COLONEL HIS HIGHNESS SAWAI TEJ SINGHJI, MAHARAJA OF ALWAR versus THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

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COLONEL HIS HIGHNESS SAWAI TEJ SINGHJI, MAHARAJA OF ALWAR v. THE UNION OF INDIA & ANR.

October 6, 1978

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[Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., R. S. SARKARIA, N. L. lh!TWALIA, A. D. KosnAL AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

Constitution of India 1950-Art. 363-Covcnants agreeing to merger of princely states-Provision in Covenants that any dispute relating to any jtem- of property of Ruler or state property to be referred for decision to a nominee of Government of India and such decision shall be final and binding on all concerned-C@nzrnunication of the Govern1nent of India t~ the effect that the settlen1ent of the inventory of properties lVas an integral part of an overall in respect of all outstanding 1natters of dispute-fVhet!ier such agreement •decision• an agreement and could be enforced by the Ruler-Bar to ;urisdic· lion of Civil Courts under Art. 363.

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(3) provided

The appellant who was the Ruler of a princely state entered into a cove nant agreeing to merge his state into a union called the United States of Matsya. The Matsya Covenant, by Art. XI Cl. (2) provided that the ruler of each state shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh an inventory of all the im as movable properties, securities and cash balances held by him private property and cl. to whether that if any dispute arose as any item of property was the private property of the ruler or the state the' Government of India property it shall be referred to such person as may nominate and the decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties. The appellant furnished an all propertfes to be his private property. claimed the rulers of const.ituent States of Matsya entered into a Covenant with the Rajpramukh into the ,States the United State of Rajasthan for nlerger of· their of F State of Rajasthan in abrogation of the 1'1atsya Covenant. The Rajasthan '.lny dis Covenant by Art. XII, CL (2) provided for the t.he property was private property or state property pute as by reference to such person as the Government of India may nominate in con3t1ltation \Vith the Rajpratnukh and tha.t the decision of such per<>on shall be final and binding on the parties.

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The ~finistry of States, Government of Indin wrote on 14th September. 1949 to the appellant that the settlement of the inventory was an integral par1 of an overall agreement in respect of all ou!.standing matters of dispute and did not stand by it~elf. After correspondence with the Government of India the appellant received a \Vritten communication intimating the decision of the Go·•ernnicnt of India in respect of 25 items of the ~roperty_

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The rippellant claimed that four buildings wh~ch wer~ in occupation of the State Government had been declared as his private properties in the inventory appended to the letter of the Government of India and that the State Govern-

TBJ SINGHJI V. UNION

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ment should pay rent to him in respect of those buildings. This claim of the for a BoPpellant hnving been rejected, he filed a suit in the district declaration that the properties were his private properties and that the respon dents should be ordered to pay rent to him.

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The suit \Vas transferred by the High Court to itself. The High Court dismissed the suit on the ground that adjudication of the dispute was barred by Art. 363 of the Constitution.

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In appeal to, this Court it was contended that the letter of 14th September, 1949 wns the result of a decision arrived at in pursuance of cl. (3) of Art. XI of Matsya Covenant and cl. (2) of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and n1ust be construed as a decision of the Government \)f Jndia.

Dismissing the appeal,

HELD : 1. The decision sought to be enforced is an agreement hit by the

Art. 363 of the Constitution and the High Court was right in dismissing suit. [74H]

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2. The so-called decision was nothing but

agree1nent bet\veen the Gove1 nrnent of Jndin and the appellant. The Letter dearly stated th<tt the inventory furnished by the plaintiff was discussed with him at New De1h1 and that a copy of the final inventory of the appellant's private properties. which had the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States, was forwarded to him. Under clause (3) Art. XI of the Mat~ya Cvvenant as also clause (2) of Art. XII of the Rajasthan Covenh11t, no approval of the Ministry of States was ca11ed for. What each of these clauses provided \Vas that if any dispute arose as to \Vhether any item of property was the private property of the ruler concerned or of his erstwhile state, it was to be referred the to such a person as the Government of India might nominate, decision of that person was to be final and binding on all parties concerned. Neither the (Jovernment of India nominated a person to whom the dispUl<:: was to be referred; nor did any such person give a decision on the point. The contents of the letter, are not at all relateable to those of either ot the so-called two clauses. On the other hand, they clearly indicate "decisions'' of the States Ministry contained in the inventory appended to the letter forrr.ed really the record of the ~a·greement arrived at between the Ministry of Stntcs and the plaintiff as a result of nesntiation<.<. [7 lD-Hl

