PARESH CHANDRA CHATTERJEE versus THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER
The Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 is not ultra vires even in relation to tea estate land, as it concerns acquisition/requisition in public interest, not tea industry development. The Tea Act, 1953 concerns tea industry regulation, not land requisition/acquisition, and does not alter or repeal...
Source-derived case information.
- Parties
- Petitioner: Paresh Chandra Chatterjee; Respondent: State of Assam and Another
- Jurisdiction
- India
- Judgment Date
- 09 August 1961
- Procedural Posture
- Petitions Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India / Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction, Final Judgment
- Outcome
- Petitions dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Ultra Vires Legislation, Compensation for Requisition/acquisition of Land, Entry 52, List I, Seventh Schedule, Article 31(2) of Constitution
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Paresh Chandra Chatterjee
Petitioner
State of Assam and Another
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Petitions Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India / Supreme Court Original Jurisdiction, Final Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 is ultra vires the State Legislature where it concerns tea estate lands due to Entry 52, List I, Seventh Schedule
- 2 Whether the Act violates Article 31(2) of the Constitution by failing to provide compensation principles for requisition
Ratio Decidendi
The Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 is not ultra vires even in relation to tea estate land, as it concerns acquisition/requisition in public interest, not tea industry development. The Tea Act, 1953 concerns tea industry regulation, not land requisition/acquisition, and does not alter or repeal the Assam Act. The Assam Act satisfies Article 31(2) as it provides for compensation, agreement between parties, and reference to Court applying Land Acquisition Act principles mutatis mutandis, thus is constitutionally valid.
Court Disposition
Petitions dismissed
Orders
- Petitions dismissed with costs
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
158 paragraphs
,
..
,
88
SUPREID~ COCRT REPORTS
JM1
Aug111t 9.
PARESH CHANDRA CHATTER,JEE
i;.
THE STATE OF ASSAM A!\D ANOTHER
(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. SnrnA RAo, M. HID.A.YATULLAH, J. C. SH.I.IT and RAOHt;BAR DAYAJ, JJ.)
Requ18iti011 of Land-T,a Estate land requi1tilioned-State Legis/ation-COf!Stitutionality of-If makea proi·ision.. for payment of compensation-·A . .,ani Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Ad, 1948 (Assam 25 of 1948) 88. 3,6,7,8-Tea Act, 1.963(2V of 1953) ""i 2,10,15-Con..titutimi of India, Art.,, SJ (2), 372, Sch. V 11, List I, Entry 52-l.and Acquisitit.n Act, 1894 (I of 1894), ... 23, 24, 25.
Certain lands out of the petiuoncr's tea cstalc Y•cre rcqui sitioneo by the State under the A"am Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948. The petiiiooer cl:allengcd the consti tutionality of the Act on the grounds that it was uUra rirea the State l.egi,lature in so far as it provided for the requisition an<l acquisition of tea estates as tea industry ,,.as a n1atter for it offended exclmive Art.31(2) of the Constitutic.n as it neither pro,·idcd for payment of compensation for property requisitioned nor specified the principles and the manner in ,.,.hich con1pcnsatiun \\·ac; to he detrrmined.
legislation by Parliament and that
/{e!d,
that the Act \\'as not ultra 1:ire.s
tlic Assan1 l"he Act \~;as valid when it '\'a5 Legislature and \\'as valid. made in 1948 and, '"·ould by reason of .:\1 L 3 72 of the Constitution, continue in force after the com1nenc:c1ncn t of the Constitution until alu:red, repealed or an1endc<l by a cvmpetent 'fhe :\ct in essence provided nn ly for requ isitio11 legislature. l:a<l nothing to or acqui~ition of lands in the public interest; it do with the tea industry. Thr Tea Act, l!l53, made by Parlian1cnt, \Vhich \\·as 1nainly concerned \\·itli the ctevclopmcnt of the tea industry and had nnthing to do "·ith the requisition and acquisition of laud. did not in any \\·ay alter, repeal or F111 ther, the Assan1 :\ct <lid not offend amend the 1\ssan1 :\ct. .:\rt. 31 (2) of the Constitution. ·r1ierc ,,·ere provisiuns in thr. Act for the payment of agreed con1pc11:sation and in case of dh~agreernent for a refrrl".nCl' ro the cour1, in \\hich reference the provisions of \vould niutatis111ufandi.Y apply. 'l'huugl1 the l..and ,\cquisith)n .\ct, 1894, <lid nut provide for rcquisi1ion of land its provisions relating to payment of compensation for acquisition of land could be applied to requisition of land after due alterations.
the Land .\cquisitiou
1\ct1 18941
••
3 s.c.:R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
89
ORIGINAL JurusDICTION : Petitions Nos. 236 and 237 of 1960. Petitions Under Art. 32 of the Consti tution of India for enforcement of fundamental rights.
