INDER SAIN versus STATE OF PUNJAB

215

INDER SAIN.

v.

STATE OF PUNJAB

May 4, 1973

[K. K. MATHEW AND I. D. DUA, JJ.]

Opium Act 1 of 1878, Ss. 9 (a) ar.d lO-Possessio11 of opium when an offence under s. 9(a)-Me11s rea whether a necessary ingredient-Presuntption under s. 10, scope of-Presumption when displaced.

Th~. appellant obtained possession of a parcel purporting to contain apples after presentin~ before the railway authorities a railway receipt endorsed in his fa"·our by the consignee. The parcel on being opened was found to Contain a considerable quantity of opium besides apple-s. At his trial for an offence under s. 9(a) of the Opium Act 1878 he however denied tbat he had anythin~ to do with the parcel. There was ·no evidence that the appellant was aware that the parcel contained opium. He was convicted by ~he trial court and the conviction was upheld on appeal by the Sessions Judge and on revision by the High Court. In appeal by special leave, this Court had to consider the effect of s. 10 of the Act which provide that in a prosecution under s. 9, "i~ shall be presumed until the contrary is proved, that all the opiun1 for Which the accused is unable to account satisfactorily is opiun1 in respect of which he has cornmitted an offence under this Act." The appellant contended that unless otherwise provided, it must be presumed that the legislature will not make an act an offence unless it is aceompanied by 1nens rea.

is not what the words mean but whether

HELD : ( 1) Normally, it is true that the plain ordinary grammatical mean .. ing of tl}.e words of an enactment affords the best guide. But in cases like the present, ,tiie,, question these 1re sufficient gfounds for inferring that Parliament intended lt.o exclude the general rule that mens rea is an essential element in every offence. The authorities show that it is generally 1!.ecessary to go behind the words of the enactn1ent and .. take other factors into consideration. So. in the context it is permissible to look into the obiect of the legislature and find out whether. as a matter of fact. the le1?:islature intended anything to be proved exceot the possession of the article as constituting the element of the offence.

[21801

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Brend v, Wood, 62 T.L.R. 462-463, 5lherras v. De Rutzen, l Q.B. 918 and

Sweet v. Parsley, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470, referred to.

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Even if it be assumed that the offence is absolute. the word 'possess' in It is necessary s. 9 connotes some sort of knowledge about the thing possessed. to show that the accused had the article which turned out to be opium. It is ·nqt necessary to show in fact that he had actual knowledge of that which he had.

[218E-F]

Reg. v. Ashwell, [1885] 16 Q.B.D. 190 and Reg. v. Warner, [1969] 2 A.C.

256, 289, relied on.

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(ii) Section 10 proceeds on the assumption that a person who is in any way concerned with opium or has dealt with it in anv manner must be presumed to have committed an offence undel' s. 9 of -the Act, 'unless the ·petson can satisfactorily prove by preponderance of probability either that he was not knowingly in· possession or other circumstances which exonerate him. The burden to account will arise onlv when the accused is in some manner found to be concerned with opium or has otherwise dealt with it, [22001

2-L373S:i;CI/74

216

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1974] 1 s.c.11.

Jn the last analysis it is only necessary for the prosecution to establish that the accused has some direct relationship with the article or has otherwise If the prosecution proves detention of the article or physical dealt with it. custody of it. then the burden of proving that the accused was not knowingly in possession of the article is upon him. The practical difficulty of the prosecu· tion to prove something within the exclusive knowledge of the accused must have made the le~islature think that if the onus is placed on lhe prosecution, the object of the Act would be frustrated.

[221C}

Lockyer v. Gibb. [1967] 2 Q.B. 243, 246, Emperor v. Santa SiliRh. A.I.R. 1944 Lahore 339, Sahendra Singh v. Emperor, A.LR. 1948 Patna 222, Abdul Ali v. The State, A.LR. 1950 Assam 152, Pritani Singh and Others v. The State, 1966 P. L. R. 200, Suh-Divisional Officer and Collccor Shh•asagar v. Shri Copa/ Chandra Khaund and Another, A.LR. 1971 S.C. 1190, State v. Sham Singh ond Others, I.L.R. [1971] 1 Punjab and Haryana, 130, Sileo Rai Singh v. Emperor, A.LR. (31) 1944 Oudh 297 and Syed Mehaboob Ali v. Statt [19671 Cr. L.J. 1727, rc(erred to.

