BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON AND SILK MILLS CO. LTD., BANGALORE versus CORPORATION OF THE CITY OE BANGALORE, BY ITS COMMISSIONER, BANGALORE CITY.

.I96I

April 5.

a S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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BANGALORE WOOLLEN, COTTON AND SILK MILLS CO. LTD., BANGALORE v. CORPORATION OF THE CITY OE' BANGALORE, BY ITS COMMISSIONER, BANGA~ORE CITY. (with connected appeal and petitions) (S. K. Das, J. L. KAPUR, M. HrnAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA AYYAB, JJ.)

M unicipality-Octroi-Constitutionality of-Final resolution for levying not published in Official Gazette-Defect, if can be vali dated-City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, r949 (69 of r949), ·ss. 38(I)(b), 98, IOJ, Sch. Ill, Part V, Classes I to Vlll Constitution of India, Arts. 276, 3or-Goverilment of India Act, r935 (26 Geo. V, Ch. 2), s. r42-A.

The appellants in the two appeals and petitioners under Art. 32 of the Constitution challenged the constitutionality of the imposition of octroi duty on cotton and wool on the grounds that (1) the failure to notify the final resolution of the imposition of the tax in the Government Gazette as required by s. 98(2) of the City of Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act was fatal to the tax, and that (2) the imposition of the tax offended Art. 276 or 301 of the Constitution.

Held, that the impugned octroi duty did not contravene the

provisions of Arts. 276 and 301 of the Constitution.

Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) v. The Union of India [1960] 2

S.C.R. 671, held inapplicahle.

Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. The State of Assam [1961] l S.G.R.

809, referred to.

Section 38(1)(b) of the Act validated any defect or irregular ity in proceedings taken under the Act which did not afiect the merits of the case. The failure to publish the final resolution did not affect 'the merits of the imposition of the tax and was there fore not fatal to it. i• The mere fact that s. 38(1)(b) occurred in a chapter dealing with Municipal Authorities or the other parts of the Section dealt with another subject was no reason for confining its operation to those subjects only.

Harla v. State of Rajasthan [1952] S.C.R. no and State of

Kera/av. P. ]. Joseph A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 296, referred to.

'fhe contention that the impugned tax contravened the pro visions of Art. 276 of the Constitution was not sustainable. Entry 52 in List II of the Constitution and entry 49 in the Government of India Act, 1935, which relate to taxes on entry of goods into a local area are not afiected by Art. 272 of the Constitution and

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[1961)

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s. r42-A of the Government of India Act, which are similar to each other and relate only to a distinct head of taxation i.e.,

~angalore Woollen, taxes on professions, trades and callings etc.

Cotton and Sllh Mills Co. Ltd. v.

The Municipality of Chopda v. M otilal M anekchand I.L.R. [r958] Born. 483, Gajadhar Hiralal Ginning and Pressing Factory v. The Municipal Committee, Washim I.L.R. [r958] Born. 628 and COYptwation of the Secretary, Municipal Committee, Karanja v. The New East India City 01 Bangalore Press Co. Ltd., Bombay A.LR. r949 Nag. 2r5, distinguished.

Classes I to VII in Schedule III of Part V make certain speci fied articles taxable and Class VIII makes "other articles which ~re not specified" taxable if approved by the Corporation. The qombined effect of ss. 97 and r30 and Part V of Schedule III including Class VIII is that the words used are of very general nature and would have the same effect as if all articles were intended to be and were included.

Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. v. The State of Bombay [r96r] I S.C.R.

709, followed.

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/

CIVIL APPELLATE Nos. 448 and 449of1957

JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals

with

Writ Petitions Nos. 97 and 107 of 1961. Appeals

from the judgment and order dated September 27, 1956, of the Mysore High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 44 and 45 of 1955.

M. C. Setal,vad, Attorney-General for India, N. C. Chatterjee, D. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghose, for the appellant in C. A. No. 448/57 and Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 97/1961.

M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, V. L. Narasimhamoorty, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for appellant in C. A. No. 449/57 and Petitioners in W. P. No. 107 of 1961.

A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and K. R. Choudhri, for respondents in C. As. Nos. 448 and 449 of 57 and W. Ps. Nos. !'7 and 107/1961.