1961
Paresk Chandra Chatterjee v. 11he State of Assam
Subba Rao J,
-
•
,
K. B. Bagchi and R. C. Dutta, for petitioner.
A. V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for
respondents.
1961. August 9. The Judgment of the Court
was deliverd by
SUBBA RAo, J.-The Petitioner owns a tea estate called the Urrunabund Tea Estate in village Udarbund in the District of Cachar in the State of Assam. The extent of the Tea Estate is about 2682 acres. Out of the said area, 553. 73 !tores are under to the tea cultivation and the rest, according Petitioner, is utilised for the purpose of tert industry and for purposes connected with the said industry. The respondents do not admit this fact and state in the counter-affidavit that the remaining area is lying fellow and unutilised. On December 4-, 1959, the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar at Silchar, respondent No. 2 issued a notification requisition ing an area of 183 bighas of land of the said Tea Estates, and by notification dated another December, 5, 1959, he requisitioned another extent of 149 bighas 19 cottahs and 11 chattacks of land of the said Tea Estate. The petitioner filed two petitions in this Court under Art. 32 of the Consti tution praying for the issue of writs of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the said orders.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner raised before us two contentions, namely, (i) tea industry is a matter for exclusive legislation by the Parliament under Entry 52, List I of t11e Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, and therefore, the Ass'lm Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act in so of 1948,
(hereinafter called the Act),
IHI
Port•h Chandra CM.tttrjn \'. Th· si.116 of A4&am
Subba Rao J.
far as it provides for th~ requisition and acquisition of a tea estate or lands appertaining to it, is 11lliavires the State Legislature ; and (ii) tho said Act is also constitutionally void as it offends Art. 31(2) of the constitution, inasmuch as it do.es not either for payment of compensation for the provide property requisitioner! or specify the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to he determined.
it
is To appreciate the first contention, neccssarv to state some facts. The Assam Lann (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948, was passed by the ARSam Legislature and it receiver! the assent of the Governor on November 14, 1948. It is a pre.Constitution Act, presumably ma.de under Entry !J, List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, which related to "compulsory acquisition of land". Entry :14, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the said Act was "dc~elopmcnt of industries, where development under Federal control is declared by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest';. It is not stated that there was any Federal law declaring that tho developmrnt of tea industry was expedient in the public interest. Therefore, at the time when the Act was passed by the Assam Legislature, even on the assumption that the entry relating to development of industries would cover legislation to prevent acquisition and requisition of land forming part of a tea estate, there waa no Federal law declaring that development of tea industry was expediout in the public interest, with the result the Act was constitutionally valid at the time it was made. If the said law, by reason of Art. 372 of the so, Constitution, would continue to be in force after the commencement of the Constitution until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. The Tea Act of 1g53 was a. Central Act which received the assent of the President on May 28, 1953. It waa pa8Bed by
-
\
195i
Pareih Cha,ndici Chatterjee v. ·i'lw State of Assam
Subha- Rao J-.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
9i
the Parliament in exercise of the power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in Entry 52, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Consti tution. Entry 52 reads, "industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest". Section 2 of the Tea Act in specific terms declares that it was expedient in the public interest that the Ullion should take urider its control the tea industry. The question, therefore, is not whether at the time the Act was passed by the Legislature of the Province it had coustitutional competence to make it'-'-there cannot be any doubt about its competence at the time it was passed-but whether by reason of the passing of the Tea Act, the Act was either altered, repealed or amended within the meaning of Art.372 of the Constitution. This leads us to the consideration of the scope of the both the Acts. First taking the Act, the preamble shows that it was passed to provide for the requisition and speedy acquisition of premises and land for certain purposes. Section 3 confers on the Provincial Government a power to requisition any land for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services essen tial to the life of the community or for providing for accommodation, transport, proper facilities communication, irrigation or drainage. Section 4 enables the Government to require the land so requisitioned. Section 6 provides for the release of the land from requisition. Sections 7 and 8 prescribe the mode of awarding compensation for requisition or acquisition of land, as the case may be. The Act in essence provides only for requisition or acquisi tion of lands in public interest. It has nothing to do with tea industry, and as for that matter any industry.
The Tea Act was enacted for a different pur pose altogether. The long title given in the Act shows that it was enacted "to provide for the control by the Union of the tea industry, including
•
,.
1~1
Pnrtah Chandra CM.tterjtt v. ]"ht Stat1 of A.ra::tm
Subba Rao .! .
