YUEN CHIU FUK 對 WONG MING

DCPI 822/2018 [2022] HKDC 167 香港特別行政區 區域法院 傷亡訴訟2018年第822號 --------------------------- 原告人 YUEN CHIU FUK 及 被告人 WONG MING --------------------------- 主審法官：區域法院暫委法官卓元暢法庭聆訊 聆訊日期：2021年11月15及17日 判案書日期：2022年4月4日 -------------------- 判案書 -------------------- 甲、簡介 本案涉及一宗於2015年4月28日約下午5時39分在新界上水掃管埔路發生的交通意外（「該意外」）。 該意外經過不受爭議。原告人駕駛車輛PV7750， 由粉嶺公路支路駛入掃管埔路，沿第一線向新運路方向行駛，而被告人駕駛車輛FT7890於原告人右方沿第二線行駛。當被告人駕駛其車輛由第二線向左方切線往第一線時，被告人車輛的左邊車身與原告人車輛的右邊車身相撞。 根據原告人的案情，該意外導致原告人下背部受傷。 被告人於《抗辯書》中承認該意外是由其疏忽所引致，被告人爭議的是該意外並沒有導致原告人所聲稱的傷勢和損失。 簡而言之，本案所爭議的不是是否存在疏忽，而是：— 該意外與原告人所聲稱的傷勢和損失的因果問題；以及 賠償金額的問題。 根據原告人於2019年6月21日存檔的《經編正的損害賠償陳述書》，原告人作出以下的申索：— 原告人（港幣） (1) 疼痛、痛苦及喪失生活樂趣損失（下稱「PSLA」） $200,000 (2) 審前收入損失 $180,900 (3) 喪失賺取收入能力的賠償 $100,000 (4) 審前特別項目賠償 $2,295 合計 $483,195 被告人沒有存檔《回答書》。根據法庭於2020年9月16日頒布的命令，被告人被視為選擇不作出相關《回答書》。 原告人由黃莎貽大律師代表，被告人則是親自行事。 乙、本案的證據 原告人於2019年4月30日作出了一份證人陳述書。原告人也於2018年12月3日作出了一份證人陳述書。兩人皆有出庭接受盤問。 原告人於2019年3月6日接受聯合醫學專家證人張民冠骨科醫生檢測，張醫生於2019年4月11日撰寫了聯合骨科報告。 根據法庭於2019年5月24日頒布的命令，張醫生所撰寫的聯合骨科報告（「《專家報告》」）將在審訊時被接納為證據，而無須傳召張醫生出庭作供。 丙、法律原則 在Yu Wai Kan（余偉強） v Law Cho Tai（羅灶帶）（HCPI 62/2010，2011年5月11日，未經彙編），於 [71]，吳美玲聆案官（其時官階）闡明，若原告人於意外前有「舊患」，意外與原告人損失及損毀的因果關係（causation）及原告人應獲的賠償金額（quantification）的法律原則如下：— “It appears to me that the following are the principles which govern the issue of causation and the quantification of loss suffered by the Plaintiff: The burden is on the plaintiff to establish on the balance of probabilities that the accident caused or materially contributed to the loss and damages he has sustained (see CMY v Tam Siu Wing [2008] 4 HKLRD 604, 613). The law's approach to causation is pragmatic where there are several concurrent factors operating to cause injury (see Lee Kin-kai, a patient by his father and next friend Li Wah v Ocean Tramping Co Ltd t/a Ocean Tramping Workshop [1991] 2 HKLR 232, 236). A material contribution to the outcome is sufficient to impose liability for that outcome. A contribution which does not fall within the exception de minimus non curat lex must be material; and a cause is sufficient, it does not need to be the sole cause (see CMY at p.612). Causation is essentially a matter for the judge and not for the doctors. The judge will be assisted by the medical evidence but is not bound by it; he is not confined to those matters which the doctors may individually have picked out in their consulting rooms. It is important to bear in mind that law and medicine apply different standards. In law, there is a causal connection if it is shown on the balance of probabilities that the accident is a substantially contributing cause of the injury. On the other hand, the doctors practice the science of aetiology and look for 'clinical cause' or 'irrefragable chain of causation' which is to be proved beyond reasonable doubt or beyond any doubt (see Lee Kin-kai, a patient by his father and next friend Li Wah at pp.235-236, Lee Sau Keung v Maxcredit Engineering Ltd & anor [2004] 1 HKC 434, 450, and Ansar Mohammad v Global Legend Transportation Limited CACV 162/2010 (unreported, 24 March 2011) at para.22(2)). The wrongdoer must take his victim as he finds him so that the wrongdoer remains liable even though the severity or extent of the damage has been increased due to the victim's pre-existing weakness or susceptibility to harm. This 'thin skull' rule (see Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence 12th ed para.5-26 at p.350) extends to 'eggshell personality' (see Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence 12th ed paras. 