1961. April 5. The Judgment of the Court was

delivered by

KAPUR, J.-A Divisional Bench of this Court made a reference* under the proviso to cl. (3) of Art. 145 on. the following two points :-

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(1) Whether the imposition in the present C8IMl

offends Art. 276 or 301 of the Constitution? •See p. 698 ""''.

Kapur].

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

709

(2) Whether t.he failure to notify the final resolu-

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tion of the imposition of the tax in the Government Bangaz,,., Wooll.,., Gazet.te is fatal to the tax ?

Cotton and Silh The facts of the case are set out in the order of the Mills Co. Ltd. v: Divisional Bench and it is unnecessary to restate them. h , Corporat1ono le l · Th e appe ants mt e two appea s an mt e two peti- City of Bangalore tions under Art. 32 are challenging the constitution ality of. the octroi duty on cotton and wool imposed by the respondent Corporation within its octroi limits. The procedure for levying municipal taxes and the power of control of Government in regard to 1 those taxes is laid down in s. 98 of the City of Banga- lore Municipal Corporation Act (Act 69 of 1949) hereinafter tl'rmed the Act. The.procedure is that a resolution intending to impose a tax has to be passed by the Corporation and that resolution is required to be published in the Official Gazette and in the local newspapers. The rate payers can then submit objec- tions and after considering such objections received during the specified time the Corporation may by resolution determine to levy the tax or duty. When such a resolution has been passed the Commissioner is required to publish forthwith a notification in the Official Gazette and in the newspapers as set out in Auh-s. (1) of s. 98 of the Act. This notification is to specify the date from which, the rate at which and the period of levy, if any, for which such tax is levied.

,

As has been stated in the order of the Divisional Bench all other requirements of s. 98 were complied with except that the notification in the Government Gazette as required by sub-s. (2) was not published. This, it was submitted, was a defect which was fatal to the legality of the imposition of the tax. To support this submission reliance was placed on two judgments of this Court in Harla v. State of Rajasthan (1) and In the former case State of Kerala v. P. J. Joseph(•). the Jaipur Opium Act was enacted by a resolution of the Council of Ministers appointed by the then Crown Representative but this law was neither promulgated nor published in the Gazette nor made known to the public. The mere passing of the resolution by the

(•) [to,i] s.c.R. 110.

(•) A.I.R. 1958 s.c. •96·

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".· C orpo1at•on o, I e City of Bangalore gate or pu

Council of Ministers without publication was held not Bangalore woollen, to be sufficient. to make the law operative. At p. 114, it was observed that reasonable publication of some Collon and Silk Mills Co. Ltd. sort was necessary and that natural justice required that before a law could operate it had to be promu!- it must e roa cast m some recognisable way. Similarly in the latter case there was no publication in the Gazette of the Order of the Government made in the exercise of the power con· ferred by an Act nor was there any communication of the order to the person affected thereby and it was held that not having been published in the Gazette it was not valid and could not have the force of law. But the respondent relied upon s. 38(l)(b) of the Act which cures defects or irregularities not affecting the merits of the case. That section provides :- S. 38(1). "No act done, or proceeding

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taken under this Aet shall be questioned merely on the ground- ( a.) (b) of any defect or irregularity in such act or

0 O IO O 0 O IO IO O O O O O O O • O O • O O O • ' O I • O • O • O O O O • O IO I

I I Io 0 0 O I I IO O 0 O O 0 O

proceeding, not affecting the merits of the case. " Thus under that provision any defect or irregularity not affecting the merits of the case saves any act done or proceeding taken under the Act on the ground of such irregularity or defect. The appellants contended that the section has no application to defects in regard to procedure under s. 98 of the Act for the imposition of taxes because s, 38 read as a whole refers to a different situation and that there was internal evidence in the section itself to show that it has no relevance to the objection taken by the appellants. The section, it was argued, is in Chapter II dealing with Municipal Authorities and this particular provi sion is in that Part of the Chapter which d1:1als with provisions common to the Corporation and its Stand ing Committees and the marginal note shows that the object of enacting it was the validation of proceedings of the Corporation and its Standing Committees and that the whole section should be read in that context. So read, it was submitted, the section must be taken to be a saving provision for the validity of proceedings

