WORKMEN OF DIMAKUCHL TEA ESTATE versus THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE

ll56

SUPRE;\'lE COURT REPORTS

[HJJSj

Fcbntarz.1 4.

WORKMEN OF DIMAKUC!-Jl TEA ESTATE ~ .. THE MANAGEMENT OF DIMAKUCHI TEA ESTATE

IS. R. DAs C. J.. S. K. DAS and A. K. SARKAR JJ.1

IndustriaL Dispute-Defi,-nition,

Interpretation of-Test 'tl1111 pe·rs07t.'. JVleaning of-Industrial Disputes Act, lfl-17 (Act XIV of 1947, s. 2(k).

.

The question for decision in this appeal was whether a dis pute raised by the workmen relating to a person who was not a workman could be an industrial dispute as defined i:y s. 2{kj of .the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it stood before the am E:ndments of 1956. The appellants, v.1ho were the workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, espoused the cause of one Dr. K. P. Banerjee, Assistant Medical Officer. \Vho had been dismissed un heard with a month's salary in lieu of notice but v.rho had ac cepted such payment and left the garden and the dispute raised was ultimately referred by the Government for adjudication under s. 10 of the Act. Both the Tribunal and the Appellate In dustrial Tribunal took the vie\\' that as Dr. Banerjee was not a \Vorkman v.rithin the meaning of the Act, the dispute v:as not an industrial dispute as defined by s. 2(k).

Held, (per Das, C.J., and S.K. Das, J., Sarkar J, dissenting) that the expression 'any person' occurring in s. 2 {k) of the In dustrial Disputes Act, 1947, cannot be given its ordinary mean· ing and must be rr:ad and 1Jnderstood in the context of the Act and the object the Legislature had in viev.·. Nor can it be equat ed either with the \?Ord 'v,'orkn1an' or 'employee'.

The two tests of an industrial dispute as defined by the sec tion must, therefore, be-(1) the dispute n1ust be a real dispute, capable of being settled by relief given by one party to the other, and (2) the person in re~pect of whom the dispute is rais ed must be one in Vihose employment. non-employment, terms uf employment, or conditions of labo.ur (as the case may be). the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest, and this must depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case.

Applying these tests, the dispute in the present case which \Vas in respect of a person \Vho \Vas not a workman and belong ed to a different category altogether, could not be said to be a dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act and the appeal must fail.

...

Narendra Kuniar Sen v. A.U

India h1(lvstrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal, 11~53) 55 Born. L.R. 125 approved.

Western India Auto·mobile Association v. The Tribunal, Bombay, [1949.J 'F.C.R. 321, distinguished.

Industrial

1958

·workmen

vj of Dimakuchi Tea E8!ate v. T!te Manago,,•nt ·"f Dimaku.;hi Tea E•fatt

S.C.R.

SUPREME · COURT REPORTS

1157

Case-law discussed. Per Sarkar, J.-There is no reason why the words 'any per son in s. 2(k) of the Act should not be given their natural mean ing so as to include an employee who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act. Consequently, a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman may be an industrial dispute within that section.

The primary object which the Act has in view is the pre

servation of the industrial peace.

The Act does not make the interest of the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute. Such interest is incapable of definition and ·to make it a condi tion of an industrial dispute would d.efeat the object of the Act. Western India Automobile Associ'<ition v. The Industrial Tribunal of Bombay, [1949] F.C.R. 321; Narendra Kumar _Sen v. The All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal, (1953) 55 Bom. L.R. 125 and United CommerCial Bank Ltd. v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1952) 1 L.L.J., 782, referred to.

Even assuming that the workmen must be interested in order that there can be an industrial dispute, the present case satisfies that test and falls within the purview of s. 2(k) of the Act.

CIVIL APPELLATE JurusmcrION: Civil Appeal No. 297 of

1956.

.

·Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 30, 1955, of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta in Appeal No. Cal. 220 of 1954.

C. B. Aggarwala and K. P. Gupta, for the appellants. Purslzottam Tricumdas for N. C. Chatterjee, P. K. Goswami, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the respon dent.

1958. Fabruary 4. The Judgment of Das, C. J., and S. K. Das, J., was delivered by S. K. Das, J. Sarkar, J., delivered a ·separate Judgment.

S. K. DAs J.-This appeal by special leave raises a ques- tion of some nicety and of considerable importance in the matter of industrial relatioos in this country. The question is the true scope and effect of the definition clause in s. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question has arisen in the following circumstan- ces.

s. K. Daa 1.

1158

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1958]

2'11J B - s. K.DaaJ.

1968 Wor- oJ Dima~ TUI 11,,,,,. T•

The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dima- kuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, Dibrugarh. The respondent is the management of the Dimakuchi tea estate, district Darrang in Assam. One Dr. TM :J,=:;:" of K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical Officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November l, 1950. He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of ap pointment: "While you are on probation or trial, your suit ability for permanent employment will be considered. If dur ing the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment, you will receive seven days' notice in writing terminating your appointment. If you are guilty of miscon duct, You are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the· period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will be confirmed in the garden's service." In February 1951 Dr. Banerjee was given an increment of Rs. 5 per mensum, but on April 21. Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Boroth. manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated : "It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will of course receive one month's salary in lieu of notice." As no reas()llS were given in the notice of termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services were being terminated. To this Dr. Banerjee received a reply to this effect: "The reasons for your discharge are on the medical side, which are outside my jurisdiction, best kn~ to Dr. Cox but a main.reason is because of the deceitful manner in which you added figures to the require ments of the last medical indent· after it bad been signed by Dr. Cox, evidence of which is in my hands."

The cause of Dr. Banerjee was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the secretary of that Sangha \vrote to the manager of the Dima kuchi tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr. Baner jee's discharge. The manager wrote back to say that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was discharged on the ground of incompetence in

S.C.R.

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1159

19&& Wmkm<11 of Dimakwt.4i Tea Eetcl4 •· The MGnagtn~nl of Dimat..,oM • Tea Eetot• s. K. D114 J.

.

his medical duties and the chief medical officer <Dr. Cox) had found that Dr. Baner1'ee was incompetent and did not have sufficient "knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medi- , cal offi.cer 111 tea garden practice." lt was further stated that Dr. Banerjee gave a faulty. inexpert and clumsy quinine in- jection to one Mr. Peacock. an assistant in the Dimakuchi te<l estate, which produced an extremely acute and severe ill- ness very nearly causing a paralysis of the patient's leg. The reasons given by the manager for the termination of the servi- ces of Dr. K. P. Banerjee did not satisfy the appellants herein and certain conciliation proceedings, details whereof are not necessary for our purpose. were unsuccessfully held over the question of the termination of the service of Dr. Banerjee. The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripar- tite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Kannachari Sangha respectively. This Board recommended that Dr. Baner- jee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his dis- charge. After the recommendation of the Board, the respon- dent he.rein appears to Ii.ave offered a sum equal to 28 month's salary and° allowances in lieu of re-instatement; to this, how- ever. the appellants did not agree. In the meantime, Dr. K. P. Banerjee received' a sum of Rs. 306-1-0 on May 22, 1951 and left the tea garden in question. Then, on December 23, 1953. the G•wernment of Assam published a notification in which it was staled that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen bet- ween the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas. it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for ad-' judic:11ion to a Tribunal constituted under s. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U. K. Gohain. Additional District and Sessions Judge. under d. k) of sub-s. (I) of s. IO of the Act. The dispute which was thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms:

?'1'c;rkr11t;'1~ of Dim1 ik.~telii Te" !:_Ns~te v.

-

TJ1e _,\la11r19.;mcnt

Di1m~/.,'11.chi 'J'ui FhtaW

1160

SUPREME COURT REPOHTS

trn5s]

"(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee. A. M. O.?

(ii) If not. is he entitled to re-instatement or any other

relief in lieu thereof?"

of

Both parties filed written statements before Mr. Gohain and ihe respondent took the pica that Dr. K.P. Banerjee was not a "workman·· within the meaning of the Act; therefore. there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that ex prc.<Sion was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no juris diction to make an adjudication on merits. Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a "workman" within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:

"Dr. rlauerjee being not a 'workman', his case is not one of an "industrial dispute" under the Industrial Disputes Act and his case is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribu nal and the Tribunal has therefore no jurisdiction to give any relief to him."

There was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tri bunal of India, Calcutta. That Tribunal affirmed the finding of Mr. Gohain to the effect that Dr. Banerjee was not a work man within the meaning of the Act, The Appellate Tribunal then said:

"A dispute between the employers and employees

to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, must be between the employers and the workmen. There cannot be any industrial dispute bet ween the employers and the employees who are not work men."

The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the Labour Appel late Tribunal. The appellants herein then moved this Court for special leave and by an order dated March 14, 1956. special leave was granted, but was "limited to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman falls within the scope of the definition of industrial dispute contain ed ins. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."