(iii) la his statement under s. 342 the appellant totally denied having anything to do with the parcel. He never put forward the case that he bona fide believed that the parcel contained only apples. He was in physical custody of opium. He had no pica that he did llot know about it. Accordingly the conviction must be confirmed.

[sentence altered] [221F]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No, 44

(N) of 1970.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated D~cem­ ber 2, 1969 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 612 of 1968.

S. K. Dhingra, for the appellant.

llarbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MATHEW, J.-The appellant was charged by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sangrur, with an offence under s. 9(a) of the Opium Act. He was found guilty of the offence and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one yea{ and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imorisonment for a further period of six months.

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The appellant appealed against the decision to the Soosions Judge,

Sangrur. He dismissed the appeal.

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The appellant filed a criminal revision before

the High Court

against the order of the Sessions Judge. The revision was also dh- G missed.

This appeal, by special leave, is frotn the judgment of the· High

Court.

The case against the appellant was as follows. The appellant pre

sented Railway Receipt No. 641154 dated September 22, 1967, consignment of a parcel of apples purporting to be from one Uchar.a Das of Solan to one Sham Lal of Dhuri and endorsed to him by the consigne~, to the parcel clerk at the Railway Station, Dburi, and got delivery of the consignment. Head Constable Shiv Ram Singh got

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INDER SAIN v. PUNJAB (Mathew, J.)

217

secret information at the Railway Stlltion Dhuri that there was opium in the consignment. He organiied a raid with the help of Pritam ~ingh and Mohinder Singh and stood in front of the parcel office under the bridge. While the accused was carrying the parcel, the Head Constable ir,tervened and questioned him. The parcel was there after opened and it contained 4,350 gms. of opium along the apples. The opium was seized and its samples were put in separate containers and sealed with the seal of the Head Constable. When the report was received that the sample was opium, the appelant was challaned.

The prosecution examined Pritam Singh (PW-1), Bal Mukand, Parcel Clerk (PW-2), Mohinder Singh, Luggage Porter (PW-3), Ramji Dass, Octroi Moharrir (PW·4) and Shiv Ram Singh, Head Constable (PW-5). PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4 did not support lhe pro secution case. But on the evidence of the parcel clerk (PW-2) and the Head Constable (PW-5), it was found by the Judicial Magistrate that the appellant was in actual possession of opium and has committed an offence under s. 9 of the Act. This finding was confirmed in appeal and also in revision.

The question is whether the conviction of the appellant on

the

basis of this finding for an offence under s. 9(a) was justified.

Sections 9 and 10 of the Opium Act provide :

"9. Any person who, in contravention of this Act, or of rules made and notified under s. 5 or s. 8, (a) possesses opium, or (b) transports opium, or ( c) imports or exports opium, or ( d) sells opium, or ( e) omits to warehouse opium, or removes or does any act in respect of warehouse opium, and any person who otherwise contravenes any such rule, shall, 011 conviction before a magistrate, be punishable for each such offence with imprisonment which may extend to three wars, with or without fine; and, where a fine im posed; the convicting magistrate shall direct the offender to be imprisoned in default of payment of the fine for a term which may extend to six months, and imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may !Jave been sentenced.

such

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"10. In prosecutions under s. 9,

it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that all opium for which the accused person is unable to account satisfactorily is opium in respect of which he has committed an offence under this Act."

It was argued that unless otherwise provided, it must be presumed that the legislature will not make an act an offence unless it is accom panied by mens rea. Jn Brend v. Wood(!) Lord Goddard, C.J. said :

"It is of the utmost importance for the protect10n of the liberty of the subject that a court should always bear in mind that, unless a statute, either clearly or by neces-

(I) 62 T, L. R. 462-463.

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218

&UPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1974 J 1 s.c.a.

sary implication, rules out mens rea as a c~nstituent part of a crime the court should not find a man guilty of an offence against 'the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind."

the In Sherras v. De Rutzen( 1) it was held that s. 16(2) of Licensing Act, 1872, which prohibits the supplying by a licensed person of liquor to a constable on duty, did not apply where the licensed person bona fide believed that the constable was off. duty. Wright, J. said at p. 921 :

"There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil inten tion, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is. an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the. subject matter with which it deals, and both must be considered : Nichols v. Hall 11873) L.R. 8 C.P. 322".