3 S.C.R.

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711

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. e eiect or irregu anty ment10ne m c .

of the Municipal Authorities which was clear from cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) which deals with defects on the Bangalo~-Woollen, ground of vacancy or defect in the constitution of the cotton and Silk Corporation or of any Standing Committee and sub- Mills co. Ltd. v: s. (2) of that section also has reference to the meetings of the Corporation and therefore, it was contended, Corporation of the f b City of Bangalore th d c _ o su - section (I) in any act done or proceeding taken also Kapur J. must have reference to that kind of defect which is referred to in other parts of the section. It was further submitted that the words "not affecting the merits of the case" showed that the reference was not to any defect in regard to the procedure for imposi- tion of taxes but defects etc. which might arise in the proceedings of the Corporation and which have refer- ence to a defect in the constitution of the Corporation or its Standing Committees. Reference was also made to the marginal note in the section.

l (b)

I,t is unnecAssary in this case to discuss the relevance of marginal notes in the construction of s. 38(l)(b) because in our opinion the language is unambiguous and clear and it validates any defect in any act done or proceedings taken under the Act and makes it immune fron1 being questioned on the ground of any defect or irregularity in suoh act or proceedings not affecting the nwrit s of the case and merely because it is in a chapter dr>aling with Municipal Authorities or other parts of the section dealing with another subject is no re11son for confining its operation to the defects con ten<kd for by the appellants,

The resolution was published in newspapers and was also communicated to those affected by it and thus it was well known. The failure to publish it in the Government Gazette did not affect the merits of its imposition. The answer to question No. 2 referred therefon' iH that the mere failure to notify the final resolution of the imposition of the tax in the Govern ment Gazette is not fa.ta.I to the legality of the imposition.

The other question referred is whether the imposi tion offends Art. 276 or 301 of the Constitution.

qt

712

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1961]

I96I

Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk MillS co. Ltd. v. Corporation of the City of Bangalore

Kapur J.

Article 276 as far as it is relevant for the purposes of this case provides :-

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A t 276(1)" N t · h

t• 1 0 Wit Stan mg anyt mg lil ar IC e 246, no law of the Legislature of a State relating to taxes for the benefit of the State or of a munici- pality, district board, local board or other local authority therein in respect of professions, trades, callings or employments shall be invalid on the ground that it relates to a tax on income.

(2) The total amount payable in respect of any one person to the State or to any one municipality, district board, local board or other local authority in the State by way of taxes on professions, trades, callings and employment shall not exceed two hundred and fifty rupees per annum."

It was contended that the imposition of the impugned tax contravenes the provision of Art. 276(2) as it is of a sum more than Rs. 250 and is therefore unconstitu tional. This contention is not well founded. There was a similar provision in the Government of India Act, 1935, i.e., s. 142-A but there the amount mention ed in . sub-s. (2) was Rs. 50 per annum and this limitation was placed as from after the 31st. day of March, 1939. A reference to the legislative lists will show that neither the Article 276 nor s. 142-A of the Government of India Act, 1935, has any reference to the tax now impugned. In the Devolution .Rules under the Government of India Act, 1915, taxes which could be levied for the purpose of local bodies were the following :-

"Item No. 7. An octroi.

-· Item No. 8. A terminal tax on goods imported into or exported from, a local area save where such tax is first imposed in a local area in which-an octroi was not levied on or before the 6th July 1917. · Item No. 9. A tax on trades, professions and

callings. "

· In the Government of India Act, 1935, the relevant entries in the Legislative List-List II-'were 46 and 49 which ·were as follows:

46. "Taxes on profe~sions, trades, callings and employments, subject, however, to the pr!W'isions

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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of section one hundred and forty-two A of this Act." 49 .

. t for consumption, use or sale therem.

esses on entry o goo s ~n ~ a. oca area Catton and Silk Mills ca. Ltd. v.

Terminal tax was taken to List I, i.e., Central List and is now entry 89 in the Union List (List I). Corres- c,,paratfon •/the ponding entries to 46 and 49 of the Government of Ctty •!Bangalore India. Act, 1935, in the Constitution in List II are 52 and 60 which are as follows :-

-Kapur J.

Bangalore Woollen,

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52. " Taxes on ·the entry of goods into a local

area for consumption, use or sale therein."