It is clear from what has been stated above that the

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1161

question whether Dr. K. P. Banerjee is or is not a workman within the meaning of the Act is no longer open to the parties and we must proceed on the footing that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning o.f the Act and then decide the question if the dispute in relation to the termination Tlit Ma...;,gen~;11 of of his service still fell within the scope of the definition of the expression "industrial dispute" in the Act.

1958 Workmen of Dlmakuelii

Toa :itaU D;maktl/e!, • • "" s. K. Da•J.

We proceed now to read the definition clause the inter- pretation of which is the only question before us. That defi- nition clause is in these terms:

"S. 2 (k): "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or

difference between employers and employers, or between em ployers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen. which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour. of any person;" It must be stated here that the expression "workman" is also defined in the Act, and the definition which is relevant fon our purpose is the one previous to the amendments of t 956; therefore, in reading the various sections or' the Act, we shall read them as they stood prior to the amendments of 1956 and refer to the amendments only when they have a bearing on the question before us. The definition of it stood at the relevant time stated:

'workman' as

"S. 2(s): "Workman" means any person employed (in cluding an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purposes of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute, but does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government."

Now, the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman within the meaning of the Act still falls within the scope of the definition clause in s. 2(k). If we analyse easily the definition clause and naturally into three parts: first, there must be a dispute or difference; second, the dispute or difference must be bet ween employers and employers. or between employers and

falls

it

J,·l'(D)3SCT--9

ll62

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Ll958

2'Ao m::::::"

workmen or between workmen and workmen; third, the dis- 1968 w .,.hoeio af pute or difference must be connected with the employment or m ... h<Ai T"' • - non-employment or the terms of employment or with the of conditions l>f labour, of any person. The first part obviously ., "· refers to the factum of a real or substantial dispute; the second 2'• • - part to the parties to the dispute; and the third to the subject 8. x. Dru J. matter of that dispute. That subject matter may relate to any of two matters-(i) employment or non-employment, and (ii) terms of empll>yment or conditions of labour, of any person. On behalf of the appellants it is contended that the condi tions referred to in the first and second parts of the definition clause are clearly fulfilled in the present case, because there is a dispute or difference over the termination of service of Dr. K. P. Banerjee and the dispute or difference is between the Dimakucbl the employer, namely, the management of tea estate on one side. and its workmen on the other. even taking the expression "workmen" in the restricted sense in which that expression is defined in the Act. The real diffi. culty arises when we come to the third part of the definition clause. Leai:ned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the expression "of any person" occurring in the third part of the definition clause is an expression of very wide impl)rt and there are no reasons why the words "any person" should be equated with "any workman", as the Tribunals below have done. The argument is that inasmuch as the dis pute or difference between the employer and the workmen is connected with the non-employment of a person called Dr. K. P. Banerjee (even though he was not a workman). the dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the de finition clause. At first sight, it does appear that there is Cl>n siderable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression "any person" occurring in the third part, and if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed. they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provision of the Act.

::>CR

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1163

A little careful consideration will show, however, that

1968

1 11e ma....,....U o1 .

,

11

" ·

l

.

("")

Di1na"1<CM

Tea Ealalt :;. K. Du• J.

the expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the Wore.en of Dimafcuclt i definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this 'l'fa Eatau wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must T' f relate to (1) employment or non-emp oyment or n terms o employment or conditions of labour of any person~ these ne- cessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in the employer-employee relation never respect of whom existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject mat· ter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the contex of the sub- ject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that " the words of a statute. when there is a doubt about in to be understood their meaning are which they best harmonise with the subject of the enact- ment and the object which the Legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained." (Maxwell, Interpreta- tion of Statutes, 9th Edition, p. 55).

the sense

in

It is necessary, therefore, to take the Act as a whole and examine its salient provisions. The long title shows that the obje.ct of the Act is "to make provision ·for the investi gation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other purposes." The preamble states the same object and s. 2 of the Act which contains definitions states that unkm there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, cer tain expressions will have certain meanings. Chapter 11 re fers to the authorities set up under the Act, such as, Works Comm;ttees, Conciliation Officers. Boards of Conciliation. Courts of Enquiry, and Industrial Tribunals. The primary duty of a Works Committee is to promote measures for securing and preserving amity and good relations between the employer and his workmen and. to that end, to comment

L,'P(D)it''WT-H( a)

1968

w.,...,_ of

Di...kuMi Tea E..,,. v. '1'111 MBMgem••• of Di""'kuc/>i Tto E.,,,.. s. K. IJa• J.

1164

SUPREME COURT REPOUTS

[1958]

.

·

.

·

1

·1·

C

in

reference

upon matters of their common interest or concern and en· deavour to compose any material difference of opinion in respect of such matters, Conciliation Officers are charged with the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement be of mdustnal disputes. A Board of onc1 iat10n may a so constituted for the same purpose, namely, for promoting the settlement of an industrial dispute. A Court of Enquiry may be appointed for enquiring into any matter which appears to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. Section 7 of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to constitute one or more Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Chapter III ~ontains provisions relating to the reference of industrial disputes to Boards of Conciliation. Courts of the Enquiry or Industrial Tribunals, and the present case was made under s. 10 of that Chapter. Under s. IO(c) of the Act where an appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial disputes exist or are apprehend· ed, it may. at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant 1tl the dispute to a Tribunal for adjudication. Chapter IV of the Act deals with procedure. powers and duties of the au· thorities set up under the Act. Where an industrial dispute has heen referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, s. 15 re· quires that the Tribunal shall bold its proceedings expedi tiously and shall as soon as practicable on the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government. Sec tion 17 lays down inter alia that the award of a Tribunal shall within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by the appropriate Government be published in such manner as it thinks fit. Section 17-A lays down that the award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under s. 17; it also contains certain other provisions which empower the appro· priate Government to modify or reject the award. Section 18 it relates is important for our purpose, and in so ta awards it states that an award which has become enforce· able shall be binding on-

far as

S.C.R.

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1165

(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

.

-

J9S3

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the pro- re-

ceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Tribuna cords the opinion that they were so summoned withoitt pro· The~ el per cause;

T111 Biia#

1

Wo•hlM of Di111aheAO T«i B~ .,.

(c) where a party referred to under clause (a) or Clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; and

8· K Dtu J.

(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who are employed in the establishment or part of establishment as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently beoome employed in that establishment or part.

Section 19 lays down the period of operation of settlements and awards and states inter alia that aiI1 award shall, subject _to the provisions of the section, remain in operation for a period of one year. Chapter V of the Act deals with strikes and lock-outs, Chapter V-A with lay-off and retrenchment, Chapter VI with penalties and Chapter VII with miscella neous ma.tters. It is important to note that tpough in the defi nition of "lock-out", s. 2 (1) of the Act, and "strike", s. 2(q). of the Act, the expression 'any person' has been used, in ss. 22(2) and 23 of the Act which deal with 'look-out" and "strike", only the word 'workmen' has been used. Section 33 provides that during the pendency of any conciliation proceed ings or any proceedings before a tribunal of any industrial dispute, no employer shall (a) alter to the prejudice of the workmen concerned, the conditions of their service etc. or (b) discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise any work man concerned in the dispute. Section 33 A, however, uses the word 'employee', but read with s. 33, the word employee must mean there a w,orkman. Section 36 which deals with representation of parties ha:s some bearing on the question beft>re us. It lays down that a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceed ing under the Act by-

1166

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1958]

(a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is

1968 w..- •! ~ (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which

a member;

fl< Ma;;,_ 01 the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and

D;...ahM. Tw E..;.

&.K.Da•J.

(c) where the worker is not a member of any

trade union, by an officer of any trade union connected with, or by any o er workman employed m the industry m w ch the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.

hi

th

.

.

An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under the Act by-

(a) an officer of an association of employers of which

he is a member;

(b) an officer of a federation of associations of em ployers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated; and

(c) where the employer is not a member of any associa tion of employers, by an officer of any association of em ployers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and au thorised in sudh manner as may be prescribed.

Sub-section (3) of s. 36 states that no party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under the Act or in any pro ceedings before a court. Sub-section (4) states thirt in any pro ceeding before a Tribunal a party to a dispute may be repre sented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Tribunal The point to note is that there is no particular provision for the representation of a party other than a workman or an employer, presumably because under the second part of the definition clause the parties to an industrial dispute can only be employers and employers, employers and workmen or workmen and workmen.

Thus, an examination of the salient provisions ·of the Act

shows that the principal objects of the Act are-

s.c.R.

SUPR.EME COURT REPORTS

U67

(1) the promotil:>n of measures for securing and preserv-

196&

ing amity and good relations between workmen;

the employer and Worhaca o/ ~-=-

(2) an investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, The .If~ of

between employers and employers, employers and workmen, Di~ Tea "'* or workmen and wl:>rkmen, with a right of representation by s. K. Dae J. a registered trade union or federation of trade unions or as- sociation of employers or a federation of ass1:>ciatio!l8 of em- loyers;

(3) prevention of illegal strikes and lock-outs; (4) relief trenchment; and

to workmen in the matter of lay-off and re

(5) collective bargaining.