-
-
~UPltEME COl'R'l' Itj.;PORT~
[l 962]
the control, in pursuance of the lnt,,mational Agreemt·nt now in force. of the cuJti,·ation of tea in, and of tho export of tea. from, fndia aml for that purpose to establish a Tea Board and levy a customs duty on tea. exported from India··. Chapter II provides for the establishment and constitution of the Tea Board and s. 10 therein describes it8 duties and functions; its functions are mainly intended to promote the development of the tea industry, to regulate the production and extent of cultivation of tea, to improve its quality and to regulate the internal and external trade in tea. Chapter III preserib<'H the method of control over the extension of tea cultivation and Ch. IV, the control onr tlw export of tea and tea seeds. Chapter V <leals with fiuauc<', accounts and audit. Chapter VL regulates the power of tht' Central l~ovcrmnent to cuutrol price and distribution of tea or tea waste. ChaptN VII provides for miscella· · neous matters ~u<'h a~ licensing of brokers, tea. manufac·tur<'I;8 <'IL'., pfJW<'r ofinsper.tion and pPnalties th<' commission of certain offrncl'S created bv for the Act. His, therefore, manifcHt that. th<' l'ea A~t mainly concerned with the development of t.h!' tea industry, and it haH nothing to do with the requisi· tion or acquisition of lands, though the said lands may from part of a tea estate or used for purposeR incidPntal to the !<!a industry. Indeed, s.15(1Xb) of the Tea Act provirlcs for ihc contingenc~· of a part of a land on which tea is µ!anted being compulsorily acquired under the provision.-; of the Land Acquisi· tion Act, 18!).1 (Act I of 1894) or by any other law for the time being in foree and no longer carries tea. In such an cvont, the Haid section authorises the owner of the tea estak in which such land is situate to apply to the Board for permission to plant tea on land not planted with ka. The Tea Act, therefore, not only does nut expressly prohibit the acquisition of any lnncl, but aho in express terms provided for the replacement of the area acquired by other land the purpose of tea plantation. Though tl1c for
I
-
-
1961
Pareah Chandra Ch'ltterjee v. The State of Asaa m
Subba Rao J.
3 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS .. -,_.
93
Tea Act does not in terms visualize the contingency of requisition as distinguished from acquisition, we can not come to a different conclusion in respect of it, for the worrl «'acquisition" must have been used in a comprehensive sense so as to include requisition also. That apart, the provisions of the Act do not expressly or by necessary implication prohibit requi sition of a land nsed directly or incidentally for the purpose of plantation of tea. The ruleH made nnder the Act only provi1le for the ''ontrol of tea industry and they have no bearing 011 the question of requisition or acquisition of land. A comparativP studv of both the Acts makes it clear that the two Acts deal with different matters and were passed for different purposes. The Tea Act in no sense of the term can be described as one altering, repealing or amending the Act passed by the Assam Legisla ture. This contention is, therefore, rejected.
There are no merits in the second contention
either. Article 31(2) of the Constitution reads :
. "No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public pur pose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and eithei· fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in ques tion in any court on the ground th9t the com pensation provided bv is not · adequate."
that
law
Under .t~i~ A.rticle, the law .made for acqui- . nng or reqms1t10nmg a property rn conditioned bv two circumstances, namely, (i) the existence of a P.ublic purpose, and (ii) t~e payment of compensa tion. If the law provides for compensation and either .fix~s the amo1:1nt of compensation or specifies t.he prmc1ples on wluch, and the manner in which ,
.
.
.
'
'
94
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[1962)
J961
Pt1re!h Chandra Cholf<rju v. Tl•t State of AtMa m
Sulba Rao J.
the compensation
the compensation is to lie determined, the adequacy justiciable. The of the said question is whether the Act satisfies conditions. The relevant provisions of the Act dealing with compensation in the case of requisition of land are as under.
is not
land
Section G. (i) Whcrn any
requisitioned under section 3 is not acquired and is to be released fiom requisition, it will revert to the owner and the Collecter will deliver the land to rnch owner or pos8e~sion of interested p<'r~nn who was rerogniscd under section 7(3).
th<'
Section 7. (;{) Where any
requi~i tioned under section 3, thero shall be pa1<l to every per~on interceted such compensation as may be agreed upon in writing between such person and the Collector, in respect of:-
land
is
(a)
t.he requisition of such lands ; and
(h) any damage <lone during the period of requisition to such land other than what may have been sustained by natural causes.
Sectio11 8. (I) The Colkctor shall
in every
case-
x
x
x
x
(b) where there is 1my disagreement with regard to the compensation payable under sub-8rdion (3) of scC'tion i between the Collector anrl the person to whom possession of any land ie delivered under section 6.,
rofn the matter to the decision of the Court.