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3. Parag:;aph three of the letter talks of the "settlement of the inventory•· wbich \vas to be an integral part of an "ovcnill agreen1cn_t in re'.'.;pcct of 3'11 outstanding matters of dispute" and was not to stand by itself. tbG letter said v.'as that all the disputes regarding ·the property of the Ruler \Vere inventory to be settled by an overall agreement that the contents of appended to the letter merely recorded the settlement between the appeilant and the Ministry and that even those contents were not to be regarded as fin:tl settlement of the n1atters dealt with therein unless they formed part of an agreen1ent embracing all items of property. [72B-Cl

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4. In the instant case instead of having the disputes referred for decision to a person nominated by the parties they decided to adopt the method of n1utual agreement to settle those disputes. Such mutual agreement could not

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: be regarded as a decision by ta· person nominated by the Government of India either under clause (3) of Art. XI of Matsya Covenant or clause (2) of Art. XII of Rajasthan Covenant. It must be deemed to be nothing more nor ' Jess than a·n agreement simpliciter eren though it was labelled as a decision of the States Ministry. [72H-73B]

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5. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any agreement which was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to \.vhich the Government of India was a party. The operation of the Article is not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement whether it \V<ls primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a prece ding agree-ment would fall within the ambit of the Article. The fact that the agreement contained in the Jetter dated the 14th September, 1949 had reiiiulted from action take11 under the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no an;wer to the pJea raised on behalf of the respondents that Art. 363 of the Constitution is a bar tc the maintainability of the two suits, nlthough that agreement did not flo\~ di!'ectly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and departing from the provisions of clause (2) of Art. XII thereof. [73D~EJ

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1969.

From the JudgmeTit and Decree dated 29-4-1965 of the Rajasthan

High Court in D. B. Civil Misc. Case No. 67 of 1965.

B. D. Sharma for the Appellant.

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S. N. Kacker, Sol. Genl., U. R. Lalit and Girish Chandra for

Respondent No. I.

S. M. Jain for Respondent No. 2

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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KosHAL, J. Th·e facts

forming the background to this appeal by certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan against itll judgment dated the 29th April 1968, in so far as they arc undisputed, may be stated in some detail. On the 28th February 1948, the Rulers of the erstwhile States of A!war, Bharatpur, Dholpur and Karauli entered into a Covenant (hereinafter refurred to as the Matsya Covenant) agreeing to merge their States into one State known as the United State of Matsya which was to come into bebg on the 1st of April 1948 with the Ruler of Dholpur as its Raj Pramukh. Article VI of the Covenant provided that the Ruler of each Covenanting State shall, as soon as may be practicable and in any event not later than the 15th March, 1948, make over the administration of his State to the Raj Pramukh and that thereupon all rights, authority jurisdiction belonging to such Ruler which appertained or were incidental to the Government of his State, shall vest in the United State of Matsya.

a:ad

TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, I.)

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Article XI bl tl1e Covenant provided for the private properties of the A Ruler and ran thus :

"!. The Ruler of each Convc::ianting State shall he entitl ed to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties (as distinct from State properties) belonging to him on the date of his making over the administration of that :State to the Raj Pramukh.

"2. He shall furnish to the Raj Pramukh before the 1st May, 1948, an inventory of all the immovable properties, &ocurities and cash balances held by him as such private pro ,perty.

"3. If any dispute arises as to whether any item of pro perty is the private property of the Ruler or State property it shall be referred to such person as the G-Overnment of India may nominato and the decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned."

Tho United State of Matsya came into being as stipulated in the Matsya Covenant on the 1st of April 1948 and during the same month the Ruler of Alwar, who is th: appellant before us, furnil;hed to the Raj Pramukh an i'.:lventory of all the immovable properties, securities and cash balances held and c:aimed by him as his private properties.