The Act is primarily meant for regulating the relations of em ployers and workmen-past, present and future. It draws a distinction between 'workmen' as such and the managerial or supervisory staff, and confers benefit on. the former only. It is in the context of all these provisions of the Act that the definition clause in s. 2(k) has to be interpreted. It seems to us that if the expression "any person" is fairly obvious given its ordinary mea!ning, then the definition clause will be so wide as to become inconsistent not merely with the ob jects and other provisions 1:>f the Aot, but also with the other parts of that very clause. Let us see how the definition clause is works if the expression "any person" occurring therein given its ordinary meaning. The workmen may then raise a dispute about a person with whom they have no possible Cl:>mmunity of interest; they may raise a dispute about the employment of a person in another industry or a different es tablishment..;....a dispute in which their own employer is not in a position to give any relief, in the matter of employment or non-employment or the terms 1:>f employment or condi tions of labour of such a person. In order to make our mean ing clear we may take a more obvious example. Let WI as sume that for s1:>me reason or other the workmen of a parti cular industry raise a dispute with their employer about the employment or terms of employment of the District Map trate or District Judge of the district in which the industry

1168

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958]

1958

Tea EJ...,, s. K. Da• J.

Work...,. of ~;:;.z: v.

is situate. It seems clear to us that though the District Mugis-· trate br District Judge undoubtedly comes within the ex- pression "any persbn" occurring in the definition clause, a dispute a!bout his employment or tenns of employment is not Ta. :i::z:;.f of an industrial dispute; firstly, because such a dispute does not come within the scope of the Act, having regard to the defi- nition of the words "emplllyer", "industry", and ·'workman" and also to other p~ovisions of the Act; secondly, there is no possible community of interest between the District Magis trate or District Judge on the bne hand and the disputants, results employer and workmen, on the other. The absurd that will follow such an interpretation have been forcefully expressed by Chagla C. J., in his decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tri bunal('):

"If "any person" were to be read as an expression with out any limitation and qualification whatsoever, then we must not put even. any territorial restriction on that expres sion. In other words, it would be open to the workmen not only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employment of persons employed in the same industry as themselves, not only to raise a dispute with regard to the tenns of employ ment in corresponding or similar industries, not only a dis pute with regard to the tenns of employment of people em ployed in our country, but the terms of employment of any workman or any labourer anywhere in the world. The propo sition has only to be stated in order to make one realise how entirely untenable it is."

Take, for example, anbther case where the workmen raise an objection to the salary or remuneration paid to a Mana ger or Chief Medical Officer by the employer but without claiming any benefit fur themselves, and let us assume that a dispute or difference arises between the workmen on one side and the employer on the other over such an objection. If such a dispute comes within the definition clause and is re ferred to an industria 1 tribunal for adjudication, the parties

(r) [1953] 55 Born. L.R. 125, 129, 130.

S.C.-R

SUPR.EMB COURT REPORTc

116!1

,, "· · anagement o;

•

•

1

·

h

b

1958

ll'<wlomen of Vimakuchi Tea Elllat•

to the dispute will be the employer on one side and his work- men ·on the other. The Manager or the Chief Medical Officer cannot obviously be a party tb the dispute, ecause e is not a 'workman' within the meaning of the Act and there is no Th 111 e: dispute between him and his employer. That bemg tlie pos1- Dimak.ichi tion, the award, if any, given by the Tribunal will be bind- Tea Eatatt ing, under cl. (a) of s. 18, on the parties to the dispute and ,9, K. Das J. not on the Manager or the Chief Medidal Officer. It is ex- tremely doubtful if in the circumstances stated. the Tribunal can summon the Manager or the Chief Medical Officer as a party to the dispute, because there is no dispute between the Manager or Chief Medical Officer on one side and his em- loyer on the other. Furthermore, s. 36 of the Act does not pro- vide for representation of a person who is ·not a party to the dispute. If, therefore, an award is made by the Tribunal in the case which we have taken by way of illustration, that award, though binding on the employer, will not be bind- ing on the Manager or Chief Medicat Officer. It should be obvious that the Act could not have contemplated an even- tuality of this kind, which does not promote any of the ob- jects of the Act, but rather goes against them.

When these difficulties were pointed out to learned coun sel for the appellants, he conceded limitations must be put on the width of the expression "any person" oc• curring in the definition clause. He formulated four such limitations :

that some

(1) The dispute must be a real and substantial one in respect of which one of the parties to the dispute can give re lief to the other; e.g., when the dispute is between workmen and employer, the employer must be in a position to give relief to the workmen. This, according to learned counsel for the appellants, will exclude those cases in which the work men ask for something which their employer is not in a posi tion to give. It would also exclude mere ideological differ ences or controversies.

(2) The industrial dispute if raised by workmen must relate to the particular establishment or part of establishment

1170

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[19118]

19SB

in which the workmen are employed so that the definition

w.,.,,,,,. .. •/ clause may be consistent with s·. 18 of the Act.

•

Dimaku<lu Tea E1tate

Dimal:troAi

(3) The dISpute must relate to the employment, non-em- 'l'he Man;g.,..nt of ployment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person, but such person must be an em- ployee discharged or in service or a candidate for employ- Tea E8tate s. K. D .. J. ment. Aocording to learned counsel for the appellants, the person about whom the dispute has arisen need not be a workman within the meaning of the Act, but he must answer to the description of an employee, discharged or in service, or a candidate for employment.

(4) The workmen raising the dispute must have a nexus with the dispute, either because they are personally interest ed or because they have taken up the cause of another per ,;on in the general interest of labour welfare. The further argu ment of learned counsel for the appellants is that even im posing the aforesaid four limitations on the width of the expression "any person" occurring in the definition clause, the dispute in the present case is an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (le) of the Aot, because (1) the employer could give relief in the matter of the termination bf service of, Dr. K.P. Banerjee, (2) Dr. K.P. Banerjee belonged to the the same establishment, namely, the same tea garden, dispute related to a discharged employee (though not a work man) and (4) the workmen raising the dispute were vitally interested in it by reason of the fact that Dr. Banerjee (it is stated) belonged to their trade union and the dismissal of an employee without the formulation of a charge and without giving him an opportunity to meet any charge was a matter of general interest to all workmen in the same establishment. the We now propose to examine the question whether limitations formulated by learned counsel for the appellants are the only true limitations to be imposed with regard to the definition clause. In doing so we shall also consider what is the true scope and effect bf the definition clause and what are the correct tests to be applied with regard to it. We think that there is no real difficulty with regard to the first

(3)

S.C.R..

SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS

1171

L.

1958

8. K. Das J.

b dir tl

two Jimitations. They are, we think, implicit in the definition clause itself. It is obvious that a dispute between employers Workmen of JJimak'UCki and employers, employers and workmen, or between work- Tea Eslale men and workmen must be a real dispute capable of set- The ;~nagement of tlement or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the ~!~i dispute to give necessary relief to th'e other. It is also obvi- . ec y or suu- ous that the parties to the dispute must e stantially interested therein, so that if workmen raise a dis- pute, it must relate to the establishment or pa:rt of establish- .men in which they are employed. With regard to limitation (3), while we agree that the expression 'any person' cannot be completely equated with 'any workman' as defined in the ·Act, we think that the limitation formulated by learned coun- sel for the appellants is much too widely stated and is not quite correct. We recognise that if the expression 'any person' means 'any workman' ·within the meaning of the Act, then it is difficult to understa11d why the Legislature instead of using the expression 'any workman' used the much wider expres- sion 'any person' in the third part of the definition clause. The very circumstance that in the second part of the defini· tion clause the expression used is "between emyloyers and workmen or between workmen and workmen" while in the third part the expression used is "any person" indicates that the expression "any person" cannot be completely equated with 'any workman'. The reason for the use of the expres- sion "any person" in the definition clause is, however, not far to seek. The word 'workman' as defined in the Act (before the amendments of 1956) included, for the purposes of any proceedings under the Act in relation to an industrial dis- pute, a workman discharged during the dispute. This defini- tion corresponded to s. 2 (j) of the old Trade Disputes Act, 1929 except that the words "including an apprentice" were inserted and the words "industrial dispute" were substituted for the words "trade dispute". It is worthy of note that in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, the word 'workman' meant any person employed in any trade or industry to do any skilled

117:!

SUPREME COUR1' REPORTS

[1948)

8

•

•

to

• K. Das J.

