Hong Kong Judgment

Court of First Instance

LEE CHUN MUI v. SECURICOR GURKHA SERVICES LTD AND ANOTHER

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Source document

01

Holding and result

The application for a separate trial was dismissed because the question whether the 2nd third party owed a duty of care was fact‑sensitive and inextricably interwoven with disputed facts in the main action, no significant saving of time or costs would result, and separating the issue would unjustly delay the plaintiff.

Court disposition

Application dismissed

Orders

  • Application for separate trial of preliminary issues dismissed
  • Stay of third party proceedings refused

02

Material facts

Parties

LEE CHUN MUI

Plaintiff Counsel: Miss D. Yew of Messrs Joseph Leung & Associates

SECURICOR GURKHA SERVICES LIMITED

Defendant Counsel: Mr Daniel K. K. Chan, instructed by Messrs T. S. Tong & Co.

TAI YUE ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED

Defendant Counsel: Messrs Paul C. K. Tang & Co.

SECURICOR HONG KONG HOLDINGS LIMITED

Third Party Counsel: Mr Daniel K. K. Chan, instructed by Messrs T. S. Tong & Co.

MICHAEL NG ARCHITECTS & CONSULTANTS LIMITED

Third Party Counsel: Mr Nicholas Longley of Messrs Tanner De Witt

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Personal Injuries Action / Chambers Application for Separate Trial of Preliminary Issues (case Management)

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
The 2nd third party submitted that the duty issue could be examined as a discrete preliminary legal issue involving separate facts and that a separate trial would save time and costs; alternatively sought a stay of third party proceedings.
Respondent
The plaintiff and 1st defendant opposed; argued the duty question is fact‑sensitive and interwoven with main action facts, factual disputes preclude a preliminary legal trial, splitting would delay plaintiff and not produce significant savings; 1st defendant contended accident caused by 2nd defendant and 2nd third party and that 2nd third party may be an occupier depending on control.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2007 paragraphs 34/4/9 and 34/4/9A

    All issues in a case are to be tried together unless it is just and convenient to depart from that rule; separate trials are exceptional

  2. 02

    Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2007 paragraphs 34/4/9 and 34/4/9A

    A preliminary point of law should not be tried separately where there are facts in dispute or where factual and legal issues are interwoven

  3. 03

    Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (11th ed.) paras 7‑93 to 7‑96 and Miller v South of Scotland Electricity Board [1958] S.C. (H.L.) 20

    A duty to take care may be owed by persons other than owners/occupiers where their activities create a source of danger and they know or ought to know of risk; precautions include warnings, guarding and fencing

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

The application for a separate trial was dismissed because the question whether the 2nd third party owed a duty of care was fact‑sensitive and inextricably interwoven with disputed facts in the main action, no significant saving of time or costs would result, and separating the issue would unjustly delay the plaintiff.

Obiter and limits

  • Whether the 2nd third party was an occupier depends on whether it had sufficient control over the staircase
  • Keeping the plaintiff waiting for determination of the preliminary issue at first instance with the possibility of appeal would be unjust and inconvenient
  • A stay of the third party proceedings was not appropriate as the relevant facts must be litigated in the main action

Court disposition

Application dismissed

  • Application for separate trial of preliminary issues dismissed
  • Stay of third party proceedings refused

Source and reliance status

Court of First Instance · 15 February 2007

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Court of First Instance

Judgment· 15 February 2007

LEE CHUN MUI v. SECURICOR GURKHA SERVICES LTD AND ANOTHER

bjbj HCPI 774/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 774 OF 2005

BETWEEN

LEE CHUN MUI Plaintiff and

SECURICOR GURKHA SERVICES LIMITED 1st Defendant

TAI YUE ENGINEERING COMPANY LIMITED 2nd Defendant and

SECURICOR HONG KONG HOLDINGS LIMITED 1st Third Party MICHAEL NG ARCHITECTS & CONSULTANTS LIMITED 2nd Third Party Before : Hon Sakhrani J in Chambers Date of Hearing : 15 February 2007 Date of Decision : 15 February 2007

D E C I S I O N

AUTONUMOUT This is an application by the 2nd third party for an order that there be a separate trial of preliminary issues relating to the question of whether the 2nd third party owed a duty of care to the plaintiff at common law or under the Occupiers Liability Ordinance Cap. 314 ( ). I notice that if such an order were made, this would not dispose of all questions of liability between the 1st third party and the 2nd third party. The application is made by summons dated 10 January 2007. This is a matter of case management.

AUTONUMOUT The plaintiff s claim in this action is for damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff was injured in the course of her employment as a security officer with the 1st defendant which provides security services. At the material time the plaintiff was working at the Security Centre, 483, Castle Peak Road, New Territories ( the premises ).

AUTONUMOUT The premises were at the time undergoing renovation and construction works. The 2nd defendant was the principal contractor who was contracted to carry out such works.

AUTONUMOUT On 16 August 2003 in the course of her employment with the 1st defendant, the plaintiff fell down a staircase ( the staircase ) in the premises. The plaintiff s case is that she was descending from the top rung of the staircase. As she was stepping on the third or fourth rung from the top, she slipped and fell because the rungs and floors of the staircase were rough and uneven and the handrails were demolished. As a result she sustained personal injuries. The staircase was also undergoing renovation works at that time.

