WONG YAN YAN AND ANOTHER v. HUI MAN FAN CINDY aka HUI MIU AND OTHERS

DCCJ 778/2021 [2024] HKDC 116 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 778 OF 2021 -------------------------------- BETWEEN WONG YAN YAN 1st Plaintiff WONG WING SZE ANNABELLE 2nd Plaintiff and HUI MAN FAN CINDY (許曼芬) also known as HUI MIU (許淼) 1st Defendant 深圳市天諾餐飲管理有限公司 2nd Defendant GLOBAL RICH ENTREPRENEUR LIMITED (九馨餐飲管理有限公司 or previously known as 天盛創業有限公司) 3rd Defendant 前海麥思 (深圳) 電子商務有限公司 4th Defendant -------------------------------- Before: Deputy District Judge Gary C C Lam in Chambers (Open to Public) Date of Hearing: 17 January 2024 Date of Decision: 18 January 2024 -------------------------------- DECISION -------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Before me is the 1st – 4th defendants’ summons (“D1-4’s Summons”) to dispute the Court’s jurisdiction under Order 12 rule 8 of the Rules of the District Court (“RDC”) and/or to stay the plaintiffs’ action on the ground of forum non conveniens. The 1st to 4th defendants were all along represented by solicitors until 2 days before the hearing when the 1st and 3rd defendants filed notice to act in person and 1 day before the hearing when the 2nd and 4th defendants filed notice to act in person. Since all the documents have been prepared in English and the plaintiffs’ submissions are also prepared in English (given that when the same were filed, the notices to act in person had not yet been filed), I find it appropriate to prepare this Decision in English, with direction that an interpreter be arranged to explain this Decision in Cantonese to the 1st defendant (representing herself and the 3rd defendant) and the representative of the 2nd and 4th defendants. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On 22 February 2021, the plaintiffs issued the writ of summons specifically endorsed with Statement of Claim. On the 1st and 3rd defendants are within jurisdiction, while the 2nd and 4th defendants are out of jurisdiction in the PRC. On 24 February 2021, the plaintiffs’ solicitors properly served a sealed copy of the writ of summons on the 1st defendant. As regards the 3rd defendant (the only other defendant within jurisdiction), also on 24 February 2021, the plaintiffs’ solicitors posted a sealed copy of the writ of summons by ordinary post addressed to the registered office of the 3rd defendant as appeared in the record of the Companies Registry at that time, namely, Unit 2, 20th Floor, Ricky Centre, No 36 Chong Yip Street, Kwun Tong, Kowloon, Hong Kong (the “Ricky Centre Address”). On 3 June 2021, upon the plaintiffs’ application as there had been no notice of intention to defend filed, the Default Judgment against the 3rd defendant was entered. The entire action had since been a lying dog sleeping until 27 February 2023 when the 1st – 4th defendants’ solicitors filed a Notice to Act, although the plaintiffs had not applied for any leave to serve out on the 2nd and 4th defendants. On 6 April 2023, the 1st – 4th defendants’ solicitors filed a Notice of Intention to Proceed. On 13 July 2023, D1-4’s Summons was filed. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM According to the Statement of Claim, the 1st defendant was and is the actual, ultimate owner of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. The plaintiffs claim that on a date before 30 November 2019, the 1st defendant introduced to the plaintiffs a business plan of the 2nd defendant, 3rd defendant and/or 4th defendant for setting up a “Shenzhen Club No 2” (the “Shop”), and made a representation (the “Representation”) to them that the business plan was real. The plaintiffs plead that induced and in reliance upon the Representation, each of the plaintiffs entered into a contract dated 30 November 2019 (the “Contract”) with the 2nd defendant on, among others, the following terms:- Upon payment of CNY50,000, the plaintiff would be entitled to enjoy preferential rights of 1% dividend out of the monthly turnover of Shenzhen Club No 2. The plaintiff shall receive her respective share of 1% dividend once every 3 months to be payable on every 20th day of that calendar month. About the same time, in performance of the Contract, each of the plaintiffs paid the CNY50,000 into an account designated by the 1st defendant which was controlled or belonged to the 4th defendant. On 13 December 2019, the 4th defendant issued receipts of acknowledgment of the payments to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs plead that the Representation was false and was fraudulently made, because Shenzhen Club No 2 had never been set up as represented. The plaintiffs further plead that the 1st – 4th defendants “acted in concert appearing to be running ordinary or actual business… did not set up ‘Shenzhen Club No 2’… with no intention to perform the Contracts…” As a result, in mid-2020, the plaintiffs “informed the 1st defendant and rescinded the Contracts”. Thereafter, according to the plaintiffs, the 1st defendant requested the notice of rescission to be reduced into writing, and subsequently, further requested that the notice of rescission would be effective only upon 3 months’ time. The plaintiffs acceded to all these requests, and on 25 September 2020, the 2nd defendant confirmed the receipt of the plaintiffs’ notices of rescission of the Contracts. On 