60. " Taxes on professions, trades, callings and

employments. " The history of these tax:es therefore shows that in the Devolution Rules. under the Government of India Act, 1915,· octroi, terminal tax: and tax:es on profes sions and callings were tli:ree distinct heads of taxation. Similarly in the Government of India Act, 1935, and in the Constitution the two entries are separate. Therefore when s. 142-A was added in the Govern ment of Indil/' Act, 1935, its operation was limited to entry 46 of List II and had no reference to entry 49 w bicb deals with cesses on entrJ<; of goods. The position under the Constitution is exactly the same and therefore neither s. 142-A of the Government of India Act, 1935 nor Art. 276 bas any effect on entry 49 in the Government of India Act, 1935 or entry 52 in the Constitution. The learned Attorney-General in support of his argument that the impugned tax is .a tax on trade, relied upon three judgments : The Municipality 'of Ohopda v. Motilal Manekchand ('); Gajadhar Hiralal Ginning &: Pressing Factory v. The Municipal Committee, Washim ('); and Secretary, .ll:luni· cipal Committee, Karanja v. The New Ea.st India Press Co. Ltd., Bombay('). None of these cases bas any applicability to the tax now impugned because the facts were different and the imposition was of a different character. The attack on the constitution ality of the impugned tax on the ground of contraven tion of Art. 276 is therefore not sustainable and must be rejected.

(I) I.L.R. [1958] Bom. 483.

(2) I.L.R. [1958] Bom. 625.

(3) A.I.R. 1949 Nag. ZI5.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1961]

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The second ground of assault on the constitution- ality of the tax imposed is based on contravention of

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anga o" Woollen, A B Cotton and Silk Mills co. Ltd. v. Corporation of the City 0f Bangalore It was contended that

30 Art. 301. "Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free."

IC prov1 es :-

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the tax imposed directly affected the movement of goods and therefore violates Art. 301 which guarantees the freedom of trade throughout the territory of India. In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assa.m ('), Gajendragadkar, J., giving the opinion of the majority said :-

"that the content of freedom provided for by Art. 301 was larger than the freedom contemplated bys. 297 of the Constitution Act of 1935, and what ever else it may or may not include, it certainly includes movement of trade which is of the very essence of all trade and is its integral part. If. the transport or the movement of goods is taxed solely on the basis that the goods are th us carried or trans ported that, in our opinion, directly affects the freedom of trade as contemplated by Art. 301. If the movement, transport or the carrying of goods is allowed to be impeded, obstructed or hampered by taxation without satisfying the requirements of Part XIII the freedom of trade on which so much emphasis is laid by Art. 301 would turn to be illusory."

According to Shah, J., the content is wider. At page 241 the learned Chief Justice gave it a more restricted meaning. Relying on these observ.ations it was contended that the tax which is affected by Art. 301 is one which is directly on movement .of trade, i.e., from one point to another. As against this reliance was placed by the respondent on Art. 305 which at the relevant time was as follows:-

Art. 305. "Nothing in articles 301 and 303 shall affect the provisions of any existing law except in so far as the President may by order otherwise direct; ... " According to this article the provisions of Art. 301 do not affect the provisions of any existing ll).w except in so far as the President may otherwise direct and there

(1) [1961] I S.C.R. 809.

3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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is no such direction by the President. "Existing law" has been defined in Art. 366, clause (10), to mean:

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ex1s mg aw means any aw, r mance, or er, Collon and s;ik bye-law, rule or regulation passed or made before Mills co. Ltd. the commencement of this Constitution by any Legis- lature, authority or person having power to make C~rporation oftke such a law, Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule or re- City 01 Bangalore gulation;"

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and by Art. 372 all laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature. It was 'these provisions which were relied upon as an answer to the question of the applicability of Art. 301. But the learned Attorney-General argued that the action taken by the Municipal Corporation was after the coming into force of the Constitution, being a levy imposed as from January, 1955, that the imposition of the tax was subordinate legislation which could not be saved undey Art. 305 cind that the tax could only be imposed by resorting to the provisions of Art. 304(b) which provides:

Art. 304. "Notwithstanding anything in article 301 or article 303, the Legislature of a State may by law-

(a) ............................................................ .. the (b) impose such reasonable restrictions on freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that State as may be required in the public interest:

Provided that no Bill or amendment for the pur poses of clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the Legislature of a State without the previous sanction of the President."