Dimai11chi Tt.aEWite

1958 iv orkm•~ of Dimakuchi Tea E•tate

or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. It is clear enough that prior to I 956 when the definition of 'work· man' in the Act was further widened to include a person dis. The .Ma~·,,,..nt •! missed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of the dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment led to the dispute, a workman who had been du;. charged earlier and not during the dispute was not a work man within the meaning of the Act. If the expression. "any person" in the third part of the definition ctause were to be strictly equated with 'any workman'. then there could be no industrial dispute, prior to 1956, with regard to a work man who had been discharged earlier than the dispute, even though the discharge itself had led the dispute. That seems to be the reason why the Legislature used the expres sion 'any person' in the third part of the definition clause so as to put it beyond any doubt that the non-employment of such a dismissed workman was also within the ambit of an industrial dispute. There Wll'S a wide gap between a 'work man' and an 'employee' under the definition of the word 'workman' in s. 2(s) as it stood prior to 1956; all existins workmen were no doubt employees; but all employees were not workmen. The supervisory staff did not come within the definition. The gap has been reduced to some extent by the amendments of 1956; part of the supervisory staff (who draw wages not exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem) and those who were otherwise workmen but were discharged or dismissed earlier have also come within the definition. If and when the gap is completely bridged. 'workmen' will be syno nymous with 'employees', whether engaged in any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work, etc. But till the gap is completely obliterated, there is a distino tion between workmen and non-workmen and that distino tion has an important bearing on the question before us. Limitation no. (3) as formulated by learned counsel for the appellants ignores the distinction altogether and equates 'any this person' with 'any employee'-past, present or future:

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1173

1958

work""" of f.~':'1.":};; v.

n;,,,,,/,1tclii 'fea 8-'10'' 8. K. .Tia.~ .1.

· k 7' It;; llfonagenumt of ·

clause ·

f

.

.

l

d

we do not think is quite correct or consistent with the other provisions of the Act. The Act avowedly gives a restricted meaning to the word 'workman' and almost all the provi- sions of the Act are intended to confer benefits on that class of persons who genera ly answer to the escr1pt1on o wor - men. The expression 'any person' in the definition means, in our opinion, a person in whose employment, or non-employment, or terms of employment, or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest-with whom they have, under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. Our reason for so holding is not merely that the Act makes a distinction between work- men and non-workmen, but because a dispute to be a real dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substanti~lly interested in the em- ployment, non-employment, terms of employment or condi- tions of labour of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit, who cannot by them- selves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose repre- sentation the Act makes no particular provision? We ven- ture to think that the answer must be in the negative. Limi- tation (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of labour welfare may furnish, in some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial in- terest in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the principle· of solidarity of the labour movement or general welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the prin- ciple of community of interest; the workmen can raise a dis- pute in respect of those persons only in the employment or non-employment or the tenns of employment or the condi- tions of labour of whom they have a direct or substantial in- terest. We think that Chagla CJ .. correctly put the crucial test when he said in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Indus- trial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal('). ( ') [195~] 55 Born. "L.R. 125. 129, 130.

1968

Wor'lom.n of Dimaku~Tii Tea E""'" v. Tiu! .Management of Dimal .. chi Tea E&ate s. K. n .. J.

1174

SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS

[1958]

I

h

. .

nJ

"Therefore, when s. 2 (kJ speaks of the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the condi- · f ib f · hons o a our o any person, It can o y mean t e emp oy- ment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the cond1hons of labour of only those persons m the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of Jabour of whom the workmen themselves are directly and substantially interested. If the workmen have no direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-em ployment of a person or in his terms of ·emplt>yrnent or his conditions of labollr, then an industrial dispute cannot arise with regard to such person."

•

We reach the same conclusion by approaching the ques tion from a somewhat different standpoint. Ordinarily, it is only the aggrieved party who can raise a dispute; but an 'industrial dispute' is put on a collective basis, because it is now settled that an individual dispute, not espoused by others of the class to which the aggrieved party may belong, is not an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2 (k), As Isaacs J. observed in the Australian case of George Hud son Ltd. v. Australian Timber Workers' Union('):

"The very nature of an 'industrial dispute' as distinguish ed from an individual dispute, is to obtain new industrW conditions, not merely for the specific individuals then work ing from the specific individuals then employing them, and not for the moment only, but for the class of employees from the class of employers ....................... . It is a battle by the claimants, not for themselves alone."

Section 18 of the Act supports the aforesaid observations, in so far as it makes the award binding not merely on the par ties to the dispute, but where the party is an employer, on his heirs, successors or assigns and where the party is com posed of workmen, on all persons employed in the establish ment and all persons who subsequently become employed therein. If, therefore, the dispute is a collective dispute, the party raising the dispute must have either a direct interest in the subject matter of dispute or a substantial interest therein in the sense that the class to which the aggrieved party be-

(') 32. C.L.R. 413, 441.

Jr°'"'""" of Dimak1tclli TeaEstaie v. The M11nage111t11t -Of r1im.a.kwlii l'ea Estak

S.K. Da$ J.

S.C.R.

SUPRElVIE COURT REPORTS

1175

.

.

,

f h'

, b

longs is substantially affected thereby. It is the community of interest of the class as a whole-class of employers or class of workmen-which furnishes the real nexus between the dis- pute and the parties to the dispute. We see no insuperable c ty m t e practica I application o t 1s test. In a case diffi ul where the party to the dispute is composed of aggrieved work- men themselves and the subject matter of dispute relates to them or any of them, they clearly· have a direct interest in the dispute. Where, h'owever, the party to the dispute also composed of workmen, espouse the cause of another person whose employment, or non-employment, etc., may prejudi- cially affect their interest, the workmen have a substantial in· terest in the subject matter of dispute. In both such cases, the dispute is an industrial dispute.

Learned counsel for the appellants has also drawn our attention to the definition of a 'trade dispute' in the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926. That definition is also in the same terms, but with this vital difference that the word 'workmen' means there "all persons- employed in trade or industry whe ther or not in the employment of the employer with whom the trade dispute arises." It is obvious that the very wide definition of the word 'workmen' determines the ambit of the definition of a 'trade dispute' in the Trade Unions Act, 1926. The provisions of that Act have different objects in view, one of which is the expenditure of the funds of a registered Trade Union 'on the conduct of trade disputes on behalf of the Trade Union or any member thereof. We do not think that that definition for the purposes of an Act the Trade Unions Act is of any assistance in construing the definition in the Act with which we are now concerned, even though the words employed are the same; for, one thing, the meaning of the word 'workman' completely changes the ambit of the definition clause, and for another, the objects, scheme and purpose of the two Acts are not the same. For the same rea sons, we do not think that with regard to the precise prob· Iem before us much m;sistance can be obtained by a detailed

like

1176

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

f19118]

19ii8

Workm1m of r,,, Estate Din•rtJ•uchi ,._ T!1s: J.fa11ngcmrnt (lf f Dimahchi Th< ~sta.te S. K. Da~ J.

examination of English, American or Australian decisions force given with regard to the terms of the statutes in h · ed its own t ose countries. tenns-p~cularly when the definition of a 'workman' varies rom statute to statute and, wit changmg ct>n ttJons, om time to time. and country to country.

. ct must mterpret

· E h A ac

in on

be •

d' ·

· h

fr

•

The interpretation of s. 2(k) of the Act has been

the subject of consideration in various Indian decisions frt>m different points of view. Two recent decisions of this Court considered the question if an individual dispute of a work man was within the definition of an industrial dispute. The decisitm in C. P. Transport Services Ltd. v. Raghunathl'), re lated to the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act (No. XXIII of 1947) and the decision in Newspapers Ltd. v. State Jndu,-trial Tribunal, U. P.('). to the U. P. In dustrial Disputes Act (No. XXVIH of 1947). Both these de cisions considered s. 2(k) of the Act. but with reference to a different problem. The definition clause in s. 2(kl was consi dered at some length by the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. The Industrial Tribunal, Bom· bayC). and learned counsel for the appellants has placed great reliance on some of the cbservations made therein. The question which fell for dec.ision in that case was whether "in dustrial dispute" included within its ambit a dispute with re gard to re-instatement of certain dismissed workmen. It was held that re-instatement was connected with non-employment and, therefore, fell within the words of the definition. It ap pears that the finding of the Court from which the appeal was preferred to the Federal Court was that the workmen whose the re-instatement was in question were discharged during dispute and were. therefore, workmen within the meaning of the Act. Therefore. the problem of interpretation with which we are faced in this oase was not the problem before their Lordships of the Federa:I Court. The observations on which learned counsel for the appellants has relied are these:

"The question for determination is whether the defini- ( ') [1956] S.C.R. 956. (') (1949] F.C.R 321. 329-330. 346~147.

(') A.LR. (1957) S.C. 532.

1968

Wor.l:tmn of Di'1114lc!Wii Te.a Estate

, _ M v _ ,, p,.., anagemtnl o1 Dimalcucki Tea ~state s.K. Das J.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1177

.

