LEKHRAJ SATRAMDAS, LALVANI versus DEPUTY CUSTODIAN-CUM-MANAGING OFFICER & ORS.
The Deputy Custodian, having been vested with power to appoint the appellant as Manager under s. 10(2)(b) of the 1950 Act, had the implied power to terminate such appointment by virtue of s. 16 of the General Clauses Act. The validity of the removal order was unaffected by reference to the wrong statute, as the order was within the substantive statutory competence. No writ could be issued to enforce what was essentially a contractual obligation, nor was there any concluded contract or final allotment in favour of the appellant; thus, no right could be enforced by writ.
- Parties
- Appellant: Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani; Respondents: Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer & Ors.
- Jurisdiction
- India
- Judgment Date
- 04 May 1965
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Supreme Court Appeal Under Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution From Decision of the Kerala High Court
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed with costs.
- Legal Topics
- Termination of Appointment, Powers of Public Authorities, Evacuee Property, Writ Jurisdiction and Contractual Rights
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Lekhraj Satramdas Lalvani
Appellant
Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer & Ors.
Respondents
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Supreme Court Appeal Under Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution From Decision of the Kerala High Court
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the Deputy Custodian could lawfully terminate the appellant's appointment as Manager under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950
- 2 Whether the removal of the appellant as Manager was invalid for being made under the wrong act
- 3 Whether the appellant was entitled to a writ of mandamus for reinstatement or to restrain sale
Ratio Decidendi
The Deputy Custodian, having been vested with power to appoint the appellant as Manager under s. 10(2)(b) of the 1950 Act, had the implied power to terminate such appointment by virtue of s. 16 of the General Clauses Act. The validity of the removal order was unaffected by reference to the wrong statute, as the order was within the substantive statutory competence. No writ could be issued to enforce what was essentially a contractual obligation, nor was there any concluded contract or final allotment in favour of the appellant; thus, no right could be enforced by writ.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed with costs.
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