Hong Kong Judgment

Court of Appeal

HKSAR v. NG CHUN IP

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Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

Leave to appeal was refused because the offences, while arising from one incident, reflected different criminality (objective dangerous driving and separate offences of driving while disqualified and uninsured), the applicant's recent identical convictions justified a consecutive element, and the overall 19-month sentence with a 3-year disqualification was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

Court disposition

Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused

Orders

  • Application for leave to appeal refused
  • Sentences stand: total imprisonment 19 months
  • Driving disqualified for 3 years from date of sentence and applicant to attend driving improvement course at his own expense within last 3 months of disqualification

02

Material facts

Parties

HKSAR

Respondent Counsel: Ms Grace Au SPP, Department of Justice

Ng Chun Ip (吳俊燁)

Applicant Counsel: Appeared in person

Amounts and remedies

  • Monthly Income: HKD 15,000
  • Age at Sentence: 26
  • Total Imprisonment Months: 19
  • Disqualification Period Years: 3

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Criminal Appeal (leave to Appeal Against Sentence) / Leave Application Refused by Court of Appeal

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
Applicant argued the three charges arose from a single incident and sentences should run wholly concurrently; submitted driving was not overtly dangerous (more akin to careless driving) and disputed asserted speed; relied on mitigation and plea discount.
Respondent
Respondent submitted the starting points were not manifestly excessive, the offences reflected distinct aspects of culpability so a consecutive element was justified, the applicant's recent identical convictions made concurrency inappropriate, and the total sentence and 3-year disqualification plus driving course were fair and proportionate.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine (cited in judgment)

    Distinct offences arising from the same incident may attract consecutive elements where they reflect different aspects of culpability

  2. 02

    Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine (cited in judgment)

    Differentiate objective dangerousness of driving from the driver's moral culpability (why he drove as he did)

  3. 03

    Court of Appeal sentencing jurisprudence (as applied in judgment)

    Appellate court will not interfere with sentencing unless the overall sentence is manifestly excessive or arrived at in error of principle

  4. 04

    Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374 s37(2D)

    Section 37(2D) Road Traffic Ordinance permits a 50% increase where driving was under the influence of alcohol or drugs

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

Leave to appeal was refused because the offences, while arising from one incident, reflected different criminality (objective dangerous driving and separate offences of driving while disqualified and uninsured), the applicant's recent identical convictions justified a consecutive element, and the overall 19-month sentence with a 3-year disqualification was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

Obiter and limits

  • Court noted the judge's factual findings from dashcam footage and that no one was injured but the driving posed significant risk
  • Applicant warned of right to renew the leave application but also warned that any renewal could result in loss of time spent in custody if renewal is unjustified

Court disposition

Application for leave to appeal against sentence refused

  • Application for leave to appeal refused
  • Sentences stand: total imprisonment 19 months
  • Driving disqualified for 3 years from date of sentence and applicant to attend driving improvement course at his own expense within last 3 months of disqualification

Source and reliance status

Court of Appeal · 25 March 2026

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Court of Appeal

Judgment· 25 March 2026

[2026] HKCA 570

CACC 157/2025, [2026] HKCA 570 On Appeal From [2025] HKDC 806 in the high court of the hong kong special administrative region court of appeal criminal appeal no 157 of 2025 (on appeal from DCCC NO 314 of 2024)

BETWEEN

HKSAR Respondent and Ng Chun Ip (吳俊燁) Applicant Before: Hon Macrae VP in Court Date of Hearing: 25 March 2026 Date of Judgment: 25 March 2026

J U D G M E N T On 23 May 2025, the applicant pleaded guilty in the District ‍Court before Deputy ‍Judge M Chow (“the judge”) to three charges, namely: Dangerous driving, contrary to section 37 of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374 (“Charge 1”); Driving while disqualified, contrary to section 44(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap 374 (“Charge 2); and Using a motor vehicle without third party insurance, contrary to section 4(1) and (2)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance, Cap 272 (“Charge 3”). On the same day, the judge sentenced the applicant to a total of 19 months’ imprisonment with an overall disqualification period of 3 ‍years, and further ordered that he must attend a driving improvement course at his own expense within 3 months before the expiry of the disqualification order. The amended summary of facts On 23 October 2023, at 8:40 pm, police officers were conducting a roadblock snap check at the junction of Dundas Street and Ferry Street in Yau Ma Tei, Kowloon. The applicant was at the time driving a private car with a registration mark YA1695 (“the car”) with a female in the front passenger seat. The car turned from Ferry Street into Dundas Street. Upon seeing the roadblock, the applicant immediately reversed back into Ferry Street and drove off in the direction of Waterloo Road. Police officers boarded a police vehicle and gave