5-31 - 5-33 at pp.351-352, Lam Wing Ming v Dragages et Trauvaux Publics (HK) Ltd & anor HCPI 1090/1995, Master A Chung (as he then was) (unreported, 21 July 1998) at paras.14-17, CMY at pp.610-613 and Page v Smith [1995] 2 All ER 736). Thus, if the primary victim has a pre-existing propensity to depression or psychiatric illness which is activated or re-activated by physical injury caused by the wrongdoer's negligence, the wrongdoer cannot escape liability for the loss caused by the activated or re-activated depression even in rare or aggravated form by pleading lack of foreseeability once the relevant duty of care is established and personal injury of some kind is reasonably foreseeable. When considering the effect of a pre-existing condition on an award of damages, there are 3 possible scenarios. The first is where the plaintiff is almost certain to have gone through life unaffected by the condition, and the defendant will be liable for all damage caused. The second is where there is a strong possibility that some other event or natural progression of the condition will have brought about the plaintiff's present state, so it will be necessary to assess the degree of the possibility in deciding what reduction is appropriate in the same way as it is necessary to assess the effect of other vicissitudes of life that may abbreviate the plaintiff's working life or lifespan and thus abridge his loss. The third is where this will certainly have occurred at some stage in any event so that clearly an allowance has to be made but the extent of which depends on the evidence as to when the precipitating event will have occurred (see Chan Kam Hoi v Dragages et Trauvaux Publics [1998] 4 HKC 523, 527). Where a pre-existing condition is likely to lead to disability and loss in the absence of the injury for which the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the usual method of assessing the recoverable loss is to take account of the risks by an appropriate assessment of general damages. Past loss of earnings may also be reduced if the risks during the years concerned are sufficiently high. For future loss of earnings, a reduced multiplier is usually the most accurate way of giving effect to the findings on the medical evidence, especially when a plaintiff's working life is likely to be limited by a pre-existing condition (see Chan Kam Hoi at p. 529 and Cheung Fat Tim v Wong Siu Ming trading as Kee Construction Company & anor HCA 5079/1991, Findlay J (unreported, 17 January 1995)). The principles in (e)-(f) above have been developed by the courts to give the plaintiff reasonable compensation in order to achieve restitutio in integrum, which is the key objective in awarding loss caused by negligence.” 丁、該意外與原告人所聲稱的傷勢和損失的因果問題 於審訊中，被告人指出在該意外後，原告人的車輛只有倒後鏡有損毁，原告人於意外現場亦沒有表示不適，因此原告人根本沒有因意外遭受人身傷害。 本席認為被告人的案情與當時文件的紀錄不符。就原告人車輛的損毁，高級警員16556陳志光的口供指「V1：P/C PV7750右車頭及車身損毁」，警員52277趙志廣的口供指「V1：P/C PV7750（右邊車頭損毁）」。 就原告人於該意外現場曾否表示他有不適，高級警員16556陳志光的口供指「司機男子袁照福 … 司機腰痛。現場有救護車A637治理」。警員52277趙志廣的口供指「D1 (I/PI)：M/袁照福（58歲）（腰痛輕傷清醒）。」 而且，原告人於意外發生約4小時後已到醫院急症室求醫。根據《專家報告》，原告人下背軟組織的傷勢與該意外模式一致。 基於以上原因，本席認為該意外導致或至少有份促成原告人的下背部傷勢。 戊、賠償金額的問題 被告人案情指原告人於意外前有「舊患」，包括：— 原告人於2007年5月1日駕駛巴士開工時發生交通意外，令其腰部及頸部受傷； 原告人於2009年4月10日駕駛巴士開工時發生交通意外，令其頸、胸、背及腰部受傷； 原告人於2011年4月29日乘搭巴士是發生交通意外，令其頸部扭傷及下頷撞傷；及 原告人於2011年12月17日駕駛巴士開工時發生第四次交通意外，第三度扭傷頸部，頸椎多處椎間盤突出及椎管狹窄引致神經線受擠壓，及頸椎出現明顯退化。 就2009年4月10日的交通意外， 雖然該意外牽涉原告人的背部及腰部，但《專家報告》中指出有關傷勢在該意外發生前應已康復至令人滿意的程度。雖然《專家報告》未有提及2007年的交通意外，但由於2007年的交通意外發生的時間早於2009年，在邏輯上而言，若果《專家報告》認為2009年的傷勢已康復，也必然代表在2009年之前的傷勢也已康復。 就2011年兩項的其他交通意外， 它們與背部和腰部無關， 被告人被盤問時也同意 這個說法。 總括而言，本席認為原告人的舊患與原告人在本案中所遭受的損失無關。 戊1. PSLA 在結案陳詞中，黃大律師在這個項目上沒有堅持要求HK$200,000。