•

d

tion of the expression "industrial dispute" given in the Act includes within its ambit, a dispute in regard to re-instate- . f th d fin .ment of dismissed employees ......... The wor s o e e 1-. tion may be paraphrazed thus: "any dispute which has con- _ nection with the workmen bemg m, or out of service or emp- loyment". "Non-employment" is the negative of "employ· ment" and would mean that disputes of workmen out of ser· vice with their employers are within the ambit of the defini· tion. It is the positive or the negative act of an employer that leads to employment or to non-employment. It may relate to an existing employment or to a contemplated employment, or it may relate to an existing fact of non-employment or a con- templated non-employment. The following four illustrations elucidate this point: (l) An employer has already employed a person and a trade union says "Please do not employ him". Such a dispute is a dispute as to employment or in connection with employment. (2) An employer gives notice to a union saying tha:t he wishes to employ two particular persons. The to employment. It union says "no". This is a dispute as arises out of the desire of the employer to employ certain per- sons. (3) An employer may dismiss a man, or decline to em· loy him. This matter raises a dispute as to non-employment. (4) An employer contemplates turning out a number of peo- ple who a!I'e already in his employment. It is a dispute as t~ contemplated non-employment. "Employment or non-em- . ployment" constitutes the subject matter of one class of in· dustrial disputes, the other two classes of disputes being those connected with the terms of employment and the conditions of labour. The failure to employ or the refusal to employ are actions on the part of the employer which would be covered by the terms "employment or non-employment". Re-instate ment is connected with non-employment and therefore within the words of the definition." ................................................... •-........ ' ............... . "It was contended that the re-instatement of the discharg the

ed workmen was not an industrial dispute because · if

is

LJP(D)3SCl-10

fr o-rktrteu uj 1;;'.;"';~~~; v. Tf,,· Jbuwocu•wl of fh"mahudii 2"•a Eetak s.K. D"' J.

ll78

Slil'RE:ME COUilT REl'ORT::;

[J 958]

km

till

b ·

en an

e 1spute emg s

union represented Lhe discharged employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty the dis- in the respondents (unionl taking up the cause of · d l "al d th d' c 1arged Wbr an m ustrt dispute between the employer and the workmen. The non- employment "of any persott" can amount to an industrial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling im der the definition of thM word in the Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued that if the respondents represented the undis charged employees, there was no dispute between them and the employer. That again is fallacious, because under the definition of industrial dispute. it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the disoharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., "any person" are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants." It is true that two of the illustrations~ Nos. (2) and (3)-given in the aforesaid observations seem to indicate that there can be an industrial dispute relating to persons who are not strictly speaking "workmen"; but whe ther those persons would answer to such description or what community of interest the workmen had with them is not stated and in any view we do not think that illustrations given to elucidate a different problem can be taken as determina tive of a problem which was not before the court that case.

in

A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in D. N. Banerjee v. P. R. Mukherjee('). The question there was whether the expression "industrial dispute" included dis putes between municipalities and their employees in branches of work analogous to the ca'Trying on of a tarde or business . . More in point is the decision of the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in a number of appeals reported in 1952 Labour Appeal Cases. p. 198. where the question now before us arose directly for decision. The same question arose for decision before the All India Industrial Tribunal <Bank Disputes) and the majPrity of members (Messrs. K. C.

(') [1953] S.C.R. 302.

8.C.R.

SUPREME COURT R.EPOHT8

1179

Sen and J. N. Majumdar) expressed the view that a dispute between employers and workmen might relate to employ- ment or non-employment or the terms of emplt>yment or con- ditions of labour of 'persons who were not workmen, and the . words 'any person·· used m the defi111t1on clause were e, ast1c enough to include an officer, that is, a member of the super- visory staff. The majority view will be found in Chap. X of the Report. The minority view was expressed by Mr~ N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, who said:

. . .

· I

.

w;s WMkmw of ¥';:E":f:.{~i , v. 'I he Man<J{feme11I of Dimal:uchi Pea E•talc s.K. Das J.

"It is fairly clear to my mind that "any person" in the • Act means· any- one who belongs to the employer class or the the cases in whose favour or against workmen class and whom can be said to be adequately presented by the group ot category of persons to which he belongs.

that

remembered

As stated already it should be

the cases relied upon for the view that 'any person' may mean others also besides the workmen were all cases relating to workmen. They were discharged or dismissed workmen and when their cases were taken up by the Tribunal the point was raised that they had ceased to be workmen and were therefore outside the sebpe of tbe Act. This argument was repelled.

In my opinion, there is no justification for treating such cases as authorities for the wider proposition that a valid industrial dispute can be raised by workmen about the em ployment or non-employment of somC4:)ne else who does not belong and never belonged to their class or category.

to My view therefore is that the Act does not apply cases of non-workmen, or officers, if they may be so ca>Iled." Both these views as also other decisions of High Courts and awards of Industrial Tribunals, were considered by the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chainnan of the Tribunal (Mr. J. N. Majumdar) itcknowledged that his earlier view was not correct and expressed bis opinion, con· curred in by all the other members of the Tribunal, at p. 210-

1180

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958]

person' has to be interpreted in terms of

"l am, therefore, of opinion that the expression

'any 1968 'workmen'. The Workmen of Dimakm:hi words 'any person' cannot have, in my opinion, their widest amplitude, as that would create incongruity and repl!gnancy Tea E8'au Th• .Jlan:;,,.., .. of in the provisions of the Act. They are to be interpreted in a ~~ima~i manner that persons, who would come within that expression, can at some stage or other, answer the description of work· JwE8'ae s.K. v .. J. man as defined in the Act."

the

It is necessary to state here that earlier a rnntrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Bir/a Brothrrs, Ltd. v. Modak('), by Banerjee J. in The Dalhousie Jute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak('), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Mad ras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Work· men('). It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations which have generally weighed with some of learned Judges in support of the view expressed by them; these two - considerations are that (!) normally workmen will not raise a dispute in which they are not directly or substantially in· terested and (2) Government will not make a reference unless the dispute is a real or substantial one. We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammati cal or etymological interpretation of the expression "any pers1>n" occurril)g in the definition clause should lead, on the contrary, to an interpretation which, to use the words of Maxwell, is to be found in the subject or in the occasion on which the words aJre used lllld the object to be attained by the statute.

We are aware that anybody may ·be a potential wt>rkman and the concept of "a. potential workman" introduces an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty. We also agree that the expression "any person" is co-existensive with any workman, potential or otherwise. We think, however, that the crucial test is one of community of interest and the per in son regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one whose employment, non-anployment, terms of employment or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the

(1) I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (') [1952] L.L . .J. 122.

(") [19111) 1 IL.J. 145.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1181

dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Whether such direct or substantial interest has been established in a parti cular case will depend on its facts and circumstances.

195S

Workmonof DiMku.eM 'l'da J!Jstak

Two other later decisions have also been brought to our The M~~gemen~ of

lj,imaEkuchi ~ea #al•

B.K. Da•?J

notice: Prahlad Rai Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh(') in which Bhargava J. expressed the view that the expression 'any person' in the definition clause did not mean a work- man and the decision in Narendra Kumar Sen v. All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunai(2), rt'ing the .decision of Chagla C. J. and Shah J: from which we have already quoted some extracts.

•

An examination of the decision referred to above un doubtedly discloses a divergence of opinion: two views have been expressed, one based on the ordinary meaning of the expression 'any person' and the other based on the context, with reference to the subject of the enactment and the objects which the legislature has in view. For the reasons which we have already given, we think that the latter view is correct.

To summarise. Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression 'any person' in s. 2(k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as· arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute bet ween the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two parts Of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settle ment or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving ne cessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dis pute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is "thin the raised need not be, strictly speaking, a 'workman'

(') A.I.R. (1955) N.U.C. Allahabad 664. ) (1953) 55 Born. 1 R. 125. 2 (

J!lJS

JY orl'fneti of DitMk1l-chi T e-1i. Elt<lte v. Tlie .Marutg1~1r~nt of JJim,alatcl1i Tv.i. E~late

S.K. /Jo,J.

1182

SU.PHE.ME COURT H.EPORTS

[1958]

meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of la bour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial in terest.

Jn the case before us, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a 'workman'. He belonged to the medical or t_echnical staff a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of ser vice was an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k) of the Act.

The result. therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dis missed. In the circumstances of this case there will be no order for costs.

SARKAR J.--On November 1, 1950, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed the Assistant Medical Officer of the Dima in kudhi Tea Estate, whose management is the respondent this appeal. On April 21, 1951, the respondeni .terminated Dr. Banerjee's service with effect from the next day and he was offered one month's salary in lieu of notice. He accepted this salary and later left the Tea Estate. The workmen of the Tea Estate raised a dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee. On December 23, 1953, the Government of Assam made an order of reference for adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of s. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The order of refer ence was in the following terms

Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen in the matters

·specified in the schedule below between:

(!) The workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate. P.O. Dima kuchi, District Darrang, Assam represented by the Secretary, Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, I.N.T.U.C. Office, P.O. Dibrugarh, Assam and,

(2) The management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, P.O. Dimakuchi, District Darrang, Assam whose agents are Messrs. Williamson Magor and Company Limited, Calcutta.

RC.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1183

And whereas it is considered expedient by the Govt. of Assam to refer the said dispute for adjudication to a Tri.bunal -constituted under section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947)

1958

Worktnµi of IXmalDuchi Tea Estate

Th6Ma~emenlof

Now. therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by ~':;;

-clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 10, as amended, of _the Industrial Disputes Act <XIV of 1947), the Governor of Assam is pleased to refer the said dispute to Sri Uma Kanta Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge (retired) who has been appointed to constitute a Tribunal under the pro- visions of the said Act.

