Registered Trustees Of The Church Of Christ and Another Vrs Essilfie and Another [2022] GHAHC 88 (16 November 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT HELD IN CAPE COAST ON WEDNESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2022, BEFORE HER LADYSHIP MALIKE AWO WOANYAH DEY (HIGH COURT JUDGE) SUIT NO:E12/16/2021 1. THE REGISTERED TRUSTEES OF THE ----------------- PLAINTIFFS CHURCH OF CHRIST 2. THE HEAD PASTOR CHURCH OF CHRIST VS. 1. YAW ESSILFIE MARTIN ------------------- 1ST DEFENDANT 2. KWAME KWAMIN ------------------- 2ND DEFENDANT PLAINTIFF PRESENT DEFENDANTS PRESENT GUSTAV ADDINGTON FOR THE PLAINTIFFS 1SAAC AGGREY FYNN FOR THE DEFENDANTS JUDGMENT The plaintiffs herein issued a writ of summons and statement of claim on 27th October 2020, claiming the following reliefs against the defendants; 1. A declaration that the judgements obtained by the defendants in the cases of Efia Kobi v the Church of Christ E1/13/2007; Yaw Essilfie vs The Elder Church of Christ Rent Office and Yaw Essilfie Martin and Another v Church of Christ E2/3/2018 against the plaintiff church were procured by fraud. 2. An order of the court to set aside the said judgments. 3. An order staying execution of all the judgments mentioned in the cases aforementioned. 4. An order of Perpetual Injunction to restrain the defendants or any member of their family or any person or persons lawfully claiming through them from having anything to do with the building that serves as the plaintiff's church building which is located at Kotokuraba in Cape Coast and bounded by the properties of Mr Ayi Acquah, Aunty Baby and the Commercial Street. PLAINTIFF’S CASE Per the attached statement of claim, the 1st plaintiff is a registered entity under the laws of Ghana with its headquarters in Accra, whilst the 2nd plaintiff is the head pastor of a branch of the said church in Cape Coast. The defendants are ordinarily resident at Assin Kwaataa near Assin Fosu and are members of the family of Opanyin Stephen Kweku GYEWU, deceased. The plaintiffs allege that sometime in 1967, the defendants' ancestor or predecessor, who was resident in Cape Coast, fell into debt, as a result of which his building at Coronation street was to be sold by order of the court. Therefore, the said Opanyin Kodwo Owuo approached the head pastor of the plaintiff church, specifically Prophet John Mensah, deceased, for financial assistance, which he gave though the debt was more than the land itself. They entered into an agreement which was registered with the Lands Commission at the time. When Opanyin Kodwo Owuo died, he was succeeded by Opanyin S. K Gyewu. When Opanyin S. K Gyewu got to know about the sale of the land and building to the church, he surreptitiously went to the Lands Department and managed to remove the original document and, without the consent of the plaintiff's board re-entered into a new agreement with some members of the church who were not aware of the history of the building. The said SK Gyewu also sold the same premises to one William Imbrah of Cape Coast; thus, the plaintiffs’ church instituted an action against him, and the said Imbrah with the suit entitled Church of Christ Vs Opanyin S. K Gyewu and William Fiifi Imbrah. When the act of fraud dawned on the said Imbrah, he withdrew from the case, and SK Gyewu was found liable, and amongst other things, he was ordered by the court to return the original documents to the Lands Department. He refused and rather paraded himself as the owner of the building with the church as his tenant. In October 2001, the family of S. K Gyewu met with representatives of the plaintiff church in Cape Coast to discuss matters relating to the disputed building, and all the fraudulent acts of the said Gyewu came to light. In 2007 S. K Gyewu instituted an action against the church at the Cape Coast High Court per the title SK Gyewu vs the Church of Pentecost suit No. E1/13/2007 for a number of reliefs, amongst which was for a declaration that the disputed property belonged to his family and before the commencement of the trial of the suit, he died and was substituted by his sister, Afua Kobi. Thus the title of the case was altered to read as AFUA Kobi Vs The Church of Christ. The plaintiffs allege that sometime in 2005, Efua Kobi settled the case with the church and agreed that the plaintiff church should put up a three-bedroom house for Efua Kobi and her family at Assin Kwaataa. That compensation of c25000000 was to be paid to Efua Kobi and her family. According to the plaintiffs, the said agreement was reduced into writing and executed by the parties; thus, the defendants are estopped from contending that the matter was not resolved in favour of the plaintiff's church. Subsequently, the plaintiff church put up a three-bedroom house for the family as agreed and also paid the sum of C25000000 plus C10,000000 into court to cater for the delay. However, the defendants took advantage of the death of Efua Kobi and the absence of plaintiffs' counsel to obtain judgment which judgments are tainted with fraud. The grounds of fraud were particularised as follows; a) Deliberately misleading the court