STATE OF U.P. versus P.A. MADHU
The High Court erred in overlooking intrinsic merit in the evidence of reliable eyewitnesses, applied inconsistent standards, and wrongly treated a cryptic telephonic message as undermining the prosecution. The acquittal was based on untenable general grounds and speculative reasoning disregarding credible direct...
Source-derived case information.
- Parties
- Appellant: State of U.P.; Respondent: P.A. Madhu; Intervenor: Ram Jethmalani
- Jurisdiction
- India
- Judgment Date
- 17 July 1984
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal / Supreme Court Decision on Appeal Against Acquittal by High Court
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence of respondent restored.
- Legal Topics
- Appreciation of Evidence, Interference by Supreme Court Under Article 136, First Information Report (fir), Section 302 IPC (murder), Section 25(1)(a) Indian Arms Act, Value of Telephonic Information as FIR
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
State of U.P.
Appellant
P.A. Madhu
Respondent
Ram Jethmalani
Intervenor
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal / Supreme Court Decision on Appeal Against Acquittal by High Court
Legal Issues
- 1 When should the Supreme Court interfere with High Court's appreciation of evidence under Article 136?
- 2 Can a cryptic telephonic message to police amount to a First Information Report (FIR)?
- 3 Was the acquittal by the High Court justified on facts and evidence?
Ratio Decidendi
The High Court erred in overlooking intrinsic merit in the evidence of reliable eyewitnesses, applied inconsistent standards, and wrongly treated a cryptic telephonic message as undermining the prosecution. The acquittal was based on untenable general grounds and speculative reasoning disregarding credible direct evidence and the conduct of the accused. The accused was caught at the spot with the weapon, and the prosecution evidence is consistent, credible, and corroborated.
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence of respondent restored.
Orders
- Judgment of the Allahabad High Court set aside.
- Respondent convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
210 paragraphs
1
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STATE OF U.P.
v
P.A. MAOHU
17 July, 1984
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[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND SABYASACHI
MUKHARJI, JJ.]
Constitution of India-Art. 136-Supreme Court-When woufd Interfere
·with the appreciation of evidence by the High Cpurt.
Code ofCrim;nal Procedure-S. 154-FJR-Cryptlc information on phone to police-Cannot be treated as FIR-Being first in point oftims make no diffe rence-Name of assailant not mentioned telephonic message-Whether discredits prosecution case .
in
The respondent, Secretary of the workers union of a construction company, D.W. 1, Vice-President of the Union, the deceased and P.Ws. S and 7. officers of the company and P.W. 6, standing counsel of the company were all coming out of the office of an industrial tribunal after filing their written statements in a dispute raised by· the workers. The prosecution cas~ was that at the main gate of the tribunal's building the respondent suddenJy star ted firing from a pistol and shot dead the deceased. As firing was going on, a telephonic message conveying the fact that gunshots were being fired was sent to the nearby police station. On receipt of the telephonic message the police arrived ;t the sp,t, seized the pistol and took the respondent and some of the witnes4'es to the police station where a formal FIR was registered. The Session.i Judge conv.icted the accused under s. 302 IPC ands. 25 (1) (a) of Indian Arms Act and sentenced him to life imprisonment and one Years' rigorous imprisonment respectively. On appeal the High Court reversed the. judgment of the Sessions Judge. The High Court observed that if P.W. 7 had given the telephonic message, as stated by D.W. 1, he would have men .. tioned the name ·or the assailant because he was a fu11-f1edged eye-witness but since his name had not been mentioned it was the strongest possible circum stance to discredit the prosecution case. Hence this appeal.
A11owing the appeal,
HELD ; Normally this Court does not interfere against the judgment of
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~he High ?curt pur~I! on. appreciatio'n of evidence, But this Court would I~terfere with the drc1s1on ot the High Court if there appear to be very special c1~cumstances Which have been ei:her overlooked or not considered by the High Court or the High Court does not appear to have examined the intrinsic merits of the evidence of the witnesses but has proceeded to acquit the accused on general grounds which are wholly untenable. [5B-C)
A cryptic information on telephone has been held by this Court to be of no value at all, The mere fact that the information was the first in point of tjme does not by itself clothe it with the character of first information report.
Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, [1971) I SCR 599, referred to.
In the instant case the telephonic message was an extremely cryptic one
and could not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of the tern1,
The High Court has applied two different standards to assess the evi dence of the prosecution and that of the defence. While the High Court accepts the uncorroborated evidence of D. W. 1 who is as much interested in the dispute as the deceased, if not inore, being Vice-President of the Union and also in possession of the brief case of the respondent, yet it disbelieves the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 mainly on the ground that they were highly interes· ted. (7H; SA-BJ
•
The High Court completely lost sight of two important facts-(!) that P .Ws. 5 and 7 were high officers of the company and were not likely to depose falsely on a matter like this, and (2) that P.W. 6, who was the standing eounsel of the company and other labour cases for more than 3 decades, fully corroborates the evidence of P, Ws. 5 and 7. We have examined the evidence of P.Ws. 5 and 7 with very great care and caution but we are un'able to find anY discrepancy or defect in their evidence so as to lead any court to reject the same. [BE-Fl
The finding of the High Court that it is difficult 10 believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt to escape is also most lnnrealistic. There is clear evjdence of P.Ws. 5, 6 and 7 that after the responcent threw down the pistol he was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he could not e~cape. The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter. Moreover~ if a perscn ~ommits a cold-blooded murder in the premises of a court which is bound to be full of other litigants also, he cannot lhink of escaping and is bound to be caught by some one: or the other. [9A-C]
Relying on the evidence of D.W. 1, the conctus.ion reached by the High Court that it is exteremelY doubtful that the witnesses could see the incident -=-rrom inside the court room as there was~no door or wipdow t}lrough which,
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U.P. STATE v. P.A. MADU (Fazal Ali, J.)
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the incident could be seen is purely speculative and against the weight of evidence on record. The evidence of D.W. 1 who was a highly interested witness, should not have been acted upon in the pec,1Jiar facts and circum- stances of this case unless corroborated by independent evidence. [9D; F-G]
The High Court seems to have completely overlooked the fact that there was no reason for the three eye-witnesses, one of whom was a standing counsel for about 30 years, to have falsely implicated the respondent merely becau~e he was Secretary of the Union. The consistent course of conduct of the respondent speaks volumes against liis innocence. He was caught redhan- ded at the spot and was surrounded bY the Witnesses so that he could not escape, and the police arrived within fifteen minutes of the occurrence and took him to the police station. [9H; IOA]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
611 of 1981.
Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th February, 1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Cr!. Appeal No. 11478 of 1980.
Da/veer Bhandari, H.M. Singh and Ranbir Singh Yadav for
the Appellant.
R.L. Kholi and Girish Chandra for the Respondent.
Ram Jethmalani, Ms. Rani Jethmalani and S.B. Jethmalani
for the Intervenor.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAzAL ALI, J. Our hard-won
the private sector. Labour and
freedom from British yoke ushered in a new era of progress and prosperity resulting in setting up or a large number of industries of all sorts and· kinds in various spheres, some of them being Government conttOlled and some of them in industrial laws of the country passed after independence created a sense of new awake ning in the labour force which became more and)nore conscious of the rights and privileges conferred on them by the laws. Although disputes between the labour and management is now a common life of the country yet seldom in the feature of the it ever happened that a dispute history of industrial disputes has to take the toll of a human assumed such large proportions as life resulting in a cold-blooded murder in broad day light and that too in a court premises.
industrial
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Such an extraordinary event
the suhject·matter of this appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court where a Secretary of the labour Union seems to have run amuck and fired several shorts by a couri!ry·made pistol shots on an officer of the management and killed him at the spot.
is
The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court and need not be lies within a narrow compass repeated. The matter, therefore, and we purpose only to examine the reasons and the inferences drawn by the High Court for acquitting the respondent, Madhu.