25 December 2020, upon the lapse of the 3 months since the receipt of the notices, the plaintiffs still had not been refunded the CNY100,000 or the HKD equivalent of HK$114,942.52 (the “Total Sum”). The plaintiffs claim in paragraph 22 of the Statement of Claim:- “In breach of the 1st defendant’s representation (whether fraudulently or otherwise) and/or the Contracts, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and/or 4th defendants had and received the Plaintiffs’ said Total Sum without or without corresponding consideration or failed to return the said Total Sum to the plaintiffs.” The plaintiffs claim specifically for refund from “the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and/or 4th defendants” of the Total Sum, but do not claim for damages as an alternative if refund is not granted. 1ST – 4TH DEFENDANTS’ CASE There is no draft defence provided. In their affirmation in support (prepared by their solicitors back then), the 1st – 4th defendants aver that:- The 1st defendant did not make the Representation. The 1st defendant is not the actual owner of the 2nd defendant. The 3rd defendant is not a privy to the matter. The Shop did commence business in November 2019 and thus if there were any Representation, the Representation was not false. The Shop, however, had not made any profit since commencement of business. The Total Sum was paid for the rights for 1% dividend and for RMB60,000 electronic coupons. There is no total failure of consideration and thus the Total Sum is not refundable. D1-4’s SUMMONS: DOES THE COURT HAVE JURISDICTION? D1-4’s Summons has two limbs: one is to dispute jurisdiction under Order 12 rule 8 and the other to ask the Court to stay the action on forum non conveniens. I shall deal with the first limb first. Both the 1st and 3rd defendants are within jurisdictions, thus falling within Order 11 rule 1(a) of RDC. From the plaintiffs’ case as described above, it was because of the 1st defendant’s Representation that the plaintiffs entered into the Contracts with the 2nd defendant, and it is because of the Contracts with the 2nd defendant that the plaintiffs made payment of the Total Sum to the 1st and 4th defendants. It is the plaintiffs’ case, as appears from the Statement of Claim, that the 1st – 4th defendants, acting in concert, had and received the Total Sum (although I have to say that how it is the case is not particularly clear and/or lacks particulars, which is not a matter I have to deal with here). Thus, I think the claim falls within Order 11 rule 1(c) of RDC, and thus, the Court has jurisdiction. D1-4’s SUMMONS: FORUM NON CONVENIENS In respect of forum non conveniens, first and foremost, I note that while D1-4’s Summons asks the Court to stay the present action in favour of 深圳前海合作區人民法院, in the affirmation in support, the 1st – 4th defendants do not name any such court, and in any event there is no evidence to explain why the present action should be litigated in 深圳前海合作區人民法院. The evidence only tries to explain why a PRC Court is a more appropriate forum. It is trite that the applicant for a stay on forum non conveniens has to name the foreign court in favour of which the action should be stayed, and needless to say, there must be evidence to explain why that specific foreign court is more appropriate: see Greenwood Ltd v Pearl River Container Transportation Ltd & another, CACV 27/1994, 25 May 1994. This in my view is sufficient for me to dismiss D1-4’s Summons. In any event, I am prepared to deal with the specific grounds raised by the 1st – 4th defendants in their supporting affirmation , namely:- One 許社輝 (being 監事 of the 3rd defendant) (who represents the 2nd and 4th defendants before me) was responsible for the entire negotiation process of the Contracts and the negotiation and the signing of the Contracts were carried out in the PRC. (“Ground 1”) The Shop had commenced and had been operating in Shenzhen, and evidence in relation to the commencement and operation would be from persons residing in the PRC. (“Ground 2”) The Shop was located in Shenzhen, and any evidence of commencement of the Shop would naturally come from the PRC. (“Ground 3”) The accounts of the Shop are prepared in accordance with the PRC laws and regulations. (“Ground 4”) The Contracts are governed by the PRC law. (“Ground 5”) The law is well settled. I shall apply the following statement of the legal principles approved by the Court of Final Appeal in SPH v SA (2014) 17 HKCFAR 364 at §51:- “1. The single question to be decided is whether there is some other available forum, having competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of an action ie in which the action may be tried more suitably for the interests of all the parties and the ends of justice? 2. In order to answer this question, the applicant for the stay has to establish that first, Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum ('appropriate' in this context means the forum has the most real and substantial connection with the action) and second, there is another available forum which is clearly or distinctly more appropriate than Hong Kong. Failure by the applicant to establish these two matters at this stage is fatal. 