The argument therefore was this that the Act being an "existing law" might be saved under Art. 305 but that would operate on and save the taxes on articles specified in Schedule III of Part V, itAm 18, i.e., octroi on animals and goods set out in Classes I to VII of that Part but would not save the octroi on other arti cles under Class VIII imposed after the Constitution because that would be an addition of a bye-law, rule or order and would not fall within the term " existing

716

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1961]

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r961 v ·-- 11 1 I anga ore oo en, Colton and Silk Mills co. Lid. v.

law". The impugned tax was levied under class VIII set out in part V which is as follows:- , ctori Class VIII-Other articles which are not specified above Corporation of the and which may be approved the Corporation by an C•ty of Bangalore by order in this behalf............ Octroi is to be levied by reference to s. 130 of the Act which provides:-

Rs. 2-0-0 per cent. ad valorem.

aximum rate

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S. 130. "If the oorporat.ion by a resolution deter mines that an octroi should be levied on animals or goods brought within the octroi limits of the city, such octroi shall be levied on such articles or goods specified in Part V of Schedule III at such rates not exceeding those laid down in the said Part in such manner as may be determined by the corporation." Therefore under this section if the corporation resolv ed to levy octroi on animals or goods brought within the octroi limits of the city then this octroi was to be levied at rates not exceeding those laid down in that section. This, it was submitted, was subordinate legislation and therefore was not saved by Article 305 . because "existing law" as defined means any law, ordinance, order, by-law, rule or regulation passed before the·Constitution and as the impugned tax was a new regulation passed after the Constitution it was not saved by Art. 305. In support of this reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in Hamrlard Dawakhana (Wakf) v. The Union of India('); but as was observed by the Divisional Bench that case does not apply to the facts of the present case.

For the respondef!t it was argued that (1) goods and animals were specified in the Act and therefore there was no making or passing of new regulations and (2) it is not a case of delegated legislation but is a case of conditional legisla~ion. It was firstly submitted that there is sufficient' specification in the Act itself of the articles on which the octroi duty could be levied. Section 97 of the Act gives the power to levy octroi duty on animals or goods without any exception which are brought within the octroi limits. Sections 98

(•l (1960] 2 s.c.R, 67"

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3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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and 130 lay down the procedure for the levying of taxes and impose a limitation on the extent of the Bangalore woollaK, tax to be levied and Classes I to VII make certain Cotton and Sil~ articles taxable and Class VIII makes other articles Mills Co. Ltd. ,, •• v: and goods taxable if they are approved by the Corpo- Corporation o, m• t • ra 10n. to t e su Ject as t e support Cit of Bangalore of a decision of this Court in Anwarkhan Mahboob Co. v. The St,ate of Bombay ('), where the facts were that the assessee was subjected to a purchase tax under s. 14(6) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Act III of 1953). The contention of the assessee was that the goods had not been specified in the Sales Tax Act. In that Act in the schedule were mentioned the goods the sale or purchase of which was subject to tax and the last entry wa.s of" a.II goods other than those speci- fied from time to time in Schedule A (and section 7 A) and in the preceding entries . " The question for deci- sion was whether that entry amounted to specification of goods for the purposes of Sales Tax and it was held that it was. This case was sought to be distinguished on the ground that the words there were " a.II goods other than ......... " and those words would comprise every article which was not specifically mentioned in the Schedule. We are unable to accept this distinct.ion because even though the words used in the present statute a.re different the combined effect of ss. 97 and 130 and Pa.rt V of Schedule III including Class VIII which have been set out above is that the words are of very general nature and would have the same effect as if all articles were intended to be and were includ ed. In view of this it is unnecessary to discuss the second contention.

Therefore the answer to the first question referred is thatthe impugned octroi duty does not contravene the provisions of Arts. 276 and 301. In view of our decision on the two questions referred these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.

Consequently Writ Petition Nos. 97 and 107 are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in those petitions.

Appeals dismissed. Petitions dismis&ed.

(1) (1961) 1 S.C.R. 709.