED PARTIES 18