(2) The proviHions of .the Land Acquisi tion Act,. 1894, sl!llll m11tatis m'!lf(Jndis . apply
Jj(J]
Pare1h Chandra GluUt«rj•e v. Thi S!ak of A6'am
Sub~a RaoJ.
3:S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS
95
in respect of any reference made to the Court under sub-section (l ). These provisions provide for the payment of
in wl1ich
agreed compensation, and, in the case of disagre ement between the Collector and the person to whom possession of any land is delivdred under s.6, for a reference to the Court. In respect of any such reference to the Court, the provisions of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall mutatis mittandis apply. The argument is that in the matter of requisition, ~he Land Acquisition Act, 1894, does not prescribe any principles for awarding compensa tion and, therefore, in respect of requisition, either sub-s. (2) of s.8 is not applicable or becomes otiose, with the result that the Act does n9t lay down any principles on which and manner the compensation is to be determined. This argument the expression "mutatis mutandis" in ignores sub-s.(2) of s.8. 1'he said expression means "with due alteration of details". The Land Acquisition Act applies only to acquisition of land as distinguished requisition of land. Acquisition deprives from the owner permanently of his land ; and requisi to tion deprives him present possession. When for ·which the land was requisitioned ceased, it may be made to revert to him. Sub-s.(2) of s. 8 of the Act makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, with due alterations of details or appropriate changes. apply in respect of any reference made to the Court. Part III of the Land Acquisition Act provides for a reference to the Court and the procedure thereof. With appropriate modifications the provisions of that Chapter apply . to a reference in respect of compensation for requisition. Sections 23, 24 and 25 lay down the principles for ascertaining the amount of compensa tion payable fo. a person whose land has been acquired. We do not see any difficulty in applying th.ose principles for payin~· compensation in the
right the necessity
only of his
1901
l'arel'h Chan1[r11 Chatl~rju v. Tl~ Slalt of .A.:.Ro m
Subta Rao J
!JG
SUPRE!l1E COlTRT REPORTS
(1962)
matter of requisition of land. While in the case of land acquirPd, the market value of the land is ascertained, in the case of requisition of land, the compensation to the O\rncr for depriving him of his possession for a stated poriod will be ascertained. It may be that appropriate changes in the phraseo logy used in the said provisions may have to be tn apply th(' prineiplcs underlying those madc> prov1s1ons. To the Land A .. q11isit ion Ac·I. sn.ys :
illustmtt' :
;;.:!:! of
(I)
In d<>t<"nniniug th" amount of com pensation to he awanl<·cl for lluul acquired umler this Act, th" Court ,;Jiall take into c-on8ideration- first, thc> market ,·a]ll(• of the land at the date of the pnhlieation of the notifiration 11mler Section 4, s11 b-sec:t.io11 (I);
Recond/y, the dama!!e sustained by th<' person interested, h~' reason of the taking of auy standing crops or trees which may h<' on thc> Jami at. the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof;
thirdly, the damage if any sustained by the pe1w1n interested, at the time ofthn Collector'H taking possession of th<' Jund, by reaHon of st·vering such la11(l from his other lnnd;
fuurlhly, th<' damage if any sustained by th" pt·rson inter.,sted, at the time of t4e Collee tor's taking poss£•ssion of the land, by reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property, movahle or immo>able, in anv other manner, or his earnings;
fifthly, if, in consequence of the land by the Collt'ctor, the pc>rson intcrestccl is compelled to change his residence or place of business, the reasonable expenses if any incidental to ~uch change; and
,. "
)
3 S.C.R.
SUPREl\IE COlJRT REPORTS
97
sixthly, the damage if any bona fide resulting _ from diminution of the profits of the land bet,rnen the time of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and __ the time of the Controller's taking possession of the land. In addition to ·the market value of the land as above provided, the _Court shall in every case award a . sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in considera ·tion of the compulsory nature of the acquisi:. tion.
(2)
-
-
1961
Partsh Chandra Chatterjee v. The State of ABB·'.lm --- Subba Rao J.
If instead of the word "acquisition" the word "requisition" is rea_ di and instead of the words "the_ market value of the and" the words "the market value of tho interest in the- Janel" of which the owner has been deprived arc read, the -two sub, sections of the section can, without-any difficulty; be applied to the determination of compensation for requisition of a land. So too, the other section· can },le applied. If the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner be accepted, we would be attri buting to the Legislature an incongruity, namely; that while it provides principles of _ compensati6n _ in the matter of acquisition, it omits to do so in the matter of requisition, though in both the cases a reference to the Court is provided. For the afore said reasons, we reject this contention.
No other point is r~ised.' In the· result" the
petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. -
\
.
Petitions dirn1i8.<e•!.
>
I I~