HASSAN WALEED v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 307/2018 [2020] HKCFI 2910 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 307 OF 2018 ___________________ BETWEEN HASSAN WALEED Applicant and TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / Putative Respondent Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office and DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION Putative Interested Party ___________________ Before: Hon CampbellMoffat J in Chambers Date of Hearing: 13 November 2020 Date of Decision: 13 November 2020 D E C I S I O N Introduction This is an application dated 28 August 2020 to appeal my decision of 30 June 2020 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant had 14 days in which to apply to appeal that decision. He did not do so. He now requires leave to extend time to appeal against that order. The applicant attended court with the benefit of an interpreter, although he was late. Procedural Background The applicant is a claimant under Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. He entered Hong Kong illegally on 31 October 2013. He submitted a nonrefoulement claim on 11 January 2017 and was offered an interview by the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) on 1 February 2017 but failed to attend because he had a hangover. The Director considered his claim upon the papers and dismissed his claim under all heads, by Notice of Decision on 15 February 2017. He appealed those Decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the TCAB”). The adjudicator of the TCAB, Mr Christian Patrick Carney (“the Adjudicator”), heard him on 10 November 2017. The Adjudicator refused his appeal on 12 January 2018. The applicant filed a notice of application on a Form 86 seeking leave to apply for judicial review on 27 February 2018 and did not request an oral hearing. The matter was therefore considered on the papers. His application for leave to apply for judicial review was refused on 30 June 2020. He had 14 days from that date to appeal that decision which would have expired on 14 July 2020. By way of summons dated 28 August 2020, he seeks leave to appeal out of time. An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g)). The applicant may appeal as of right. However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against a CFI judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, which is an interlocutory order, has to observe the time limits for appeal under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court which allows 14 days. Where the applicant is out of time to appeal against a judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review, an extension of time may be granted by a judge of the Court of First Instance under Order 59, rule 2B(6). The Court is required to consider (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted. In order to obtain that leave, an application must be made promptly and it must be supported by an affirmation or affidavit deposing to any facts relied upon by the applicant and giving a full account of and explanation for the whole of the delay since time expired. Whilst the granting of an extension of time is entirely within the discretion of the Court, the applicant is required to explain the reasons for his delay as this forms part of the consideration of whether there is good reason to allow an extension of time. In his Affirmation in support, the applicant accepted he was late but lay the blame at the door of the Court for not sending him the letter or ringing him up. He suggests that he did not receive the Form CALL1 until 26 August 2020 and gave no reason within his Affirmation as to why that was the case. The Court file suggests that it was properly served upon the address given at that time, which is the same address the applicant currently uses. It is the duty of a litigant to give the Court an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in a timely manner. The consequences of any delay arising from failing to do so will fall upon the litigant. Even if the Court does accept that the explanation given for the delay is a reasonable one, the Court is required to examine whether there is any merit in the applicant’s appeal. Whether there is any such merit will depend upon wellestablished legal principles including the fact that the Court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying claim. The question for the Court is whether any submissions truly seek to review the exercise of a judicial function and in so doing indicate a reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal. Despite advice, the applicant insisted his sole purpose was to seek a rehearing. As the role of the Court in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal from the Decisions of the Director and the Adjudicator, it follows that an appeal from this Court should not be founded upon any attempt to appeal those same decisions. It is an appeal from the decision of this Court and the applicant should look to draft grounds of appeal on that basis and to indicate the basis of any appeal within his Affirmation in support. Conclusion The applicant has now been in Hong Kong since 2013. He has been interacting with various government agencies since that date. The explanation he has offered to this Court, as to why he did not receive the order is not acceptable. Indeed, I did not believe him. In any event, I have considered his underlying application. It has no merit as explained in the initial refusal of leave. There were no formal grounds of review below. They were in outline only. The court considered them and explained why they were insufficient to establish a case to go to review. There was no complaint before the Court today as to the decision to refuse leave. The applicant merely wishes the Court of Appeal to consider his situation afresh. Having considered the length of delay, reason for the delay and underlying merits of his application, it would not be in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time in all the circumstances of this case. The applicant’s summons dated 28 August 2020 be dismissed. (A P CampbellMoffat) Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court The applicant appeared in person.