AUTONUMOUT The plaintiff claims against the 1st defendant as the employer for damages for negligence and breach of duty. There is also a claim for breach of duty under the OLO. The plaintiff claims against the 2nd defendant for breach of duty under the OLO.

AUTONUMOUT The 2nd defendant joined the 1st third party by a third party notice. The 1st third party owns the premises and is an associated company of the 1st defendant. By the third party notice the 2nd defendant claims contribution and indemnity.

AUTONUMOUT The 1st defendant joined the 2nd third party by a third party notice claiming contribution and indemnity. The 2nd third party are the architects for the renovation and construction works.

AUTONUMOUT This application is opposed by the plaintiff and the 1st defendant.

AUTONUMOUT The principles governing whether a split trial should be ordered or not is well settled and is contained in the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2007 at paragraphs 34/4/9 and 34/4/9A. The general rule is that all the issues in a case are to be tried at the same time. Only if it was just and convenient should there be a departure from the general rule. An order for separate trial should only be made in exceptional circumstances on special grounds.

AUTONUMOUT It is also clear that where the issues of fact are interwoven with the legal issues raised it will be undesirable for the Court to split the legal and factual determination. And it is also a principle that the order for the trial of a preliminary point of law should not be made where there are facts in dispute.

AUTONUMOUT I have considered the submission of Mr Longley for the 2nd third party in support of the application. I am unable to accept, as submitted by him, that an examination of whether the 2nd third party owed a duty of care to the plaintiff requires an analysis of quite discrete facts and circumstances.

AUTONUMOUT Mr. Chan, for the 1st defendant, rightly pointed out that the 1st defendant s claim against the 2nd third party is on the basis that the accident to the plaintiff was caused by the 2nd third party in common law negligence as well as the breach of the common duty of care under the OLO.

AUTONUMOUT At paragraph 7 93 of Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence 11th ed., it is stated The duty to take care, when it is known that a person is present upon land and is likely to be injured unless care is taken, is by no means confined to those who own or occupy the land. It is a duty which is owed by everybody about to do an act which will cause injury unless care is taken.

AUTONUMOUT And at paragraph 7 94, it is stated The duty of a person who is neither the owner nor the occupier of land may in some cases be greater than that of the owner or occupier. If he is doing something on the land which he knows or ought to know will be a source of danger to persons on or likely to come on the land and meddle with the subject of his activity, he is under a duty to take precautions to prevent damage. Reasonable precautions will include such matters as giving warnings, guarding, fencing off or otherwise taking steps to preserve the safety of the persons who come on the premises.

AUTONUMOUT And at paragraph 7 96, there is contained the following quotation from Lord Denning in Miller v. South of Scotland Electricity Board [1958] S.C. (H.L.) 20 to a third party depending on the facts of the case. The factual circumstances relating to the duty of care of the 2nd third party are in dispute.

AUTONUMOUT The 1st defendant says that the accident was caused by 2nd defendant and the 2nd third party because they knew of the state of the staircase. The 1st defendant also says that the 2nd third party was also the occupier of the staircase. This depends on whether on the facts of the case the 2nd third party has sufficient control of the staircase so as to make it liable as an occupier.

AUTONUMOUT It seems to me that the facts and circumstances that the Court would have to consider in arriving at whether or not there was a duty of care on the part of the 2nd third party cannot be isolated and separated from the facts and circumstances in the main action. The consideration of the question of whether the 2nd third party owed a duty of care to the plaintiff is fact sensitive and cannot conveniently be separated from all the facts in dispute by the parties in the action.

AUTONUMOUT I have considered the other submissions made by Mr. Longley. I am not persuaded that there will be a significant saving of time and costs if an order were made.

AUTONUMOUT In my judgment it is not just and convenient to make an order as sought.

AUTONUMOUT I would also observe that the plaintiff would also, if an order were made, be kept waiting to have his trial in the main action while the issue is determined at first instance with the possibility of an appeal. That is not, in my view, acceptable and is wholly unjust and inconvenient to the plaintiff.

AUTONUMOUT Longley submitted that as an alternative there should be a stay of the third party proceedings. That is also not acceptable, in my view, as all the relevant facts would have to be gone into the main action and it would not be just and convenient to separate the matter in the manner sought.

AUTONUMOUT I dismiss the application. (Arjan H. Sakhrani) Judge of the Court of First Instance, High Court Miss D. Yew of Messrs Joseph Leung & Associates, for the Plaintiff Mr Daniel K. K. Chan, instructed by Messrs T. S. Tong & Co., for the 1st Defendant and 1st Third Party Messrs Paul C. K. Tang & Co. for the 2nd Defendant, being absent Mr Nicholas Longley of Messrs Tanner De Witt for the 2nd Third Party

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Miller v South of Scotland Electricity Board [1958] S.C. (H.L.) 20

Case cited

Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (11th ed.)

Case cited

Occupiers Liability Ordinance Cap. 314

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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