M/s. Hindustan Construction Company (hereinafter referred to as the 'company'), had undertaken the construction of Jamima Hyde! Project in Khadar, District Dehradun.
· the dearness allowance claim of the
To begin with, it appears that there was some dispute about labour from the management which was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The respondent, who was the Secretary of the Union, was looking after the case on behalf of the workers, while PWs 5 and 7 were the officers appear ing on behalf of the management before the Tribunal. The deceased, S.J. Sirgaonkar, was Deputy Personnel Manager of the Bombay Branch of M/s. Hindustan Construction Company. He was shot dead by the respondent after he (deceased), alongwith the other officers of the management, had come out of the Tribunal's office at Meerut after filing their written statements. Thereafter one of the eye-witnesses, S.K. Gui (PW 7) asked someone to give a telephone call to the police station, which was· nearby, on receipt of which the police arrived at the spot, seized the accused and some of the witnesses to the . the pistol and took police station where a formal FIR was registered. The Pancha nama was prepared and other formalities were, however, done at the spot.
The learned Sessions Judge, after a careful consideration of the evidence of the three main eye-witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) as ·also the evidence of Durga Das (DW I), came to a clear conclu sion that the prosecution case against the respondent was fully the respondent uncler proved and accordingly he
convicted
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ti.E'. STATE V. P.A. M·\1JHlJ (Fazal Ali, ],)
to
imprisonment for life. He s.302, I.P.C. and sentenced him also convicted the respondent under s. 25(l)(a) of th~ Indian Arms to one year's R.l. The respondent went Act and sentenced him the decision of the up in appeal Sessions Judge which was reversed by the High Court and the respondent was acquitted of the charges framed against him.
the High Court agaimt
to
Normally, this Court does not interfere against the judgment of a High Court purely on appreciation of evidence. But, in this case, there appears to be very special circumstances which have been either overlooked or not considered by the High Court. Besides this, the High Court does not appear to have examined intrinsic merits of the evidence of the witnesses but has the proceeded to acquit the respondent on general grounds which, we shall show hereafter, are wholly untenable.
It appears that July 5, 1977 was
the date fixed in the Indus trial Tri bun a), Meerut for the parties to file their written statements and in this connection the deceased alongwith the other eye-wit nesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) attended the Tribunal and PWs 5 and 7 filed their written statements. P.W. 6 was Cthe standing counsel. of the Company and had been representing the same in all labour disputes concerning the Company. The respondent was lineman of the Project and was the holding the post of hydel Secretary of the labour Union. DW I, Durga Das, who was also at the spot was the Vice-President of the said Union.
reached
(the deceased)
It appears that after filing the witnesses and
the written statements at about the respondent came out of the 11. 30 a.m. themselves. As soon as court premises and were talking between the respondent and Sirgaonkar the main gate of the Tribunal building, the respondent is alleged to have taken out a country-made pistol and fired five shots one after the other in quick succession, with the result tbat Sirgaonkar fell down and died at the spot. Thereafter, the respondent threw away the pistol but he was surrounded by the witne1ses and later It is also alleged by handed over to the police on the prosecution the firing was going on a telephonic message was sent to the police station Civil Lines, Meerut about the firing and it was received by MasrQor Ali, PW 9, who made in the general diary at 11.39 a.m. The an entry to that effect telephonic information merely conveyed the fact that gunshots
their arrival.
that while
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were being fired. On receipt of the information, PW-10. Ram Datt Gautam, the Sub-Inspector of Police, proceeded to the place of occurrence and found the body of Sirgonkar lying outside the main gate of the Tribunal building and lhe 1espondent being apprehended by the accused into custody and proceeded to the police station along with PW 7, S.K. Gui, where a regular FIR was registered. The usual proceedings about the post-mortem and inquest the follo wed '&nd after a thorough the police submitted a chargesheet against the respondent which resulted in his convic tion by the Sessions Judge. This, in short, is the prosecution case.