Sarkar J.

SCHEDULE

(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A. M. O.?

·(ii) If not, is he entitled to re-instatement or any other

relief in lieu thereof?

The Tribunal held that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman :as defined in the Act and, therefore, the dispute referred was · not an industrial dispute and consequently it had no jurisdic tion to adjudicate upon such a dispute. Tb'e workmen pre· ferred an appeal. to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. · That Tribunal dismissed the appeal holding that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman within the definition of that term in the Act and as the dispute was connected with his employment or non-employment, it was not an industrial dispute, and was therefore beyond the jurisdiCtion of the Industrial Tribunal. From that decision ·the present appeal by the workmen of the Tea Estate arises with leave granted by this -Court under Art. 136 of. the Constitution~ In granting the leave this Court limited it to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workman, falls within the scope of the definition of "Industrial Dispute" contained in s. 2(k) of the Act. That, therefore, is the only question before us.

Section 2(k) is in these terms:

"Industrial dispute means any dispute or difference bet ween employers and employers or between employers and

Jf orkmtn of IJimakueki Pee EMle v. Tl" Jf•·••u- of J}r'm.nkuehi 1-·ea Edak

So-rkar J.

1184

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1958

workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or. non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person."

The. dispute that was raised was between an employer, the respondent in this appeal and its workmen, the appellants before us and concerned the employment or non·employment of Dr. Banerjee, a person employed by the same employer but who was not a workman. The question that we have to decide has arisen because of the use of the words "any per son" in the definition. These words are quite general and very wide and according to their ordinary meaning include a person who is not a workman. If this meaning is given to these words, then the dispute that arose concerning Dr. Banerjee's dismissal would be an industrial dispute because the dispute would then be clearly within s. 2(k). This indeed is not disputed. Unless there are reasons to the contrary these words have to be given their ordinary meaning. In Bir/a Brothers Ltd. v. Modak(') and in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Trilnmal of Bombay(') it was held that the \vords Hany person" Y.'ere not meant to refer only to workmen as defined in the Act but were wide and general and would include others who were not such workmen. In The Dalhousie lute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak('), Banerjee J. said, "Any person means whatever individual is chosen. I see no reason to restrict the meaning of the word 'person'." The same view was expressed in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen('), which was the decision of an Industrial Tribunal. There is then some support for the view that the words 'any person' should have no restric tion put upon them.

It is pointed out on behalf of the respondent that it is not its contention that the words 'any person' should be understood as referring only to a "workman" as defined in the Act but that those words should include all persons of

(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (') [1951] 1 L.L.J. 154.

(') [1949] F.C.R. 321. (') [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1185

•

1956

the workman class and so they would include discharged workmen. It is then stated that the first two of the cases men• w orlmim of f.':E=i tioned above were concerned with a dispute regarding dis· charged workmen and did not therefore decide that the words 'any person' included all. It is no doubt true that these cases were concerned with a dispute regarding discharg· cd workmen but I do not understand the decision to have proceeded on that basis. Sen 1. said in Birla Brothers case(') (p 213) that, "It cannot be argued that workmen dismissed prior to the Act are not 'persons' ". Anfi in the Western India Automoble Association case('), it was said (p. 346-7).

IXmak<uchi Te" E•lal<

Sarkar .1.

•

Y. 'l'hs M anagemuit of

"It was contended that the reinstatement of the dis· charged workmen was not an industrial dispute because if the union represented the discharged employees, they were not workmen within the definition of that word in the Indus· trial Disputes Act. This argument is unsound. We see no difficulty in the respondents {union) taking up the cause of . . the discharged workmen and the dispute being still an indus trial dispute between the employer and the workmen. The non-employment "of any person" can amount to an indus· trial dispute between the employer and the workmen, falling under the definition of that word in the Industrial Disputes Act. It was argued that if the respondents represented the undischarged employees, there was no dispute between them and the employer. That again is fallacious, because under the definition of industrial dispute, it is not necessary that the parties to the proceedings can be the discharged workmen only. The last words in the definition of industrial dispute, viz., "any person", are a complete answer to this argument of the appellants."

The last two of the cases mentioned earlier were not how· ever concerned with any dispute regarding discharged work· men. In The Dalhousie Jute Co. case(') the dispute was with regard to the employment of persons who sought employment as workmen and in the East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. case('} the dispute concerned the dismissal of a member of

(') I.L.R. (1948) 2 Cal. 209. (') [1951] 1 L.L.J. 145.

("). [1949] F.C.R. 321, (4) [1952] 1 L.L.J. 122.

1186

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958)

the supervisory staff, that is, another employee of the same 1~68 employer who was not a workman. It is however said that wori,..,. of Di~i in none of these cases the arguments that are now advanced appear to have been advanced and they were not consider-ed Tea E.,,,,. I shall there fore lay these cases aside in deciding the question that has arisen . •

Tlle .Ma,.:g.,..,., of in the judgments. This comment is justified.

n;....-; Tt11 E"°" 8irkar J.

Are there then good reasons for not giving to the words "any persons" their plain meaning? Several have been ad vanced and I shall examine them a little later. I wish now . to discuss how it is· proposed to restrict the meaning of these I have already stated that the contention is that the words,. words are not confined to a workman but refer only to a person of the workman class. This, I confess, I do not fol- · low. The word "workman" is a term defined in the Act. Outside the definition it is impossible to say who is a work man and who is not. That being so, the words "workman dass" would be meaningless unless they meant all persons who were workmen 'as defined in ·the Act. So read the words "any ·person" would niean only a workman. But it is .conceded that this is not so. And, of course, it cannot be so, for, if that was intended, there was no reason for the legisla ture not to have used the words "any workman" instead of the words "any person". Again if this was the intention, then a dispute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute for a dismissed workman was not a workman within the definition of . that word in the Act as it stood in 1953, that being the Act with which we life concerned. Such a result is against all conceptions of indus trial disputes laws. It is indeed not contended that a dis pute concerning the dismissal of a workman would not be an industrial dispute. It therefore seems to me that the words "any person" cannot be said to refer only to persons of the workman cl.ass. If they cannot be restricted as being under stood to refer only to a person of the workman class, it is not suggested that they can be restricted in any other manner.

It is then said that the words refer to "workmen". dis-

1958

ll'orl,mon of JJimalmcl1i . 7.'ea l!Jatat• v. 'Plw .illam.aae11ient <U Dimakucki 1'rnEstatc

Sirkar J.

S.O.R

SUPRE~IK COURT H.EPOl-nS

1187

.

.

•

•

·

l

h

ks

l d

missed as well as in employment as also those, who in future, become "workmen"'. Again I am in difficulty. So under- stood the words wou d not me u e a person w o see em- ployment as a workman because he has not become a work- man tdl he is employed. That bemg so, it would have to be said that a dispute raised by workmen in employment when those of the new workmen are to be appointed, that only candidates as agree to join their union should be appointed and others should not be, would not be an industrial dispute. That again seems to me to be against all conceptions of in- dustrial dispute laws. Furthermore, I am wholly unable to appreciate what is meant by a dispute concerning a person, who is not at the time the dispute arises, a workman but in future becomes one. When is. such a person to become a workman? I find no answer. Again, is it to be said that whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not may have to depend on future circumstances for there is no knowing whether the person concerning whom the dispute arises will later become a workman or not? .If he becomes one, there can be no dispute concerning him referable to a point of time before he became one, and, if he does not, he cannot be one who in future becomes a workman.

It is said that the words "any person" were used instead of the word workffian because it was intended to include within them persons who had been dismissed before the dis pute arose and who were not within the definition of work men in the Act as it stood in 1953. If that was the reason, why could not the legislature use the words "workmen and dismissed workmen?" There was nothing to prevent that being done. In fact the definition of "workman" has been amended in 1956 to include workmen discharged in conse quence of an industrial dispute or whose discharge has led to that dispute. So, as the definition now stands, it includes persons dismissed before the dispute arose. Yet the words "any person" have been !aft untouched in s. 2 (k) .and not been replaced by the word workman. This, to my mind,

1968

IVM/cmeno/ Dimak"""i Tea E<taJ•

1188

SUPREME COURT REPORT

[1958]

shows that it was not the intention to confine the words "any person" to workmen in employment or discharged.

Dimakuchi Tea E•tate BirkarJ.

But it is said that the words "any person" were left in p/,. Ma~,.,...,.1 of the Act because it was intended to include not only workmen in employment and dismissed workmen but also persons It is said that, that this is who in future become workmen. so appears from s. 18 of the Act. I shali presently consider this section but I desire to observe now that this argument much weakens the argument noticed in the preceding para graph, for if the words "any person" were used so that persons who in future become workmen might be included in them, they could not have been used to avoid such dismissed work men as were not workmen as defined in the Act being ex cluded from them. It seems to me that if it is argued that the words "any person" were used so that persons who in future become workmen may be included in them, it cannot be argued that those words were used instead of the word "workman" because it was intended to include within them certain dismissed workmen who were not workmen within the definition of that term in the Act as it stood in 1953.

