YAM WING CHIU v. WONG YEE LING AND ANOTHER

DCCJ 1047/2022 [2026] HKDC 632 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 1047 OF 2022 --------------------------------------- BETWEEN YAM WING CHIU Plaintiff and WONG YEE LING 1st Defendant NG KA MAN 2nd Defendant --------------------------------------- Before: Master Vincent Kee in Court Date of Hearing: 4 February 2026 Date of Assessment of Damages: 17 April 2026 ------------------------------------------ ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES ------------------------------------------ A. INTRODUCTION This is an assessment of damages in a libel action. Judgment on liability was entered against the 1st and 2nd Defendants in default of defence by DDJ B Mak on 28 November 2022 (“Default Judgment”). See [2022] HKDC 1377. At the hearing for assessment of damages, the 1st and 2nd Defendants were unrepresented and did not appear. Having considered the affirmation of service filed on 2 February 2026 on behalf of the Plaintiff, I was satisfied that the 1st and 2nd Defendants had been duly notified of the proceedings and the hearing for assessment of damages. I therefore proceeded with the hearing in their absence. B. THE PLAINTIFF’S CASE I gratefully adopt the Plaintiff’s pleaded case as summarized by DDJ B Mak in the Default Judgment as well as the abbreviations used therein: “9. The plaintiff had been a member of the Society for Abandoned Animals Limited (“SAA”) since around mid-2016. He was disqualified as a volunteer dog handler on or around 27 July 2018. 10. The 1st defendant is and was a dog training consultant of SAA. The 2nd defendant is and was the general manager of SAA. 11. There was a whatsapp group in the name of “SAA領犬員交流區” for communications between the management of SAA and the volunteer dog handlers of which plaintiff, the 1st defendant and other volunteers of SAA were members (“the volunteer whatsapp group”). There were around 50 members in the group. 12. There was another whatsapp group in the name of “SAA PAK SHA SHELTER通訊” within the management of SAA including the 1st and 2nd defendants (“the management whatsapp group”). 13. On 27 July 2018, the 1st defendant posted the following message in the volunteer whatsapp group: “近日收到眾多領犬員投訴，被某領犬員不停滋擾，感到心身疲累。而該滋擾領犬員亦不認同會內機構做法。於報刊將事實內容本抹倒置，會內決定取消該領犬員資格。感謝該領犬員這些年來的幫忙，希望日後你能幫助其他更多有需要的事情。謝謝。” (“the 1st statement”) 14. The plaintiff was removed from the volunteer whatsapp group immediately after 1st statement was published. 15. On or around 27 July 2018, the 2nd defendant posted the following message in the management whatsapp group: “近日收到眾多領犬員投訴，被領犬員（阿超）不停滋擾。而他亦不認同本會制度，監於避免他會挑撥及擾亂本會秩序為由，因此從即日起取消其領犬員資格。 另外與同事工作上有不清晰的問題，應向直屬主管查詢。如外界對本會有任何查詢，亦歡迎致電查詢。” (“the 2nd statement”) 16. Both the 1st and the 2nd statement were communicated to members in the 2 whatsapp groups. 17. The plaintiff says the 1st and 2nd statement conveyed the message that a large number of volunteer dog handlers complained that the plaintiff harassed and/or caused nuisance to them whereby his reputation was harmed.” Insofar as the assessment of damages is concerned, the Plaintiff in the Statement of Claim claimed against the 1st and 2nd Defendants jointly and severally for general damages and exemplary damages. C. DEFAULT JUDGMENT In the Default Judgment, DDJ B Mak found for the Plaintiff on libel. He was satisfied that the 1st and 2nd statements were published by the 1st and 2nd Defendants respectively and they were defamatory to the reputation of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was awarded damages to be assessed and granted an injunction restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants from publishing similar defamatory statement. D. EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF The Plaintiff adopted his witness statement dated 10 June 2025 in full at the hearing for assessment of damages. The Plaintiff said that: The 1st and 2nd statements were respectively published in two different WhatsApp groups containing around 60 members in total. The Plaintiff was removed from the volunteer WhatsApp group after the 1st Defendant had published the 1st statement. He did not have a chance to explain to other members. After the publishing of the 1st statement in the volunteer WhatsApp group, other volunteers of SAA mistakenly believed that the Plaintiff did persistently disturb other volunteers causing them to lodge complaints about him. After the publishing of the 2nd statement in the management WhatsApp group, some managing staff of SAA mistakenly believed that the Plaintiff did persistently disturb other volunteers causing them to lodge complaints about him. As a result, the Plaintiff was disqualified from being a volunteer dog handler of SAA. Other volunteers chose to distance themselves from him. Since 2015, the Plaintiff was suffering from mental illness. His condition had improved a lot since joining SAA. He added when giving evidence in Court that he started to have less irrational thoughts and not to be afraid of loud noises after undertaking volunteer works in SAA. However, because of the 1st and 2nd statements, the Plaintiff lost his qualification as a volunteer dog handler and the opportunity to take care of dogs and make friends in SAA, contributing to the relapse of his mental illness. He therefore had to attend follow-up