chase. Ignoring multiple warnings issued from the police vehicle through a loud hailer, the applicant continued to drive the car, disregarding road markings by making an unauthorized U-turn on one occasion, running through a red light twice, changing lanes frequently and driving at a high speed in a built up area when the speed limit on the relevant roads was 50 ‍kph. Eventually, the police vehicle intercepted the car outside 80 ‍Public Square Street in Yau Ma Tei. The applicant and his female passenger alighted from the car. She remained next to the car while the applicant fled. However, he was intercepted some 50 ‍metres away. When enquiries were made, it was discovered that the applicant had been disqualified from driving until 25 March 2024. The applicant was initially arrested for dangerous driving. However, following his answer under caution that “because I am being disqualified, I have to flee”, he was further arrested for driving while disqualified and using a motor vehicle without third party insurance. The applicant responded under caution, “I know I am disqualified from driving, please give me a chance.” Mitigation The applicant was 26 years of age at the time of sentence. The female passenger in the car was his girlfriend. He was a construction site worker, earning about $15,000 per month. He provided for his family and was said to be extremely remorseful. Prior to

the present case, the applicant had a conviction for driving while disqualified and one for using a motor vehicle on a road against third party risks, for which he was sentenced on 6 December 2022. On that occasion he was sentenced to a Community Service Order for 240 ‍hours and disqualified from driving for 12 months. He had previously committed two road traffic offences: one for careless driving in 2020; and another for driving in excess of the speed limit by more than 45 ‍kph in 2022. He also had a substantial record of fixed penalties. It was said in mitigation that the applicant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offences and he was attempting to evade police apprehension simply because he had earlier been disqualified from driving. Counsel on behalf of the applicant accepted that disregarding multiple police warnings to stop, disregarding road markings not to make a U-‍turn, intentionally running through a red light twice all in an attempt to evade police apprehension were aggravating features of the case. No special reasons for not imposing a disqualification order were put forward. Sentence The judge remarked that, from the dash camera footage, the road conditions at the time of offences were not as busy as during daylight hours and the roads were clear of traffic. She observed that the car chase lasted about 3 minutes. Although nobody

was injured, the judge observed that the manner in which the applicant drove posed a significant risk to his passenger and other road users. She rejected the submission that it could be a mitigating factor that the applicant was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time because, if that had been the case, the applicant would have then faced a 50% increase in sentence under section 37(2D) of the Road Traffic Ordinance. In relation to Charge 1, the judge adopted a starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment and, giving a discount of one-third for his timely plea, the sentence passed was 16 months’ imprisonment. Noting that a disqualification order was “forward looking and preventive” in nature, she ordered that the applicant be disqualified from driving all vehicles for a period of 3 years and be required to attend a driving improvement course at his own expense. In relation to Charges 2 and 3, the judge noted that the applicant committed the present offences within 7 months of his previous disqualification order, which took effect from 26 March 2023. This was the second occasion on which the applicant drove while disqualified and without third party insurance. She adopted a starting point of 9 ‍months’ imprisonment for both Charges 2 and 3. Applying a discount of one-third for plea, the sentences became 6 months’ imprisonment. The judge imposed a disqualification

order for a period of 3 years, which was to take effect from the date of conviction. Bearing in mind the issue of totality, the judge ordered the sentences on Charges 2 and 3 to run wholly concurrently with each other. However, 3 months of that sentence were ordered to run consecutively to that of Charge 1, resulting in a total sentence of 19 ‍months’ imprisonment. The disqualification orders were also ordered to run wholly concurrently. Therefore, the applicant was disqualified for a total period of 3 years, with effect from the date of sentence. In addition, the applicant was ordered to complete a driving improvement course within the last 3 months of the disqualification period. Grounds of appeal The applicant has applied for leave to appeal against his sentence. By his Form XI, he complains that his sentences should have been ordered to run wholly concurrently given that the charges arose out of the same incident. He also produced this morning a 4-page submission in writing, which has been translated for me in open court. Essentially, he maintains that his driving manner was not overtly dangerous, being more akin to careless driving. He takes issue with the suggestion by the judge that his speed had reached 80 kph at one point. However, I note that the figure was acknowledged by the applicant’s counsel during mitigation. The respondent’s submissions In opposing the