into believing that the plaintiff church is still a tenant of the family of Opanyin S. K Gyewu and b) Deliberately clouding the eyes of the court into believing that the plaintiff church was still indebted to the family of Opanyin S. K Gyewu. DEFENDANT’S CASE In their joint statement of defence filed through their lawyer, the defendants denied almost all the plaintiffs' averments and dared the plaintiffs to produce any order directing S. K Gyewu to return any document to the Lands Commission. They also averred that SK. Gyewu only leased portions of the land in front of the premises to the said William Fiifi Imbrah, and when the plaintiff instituted the action, they abandoned it when they realised that S. K Gyewu had the right to lease out the land. They also dared the plaintiffs to produce any meetings they had with the defendants' predecessors and stated that the defendants regarded the plaintiff church as their tenants because they were paying rent to S. K Gyewu. They denied that SK Gyewu initiated an action in court in 2007 because he died in 2005, and a dead person cannot initiate an action in court. They asserted that the matters averred to by the plaintiff in paragraphs 14, 15, 16 and 17 of the statement of claim became a subject matter in the substantive case titled Efua Kobi vs the church of Christ with Suit No E1/ 13/2007. They asserted further that the terms of settlement were in respect of rent arrears due to the defendants' family in respect of the building occupied by the plaintiffs on the defendants' land for its activities. They further asserted that the recent judgment obtained by the defendants was in respect of an order directed at the plaintiff to pay GHC58 800 as rent due and interest thereof and recovery of possession of the rented premises for non-payment of rent. In the judgement of Efua Kobi vs The Church of Christ, the court held that the land was leased to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs did not appeal against the judgment. Thus the plaintiffs are estopped by litigating the same matter with the defendants. They denied that the two judgments were obtained by fraud. Thus, the court should dismiss the action. At the close of pleadings, the two issues filed by counsel for the plaintiffs were adopted for trial. They are; 1. Whether or not the judgments the subject matter of the suit were procured by fraud 2. Whether or not the defendants and their predecessors misled the trial courts. BURDEN OF PROOF Before I proceed, the preliminary points to be stated include who bears the burden of proof and what degree of proof is required from the parties to resolve the controversy at stake. On the general burden of proof, the Supreme Court held in Bank of West Africa vs Ackun [1963] 1 GLR 176 SC that the onus of proof in civil cases depends upon the pleadings. The party who, in his pleadings, raises an issue essential to the success of his case assumes the burden of proof. The burden would shift to the other party when a prima facie case had been established. The test as to which party bore the burden of proof on any allegation is: Which party would fail if the allegation in question were struck out of the pleading? Section 12 of the Evidence Act states as follows; 1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of persuasion requires proof by a preponderance of the probabilities. (2) "Preponderance of the probabilities" means that degree of certainty of belief in the mind of the tribunal of fact or the Court by which it is convinced that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence. In the case of GIHOC Refrigeration and Household Products Ltd v. Hanna Assi [2005 2006] SCGLR 458, it was stated that “since the enactment of NRCD 323, therefore, except otherwise specified by statute, the standard of proof (the burden of persuasion) in all civil matters is by a preponderance of the probabilities based on a determination of whether or not the party with the burden of producing evidence on the issue has, on all the evidence, satisfied the Judge of the probable existence of the fact in issue." In the case of Faibi v. State Hotels Ltd. [1968] GLR 471, it was held as follows; “Onus lay upon the party who would lose if no evidence was led in the case; and where some evidence had been led it lay on the party who would lose if no further evidence was led.” Nevertheless, a higher standard of proof is required where criminal conduct such as fraud is alleged in a civil suit. That is an exception to the general rule. Thus where a party alleges any criminal conduct, such as fraud or forgery, against another party, he shall be required to prove the allegation of criminal conduct to the standard burden of proof in criminal matters, which is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of the civil aspect, he shall prove same by a preponderance of the probabilities. See the case of SASU BAMFO V SIMTIM [2012] 1 SCGLR 136 and section 13 of the Evidence Act, 1975 NRCD 323. In Dzotefe vs Harhormene [1987-88] 2GLR 681, the Supreme Court, through Ampiah JA. as he then was stated; “The settled practice of the court is that the proper method of