COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY versus R.H. PANDI MANAGING TRUSTEES OF TRUST, BOMBAY

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COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, BOMBAY CITY v. R.H. PANDI MANAGING TRUSTEES OF TRUST, BOMBAY September 4, 974 [A. N. RAY, C.J., K. K. MATiiEW AND Y. V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Supreme Cou~t Rules, 1966, 0.6 r.2(14).- Whether Chamber Judge clan d/S

pose of applications for condonaticn of delay in filing petitions of appeal.

Order 6, Rule 2(14) provides that the powers of the Court in relation to applicatfons for enlargement or .abridgement of time except where the time is fixed _by the Court or relates to deposit of security and except applications for condonation of delay in filing Special Leave Petitions, may be exercised by a single Judge sitting in Chambers.

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On the question whether applications for condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal should be heard only by the Court which can dismiss the appeal and not 'by the Judge, ·in Chambers, because, the refusal of such an application will amount to dismissal of an eppeul by the Judge in Chambers,.

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HELD : The words 'Enlargement or abridgement of time in 0.6 r. 2(14) of the ·Rules, take in applications for enlargement of time appointed by the Rules. A petition of appeal is required under Order 15 of the Rules to be presented within 60 days from the grant of certificate of fttne&S, and under Order 46, r. 3 of Rules, the Supreme Court, on application may enlarge and abridge the time appointed by these rules for. doing· any act· etc. Therefore, a Chamber Judge may exercise the powers of the Court in relation for condonation of delay in filing a petition of appeal. In fact, but for the exception in the Rule even applications for condonation of delay In filing special leave · petitions would be Included therein. Further, this Jlractice of the .Chamber Jud~e bearing applications for· condonation of delay in filing petitions of appeal within the time appointed by ·the· Supreme Court Rules has ·been followed ever since 1966. Where a practice has existed it is convenient to adhere to it, because, the practice of the Court is the law of the 'Court.

to. any application

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Cocker v. Tempest 7 M. & W. 502, referred to.

CivrL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 895 to .897

of 1973.

Appeals from the Judgmen~ & Order dated the 9th April, 1970

of the Bom~y High Court in l.T. Ref. No. 105of1963.

Civil Appeals Nos. 898 to 899. of 1973 Appeals from the Judgment & Order dated the 17th/18th March,

1970 of the Bombay High Court in !·T. Ref. No. 94 of 1963.

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Civil Appeal No. 2054 of 1971. Appeal from the judgment & Decree dated the 14th September,

1969 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 435 of 1962.

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F. S. Nariman, Addi. Solicitor General, .and R. N. Sachthe)I, for the appellants (In CAs. Nos. 895-899/73) and for Attroney General. ·. A. V. Ran~ and A. Subhashini, for the appellant (In CA. No.

2054/71).

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1975] 2 s.c.R.

P. C. Bhartari K. J. Johsn and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respon

dents (In CAs. Nos. 895-899).

V. Sriniw.san & Lily Thomas, for respondent No. 2

(In CA.

No. 2054/71).

A. K .. Sen, and Janardan Sharma, for Sup. Ct. Bar Assn.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RAY, C. J.-In these matters a question arises as to whether appli cations for condonation of delay in fi1lna petition ol oppeal can b heard by the Judge in Chambers. An argument is advanced before the Hon'ble Judge in Chambers that if an application for condonation of delay is refused by the Judge in Chambers it will amount to dis· missal of the appeal by the Juage in Chambers. Therefore, it is said that these applications should be heard by the Court which alone can dismiss an appeal.

· Noticen were given to the Attorney General and th: Bar Asso· ciation because it was said. that ¢e existing practi~ of posting appli cations for condonation of delay in filing petition of appeal before the Judge in Ch!IDlbers should be discontinued and such applications should be listed before the Court.

The relevant rule is Order VI Rule 2(14) of the Supreme Court Rules. Order VI Rule . 2 states that the powers of the Court in rela tion to matters enumerated there m~y be exercised by a Single Judge sitting in Chambers. Oauie (14) reads "Applications for enlarge· ment or abridgement of time except where the time is fixed by tqe Court or relates to deposit of security and except applications for con donation of delay in filin$ special leave petitions". Under the Rules it follows that all applications for enlargement or abridgement of time except the three cases mentioned in Order VI rule 2(14) are heard by the Judge in Chambers. An important exception is application for condonation of delay .in filing special· leave petitions.

Order X~VII Rule 3 of '1te Supreme Court RUles states that the Co1,1rt may enlarge or abrdlge any time appointed by these rules or fixed by any order enlarging time, for doing any act or taking pro ceedings, upon such terms (if any) as the justice of the case may require, and any enlargement may be ordered, although the applica· tion therefor is not made until after the expiration of time appointed or allowed .. A petition of appeal is required .under Order XV of the Rules of this Court to be presented within 60 days from . the grant of certificate of fitness. The time to present the petition of appeal is fixed by the Rules of this Court. Therefore Order XLVII Rule 3 will apply with re1?ard to enlargement I.or abridgement of any time appoin~ by the Rules for doing any act.

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Order VI Rule 2( 14) speaks of applications for enlargement or abridgement of time. Here the words "enlargement or abridgement of time" take in. a~plications for ~nlargement o! time appointed by the R:ules. The iqgi1.dicant feature 1n the Rules 1s that applications for condonation of delay iii filing special leave petitions are excepted from

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C.J.T, v. R. H. PANDY (Ray, C.J.)

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the business of a Chamber Judge. The natural presumption is that but for the exception the Rule would have included also applications for condonation of delay in filin~ special leave petitions. Any appli· cation for condonation of delay 1n filing petition of appeal is there· fore included in applications for enlargement or abridgement of time.

TI1is practice of the Chamber Judge hearing applications for con· donation of delay in filing petitions of appeal within the time appointed by the Rules of this Coun has been followed ever since 1966. Cursus curiae est lex curiae. The practice of the Coun is the Court. See Broom's Legal Maxims at p. 82. Where a practice has existed it is convenient to adhere to it because it is the practice. "The power of each Court ciVer its own process is unlimited; it is a power incid.ent to all C.ourts". See Cocker v. Tempest.('1)

the law of

We are therefore of opinion that applications for condonation

rl. the Chamber business

delay in filing petitions of appeal are within under Order Vl Rule 2(14).

V.P.S.

(1) 7 M& W 502.

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