the witnesses. The police officer
investigation
took
The main grounds on which
the High Court has reversed the judgment of the Sessions Judge may be summarised as follows :
,•
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that as
In fact, DW I merely says
Durga Das, DW I who was admittedly at the scene of the occurrence bas stated the shooting started, PW 7 bad given a telephonic message to the police station. The High Court by an implied process of reasoning has observed that if PW 7 had given the telephonic message he would have mentioned the name of the assailant because he was a full-fledged eye witness but it is the strongest possible since bis name bad not been mentioned circumstance to discredit the prosecution case. We are, however, this somewhat involved reasoning of the unable to agree with High Court. that Gui telephoned to the poolice station about the firing and said something in English, to have presumed that from this the The High Court seems irresistible inference to be drawn is that Gui did not mention the name of the assailant of the deceased and on this ground alone is based on a serious the prosecution must fail. This argument error. telephonic message was an extre mely cryptic one and could not be regarded as a FIR in any sense of the term. Secondly, assuming that Gui had given the tele in utter chaos and confusion when shots after phonic message there was no occassion for shots were being fired at the deceased, Gui to have narrated the entire story of the occurrence. In fact, in his evidence Gui has denied telephoned the police but he stated that he asked somebody to telephone the police which appears t@ be hoth logical and natural. Moreover telephone has been held by this such a cryptic
that he personally
In the first place,
information on
the
U.P. STA1'E I'. P.A. MAOHU (Pazal Ali, J.)
1
Court to be of no value at all. Punjab(') this Court in identical circumstances observed thus :
In Tapindar Singh v. State of
A
that that firing had
"The telephone message was received by Hari Singh, A.SJ., Police Station, City Kotwali at 5.35 p.m. on the infor September 8, 1969. The person conveying mation did not disclose his identity, nor did he give any is said to have been other particulars and al! taken place at the taxi conveyed was stand, Ludhiana. This was, of course, recorded in the daily diary of the police station by the police officer responding to telephone call. But prime facie this cryptic and anonymous oral message which did not in terms clearly specify a cognizable offence cannot be treated as first information report The mere fact that this information was fi1 st in point of time does not by itself clothe it with the character of first information report."
the
the
'
the
this fact,
therefore,
that even
fundamental Jn view of this decision, to the ground. Moreover, reasoning of the High Court falls independent witness Durga Das himself does not appear to be an but he was highly interested because being the Vice-President of looking after the case in the Industrial the labour Union he was Tribunal on behalf of the workers. There is clear evidence of the brief case of the respondent prosecution witnesses time of the occurrence. Although was handled by DW I at the DW I denied is amply proved by the evidence of it PW-5. The only comment made against this witness was that he investigating officer. But, as the did not state this fact before it may not have been necessary for this.was a matter of detail him to have stated all possible details in his statement to the police. This witness is corroborated by PW 6, an independent witness, who says that the brief case of the respondent was being carried by It, therefore, appears that DW I being the Vice Durgu Das. President of the Union and a pairvikar of the workers was highly interested and in the face of the evidence of independent witness the evidence of PW 5 like PW-6, there is no reason to disbelieve that the brief case of the respondent was being handled by DW I.
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We might state here that the High Court has applied two
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(1}[1975) 1 SCR 643.
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the evidence of the prosecution and different standards to assess that of the defence. While the High Court accepts the uncorro is as much interested in the borated evidence of OW l, who dispute as the deceased, if not more, being Vice-President of the Union and also in possession of the brief case of the respondent, yet it disbelieves the evidence of PWs 5 and 7 mainly on the ground that they were highly interested. The relevant finding of the High Court on this point may be extracted thus :
"In the first place, it shows that Subrat Kumar Gui the and M.R. Bhaumik were mainly responsible for prosecution of the case, although the deceased bad been in genaral supervision of all labour disputes of the In the second place, it also company at all the places. two witnesses were not happy with points out that these the appellant who had been representing the cause of the labourers before the Industrial Tribunal and that they were sore about his conduct. In these circumstances these two witnesses could not be said to be independent."