sessions at Tuen Mun Mental Health Centre. According to a psychiatric report by the Castle Peak Hospital dated 3 February 2023, it was reported that: After being disqualified as a volunteer dog handler, the Plaintiff had low mood and poor sleep. He had mood fluctuation reactive to different psychosocial stressors. Desvenlafaxine 50 mg was prescribed to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s evidence was all unchallenged. I find him a credible witness. I accept his evidence in full. Although the Plaintiff mentioned in his witness statement that he would claim medical expenses, Mr Siu for the Plaintiff confirmed that the Plaintiff’s claim would only be limited to general damages and exemplary damages as pleaded. E. GENERAL DAMAGES E1. Legal Principles The legal principles in relation to an award of general damages in a libel action are well-settled. Ribeiro PJ in Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Ming Pao Holdings Ltd (2012) 15 HKCFAR 299, at §§35-39 cited the following words of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in John v MGN Ltd [1996] 3 WLR 593 with approval: “The successful plaintiff in a defamation action is entitled to recover, as general compensatory damages, such sum as will compensate him for the wrong he has suffered. That sum must compensate him for the damage to his reputation; vindicate his good name; and take account of the distress, hurt and humiliation which the defamatory publication has caused.” “In assessing the appropriate damages for injury to reputation the most important factor is the gravity of the libel; the more closely it touches the plaintiff's personal integrity, professional reputation, honour, courage, loyalty and the core attributes of his personality, the more serious it is likely to be. The extent of publication is also very relevant: a libel published to millions has a greater potential to cause damage than a libel published to a handful of people. A successful plaintiff may properly look to an award of damages to vindicate his reputation: but the significance of this is much greater in a case where the defendant asserts the truth of the libel and refuses any retraction or apology than in a case where the defendant acknowledges the falsity of what was published and publicly expresses regret that the libellous publication took place. It is well established that compensatory damages may and should compensate for additional injury caused to the plaintiff's feelings by the defendant's conduct of the action, as when he persists in an unfounded assertion that the publication was true, or refuses to apologise, or cross-examines the plaintiff in a wounding or insulting way.” At §40, Ribeiro PJ further cited the relevant factors in assessing general damages as listed by Hirst LJ in Jones v Pollard [1997] EMLR 233, at p 243: “1. The objective features of the libel itself, such its gravity, its prominence, the circulation of the medium in which it was published, and any repetition. 2. The subjective effect on the plaintiff's feelings (usually categorized as aggravating features) not only from the publication itself, but also from the defendant's conduct thereafter both up to and including the trial itself. 3. Matters tending to mitigate damages, such as the publication of an apology. 4. Matters tending to reduce damages, e.g. evidence of the plaintiff's bad reputation, or evidence given at the trial which the jury are entitled to take into account ... 5. Special damages. 6. Vindication of the plaintiff's reputation past and future.” E2. Analysis Mr Siu suggested HK$200,000 as being a reasonable sum for general damages. He also submitted the following authorities for consideration: Lee Ching v Lau May Ming [2007] 3 HKLRD 623 Lo Sam Shing v Li Fong (unreported, HCA 1803/2011, 14 March 2014) Kwan Siu Wa, Becky v Marla Susilo (unreported, DCCJ 5396/2007, 17 May 2011) As observed by Le Pichon J in Hung Yuen Chan v Hongkong Standard Newspapers Ltd & Others [1996] 4 HKC 519, at p 536G-H: “As the circumstances of each libel are likely to differ and the factors to be taken into account depend on the facts of each individual case, it is difficult to extrapolate from previous awards unless there are significant similarities.” The cases referred to me by Mr Siu are not of any significant similarities to the present case. They can only be taken into account as reference but not for direct comparison and application. My reasons for the appropriate quantum of general damages are as follows: The Plaintiff was a committed member of SAA since joining in 2016. After the publication of the 1st and 2nd statements, there were members and managing staff of SAA who mistakenly thought that the Plaintiff did disturb other members causing them to lodge complaints. As a result, the Plaintiff lost his qualification as a volunteer dog handler in SAA. His mental condition became unstable again and needed to resort to medical treatment. No apology was offered by the 1st and 2nd Defendants. However, the audience of the 1st and 2nd statements were only about 60 people. There was no clear evidence relating to the Plaintiff’s reputation built up in SAA. There was also no evidence regarding the duration of the publication of the 1st and 2nd statements. In Lee Ching, the offending open letter which contained five imputations was circulated among about 200 members of a charitable organization. The plaintiffs were long-serving, experienced, dedicated and loyal volunteers of the organization. No apology had ever been offered by the defendant despite written demand. Malice was found in publishing the offending open letter by the defendant. General damages in the sum of HK$200,000 was awarded. I consider that the scale of the libel in the present case is less serious and extensive than that in Lee Ching. Having considered all the circumstances carefully, I award general damages in the sum of HK$180,000 to the Plaintiff. F. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES F1. Legal Principles In Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129, Lord Devlin at pp 1226-1227 said that an award of exemplary damages is permissible in a case of defamation where: “The defendant’s conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff… Where a defendant with a cynical disregard for a plaintiff’s rights has calculated that the money to be made out of his wrongdoing will probably exceed the damages at risk, it is necessary for the law to show that it cannot be broken with impunity.” The Court also has the discretion to award exemplary damages where there is conduct amounting to an outrageous disregard of the plaintiff’s right. In this regard, Lord Nicholls said the following in Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary [2002] 2 AC 122: “63. …The availability of exemplary damages has played a significant role in buttressing civil liberties, in claims for false imprisonment and wrongful arrest. From time to time cases do arise where awards of compensatory damages are perceived as inadequate to achieve a just result between the parties. The nature of the defendant’s conduct calls for a further response from the courts. On occasion conscious wrongdoing by a defendant is so outrageous, his disregard of the plaintiff’s rights so contumelious, that something more is needed to show that the law will not tolerate such behaviour. Without an award of exemplary damages, justice will not have been done. Exemplary damages, as a remedy of last resort, fill what otherwise would be a regrettable lacuna. … 67. Nor, I may add, am I wholly persuaded by Lord Devlin’s formulation of his second category (wrongful conduct expected to yield a benefit in excess of any compensatory award likely to be made). The law of unjust enrichment has developed apace in recent years. In so far as there may be a need to go further, the key here would seem to be the same as that already discussed: outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant. There is no obvious reason why, if exemplary damages are to be available, the profit motive should suffice but a malicious motive should not. 68. As I have said, difficult questions arise here. In view of the limited scope of the submissions made by the parties on this appeal, this is not the occasion for attempting to state comprehensive conclusions on these matters. For the purposes of the present appeal it is sufficient, first, to express the view that the House should now depart from its decision in Broome v Cassell Co. Ltd [1972] AC 1027, in so far as that decision confirmed the continuing existence of what has subsequently been described as the “cause of action” condition and, secondly, to note that the essence of the conduct constituting the court’s discretionary jurisdiction to award exemplary damages is conduct which was an outrageous disregard of the plaintiff’s rights.” F2. Analysis Mr Siu fairly did not press on this head. He rightly accepted that if the amount of general damages is sufficient to compensate for the harm done to the Plaintiff because of the 1st and 2nd statements, then no exemplary damages will be allowed. In any event, with the above legal principles in mind, I am not satisfied that the wrongdoing of the 1st and 2nd Defendant is so outrageous to the extent that a further response from the Court by awarding exemplary damages should be called for. This is because: There was no evidence suggesting that the making of the 1st and 2nd statements by the 1st and 2nd Defendants was calculated or motivated by any financial gains. There was no evidence suggesting that the wrongful behaviours of the 1st and 2nd Defendants were so contumelious that without an award of exemplary damages justice will not be done. In my view, the compensatory damages as awarded above is already sufficient to compensate the Plaintiff for the harm done by the 1st and 2nd Defendants. As a result, I refuse to allow any exemplary damages. G. DISPOSITION Based on the aforesaid, I make the following orders: The 1st and 2nd Defendants do jointly and severally pay the Plaintiff the sum of HK$180,000 as general damages, with interest at judgment rate from the date of this judgement until payment. The 1st and 2nd Defendants do jointly and severally pay the Plaintiff costs incurred after 28 November 2022 (i.e. the date of the Default Judgment), inclusive of the costs of and incidental to the assessment of damages, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed. I thank Mr Stephen Siu for his assistance. ( Vincent Kee ) Master, District Court Mr Stephen Siu, instructed by VL Lawyers, for the Plaintiff The 1st and 2nd Defendants were not represented and did not appear