impeaching a completed judgment on the ground of fraud is by action in which the particulars of fraud must be exactly given and the allegation established by strict proof.” It must be stated that the courts take a serious view of an allegation of fraud, and as observed in the case of Brutuw vs Aferiba, "the alleagata probanda must establish facts which amount to fraud and constitute it. Also, section 13(1) of the Evidence Act, 1975 (Act 323) provides that in any civil or criminal action, the burden of persuasion as to the commission by a party of a crime which is directly in issue requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. See also section 15 (1) of the same Act. Thus since the plaintiff has alleged fraud, he ought to prove same beyond reasonable doubt. In Ackah v. Pergah Transport Ltd [2010] SCGLR 728, it was held that the various methods of producing evidence include the testimonies of the party and material witnesses, admissible hearsay, documentary, and other things often described as real evidence without which the party might not succeed to establish the requisite degree of credibility concerning a fact in the mind of the tribunal or court. In Mass Projects Ltd No 2 vs Standard Chartered Bank and Yoo Mart No2 Ltd 2013 2014 ISCGLR 309, the Supreme Court stated that fraud vitiates every conduct. An allegation of fraud, if proven and sustained, would wipe away everything in its trail as if the things had never existed. It also stated that however solid a judgment might be to create an estoppel once fraud was alleged and proved against the judgment, that judgment could not stand. In the case of Kwame Boakye vs Anane Asare dated 14th July 2004 CA No19/ 2003, the court stated that for an action to set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud to be successful, it must constitute the following; the judgment sought to be set aside was delivered relying upon evidence which has been proved to have been obtained by fraud and that, but for the fraudulent evidence the judgment would have been otherwise. Another important principle that this court must stress is that the court is only seised with jurisdiction to deal with the issue of fraud. Additionally, one way or the other, should this court hold for the plaintiff at the end of the day, the court would only set aside the judgment and nothing more. That is because when a judgment is set aside on grounds of fraud, the nullity does not affect the original writ of summons. In support of this view is the case of Republic v Fast Track High Court Accra; EX Parte Sian Goldfields Ltd. Aurex Management and investment AD/SA Ltd Interested Party [2009] SCGLR 204 where the Supreme Court stated as follows; “When a judgment is set aside on the grounds that it has been obtained by fraud, the nullity does not affect the writ of summons. Similarly, when proceedings are set aside by an appellate court as a nullity, the writ which commenced the proceedings remains unaffected, unless the grounds of nullity is that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ. The legal effect of declaring proceedings null and void is that there has been no adjudication upon the claim, and so the writ or claim automatically goes back to the trial court there to be properly adjudicated upon.” On the other hand, should the court hold for the defendant, then estoppel per rem judicatam would hold sway against the plaintiffs herein. Thus, whether the property in dispute belongs to the plaintiff or the defendant cannot be determined in this suit. I have had the benefit of reading the erudite addresses filed by both counsels for the parties, and they have assisted this court in reaching its conclusion in this case. The court has decided to discuss the two issues together with the evidence led because they dovetail. 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENTS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUIT WERE PROCURED BY FRAUD 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANTS AND THEIR PREDECESSORS MISLED THE TRIAL COURTS. The plaintiffs called four witnesses and tendered various exhibits to prove their case. On the other hand, the 1st defendant also testified for himself and on behalf of the 2nd defendant. Though they filed the witness statement of one of their witnesses, they did not call her to testify on oath. It should be noted that the testimony of PW1 is basically the same as what was stated in the plaintiffs’ statement of claim. In further proof of his claim, PW1 tendered the following exhibits; • Minutes of General Meeting with the family of SK Gyawu dated 19th October 2003 marked as Exhibit A • An agreement made on the 11th March 2005 between Madam Afua Kobi and the church of Christ is marked as Exhibit B. • Photographs of building marked as Exhibit C C1 C2 C3 • Receipt of payment of GHC3500 marked as Exhibit D. • Notice of payment into court marked as exhibit E • • Judgment of the High Court Cape with suit no E1/13/2007 marked as Exhibit F Judgment of the High Court Suit No. E2/3 /2018 marked as G • Entry of judgment in a suit entitled Church of Christ vs. SK Gyewu with no suit number marked as