On the 11th of April 1948, tho Rulers of ten States, namely, Bans wara, Bundi, Dungarpur, Jhalawar, Kish:ngarh, Kotah, Mewar, Partab garh, Shahpura and Tonk entered into a Covenant agreerag to merge them into one State named the Uni~:d State of Rajasthau. That Coven ant was superseded by another dated the 10th of March 1949 (here inafter called the Rajasthan Cowna·:it) through which the United State of Rajasthan was to consist of the said ten States as also of four others, namely, Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur, with the Ruler of Jaipur as the Raj Pramukh. Clause (c) of Article I of the Rajasthan Covenant defined the expression "new Covenantbg State" to mean any of the said four States. Article II of the Covenant last mentioned provided that the United State of Rajasthan would include any other :State, the Ruler of which '!ntered into a;i agreement with the Raj Pramukh, with the approval of the Government of India, to the integ :ration of that State with the United State of Rajasthan. ·

Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant provided :

" ( 1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitl ed to the full ownership, use a;:id enjoyment of al! private properties (as distinct from State properties), belonging to

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him on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh of the former Rajasthan State or as the case may be, to the Raj Pramukh of the United State under this Covenant.

"(2) If any dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler of a Covenant .. ing State other than a new Covenanting Stare or is State pro- · perty, it shall be referred to such person as the Government of India may nominate in consultation with the Raj Pramukh, a::id the ckcision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned:

"Provided that no such dispute shall be so referable after

the first day of May, 1949.

"(3) The private properties of the Ruler of each new Covenanting State shall be as agreed to between the Govern ment of India in the Stat·~s Ministry and the Ruler concerned, a::id the settlement of properties thus made shali be final."

On the !st of May 1949, the Rulers of the States of Alwar, Bharat pur, Dholpur and Karauli which were the constituent States of the United State of Matsya, entered into an agreement (hereinafter called the Amending Agreement) with the Raj Pramukh of the United State of Rajasthan merging with four States into it with effect from the 15th of May 1949 in abrogation of the Matsya Covenant. While subscrib ing to the Amending Agreement the Ruler of Dholpur acted not only in his capacity as such but also as the Raj Pramukh of the United State of Matsya. Article IV of that Agreement •effected amendments in the Rajasthan Covenant so as to make it applicable to the said four States with effect from th·c date last mentioned. No cha::lge, however, was made in the provisions of clause (c) ,)f Artide I of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant.

On the 14th of September 1949, Mr. V. P. Menon of the Ministry of States, Government of India. wrote the following letter to the Ruler of Alwar:

"My dear Maharaja Sahib,

"Your Highness will reca:l that the inventory of immov able properties, securities and caoh balances furnished by Your Highness in accordance with Artic1e XI of the Covenant for the formation of the United State of Matsya was discussed with Your Highn~ss at New Delhi on the 9th and 10th April, I now forward for Your Highness's information a 1949.

TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, !.)

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copy of the final inventory of Your J-[ighness's private pro perties. It has the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States.

"2. The following claims of Your Highness

the count~r-claims of the former Matsya Government are still under consideration and the decision will be communicated to Your Highness as soon as possib:e.

and

( 1) cash balance of the Al war State treasury;

(2) claim for Rs. 4,82,520 as arrears of Privy Purse of Your Highness for 6 years from 1936-37 to 1942-43. "3. Your Highness will appreciate that the settlement of the inventory is an integral part of an over-all agreement in respect of all outstanding matters of dispute and does not stand by itself.

"With kind regards,

"Yours sincerely,

Sdl-

"(V. P. Menon)"

This letter was accompanied by a copy of the "final" inventory which listed 32 items. Reproduced below is the item at Serial No. 1 of that inventory :

"S. Nv.

Description of property.

Decision of the State Ministry.

J. City Palace including adjoining

building,

Ancestral. The portion of the building at present in use by the State for administrative purposes or for Museum and Imperial Bank will continue to be so used till such time as required. 'rhe requirements of the State in future will not be of the same order as today and every effo1 t will be n1ade to release the accommodation at present oc cupied in the Zenana & Mardana Mahals at the earliest practicable the date. maintenance cost of the portions used by it. Any addition or alteration in the portion used by the State will the prior consent of His require· Highness and should be carried out at State expense."