3. If the applicant is able to establish both of these two matters, then the plaintiff in the Hong Kong proceedings has to show that he will be deprived of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage if the action is tried in a forum other than Hong Kong. 4. If the plaintiff is able to establish this, the court will have to balance the advantages of the alternative forum with the disadvantages that the plaintiff may suffer. Deprivation of one or more personal advantages will not necessarily be fatal to the applicant for the stay if he is able to establish to the court's satisfaction that substantial justice will be done in the available appropriate forum.” I should therefore examine the Grounds raised by the 1st – 4th defendants to determine whether Hong Kong is not the natural and appropriate forum and the PRC Court (whichever court the 1st – 4th defendants intend to mean) is a clearly and distinctly more appropriate forum. To answer this question, I have to examine which forum has the most real and substantial connection with the action. The burden is on the 1st – 4th defendants. In respect of Ground 1, I do not see why the negotiation process and signing of the Contracts is relevant. From the defendants’ case, nothing turns on the negotiation process and the signing of the Contracts, while the plaintiffs’ complaint is the false Representation made by the 1st defendant prior to the Contracts. In any event, the mere fact that a witness, even a main witness, is resident in the PRC has long gone as a significant factor in the determination of the appropriateness of the forum, in the light of the readiness of people residents in the PRC crossing the border to Hong Kong. Further and in any event, the alleged main witness 許社輝, as I said, attended the hearing before me acting for the 2nd and 4th defendants. There appears no difficulty for him to come to Hong Kong. In respect of Grounds 2 and 3, I do not see why the fact that the commencement and the operation took place in the PRC would mean that the evidence has to be, or has to be better, received in a PRC Court. In fact, in the affirmation in support, the 1st – 4th defendants exhibited some photos to show that the Shop had commenced business and was operating. Further, even if live witnesses resident in the PRC would be necessary, as I said above, this is not a significant factor in my consideration. In respect of Ground 4, this seems to be a defence in relation to the lack of dividends. The 1st – 4th defendants’ case is that since there have been no profits, there have been no dividends, and thus, failure to distribute dividends is not a total failure of consideration. However, the 1st – 4th defendants have not explained how the PRC laws and regulations would affect the understanding of the figures of the accounts (for example, a profit would otherwise mean a loss, and a loss would otherwise mean a profit). Still further, if the PRC laws and regulations would be relevant, I see no difficulty from the evidence that a PRC opinion on this matter would be insufficient. Thus, I do not think Ground 3 would be a factor to show that the PRC courts would have a more real and substantial connection with the matter. Insofar as the accounts are to be produced to show that the Shop had indeed commenced business and had been operating, the accounts themselves would be sufficient. There seems to be no need to consider the effect of the PRC laws and regulations. In respect of Ground 5, even assuming (without finding) that the Contracts are governed by the PRC law, there is no explanation as to how the PRC law would affect the understanding of the simple texts of the Contracts. In fact, no evidence has been produced to say that certain words or clauses of the Contracts should be interpreted in certain ways due to certain PRC laws. In any event, the Courts in Hong Kong from time to time receive PRC opinion on contracts governed by the PRC law where necessary. I do not see this governing law would be a significant factor in determining which forum is more natural and appropriate. During the hearing, the 1st defendant (also representing the 3rd defendant) and 許社輝, the representative of the 2nd and 4th defendants, made oral submissions to me, which I have considered and which, I think, basically are regurgitation of the grounds above with no new points raised. I am aware that in determining which forum is a natural and appropriate forum, it is not a mechanical exercise to consider the above grounds separately. I should consider them cumulatively as well. However, having done so, I am still not satisfied that the grounds, whether cumulatively or singularly, are sufficient to satisfy me that the Hong Kong Court is not the natural and appropriate forum, and that PRC court (whichever court the 1st – 4th defendants would intend to mean) is a clearly and distinctly appropriate forum in favour of which the present action should be stayed. Therefore, I shall dismiss D1-4’s Summons. ORDER In the circumstances, I order that D1-4’s Summons be dismissed with costs to the plaintiff to be summarily assessed, with certificate for counsel, payable forthwith. I heard submissions from the 1st to 4th defendants on the statement of costs provided by the plaintiffs. I summarily assess it to be HK$120,000. ( Gary C C Lam ) Deputy District Judge Ms Kitty Tsang, instructed by Paul Kwong & Co, for the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs The 1st to 4th defendants appeared in person