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See also the decision Sweet v. Paraley(').

Normally, it is true that the plain ordinary grammatical meaning of the words of an enactinent affords the best guide. But in cases of this kind, the question is not what the words mean but w;1ether there D are sufficient grounds for inferring that Parliament intend~d to exclude the general rule that mens rea is an essential element in every offence. And, the authorities show that it is generally necessary to go behind the words of the enactment and take other factors into consideration. So, in the context it is permissible to look into the object of the legislature and find out whether, as a matter of fact, the legislature intended anything to be proved except the possession of the article E as constituting the element of the offence. assumed that the offence is absolute, the word 'possess' in s. 9 connotes some sort of knowledge about the thing possessed. So we have to deter- mine what is meant by the word 'possess' in the section. The ques- tion is whether the possessor of a parcel is necessarily in possession of everything found in it. The word 'possess' is not crystal clear. There is no clear rule as to the mental element required. In Reg. v. sovereign A>l11rell(") it was held that a person who a ·thinking it to be a shilling cannot be said to possess the sovereign It is necessary to show that the until the mistake was discovered. In other accused had the article which words, the prosecution must prove that the accused was knowingly in control of something in circumstances which showed that he was assenting to being in control of it. fact that he had actual knowledge of that which he had (see the ob servations of Lord Morris in Reg. v. Warner(').

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turned out to be opium.

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Lord Justice Parker said in Lockyer v. Gib ('):

"In my judgment it is quite clear that a person cannot be said to be in possession of some article which he or she

(I) IQ. B.918. (3) [1815116Q. B.D.190.

(2) [1969]2W. l.R.470. (41 [1969] 2 A. C. 256, 289.

(51 [1967] 2 Q B. 24J. 248.

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INDER SAIN v. PUNJAB (Mathew, J.)

219

does not realise, is, for example, in her handbag, in her room, or in some other place over which she. has control. thought is elementary; if something That I should have were slipped into your basket and you had not the vaguest notion it was there at all, you could not possibly be said to be in possession of it."

In Reg. v. Warner('), the House of Lords was concerned with the question whether the .appellant there was in unauthorised posses sion of a scheduled drug and it was held that it is not necessary to prove mens rea apart from the knowledge involved in the possession of the article. Lord Reid dissented. The majority decision would show that in a case of this nature, it is not necessary for the prosecu tion to prove that the accused had consciousness of the quality or the nature of the thing possessed and that it would be sufficient if it is proved that a person was knowingly in possession of the article· Lord Mlirris of Borth-y-Gest said :

"Must the prosecution prove that an accused had u

guilty mind ?

.. . . . . It is a declared purpose of tlie Act to prevent the misuse of drug.<;. If actual possession of particular sub stances which are regarded as potentially damaging is not controlled there will be danger of the misuse of them by those who possess them. They might be harmfully used; they might be sold in most undesirable ways. Parliament a set out therefore to 'penalise' possession. That was strong thing to do. Parliament proceeded to define and limit the classes and descriptions of people who aloµe could save in the case of possess. Ali the indications are that possession such persons Parliament decided absolutely".

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We think that the only question for consideration here is whother the appellant was in possession of opium. It was held in a number of rulings of the various High Courts that if possession of an article is made ·an offence, :hen there must be proof that the nccused was· knowingly in possession of the article. S'ee the decisions in Emperor v. Santa Singh('), Sahendra Singh v. Emperor(•), Abdul Ali v. The State('), Pritam Singh and Others v. The State( 5 ) and Sub-Divi sional Of]icer and Collector, Shivaragar v. Shri Gopa/ Chandra Khaund and Another( 6 ).

It is true that prosecution has not adduced any evidence to show that the appellant was knowingly in possession of opium. The appel lant took the endorsement of the Railway Receipt from the consignee, ·. the parcel. and presented it before the parcel clerk and obtained

(I; [1969] 2 A. C. 256.

(3) A. I. R. 1948 Patna 222. (5) 1966 P. L. R. 200.

(2) A. l. R. ;944 Lo.hCic 3: 0 . (4) A. I. R .1950 Assam 152. 161 A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1190.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[ 1974] 1 s.c.R.

There is, strictly speaking, no evidence that the appellant was aware that the parcel contained any contraband substance, much less opium ..