The State will bear

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Thereafter, correspondence went on between the Ministry of States and the Ruler of Alwar and on the 24th September 1952 the later received from the former a written communication dealing with 26 items of prop~rties. The opening clause of Para 2 of the Jetter stated :

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"2. The Government of India have carefully considered all the outJ;tanding questions in respect of your Highness's private properties, in consultation with the Rajasthan Govern ment, and their decisions in respoct thereof are as follows :-"

The description of each item covered by the letter was followed by the decision in respect thereof. That part of the Jetter which deals with item 26 is set down below :

"(26) City Palace including adjoining buildings :

The City Palace with the adjoining buildings, comprising of the Jagir Office, Central Record, Imperial Bank, Treasury, Gandhi National School etc. will be your Highness's ancestral property. Tho secretariat building will however be State property."

This decision was reiterated in an Office Memorandum issued by the Government of Rajasthan in the Political Department on the 30th of Docember 1952. Through a letter dated the 14th of October 1959 proceeding from his Private Secretary and addressed to the Chief Secre tary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, the Ruler of claimed rmt for tlu:ee properties known as the Secretariat Alwar building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining the City Palace and the bungalow at Sariska, which were in the occu pation of the Rajasthan Government. The claim was made on the ground that all the four properties had been declared to be the private properties of the Ruler in the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September 1949 mentiond above. The claim was rejected by the Ministry of Home Affairs which asserted in its letter dated the 24th of December 1959 that the four properties in question had not been recognimd as the privaie properties of the Ruler. The claim was reiterated by the Ruler through a Jetter issued by Shri Gopesh Kumar Ojha, his Legal & Financial Adviser, but the same was again turned down by the Ministry of Home Affairs through their letter dated the 6th/8th of December 1960 in which the position taken was :

"Tho Statement regarding the extent of your Private Pro perty rights in the City Palaoe area made in our Jetter dated 24-12-59 are based upon the decision reached in March 1952 after discussion with your Highness and We regret that they cannot now be reopened."

TEJ SINGHJI v. UNION (Koshal, J.)

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2. It was in the above background that the Ruler of Alwar filed two suits, being suits Nos. 4 and 5 of 1963, in the court of the District In Suit No. 5 the prayer made was that the three pro Judge, Alwar. perties known as the Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station be declared to be the private properties of the plaintiff and that the State of Rajasthan be ejected therefrom, or, in the alternative, b~ ordered to pay rent at a specified rate. A decree for Rs. 36,000/- was also claimed for mesne profits. In suit No. 4 of 1963, the claim was_ that the plaintiff was entitled to rent or mesne profits in respect of a building forming part of the Mardana Palace.

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3. Both the suits were resisted by the Union of India and the State of Rajasthan who were joined as the two del\ondants to each of them and it was claimed inter-alia that the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution of India were a complete bar to their maintainability.

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4. The two suits were transferred by the High Court of Rajasthan to itself and the question of their maintainability was mooted before it with reference to the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution D which states :

( !) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other court shall have juris diction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Consti tution by any Ruler of Indian State and to which the Goviernment of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party <md ""hich has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitu tion relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument.

(2) In this article-

( a) "Indian State" means any territory

recognised before the commencement of this Constitulion by His Majesty or the Dominion of India: as being such a State; and

the Government of

(b) "Ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or other per son recognised before such commencement by

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His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State.

The High Court proceeded to determine whether the dispute in suit No. 5 of 1963 was one arising out of an agreement such as fell within the ambit of article 363 (as was contended by the defendants) or was merely a one-sided decision of the Government of India and, therefore, outside the purview of the article as was asserted by the It held that the "decisions" contained in the latter dated the plaintiff. 14th of September 1949 had really resulted from an agreement bet ween the Ministry of States and the plaintiff, that the extent of the building adjoining the City Palace was not to be found with precision in the inventory appen\ied to the said Jetter, that consequently there Was a real dispute between the parties whether the suit property was included in the expression "adjoining building" and that the adjudica tion of such a dispute was barred by the provision of article 363 of the Constitution. Suit No. 5 of 1963 was, therefore, dismissed, but In regard to suit No. 4 of 1963, however, with no order as to costs. the High Court held !hat the property in dispute was clearly a part of the City Palace itself as it was comprised in the Mardana Mahal, that the dispute was altogether illusory in view of the fact that right up to the 8th. of December 19 60, the Government of India had been taking the stand that the disputed property was the private property of the plaintiff, that the dispute was consequently not barred by the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution, and that the suit, there In the fore, deserved to be decided by the District Judge on merits. result, suit No. 4 of 1963 was remilted to the trial court for decision according to law.

