LAU LUEN HUNG THOMAS v. INSIDER DEALING TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER
The application for leave to appeal out of time was dismissed because the argument based on repeal of section 23(1)(c) SIDO was not before the Court on the earlier occasion and did not arise from the prior decision; exceptional circumstances were not established and the appropriate remedy would be a new application...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- LAU LUEN HUNG THOMAS v. INSIDER DEALING TRIBUNAL AND ANOTHER
- Parties
- Applicant: Lau Luen Hung Thomas; 1st Respondent: Insider Dealing Tribunal; 2nd Respondent: Financial Secretary
- Court
- Court of First Instance
- Jurisdiction
- Hong Kong
- Judgment Date
- 19 May 2008
- Case Number
- HCMP1751/2007
- Procedural Posture
- Miscellaneous Proceedings on Intended Appeal Under the Securities (insider Dealing) Ordinance / Application for Leave to Appeal Out of Time; Dismissed
- Outcome
- Application dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Insider Dealing, Standard of Proof, Leave to Appeal Out of Time, Pecuniary Penalty Jurisdiction, Repeal of Statute Effect
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Lau Luen Hung Thomas
Applicant
Insider Dealing Tribunal
1st Respondent
Financial Secretary
2nd Respondent
Procedural Posture
Miscellaneous Proceedings on Intended Appeal Under the Securities (insider Dealing) Ordinance / Application for Leave to Appeal Out of Time; Dismissed
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether repeal of section 23(1)(c) SIDO and consequent want of jurisdiction to impose a pecuniary penalty constitute exceptional circumstances warranting leave to appeal out of time
- 2 Whether the Applicant is entitled to repayment of the $15,000,000 fined under section 23(1)(c) SIDO
- 3 Whether the point relied upon was properly before the Court and whether jurisdiction exists to grant the relief sought
Ratio Decidendi
The application for leave to appeal out of time was dismissed because the argument based on repeal of section 23(1)(c) SIDO was not before the Court on the earlier occasion and did not arise from the prior decision; exceptional circumstances were not established and the appropriate remedy would be a new application for extension of time if so advised; it was unnecessary to decide the separate jurisdictional points.
Court Disposition
Application dismissed
Orders
- Application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time dismissed
- Applicant ordered to pay costs
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
bjbj HCMP 1751/2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1751 of 2007 (ON AN INTENDED APPEAL PURSUANT TO SECTION 31 OF THE SECURITIES (INSIDER DEALING) ORDINANCE CAP. 395 ( THE ORDINANCE ) FROM DETERMINATIONS OF THE INSIDER DEALING TRIBUNAL IN RELATION TO ASIA ORIENT HOLDINGS LIMITED) _________________________ BETWEEN LAU LUEN HUNG THOMAS Applicant and INSIDER DEALING TRIBUNAL 1st Respondent FINANCIAL SECRETARY 2nd Respondent _________________________ Before : Hon Ma CJHC & Stock JA in Court Date of Hearing : 9 May 2008 Date of Judgment : 9 May 2008 Date of Handing Down Reasons for Judgment : 19 May 2008 _________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT _________________________ Hon Ma CJHC : On 9 2008, this Court dismissed with costs the Applicant s application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal made under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap.484. We further said that the reasons for our judgment would be handed down. By a judgment given on 28 February 2008, we allowed an appeal from the decision of Cheung JA in which he had granted an extension of time to the Applicant to appeal from a decision of the Insider Dealing Tribunal ( the IDT ). The relevant IDT decision had identified the Applicant as an insider dealer and various orders were made against him, including a fine of $15 million. This fine was imposed under section 23(1)(c) of the (now repealed) Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance Cap.395 ( SIDO ). Our decision of 28 February 2008 was to the effect that no extension of time to appeal should be given as no sufficient reason had been demonstrated to justify the granting of this indulgence. The Applicant had at that time sought to rely on a change in law that had occurred after the expiry of the time limited for appeal from the decision of the IDT. The change in law was significant as far as the Applicant was concerned. It had been held by the Court of Appeal in Koon Wing Yee v Insider Dealing Tribunal and Anor, unreported, CACV 358 & 360/2005, 30 2007, that IDT proceedings were criminal in nature and that therefore the criminal standard of proof applied, whereas the finding of insider dealing against the Applicant followed the application of a lesser standard. We held that a change was not, save in exceptional circumstances, sufficient to justify an extension of time and we noted also a deliberate decision on the part of the Applicant not, originally, to make the standard of proof point on appeal. Since our decision made on 28 February 2008, the Court of Final Appeal has handed down its judgment in the Koon Wing Yee case (on 18 March 2008). The Court of Final Appeal reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, essentially holding that proceedings in the IDT could be characterized as civil (and with this conclusion, that the appropriate standard of proof was to be the civil one) providing that the provision as to the imposition of fines (section 23(1)(c) of the SIDO) was struck down. It was this provision that, if left intact, would cause the IDT proceedings to be classified as criminal. By a Notice of Motion dated 26 March 2008, the Applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, submitting that the following questions should be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal (a) Does the repeal of section 23(1)(c) of he Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance Cap.395 and the want of jurisdiction on the part of the 1st Respondent in ordering the Applicant to pay a pecuniary penalty, constitute one of those rare and exceptional occasions, in terms of HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614 and R v Kwok Hing man [1994] 2 HKCLR 160, which warrants the grant of leave to appeal out of time. (b) Is the Applicant entitled to the repayment of the $15,000,000 which the 1st Respondent, pursuant to section 23(1)(c) of the Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance Cap.395, ordered him to pay. The argument of the Applicant ran as follows : with the repeal of section 23(1)(c) of SIDO, he has been fined under a provision that no longer exists and which should not have been in existence at the time the IDT made the order fining him. This, so argued Mr Kevin Patterson (for the Applicant), constituted an exceptional circumstance to justify the granting of leave to appeal out of time. He submitted that R v Kwok Hing Man, referred to above, was strong authority in the Applicant s favour and that the point regarding a conviction for a non existent offence to justify the granting of leave to appeal out of time, had been expressly left open by the Court of Final Appeal in HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614, at 632 (paragraph 25). In response, Mr Ronny Tong, SC (for the 2nd Respondent) resisted the application on a number of grounds, some based on the lack of jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal. In the end, I do not regard it as necessary to deal with the jurisdiction arguments. It seems to me that, even if jurisdiction were to exist, the submission that the Applicant now seeks to advance to justify leave to appeal out of time was simply not one that was made before us on the previous occasion (for obvious reasons). In other words, the question or questions which were sought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal did not arise from the decision of this Court on 28 February 2008. I accept that, on occasion, leave may be granted on a question that has not been raised before or dealt with by the Court of Appeal, but this will be relatively rare. In the present case, it was perhaps more appropriate for the point now sought to be run by the Applicant to be canvassed in a new application for an extension of time to appeal, if so advised. For the above reasons, the application was dismissed. Hon Stock JA : I agree with the reasons provided by the Chief Judge. (Geoffrey Ma) (Frank Stock) Chief Judge, High Court Justice of Appeal Mr Kevin Patterson, instructed by Messrs Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum for the Applicant Mr Ronny Tong, SC & Mr Abraham Chan, instructed by the Department of Justice for the 2nd Respondent PAGE PAGE - A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V 1udk 1udk H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V (#p# &`#$ !0 !0 !0 !0 !0 !0 !0 !0 !0 1A \ @$_"D jFen }Ht8 & 6" Normal.dot setup Microsoft Word 9.0 Title Microsoft Word Document MSWordDoc Word.Document.8