Exhibit H. To begin this court finds that most of the documents tendered in this court by the plaintiffs predate the judgments that the plaintiffs are trying to impeach in this court. Additionally, this court finds as a fact that the plaintiffs participated in the trial before Justice Mustapha to the extent that one of the witnesses presented before this court by the plaintiff also testified in that case which culminated in the first judgment delivered by His Lordship Justice Mustapha which went in favour of the defendants’ predecessor. I must also clarify that the plaintiffs admitted that there is no judgment before the court known as Yaw Essilfie Martin vs The Elder Church of Christ Rent office. That was confirmed under cross-examination at page 6 of the record by PW1 as follows; Q: The plaintiff is also seeking a declaration that the case titled Yaw Essilfie vs the Elder Church of Christ Rent Office for which same was procured by fraud A: That is so. Q: I am putting it to you that there is no case titled Yaw Essilfie Martin vs the Elder Church of Christ Rent Office for which same was procured by Fraud. A: That is not true. There is a case like that. Q: You would agree with me that you have not attached any judgment titled Yaw Essilfie Martin vs the Elder Church of Christ Rent Office. A: I will agree with counsel; the one who was at the forefront of the case is deceased thus, there are certain documents that we did not get. The court cannot accept this explanation given by PW1 because it believes that the said judgment if it genuinely exists, is an official public document which could be procured after paying the appropriate fee. Anybody who requests a copy of the said judgement was enjoined by law to pay the appropriate fee at the registry of the court, after which it would be made available to him. Having failed to produce such a judgment before the court, this court holds that the plaintiffs have failed to substantiate their claim that the said judgment even exists. Thus, it cannot be the subject of discussion as to whether it is tainted with fraud. Following the plaintiffs' complaint on the issue of fraud, the testimony of PW1 came under critical scrutiny when under cross-examination, he revealed the real reason why the plaintiffs had labelled the judgements as having been obtained by fraud. When PW1 was cross-examined on the judgment delivered by Justice Mustapha, he had this to say; Q: You will agree with me that the judgement of Afua Kobi vs Church of Christ was delivered in 2013 in favour of the defendants’ ancestress Afua Kobi at the Cape Coast High Court. That is your own Exhibit F attached to your witness statement. A: It is true that the verdict went in defendant’s ancestress’ favour but I have an explanation. We engaged an Accra lawyer and he was not appearing before the court (Kwaku Baah) that led to the verdict going against us. Q; I am suggesting to you that your answer that your lawyer was not appearing before the court and that was why the judgment went against you is false. A: It is the truth Q: Did the church appeal against the said judgment obtained in favour of the defendant’s ancestress? A: We did not appeal because the case was handled by Church of Christ officers in Accra. Q; You will agree with me that during the trial of Afua Kobi's case earlier mentioned, PW2, i.e. Elder Johnson Sowah, as stated in paragraph 2 of your witness statement, was the one who represented the church in court. A: I agree. He was not representing in his personal capacity, but he was representing the church as I am doing now. Then he continued at page 8 of the record dated 15th March as follows; Q: You will recall that all your claims as contained in your statement of claim in the present action are essentially the same as the defence put up by the church in Afua Kobi’s case in the High Court 2. A: I agree with counsel Q: You will recall that during the trial in the case of Afua Kobi vs Church of Christ, the plaintiffs’ herein defence was that the disputed land on which the building is situated was purchased by the church. A: That is so my Lord. Q: You will also agree with me in that same Afua Kobi case, you put up a defence that an agreement was entered into with the defendants herein family? A: That is so. Q: You will agree with me that in spite of all this the defence put up by the church during Afua Kobi’s case at the High Court 2 judgment went in favour of the defendants’ herein ancestor? A: I agree with counsel but this was because we did not get any lawyer to speak on our behalf. Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Q: Tell the court what makes you think the judgment was obtained by fraud in spite of the overwhelming evidence adduced at the trial? A: Because we did not get any lawyer to speak on our behalf, that led to the verdict against us and if you go through the documents i.e. minutes and agreements that we built the house for them and the amount involved was GHC 3500.00. The other witnesses, PW2 and PW3, also told the court that their lawyer failed to attend court, which was why the judgement went against them. It is rather revealing to note that PW3 even disputed the judgment that was given before Justice Boampong as different from what had been presented before the court. The evidence of PW1 and PW3 especially is, in the opinion of this court, very bizarre, especially when they claimed that a certain document had been removed from the custody of the Lands Commission by S. K Gyewu and a court of competent jurisdiction had ordered that the said document should be sent back to the Lands Commission. He failed to tender any such order or judgment given by any such court. It should be noted that the defendants averred that though a case was initiated against SK Gyewu and one Fiifi Imbrah, the plaintiffs, who were also the plaintiffs in that case, abandoned the case. Since issues were joined on that the expectation of this court was for the plaintiff to produce a copy of the said judgment or order, but rather it is an Entry of judgment that was drafted in an unknown lawyers’ office that was tendered in evidence by PW1 which did not even have any order that the said Gyewu was to return a document to the Lands Commission. In fact, without the judgement being attached to the said Entry of judgment, this court cannot rely on it. Another aspect of PW3’s evidence that the court finds to be out of this world is that he testified that he was in court and heard the judgement. According to him, the judge pronounced that they had won the case, and he was happy and left. To the extent that he even testified that they appealed the decision given by Justice Mustapha when the other witnesses, PW1 and PW2, specifically said they did not appeal any of the decisions, shows that he was just in court to say anything to support the case of the plaintiffs. Thus his credibility is at stake here. His evidence cannot be accepted as the truth. From the discourse between all the witnesses presented by the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants under cross-examination, one could clearly see that the reason they gave for saying the judgment was obtained by fraud was that their lawyer did not appear in court to put their case forward. However, as already stated, PW2 participated and testified in the trial. Additionally, there is also no doubt in the court's mind that the documents tendered by the plaintiffs, especially Exhibit B, existed when the court heard the case in High Court 2. If that was indeed the terms of settlement entered by the parties, why did the plaintiffs not tender it before the court? In fact, in the judgement before Justice Mustapha, he made explicit findings of fact before he arrived at his decision. For example, he found out that the witness representing the defendants, now plaintiffs before this court, had contradicted himself on material issues as per the evidence produced before him. The learned judge found that whilst in his pleadings he claimed that the Prophet John Mensah purchased the property he told the court in his evidence that the land was a gift to the church. He further found that since the defendant did not produce any evidence of the said gift, be it in the form of a conveyance or under customary law, he could not accept his evidence. Thus the court profoundly found that his evidence was not credible and that he had departed from his own pleadings. Furthermore, the plaintiffs admitted that the defence they put up before Justice Mustapha was the same as the claims they had made before this court to substantiate the allegation of fraud. Whilst PW1 admitted that the defence they put up was the same, he denied that the minutes, pictures and Exhibit B the agreement were before the learned Mustapha J. If those documents were indeed available at the date of that case, it behoved on the plaintiffs to have submitted them for the judge to make a proper assessment of them. I must say that this court does not even have the benefit of the proceedings before the learned judge to check the veracity of the evidence of the plaintiffs’ witnesses as to the absence of these vital documents before the trial judge in that case. They decided to produce only the judgment before this court. The proceedings have not been attached; likewise, the exhibits tendered at that trial. However, once they have admitted that the defence they put up was the same as the case they put forth before this court, then they want to invite this court to reconsider their case, which it does not have the jurisdiction to do under the laws of Ghana. To do that would be to walk along a big cauldron, and with the tip as slippery as it is, this court would fall inside should it be taken up. Likewise, in the court's opinion, having produced those documents after the judgment was given, the plaintiffs have tried to re-litigate a case they had the opportunity to defend and did so but lost. I must say that if their lawyers were absent from court, that in itself cannot be the basis for claiming that the judgement was obtained by fraud because they could still have produced those documents they claim were not presented before the court. One significant aspect of the case of the plaintiffs is that the predecessor of the defendants, Afua Kobi produced falsehood