她提供了多個案例，認為法庭應給予HK$130,000至HK$150,000。本席認為每個案例都是根據當時的實質情況而釐定金額，而該意外對原告人所造成的傷勢並不嚴重，在這個項目中，本席認為HK$90,000已經是足夠的賠償。 戊2. 審訊前的收入損失 戊2.1 獲批病假期間的收入損失 本席接納原告人的證供，於意外發生時，他的收入為每日HK$1,200，而他每月平均工作約20日，故原告人的平均每月收入為HK$1,200 ×20 = HK$24,000。 原告人獲批192病假（由2015年4月29日至2015年11月6日）。相關病假獲《專家報告》認可。 故此，原告人在這個項目中應得HK$24,000 × 192/30 = HK$153,600。 戊2.2 獲批病假後的收入損失 根據《專家報告》：— “Working Capacity & Prognosis 15. For his current condition, he should be fit to resume his former duty with reduced efficiency such as intermittent pain over his lower back on prolonged standing and walking, heavy lifting, extreme range of movement of his lower back or prolonged staircase or slope walking etc. His endurance can also be affected slightly. His current light duty arrangement could be a suitable alternative. 16. The prognosis is considered to be good with the pain showing further improvement in the future. Assessment 17. For his orthopaedic condition with reference to the pre-injury job nature, those sick leaves given should be endorsed. 18. For the parties’ reference, the degree of whole person impairment and LOEC is considered to be 1-1.25% purely for this particular accident. 19. He does not need further assessment by other doctors.” 根據原告人自己的案情，他只預計自己會從事貨倉及機械維修和燒焊工作至60歲（即直到2016年9月3日）。而根據現實的情況，原告人於病假完結後並沒有從事其他工作，並且於2016年6月1日（即相當接近60歲時）轉工，開始從事復康巴士司機工作。本席認為，原告人於2016年6月1日轉工是基於個人的選擇而不是由該意外導致，本席因此不批准原告人病假後的收入損失。 戊3. 喪失工作能力的損害賠償 於Tang Siu Tung v Sunbase International Properties Management Limited [2021] HKDC 543，於 [71]，區域法院法官歐陽浩榮闡述喪失工作能力的損害賠償的法律原則如下：— “71. In Moeliker v A Reyrolle and Co Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 132 at 140A-B (which was approved in Kings Light Industrial Limited v Lo Wai Keung [1994] 3 HKC 54 at 62 B-G), it was held that:- “This head of damage generally only arises where a plaintiff is, at the time of the trial, in employment, but there is a risk that he may lose this employment at some time in the future, and may then, as a result of his injury, be at a disadvantage in getting another job or an equally well paid job. It is a different head of damages from an actual loss of future earnings which can already be proved at the time of the trial.” 72. In Moeliker, Browne LJ further explained that:- “I do not think one can say more by way of principle than this. The consideration of this head of damages should be made in two stages. 1. Is there a ‘substantial’ or ‘real’ risk that a plaintiff will lose his present job at some time before the estimated end of his working life? 2. If there is (but not otherwise), the court must assess and quantify the present value of the risk of the financial damage which the plaintiff will suffer if that risk materialise, having regard to the degree of the risk, the time when it may materialise, and the factors, both favourable and unfavourable, which in a particular case will, or may, affect the plaintiff's chances of getting a job at all, or an equally well paid job.” (see Moeliker v Reyrolle [1977] 1 WLR 132 at 142A-C)” 根據原告人自己的證據，他已經在2021年9月3日（65歲）退休，本席因此不會在這項目給予任何賠償。 戊4. 專項賠償 本席接納原告人因意外引致以下開支：— 項目 金額 (1) 醫療費用 $1,295 (2) 交通費用 $1,000 ______ 總額： $2,295 ===== 己、結論 根據以上所說，原告人應得的賠償如下：— 原告人（港幣） (1) 疼痛、痛苦及喪失生活樂趣損失（下稱「PSLA」） $90,000 (2) 審前收入損失 $153,600 (3) 專項賠償 $2,295 合計 $245,895 就利息而言：— PSLA的利息為年利率兩厘，由入稟狀送達日（2018年4月19日）開始起計，直至本判決日。 審前收入損失和專項賠償的利息為判決利率的一半，由該意外發生日（2015年4月28日）直至本判決日。 總判決額（HK$245,895）的利息為判決利率，由本判決日起直至付款。 就本案的訟費而言，由於原告人是勝方，原告人理應得到訟費。暫准訟費命令如下：— 被告人須支付原告人在本案中的訟費，包括大律師證書，若果雙方未能同意訟費金額，則由法庭釐定。 除非任何一方在14天內以傳票方式提出申請更改，以上的暫准訟費命令將會成為絕對命令。 本席最後感謝黃大律師的協助。 （ 卓元暢 ） 區域法院暫委法官 原告人：由莊凌雲律師事務所延聘黃莎貽大律師代表 被告人：沒有律師代表，並親自應訊