5. It is the judgment of the High Court in suit No. 5 of 1963 alone

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that is challenged in this appeal.

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6. Mr. B. D. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant-Ruler, has vehemently contended that the letter dated the 14th December 1949 was not the result of an agreement beween the plaintiff and the Government of India and that, on the other hand, it was a decision arrived at in pursuance of clause ( 3) of Article XI of the Mat5ya Covenant In support of this contention it was pointed out that the letter was issued as a sequel to the inventory furnished by the plaintiff under clause (2) of that Article and that the operative pm\ of the im'cntory apryended to the letter is headed "decision of the States Ministry" wh;ch, according to learned Counsel, clearly negatives an It was further urged that even the Rajasthan Covenant did not envisaged any agreement in so far as the plaintiff was concern ed because he was not the Ruler of a "new Covenanting State" with-

II · agreement.

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in the meaning of that expression as used in clauses (2) and (3) ·of Article XII thereof, that it was clause (2) of that Artic]e which governed him and which again provided for a decision being given on disputes relating to properties and that the letter dated 14th September 1949 must still be construed as a decision if the Matsya Covenant was held to be inapplicable. A careful examination of the material ·on the record, however, clearly makes out that the contention is with •OUt substance as we shall presently show.

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7. It i~ no doubt true that the plaintiff had furnished the inventory -0f the properties held by him in accordance with Article XI of the Matsya Covenant as is stated in the opening paragraph of the letter dated the 14th of September 1949. It further cannot be gain-said >that the third column of the inventory to that letter was headed "decision of the State Ministry". These two factors, without more, might have gone a long way to support the case propounded on behalf of the plaintiff, but they are sought to be used out df context as is clear from a perusal of the entire letter from which it can be safely spelt out that the so-called "decision" was nothing but an agreement It is arrived at between the Government of India and the plaintiff. pertinent that the letter mentions that the inventory furnished by the plaintiff was discussed with him at New Delhi on the 9th and I 0th ·of April 1949 and then states that a copy of the final inventory of the plaintiff's private. properties, which had the approval of the Go vernment of India in the Ministry of States, was forwarded to him. Now, under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant as also dause (2) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant no approval of the Ministry of States was called for. In 'fact, what each of those clauses provided was tlrnt if any dispute arose as to whether any item -0f property was the private property of the Ruler concerned or of his erstwhile State, it was to be referred to such person as the Govern ment of India might nominate, and the decision of tluit person was to be final and binding on all parties concerned. Now, it is not the case of the plaintiff that the Government of India nominated a person to whom the dispute was to be referred; nor is it claimed by him that such a person gave any decision. The contents of the letter, therefore, are not at all relateable to those of either of the two clauses just above-mentioned. On the oher hand, they clearly indicate that the so-called "decisions" of the S'ates Ministry contained in the bventory appended to the letter formed really the record of the agree mwt arrived at between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff as a In this result of negotiations held on the 9tji and 10th of April 1949. connection, reference may poin~~dly be made to paragraph 3 of the ' letter which bears r~petition :

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"3. Your Highness will appreciate that the settlcme:it of the inventory is an integral part of an overall agreement in respect of all onffitanding matters of dispute and does not stand by itself."

This paragraph talks of "the settlement of the inventory" which was to be an i:itegral part of an "over-al! agreement in Pespect of all outstanding matters of dispute" and was not to stand by itself. In our opinion, the paragraph is a clincher against the plaintiff and indicate!> without any shadow of doubt that what the letter said was that all the disputes regarding the property of the Ruler were to be settled by an over-all agreement, that the contents of the inventory appended to the letter merely recorded the settlement between the plaintiff and the Ministry of States and that e~en those contents were not to be regarded as a final settlement of the matters dealt with therein unless they form ed part of an agreement embracing all items of property.