to the court to show that the plaintiffs were still her tenants. However, it is very clear to the court that the judge relied not only on the oral evidence of the parties but also on certain documents to arrive at his decision which documents have not been produced before this court, let alone challenge their veracity or genuineness before this court. Looking at the judgment, the court made findings of fact based on the evidence led by both parties, and if the plaintiffs failed to tender such vital documents, especially Exhibit B, which to all intents and purposes and on the face of it was in existence at the time they entered their defence to what they termed as “lies” of defendants’ predecessor, Then they have themselves to blame for it. This is especially so because in the case of In Re Poku (Decd) Appiah Poku vs Nsafoa Poku [2011] 1 SCGLR, it was held that “It is an entrenched trite principle of law that fraud unravels everything and a judgment obtained by fraud can be impeached by fresh action. One such encumbrance which is relevant to the facts of this case is the necessity to exercise diligence at the first instance. It is clearly established that if a party be actually or constructively cognisant of fraudulent matters in the first action but fails to avail himself of them at that time, he cannot thereafter seek to impeach the decree of the court on those grounds. This principle has been fully laid down by Aduamua-Bossman J as he then was in Anyimah III vs Kodia IV [1962] 2GLR 1." It must be made clear that the case cited above is not to show that the plaintiffs have established fraud but cannot rely on same, but instead, it is to buttress the point that if one had the opportunity to bring matters which were within one's knowledge at the first trial but failed to do so, one cannot come back to court seeking to cross-examine a witness on issues that could have been cross-examined on at the initial trial. Therefore, it must be reemphasised that the allegations of fraud alleged by the plaintiff cannot be in relation to the questions which could have been put to the witness that gave the evidence in that judgment. Thus if the plaintiffs had the documents which they have now brought before this court but failed to do so, they cannot turn around to impugn the judgment of the court on the basis of fraud because they participated in the trial, and if indeed, the documents existed at the date of the trial of the case then they should have brought them to the notice of the court. On the other hand, If it is their belief that the court overlooked their evidence and did not consider same when delivering the judgment, then rather than complain that the judgment was obtained by fraud it would have been more prudent for them to appeal the decision. This court cannot sit as an appellate court over its own judgment. Having found that the documents were available to the plaintiffs and not tendering them before the court, they cannot turn around to re-litigate the case by bringing up accusations of fraud against the defendants. On the 2nd issue, since the plaintiffs participated in that trial and had the opportunity to defend same, I cannot accept their evidence that the defendant's predecessor misled the court. If that were so, with all the arsenals they had at their disposal, they would have produced those documents. Moreover, if indeed the defendants had misled the courts in their view, then they had the opportunity to produce contrary evidence, especially in the light of the documents they are now producing before this court. It is rather revealing that the plaintiffs in this trial sought to lead evidence to show that their founder Prophet John Mensah purchased the land in 1967. If that were so, why did they agree to build three bedroom house for the defendants' family in exchange for the land and also paid certain amounts to the family long after the death of their prophet? This court cannot countenance this contradiction. It should be emphasised that this court must look at the plaintiffs' evidence since the allegations are serious and grave and require strict proof. In this case, the defendants are like accused persons who have no burden until the plaintiffs prove their case. Consequently, having analysed the evidence on record, this court holds that the plaintiffs have only come before this court to re-litigate an action they lost before a court of competent jurisdiction, and that cannot be accepted since this court would have exceeded its jurisdiction if it sets aside its own decision based on issues that a court of competent jurisdiction had already determined. In effect, the plaintiffs have failed to lead evidence to the requisite degree required by law that is beyond reasonable doubt and must fail in their action. I do not find any merit in the plaintiffs' case on the totality of the evidence. Their reliefs endorsed on the writ of summons are hereby dismissed in their entirety as unmeritorious. Costs of GHC5000.00 against the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants. MALIKE AWO WOANYAH DEY JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT CAPE COAST 17