But it is said on behalf of the prosecution that in most cases of unauthorised possession of opium the prosecution will never be able to prove that the accused was knowingly in possession of 1he article and that the burden to prove that he was not in conscious possession is upon the accused by virtue of s. 10 of the Act, 'That section seems to proceed on the assumption, if it is proved that the accused had something to do with opium, then the burden of proof that he In other has not committed an offence will be upon the aecused. words, when once it is proved in a prosecution under s. 9 of the Act that the accus.ed was in physical custody of opium, it is the accused to prove catisfactorily that he has not committed an offence It by showing that he was not knowingly in possession of opium. would, therefore, appear that the prosecution need only show that the accused was directly conce!ned in dealing with opium. If the prose cution shows that the ·accused had physical custody of opium, then, unless the accused proves by preponderance of probability that he was not in conscious possession of the article the presumption under s. 10 would arise. We do not think that the language of s. 10 would war rant the proposition that for the presumption mentioned in the sec tion to arise it is necessary for the prosecution to .establish conscious possession.

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In our opinion s. 10 would become .otiose if it were held that prosecution must prove conscious possession before it can resort to the presumption envisaged in the section. As we said Section 10 proceeds on the assumption that a person who is in any way concern ed with opium or has dealt with it in 1ny manner, must be presumed to have committed an offence under s. 9 of the Act, unless the person can· satisfactorily prove by preponderance of probability either that he was not knowingly in possession or other circumstances which will exonerate him. The burden to account will arise only when the ac cused is in some manner found to be concerned with opium or has otherwise dealt with it.

In State v. Sham Singh and Others('). Gurdev Singh. J.

speaking about s. 10 obServed :

"Section 10 of the Opium Act, in my opinion, implies ·that 11 person who is in a11y way concerned with opium lhat forms the subject matter of prosecution or has otherwise dealt with it in any manner so as to render him accountable for it will be presumed to have committed an offence under s. 9 of the Opium Act unless he can 'account satisfactorily' for it."

(I) I. L. R. (1971) I Punjab and Haryana 130.

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lNDER SAIN v. PUNJAB (Mathew, !.)

221

in Shea Raj Singh v. Emperor('), it was held :

"Section 10 expressly throws upon the accused the bur den to account for opium in respect of which he is alleged to have committed an offence.''

Practically the same view was State(").

taken in Syed Mehaboob Ali v.

In the last analysis, therefore, it is only necessary for the pros~­ cution to establish that the accused has some direct relationship with If the prosecution proves the article or has otherwise dealt with it. detention of the article or physical custody of it, then the burden of proving that the accused was not knowingly in possession of the article is upon him. The practical difficulty of the prosecution to prove some thing within the exclusive knowledge of the accused must have maqe the legislature think that if the onus is placed on the prosecution, the object of the .Act would be frustrated.

It does not follow from this that the word 'possess' in s. 9 does not connote conscious possession. Knowledge is an essential ingredient of the offence as the word 'possess' connotes, in the context of s. 9, possession with knoweldge. The legislature could not have intended to make mere physical custody without knowledge an offence. A conviction under s. 9 (a) would involve some stigma and it is only pro per then to presume that the legislature intended that possession must be c01;scious possession.

But it is a different thing to say that the prosecution should prove that the accused was knowingly in possession. It seems to us that by virtue of s. 10, the onus of proof is placed on the accused when the prosecution has shown by evidence that the accused has dealt with the article or has physical custody of the same, or is directly co11cerned with it, to prove by preponderance of probability that he did not know ingly possess the article.

In his statement under s. 342, the appellant totally denieu having anything to do with the parcel. He had no case that to his knowledge the parcel contained anything other than apples. He never put for ward the case that he bone fide believed that the parcel contained only apples. He was in physical custody of opium. He had no plea that he did not know about it.

We arc, therefore, inclined to confirm the conviction and we do so. the As regards the question of sentence, in view of the fact appellant has already undergone a pan of the sentence of rigorous im prisonmem and was cm pail from March 3, 1970, we do not think it In the circumstances we think that prnper to send him to jail again. the period of imprisonme·nt already undergone by him together with a fine of Rs. 2.500/- would be adequ1te sentence. If the fine is not paid, the appellant will be liable to imprisonment for a period of six months.

that

The appeal is allowed only to the extent indicated but dismissed in

all other respects. G.C.

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(I) A.!. R.(31) 1944 Oudh 297. ( 2) ( 1967) Cr. L. J. 1727.