Here, the High Court completely lost sight of two important facts-(1) that PWs 5 and 7 were high officers of the Company and were not likely to depose falsely on a matter like this, and (2) that PW-6, who was the standing counsel of the Company and other labour cases for more than 3 decades, fully corroborates the evidence of PWs 5 and 7. We have examined the evidence of PWs 5 and 7 with very great care and caution but we are unable to find any discrepancy or defect in their evidence so as to lead any court to reject the same. On the other hand, on a considera tion of their evidence, we are satisfied that are throughout consistent and congruous and that their evidence bears a ring of the High Court could dis truth. We are indeed surprised how believe the evidence of the eye-witnesses in the case of a cold blooded murder committed·in broad day light where the respondent was caught red-handed at the spot. The High Court also over looked the crying conduct of the respondent who went on firing one shot after the other so as to make sure that Sirgaonkar does not survive at any cost.
Another ground on which the High Court has reversed the
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judgment of the Sessions Judge that it is difficult to believe that after the respondent threw the pistol he continued to remain at the spot and did not make any attempt to escape. With due respect, this finding of the High Court is also most unrealistic. Tl!~re is clear evidence of PWs 5, 6 and 7 that after the respondent threw down the pistol he was surrounded by the three witnesses so that he could not escape. The High Court has failed to consider this important aspect of the matter. Moreover, if a person commits a cold-blooded murder in the premises of a court which is bound to be full of other litigants also, he cannot think of escaping and is bound to be caught by someone or the other.
to have relied on including DW 1, entered
The High Court was further of the view that it is extremely doubtful that the witnesses could see the incident from inside the court room as there was no door or window through which the incident could be seen. To buttress this observation, the High the evidence of DW 1 that the <;ourt seems the co.urt room as soon four persons, as the first shot was fired. This statement is obviously wrong because all the three witnesses stated that the shots were fired while they were outside tile court room and they actually saw the It was only after a few shots were respondent firing the shots. fired that they entered the court room and even so they were able the glass panes of the court to see the whole occurrence from room. There is absolutely no evidence on record to show that tho window and that the place of there were no glass panes occurrence could not be visible from In these the court room. circumstances the conclusion of the High Court is purely specula tive and against the weight of evidence on the record.
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The High Court seems to have placed some relience on the evidence of DW 1 but as he was highly interested, his evidence unless corroborated by independent evidence should not have been acted upon in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
Lastly, the High Court seems
to have completely overlooked the fact that there was no reason for three eye-witnesses, one of whom was a standing counsel far about 30 years, to have falsely implicated the respondent merely because he was Secretary of the Union .. The consistent course of conduct of the respondent speaks volumes against bis innocence. He was caught red-handed
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at the spot and was surrounded by the witnesses so that he could not escape, and the police arrived 'within fifteen minutes of the took him to the police station. Some comment occurrence and was made by the High Court about the delay in the inquest report but that does not appear to be of any consequence if the evidence of the three eye-witnesses is to be believed.
We have given our anxious consideration
to the evidence of the three witnesses (PWs 5, 6 and 7) and we find ourselves in complete agreement with the Sessions Judge that these witnesses the High Court trustworthy. were both reliable and committed a grave error of law in not going into the intrinsic merits of the evidence of each of the eye-witnesses and in discar ding the same on general grounds which also have no substance.
In fact,
For the reasons given above, we are satisfied that this is not a case in which it could be said by any stretch of imagination that another reasonable view may be possible on the evidence and circumstances of the case, viz. that the accused was innocent. The result is that the appeal is allowed, the jucgment of the High Court is oet aside and the appellant is convicted under s.302 of the Indian Panel Code to imprisonment for life as also under s.25(I}(a) of the Indian Arms Act to one year's R.I. because he was undoub· tedly found using a country made pistol which was recovered from the place of occurrence.
/
H.S.K.
Appeal allowed,