香港特別行政區 訴 黎文光

HCMA 470/2014 香港特別行政區 高等法院原訟法庭 定罪上訴 案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2014年第470號 (原東區裁判法院傳票2014年第3869號) ______________ 答辯人 香港特別行政區 訴 上訴人 黎文光 ______________ 主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官陳慶偉 聆訊日期：2015年1月28日 判案日期：2015年2月18日 判 案 書 背景 上訴人被控在2013 年11 月18 日，於薄扶林道與般咸道交界，在道路上不小心駕駛。經審訊後，上訴人被裁定罪名成立，他不服有關的裁決，現就定罪提出上訴。 控方證人(一警員)事發當天在薄扶林道69A 號外一組行人過路燈附近觀察交通情況。當天天氣良好，光線充足，交通流量普通。過了不久，當兩路交界的行人過路燈亮起綠燈時，警員看見一行人從西往東橫過行人過路線。此際，警員也看見上訴人所駕的私家車正以時速25 公里沿般咸道西行右轉進入薄扶林道。當行人看見私家車駛及時，他立刻退後。有見及此，警員立刻觀察般咸道右轉交通燈的燈號，他看見是紅色的，至於行人過路燈則仍然是綠色的。 警員截停上訴人的私家車，他亦立即上前追截橫過馬路的行人。行人向警員講述事情，並表示願意作證，警員遂抄下行人的個人資料。 上訴人的證供則謂當天確有從般咸道右轉進入薄扶林道，但當時交通燈是綠色的。在進入薄扶林道後，他看見警方設置路障，警員首先指示上訴人駛靠路邊，繼而要求上訴人續往前駛。私家車最終停在第三街。 上訴人亦謂警員曾向他指出「嗰個燈仲未轉啵」，接着他與警員討論該處交通燈是否出現問題。 上訴理據概括而言指裁判官錯誤處理警員的證供及不合理地否定上訴人的證供。 討論 就裁判官錯誤處理警員證供這方面，上訴人大律師指裁判官一方面指不會因控方證人是警員而將他列入特別的類別，但是後來卻接納控方證人是一名警員，因此他能在事後兩小時記下私家車與行人之間的距離及車速等，裁判官這樣處理警員的證供，是「口惠而實不至」。 實際上，裁判官在裁斷陳述書是表示他不會因控方證人是警員故較一般人較為可信，但是因為控方證人在當天的任務是須到現場觀察交通情況及執法，故此他能在兩小時之內仍然記得上訴人的車速及距離等，實是可靠的。 就此點，上訴法庭在 HKSAR v Kong Wai Chun and Others (unreported), CACC 252/2009, 20 May 2011 曾有以下表示： “37. Another aspect is the factors which the judge took into account in arriving at her decision to admit the evidence. These may be summarised as being that the witnesses had been especially briefed to conduct surveillance duties; their specific duty was to observe the accused with the express purpose of observing their activities and to collect evidence; they paid particular notice to the faces, build, height and appearance of the accused; and the witnesses themselves were professional and trained witnesses. She later came to the conclusion that the quality of the identification evidence “…by prosecution witness carried a stronger weight than a stranger casually encounters someone in the street without any particular purpose.” 38. In our judgment she was justified in adopting that approach. She was not alone in doing so. In R v Ramsden [1991] Crim. L. R. 295 a police officer’s attention had been drawn to a vehicle coming towards him pursued by a police car. He made a concentrated effort to look at the driver. The court accepted that whilst it was true that the same rules applied to police officers as any other witness it might be that an officer, due to the fact that he was a police officer, might have paid particular attention to the identity, facial features and so on of the person whom he was observing. The court concluded that in those circumstances it would not be wrong to direct the jury specifically as to the likelihood of the officer being correct when a mere casual observer may not be. An identifying witness who happened to be involved in the criminal justice system was likely to have a greater appreciation of the importance of identification, and so look for some particular identifying feature. 