application, Ms Au, for the respondent, submitted that the starting point of 24 months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive, since the judge had correctly identified all the aggravating factors present; moreover, the sentence was within the range of starting points suggested by the defence in mitigation. It was contended that the judge adopted the starting point for Charge 1 without considering that it was committed in the context of the applicant driving while disqualified and without third party insurance. Before passing sentence, the judge had indicated her intention of following the approach of the Court in HKSAR v Chung Ho Yin, namely, of ordering the sentences in respect of Charges 2 and 3 to run partly consecutively to that of Charge ‍1, which the applicant’s counsel appeared to accept. Ms Au maintained that, notwithstanding that the offences arose from a single incident, they were different offences reflecting different aspects of the applicant’s criminal conduct. Driving while disqualified and without third party insurance would leave road users affected by the applicant’s driving without recompense and this added to the applicant’s culpability. Accordingly, the judge’s approach could not be faulted and an overall sentence of 19 months’ imprisonment properly reflected the applicant’s culpability. Ms Au further submitted that disqualification for a period of 3

years and the requirement to attend a driving improvement course were fair, just and balanced given the applicant’s bad driving record and the circumstances of the present case. Consideration The applicant’s main contention is that the sentences in this case should all have been concurrent, given that there was one incident giving rise to three offences. However, in view of the different criminality involved in the overall course of conduct, I do not think that is a realistic or reasonable argument. The dangerous driving offence was a separate offence from the offences of driving while disqualified and using a motor vehicle without third party insurance. As explained by the Court in Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine, a defendant’s culpability, albeit in the context of the offence of causing grievous bodily harm by dangerous driving, involved two related assessments; the first being the objective dangerousness of the defendant’s driving, the second being his moral culpability. The Court said that the first “focuses more on what the driver did, the other on why he did it”. This distinction helps to illustrate why dangerous driving and driving while disqualified are rather different facets of the defendant’s culpability. The dangerous driving charge concerned the objective standard of his driving and how it placed other road users and pedestrians, as well as his

passenger, at risk. The outstanding driving while disqualified charge provided the reason why he had driven as he did to evade the police; as, indeed, he had said under caution and his counsel conceded in mitigation. However, there was another reason why the offences of driving while disqualified and using a motor vehicle without third party insurance merited a consecutive element in sentencing. The applicant had been convicted of exactly the same two offences less than a year before the events of 23 October 2023. To have made the sentences for these same offences wholly concurrent with the dangerous driving charge on this occasion would have been to devalue them completely as well as ignore the fact that the applicant is obviously contemptuous of court orders. Even if I were to accept the argument that the sentence on Charge 1 could have been less than 16 months’ imprisonment, the consecutive element for Charges 2 and 3 could have been more than 3 ‍months’, even as much as 6 months’, imprisonment. Ultimately, it is the overall sentence that the Court of Appeal would be concerned with, not the route by which the sentence was reached. The Court does not reduce a sentence because it would have sentenced differently, if the ultimate result is neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle. Accordingly, I can see no reasonable argument for appeal against any of the sentences

passed or orders made in this case. The application is refused. The applicant is advised that he has the right to renew his application for leave to appeal before the Court of Appeal, but he is also warned that the Court has the power to order the loss of any time the applicant has spent in custody pending his appeal, if it were to come to the conclusion that there was no justification for the renewal of the application. (Andrew Macrae) Vice President Ms Grace Au SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent The Applicant appeared in person

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Secretary for Justice v Chu Wing Yin Christine

Case cited

HKSAR v Chung Ho Yin

Case cited

Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374 s37

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374 s37(2D)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Road Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 374 s44(1)(b)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Motor Vehicles Insurance (Third Party Risks) Ordinance, Cap. 272 ss4(1),4(2)(a)

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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