Coming now to s. 18 it is in these terms:

A settlemem arrived at in the course of conciliation pro ceedings under this Act or an a ward which has become en forceable sha II be binding on-

( a) all parties to the industrial dispute;

(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the pro ceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board or Tribu nal, as the case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;

(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;

(d) where a party roferred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dis pute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.

1958

Workmen of -';;:.::;:

· v, The Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

Sirkar J_

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1189

h

h

km

l. h

I entirely fail to see how that section assists at all in finding out who were meant to be included in the words "any per- son". Is it to be said that s. l8(d) by making the award binding on those who become in future employed in the · d' en, 1n icates t at sue persons are estab is ment as wor treated in the same. way as workmen in actual employment and therefore it must have been iq.tended to include them within the words "any person" along with present and dis- missed workmen. I am wholly unable to agree. The object of s. 18(d) is quite clear. The Act is intended to compose a dispute between an employer and his workmen by a settle- ment or an award brought about by the machinery provided in it and the period during which an award or a settlement is to remain in. force is also provided. The idea behind s. 18 is that whoever takes up appointment as a workman in the establishment to which the dispute relates · during the time when the award or settlement is in force, would be bound If it were not so, the award or settlement would have by it. little effect in settling a dispute, for any newly recruited work· men could again raise the dispute. Any one - having any experience of industries knows that workmen are largely a shifting population and that the need for replacement of the workmen leaving and for addition to the strength of the workmen employed, is not infrequent. To meet the exigen- cy arising from this need and to make the award or settle- ment effective it was necessary to enact s. 18(d). Its object was not to place workmen in em]11.oyment and, workmen recruited in future in the same position for all purposes of the Act. On the. same reasoning, in view of s. 18(a), it has to be said that it was the intention of the Act to give the heirs, successors or assignees of an employer the same posi- tion for all purposes of the Act as that of the employer. But that would be absurd. Section 18(d) deals with a person who future becomes employed. The section does not say employed as a workman but I will assume that I do not understand what is meant by saying that such a person is within the words "any person" in s. 2(k). What is the point of time that

is meant.

is what

that

in

1968 Workma" of DiflllJh<hi TCJJvEBlate

~ima

i <• EBla•• Birkar J.

Th• Ma':fi:• of follow this.

1190

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958]

has to be considered? If it is after he has become employed, then he is a workman and admittedly within the words "any person". Is it to be said that before such employment also he is within the meaning of those words. But it is difficult to It is conceivable that any person whatsoever may in future be employed as a workman for there is noth- ing in the quality of a human being that marks him out as a workman. In this way the words "any person" would include all. That, however, is not meant, for it will defeat the very argument based on s. 18(d). Is it to be said then, only such future workmen are meant as apply for jobs as such? But the section makes no reference to such people at all and can not therafore be of any assistance in showing that it was intended that such applicants would be included within the words "any person". I am therefore wholly unable to accept the argument that s. 18(d) shows that future workmen were intended to be included within the words "any person". I wish also to say this. Assume that s. 18(d) shows that it was intended to include within the words "any person" one who in future becomes a workman. But where is the reason for saying that the words do not also include others? Section 18 provides none.

I proceed now to discuss the reasons advanced for res tricting the generality of the words "any person". They were· put as follows :

l. In certain sections of the Act the words "any person" have been used but there the rwerence is to worknien, and therefore iri s. 2(k) the words "any person" should mean per sons of the workman class.

2. The scheme anlt the purpose of the Act generally and the object of .the Act specially being to benefit work men, the words "any person" should be confined to people of the workman class.

3. The word "dispute" in s. 2(k) itself indicates that the person raising the dispute must be interested in the dispute and therefore since the dispute must concern the employ ment, non-employment, terms of employment or the condi tions of labour of a person, that person must be of the work man class.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1191

19.;t

Workmen of Dimakuch> Pea Eslate v. 7'1•e Management of

Di11111kuc1'i Pea Eslate

Sirlcar j,

The first reason, then, is that in certain sections, the Act uses the words "any person". I will assume that by the use of these words only workmen are intended to be referred to in these sections. But the question arises why is such intention to be inferred? Clearly, because the context re quires it. I will refer to some of these sections to make my point clear. Section 2(1) defines a lock-out as "the closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by the employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him". Section 2(q) defines a strike as "a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common understanding, of any number · of persons who are or have been so employed to continue to work or to accept employment." Lock-outs and strikes are dealt with in ss. 22. 23 and 24 of the Act. Section 22(2) says that no employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen except on certain condi~ tions mentioned in the section. Section 23 says that no em ployer of any workman employed in any industrial establish ment shall declare a lock-out during the periods mentioned in the section. Section 24 states that a strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if commenced or declared in contravention of s. 22 or s. 23. The definitions of lock-outs and strikes are for the purposes of ss. 22, 23 and 24. There are other sections in which lock-outs and strikes are mentioned but they make no difference for our present purpose. The lock-outs and strikes dealt with in ss. 22(2), 23 and 24 are lock-outs of and strikes by. workmen. It may hence be said that in s. 2(1) and (q1 by the word person a workman is meant. Therefore it is these sections, viz., 22(2), 23 and 24, which show what the meaning of the word 'person' in the definitions is. I would like lo point out in passing that s. 22(1) says that no person employed in a public utility service shall go on strike except on certain conditions and there is nothing in the Act to show that the word "person" in s. 22(1) means only a workman. Proceedin~ however with the· point we are concerned with,

1192

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958]

v. Tli.e Management of Dimakuchi

.

,

1958

Sarkar J.

Tw Estak

the question is, is there any provision in the Act which wo,kman of would show that the words "any person" in s. 2(k) were I have 1;.':::'l:!'~ meant only to refer to persons of the workman class. not been able to find any and none has been pointed out. Therefore the fact that m s. 2, sub-ss. (]) and (q) the word ''persons" means workmen is no reason for concluding that the same word must be given the same restricted meaing in s. 2(k). The position with regard to s. 33A, in which the word ernploye~ has to be read as meaning a workman because of s. 33, is the same and does not require to be dealt with spe I may add that if it has tq be said that because in cially. certain other sections the word "person" has to be under stood as referring to a workman only, in s. 2(k) also the same word must have the same meaning, then we have to read the words "any person" in s. 2(k) as meaning only a workman as defined in the Act. This however is not the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent. I may further say that it was not contended that the word "person" in s. 2, sub-ss. (1) and (q) and the word employee in s. 33A has to be read as including not only a workman in employment but also a discharged workman and a person who in future be comes a workman, and it seems to me that such a contention would not have been possible.

I proceed now to deal with the second group of reasons based on the object and scheme of the Act. It is said that the Act makes a distinction between employees who are work men and all other employees, and that the focus of the Act is on workmen and it was intended mainly for them. This was the view taken in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Kedar Nath Gupta('). I will assume all this. It may also be true that the Act is not much concerned with employees other than workmen. But I am unable to see that all this is any reason for holding that the words "any person" must mean a person of the workman class. The d(lfinition in s. 2(k) would be fully concerned with workmen however the

(') [1952] 1 L.L.J. 782.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1193

.

·

1968

km

d d f

or wor

words "any person" in it may be understood because the dis- pute will be one to which a workman is a party. Is it to be Workmen of Dimakuchi said that the Act would cease to be mten e en Tea E/JlaU or the focus of it displaced from workmen or that the distinc- v. The Management of . t10n between workmen and other· employees would vamsh Dimakuehi if a dispute relating to the dismissal of one who is not a ea Estate workman is held to be an industrial dispute, even though Sarkar J. I am un- the dispute is one to which workmen are parties? able to subscribe to such art argument. But it is said that in such a case the workmen would not be interested in the dis- pute, the dispute would not really be with them and they would not be in any real sense of the word parties to it. So put the argument comes under the last of the three reasons ear- lier stated, namely, that in order that there may be an indus- trial· dispute the workmen must be interested in that dispute. This contention I will consider later. It is also said in the United Commercial Bank Case(') that the main purpose of the Act is to adjust the relations between employers and workmen by securing for the latter the benefit provided by the Act. It is really another way of saying that the work- men must be interested in the dispute, for if they are not interested no benefit .can accrue to them from an adjustment o1 it. This, as I have said, I will discuss. later.

It is also said that the Act is for the benefit of workmen and therefore if a dispute concerning a person who is not a workman, is an industrial dispute capable of being resolved by adjudication under the Act, then, if the award goes in favour of the workmen raising it, a benefit would result to a person whom the Act did not intend to .benefit. So it is said, an in dustrial dispute cannot be a dispute concerning one who is not a workman. But the benefit resulting to the person in such a case would only be incidental. The workmen them selves would also be benefited by it at the same time. To adopt this argument would be to deprive the workmen of this benefit and there is no justification for doing so. How the workmen would be benefited would appear later when I discuss the question of the workmen's interest in the dispute.