39. Further, in Tyler and Others (1993) 96. Cr. App. R 332 – decision to which the judge referred in her Reasons for Verdict – Farquharson L.J. addressed a ground of appeal which complained about a passage in a summing up in which the trial judge had indicated that the jury would be entitled to take into account that it might be more likely that a police officer’s evidence in regard to identification of an accused person arrested during a riot may be more reliable than that of a non-police witness, an ordinary member of the public. He said: ‘The identification made by the police witness in the present case was related to the evidence. They were observing the crowd and were concentrating on who was throwing things at them and also, as they said, on the distinctive appearance of Hester. The training of police officers to carry out their duties when a riot is taking place and to observe what is happening around them is a point which can properly be made in the restrained way the judge expressed it.’ 40. We emphasize that what the judge took into account and what is considered in the two decisions cited is the likelihood of greater reliability being able to be placed on the observations of a trained observer engaged in a deliberate observation exercise as opposed to a member of the public not possessed of those additional skills. This in no way detracts from the well-established principle that it is inappropriate for a judge to regard the evidence of a police officer, or member of other disciplined forces, as being more creditworthy than that of any other witness simply by virtue of his position.” 證供顯示警員當天是被特別指派前往薄扶林道與般咸道交界觀察交通情況及執法，他因此較一般普通市民又或其他道路使用者更為專注在車速及交通燈的燈號上，這是正常不過的事。正如報導法庭新聞的記者在旁聽案件時，他們比一般旁聽的市民更為專注，報導出來的東西更為準確而已。裁判官這樣處理警員的證供，絕非表示警員是特別可信的人士，只是運用日常生活常識而已，本席看不到有犯錯的地方。 上訴人大律師亦在上訴理據中講及其他警員不可靠的地方，本席不打算逐一講及，因為它們都是一些瑣碎及細微的出入，完全不足以影響此案的最終裁決。 裁判官拒納上訴人的證供時表示： 「68. 本席小心考慮被告宣稱在管制般咸道行車交燈號綠色的情況下行車，當駛過薄扶林道的行人過路線上，被告亦宣稱當時行人過路線交通燈是紅色。被告的證供是在整個時段均不需等待任何交通燈號轉燈才行駛。被告的證供是警員說“嗰個燈仲未轉㗎啵”，若如被告所供稱被告在整個案發時段均不需等待任何交通燈號轉燈才行駛，被告理應同意警員的說法，根本不會回應警員“我唔同意”。 69. 本席小心考慮被告的證供，本席認為被告的證供出現前後矛盾及不一致。本席認為上述的不一致就被告證供的可信性是關鍵及實質。」 上訴人大律師指裁判官先以此對話存在但不合理為由拒予接納，但卻又在下段裁定這番說話根本不存在，這邏輯上犯錯。 本案的警員及上訴人初審時在庭上基本上是各說各話，裁判官在作出裁決時須考慮雙方講及的情況是否有內含不可能性的地方。裁判官因此先行假設上訴人確有說過這番說話，亦據此在邏輯上作出推敲。若裁判官總結上訴人的說法是內含不可能性時，他是可推論這番說話不可能出現，繼而拒納上訴人的證供的。裁判官並沒有如上訴人大律師所述般出爾反爾，邏輯上犯錯。 話雖如此，本席對裁判官以此番說話作為拒納上訴人的證供則有少許保留。當警員表示「嗰個燈仲未轉啵」時，從當時環境看，警員當時定必是指「嗰個紅燈仲未轉啵」，因為警員絕對沒有理由是指「嗰個綠燈仲未轉啵」。若是後者，則警員首先沒有理由截停上訴人所駕的車輛，其次他這樣做亦是多此一問。當上訴人表示「我唔同意」時，他定必是不同意「嗰個紅燈仲未轉啵」。就上訴人當時講及的答案，控辯雙方又或法庭實應向上訴人查詢究竟上訴人不同意的是甚麼。在沒有進一步澄清下，上訴人講及的「我唔同意」存有模糊不清的地方。裁判官可以有他的理解，但是其理解並非唯一可作的理解，若裁判官以此作為拒納上訴人的證供的理據，這裡存有不穩妥的地方。 基於以上所述，本席頒令上訴得直，定罪撤銷，刑罰擱置。 (陳慶偉) 高等法院原訟法庭法官 答辯人： 由律政司高級檢控官李希哲代表香港特別行政區 上訴人： 由李榮覺律師行轉聘李祖詒大律師代表