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8. It may be noted here that the Matsya Covenant had been abro gated with effect from the 15th May 1949 by the Rajasthan Covenant as modified by the Amending Agreement and there was thns no ques tion of any decision being given after that date under clause 3 of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant and that the anly surviving provi sion under which disputes regarding property owned by the plaintiff could be determined after the 15th of May 1949, was Article XII of It is true that the expression "new Coven the Rajasthan Covenant. anting State" as defined in clause ( c) of Article I of that Covenant meant only any of the four States of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur, that the definition was not amended by any provision of the Amending AgPoement, so that the State of Alwar could not be regarded as a "new Covenanting State" for the purpose of clause (3) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and that the clause of that Article in accordance with which disputes relating to property claimed by the Ruler of Alwar as his private property wore to be determined was clause (2) which provided for their decision by a P'erson nominated by the Government of India in that behalf. The fact remains, how ever, that no such person was ever nominated and ihat th,., letter dated the 14th September, 1949, cannot be construed (for rea•ons already stated by us) as laying down a decision of any such person. What appeam to have happened is that instead of following tho course indi cated in clause (2) last mentioned and having the disputes referred for decision to a person nominated by th~ Government of India, the parties (the Gowrnment of India and the appellant) decided to adopt the method of mutual agreement to s•,.,ttlc those disputes-a method the Matsya which always remained open to them, notwithstanding

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Covenant and the Rajasthan Covenant. Such mutual agreement couid, by no stretch of imagination be regarded as a decision by a person nominated by the Government of India either under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant or clause (2) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and must be deemed to bo nothing more or less than an agreement simplicirer even though it was labelled as a "decision of the States Ministry" in the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September, 1949.

9. Another contention raised by Mr. Sharma was that even if the letter dabod the 14th September, 1949 was held to evidence an agree ment, it was not hit by the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was an agreement resulting from the Rajasthan Coven ant which alone, according to him, was the agreement covered by the article. This contention is also without substance. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any agreement which was enteP"..-0 into or executed bdore the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to which the Gowrnment of India was a party. The operation of tho article is not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement whether it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provi sions of a preceding agreement would fall within the ambit of the arti cle. Thus the fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated the 14th September 1949 had resulted from action taken under the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the pica raised on behalf of the respondents that article 363 of the Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the two suits, although we may add, that that agreement did not flow directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was ent•ered into by ignoring and departing from the provisions of clause ( 2) of Article XII thereof.

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10. The only other conterrtion put forward by Mr. Sharma was based ori the contents of column 3 of Item 1 of the inventory append ed to th•:: letter dated the 14th September 1949. He drew our atten tion to the mention in that column of the portions of the adjoining building being occupied by the State for administrative purposes or for Museum and Imperial Bank and also comprising the Zenana and Mardana Mahals. According to him, thi~ meant that th:: entiPe build ing ad joining the City Palace was held to be the private property of the plaintiff, which finally vested in the plaintiff as from the date of tho let~::r and of which the plaintiff could not be divested by any sub In this connection, Mr. sequent decision of the Ministry of States. Sharma urged that the Ministry of States had no power of reviewing a settlement once arrived at and argued that if it was claimed that such 6--817SCI/78

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B

J)

a power existed, the determination by a court of the limited question of the power of review would be barred by the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution. This contention also is of no avail to him. As held above, the agreement dated the 14th SepN,mber 1949 was not to stand by itself but was to be a part and parcel of an overall It follows agreement •embracing all outstanding matters of dispute. tha '. the berms of the agreement contained in the letter wer•e liable to change till a final agreement was reached, and in this vi•ow of the matbor no finality could be said to attach to those ·~errru; until all the disputes became the subject-matter of an agreed settlement. The terms of the inventory attached to the letter were thus merely tentative, the process of settlement being a continuous one till all the disputes were finally resolved. And the ultimate decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed in its letter of the 24th of December 1959, not to treat the Secretariat building, Dau:at Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining the City Palace to be the private property of the plaintiff, was based upon a mutual a_greement between the parties which was reached after discussion in March 1952, as part of an over-all agreement as is evident from the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated the 6th/8th of December 1960.

11. In view of the conclusions arrived at above, we hold that the "decision" sought to be enforced by the plaintiff is an agreement hit by article 363 of the Constitution and that the High Court was right in dismissing suit No. 5 of 1963 as being not maintainable. The .appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed, but with no order as to costs.

N.V.K.

Appeal dismissed.

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