1)[1952] 1 L.L.J. 782.·

(

L/P(fl)3SCI-ll

ll94

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1958J

1968

I will show later that if the workmen were not interested in the dispute so that they could get no benefit under it, there ll'Mkmeno/ Di....w.hi would be no. reference by the Government and there would '1'et(E81Dl< be no benefit to a person who was not a workman. Further. ... '1'1"' AfJt::::s::::M' of I am unable to agree that the Act is intended to confer Its object is admitted by all to pre- benefit on workmen. It may confer some benefit on work serve industrial peace. men but at the same time it takes away their power and right to strike and puts them under a disadvantage.

'1'"' Estate Barkor J.

We were referred' to the note of dissent to the award of the majority of tbe All India Industrial Tribunal (Bank Dis putes), dated July 31, 1950. This note was by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Aiyer who later became a Judge of this Court. In that note he expressed the view that "any person" in s. 2(k) means any one who belongs to 'the employer class or the workmen class and the cases in whose favour or against represented by the whom, can be said to be adequately I have group or category of persons to which he belongs. already stated my difficulties in agreeing that the words "any person" mean only persons of the workman class. I will presently deal with the reasoning on which Mr. Aiyer bases his view but I wish to say now that it seems to me that the words "any person" cannot refer to anyone belonging to the employer class becl'use the dispute must be in connection with the employment, non-employment, or terms of employ ment or the conditions of labour of any person and it is not possible to conceive of any such thing in connection with a person in his capacity as an employer.

Mr. Aiyar first stated that a necessary limitation to be put on the words "any person" is that the person should have something to do with the particular establishment where the dispute has cropped up. He said that it could not be that the workmen in Bank A could raise a valid and legitimate industrial dispute with their employer because some one in Bank B had not been treated well by his employer. Assume this is so. But it does not follow that an industrial dispute must be one concerning a person of the workman class alone, for a person having something to do with an establishment

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORT

1195

1968 Wor'lerMnoJ ~!='11:':: v.

need not necessarily belong to the workman class. An officer in an establishment where the dispute crops up would be as much a person having something to do with that establish· ment as a workman there and, therefore, even assuming that the limitation suggested by Mr. Aiyar applies, there would The ff.':::fueri;:.m of be nothing in it to prevent an industrial dispute concerning him arising. The question is not whether the person con- cerning whom an industrial dispute may arise. has to be employed in the establishment where the dispute arises, but whether he must belong to what has been called the work- man class. The decis~on of the former question which has not arisen in ttis case, is of no help in deciding the question that has arisen and I do not therefore feel called upon to express any opinion with regard to it.

Pea Ealale SarkarJ.

themselves.

Mr. Aiyar next referred to a case where workmen of a Bank raise a dispute with that Bank about an employee of the Bank who was not ai workman, for example an officer who had been dismissed. He assumed that the Bank and In his the officer had no dispute as between view, if in such a case the dispute was an industrial dispute and could be made the subject matter of an award by an Industrial Tribunal, the award would not be binding on the officer because he had no concern with the dispute. Accord ing to him, it would be absurd to suggest that the Bank was under an obligation to give effect to the award. Therefore, in his view, such a dispute would not be an industrial dis pute. Now, whether the award would be binding on the officer or not, would depend on whether he could be made a party to the dispute under s. 18(b). It is not necessary to discuss that question now. But assume that the award was not binding on the officer. Why should not the Bank be under an obligation to give effect to the award in so far as it lay in its power to do so? If the dispute was an industrial dispute; the award would be binding on the Bank and it must give effect to it. Then the argument comes to this that the dispute is not an industrial dispute because the award

1196

SUPREl\iE COURT REPORTS

[1958]

1968

W""k""'••f whom the dispute arose. · Dimaltui/ti TG<t Esia"' v. T/1e .1.,!ana(fement of 1Jimakuc1'i Tea Esia"'

A

1

Sarkar J.

.

.

.

.

would not, as assumed, be binding on the officer concerning I cannot accept this view. Take · h" n emp oyer d1sm1sses five of his workmen. The t is case. workmen dismissed make no grievance. Three months later the employer d1sm1sses twenty five more and again neither the dismissed workmen nor the workmen in employment raise any dispute. Two months after the second dismissal the employer dismisses fifty workmen. These workmen make no complaint and leave. The workmen in employment now begin to take notice of the dismissals and think that the em ployer is acting on a set policy and raise a dispute about all the dismissals. The dispute is then referred for adjudication and an award is made in favour of the workmen. Assume that all the dismissed workmen could be made parties to the adjudication proceedings but for one reason or another, were not made parties. This award would· not be binding on the dismissed workmen and certainly not on those who had been dismissed on the two earlier occasions. They would not be covered by any of the provisions of s. 18. Is it to be said that for that reason the dispute is not an industrial dispute? I am wholly unable to agree. Such a dispute would be en tirely within the definition even on the assumption that the words "any person" mean only persons of the workman class. It follows, therefore, that in order to decide whether a dis pute is or is not an industrial dispute, the question whether the award would be binding on tbe person concerning whose employment the dispute was raised, is no test. I therefore find nothing in the minute of dissent of Mr. Aiyar to justify the putting of any restriction on the plain meaning of the words "any person" in s. 2(k). As I shall show later, if cer tain disputes concerning foremen who are not workmen and who I will assnme would not be bound by the award, are not to be industrial disputes, the object of the Act would clearly be defeated. I cannot therefore agree that the fact that an award is not binding on one affords a reason for holding that there cannot be an industrial dispute concerning him.

The matter was put from another point of view.

It is

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1197

1958

Wurk"ie" of Dimakucki Tea Bstaie ,, v. Tlie Manageme1tt o1 Dimakuchi Tea E•tat•

SarkarJ.

·

d

h

d d.

~aid that if workmen could raise an industrial dispute with their employer concerning the salary of a manager, who wa~ d not a workman, an an awar was ma e 1rectmg t e em- ployer to pay a smaller salary to the manager, the employer would be bound by the award but not the manager. Then it is said, suppose the employer had made a contract with the manager to employ him at the higher salary for a number of years. It is pointed out that in such a case the awarr· being binding on the employer, he would be compelled to commit a breach of his contract and be liable to the manager in damages. It is said that it could not have been the inten- tion of the Act to produce a result whereby an employer would become liable in damages and therefore such a dis- pute cannot be an industrial dispute. But I do not agree that the employer would be liable in damages. The award being binding on him under the Act, the performance of his contract with the manager would become unlawful after the award and therefore void under s. 56 of the Contract Act. The employer would not, by carrying out the award, be com- mitting any breach of contract nor would he be liable in damages. To hold that the dispute contemplated is an in- dustrial dispute, would not produc.:: the absurd result sug- gestecl. The reason suggested for not holding that dispute to be an industrial dispute, therefore, fails.

Take another case. Suppose there was a dispute bet ween two employers A and B concerning the wage to be paid by B to his workmen, A complaining that B was paying too high wages, and the dispute was referred for adjudica tion by a Tribunal and an award was made that B should reduce the wages of his workmen. Assume the workmen were not parties to the dispute and were not made parties even if it was possible to do so. The award would not be binding on the workmen concerned under s. 18. None the less it cannot be said that the dispute was not an industrial It completely satisfies the definition of an indus dispute. trial dispute even on the basis that the words 'any persons" mean only workmen. So again it would appear that the

1968

Workmen.of Dim.akuchi Tea Es'416 v.

1198

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(1958]

words may include one on whom the award would not be binding.

.

D•makucln Tea EBlaJ• 80,,,,,, J.

I may add here, though I do not propose to decide the Th< .M~nagem•'!' o/ question it being wholly unnecessary for the case before us ' that 1t seems to me that when a dispute concerns a person whe- ther a workman or not, who is not a party to the dispute, he can, under s. 18(b), be properly made a party to appear in the I find nothing in proceedings arising out of that dispute. If he that section to prevent such a course being adopted. is made a party, there is no doubt that the decision, which ever way it went, would be most satisfactory to all concern ed. If this is the right view, then all arguments based on the fact that the words "any person" can only include one on whom the award would be binding would disappear, for on being made a party the award would be binding on that person. It would on the contrary show that it was intended that the words "any person" should include one who is not therefore not in the workman a party to the dispute, and class.

An argument based on s. 33 was also advanced. That is this. The section provides that during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute the conditions of service of workmen concerned in the dispute cannot be changed by the employer, nor such workmen dismissed or otherwise punished by him except with the permission of the Board or Tribunal. It is said that this section shows that it was intended to pro tect only workmen and therefore the words "any person" in s. 2(k) should be understood as meaning workmen only. I do not follow this argument at all. Section 33 gives protection to workmen concerned in the dispute which can only mean workmen who are parties to the dispute. A workman con cerning whom a dispute arises may or may n:ot be a party to the dispute. The object of the section is clear. If work men could be punished during the pendency of the proceed ings, then no workman would raise a dispute or want to take part in the proceedings under the Act concerned with its adjudication. Further, such punishment would surely give

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1199

rise to another dispute. AU this would defeat the entire object of the Act which is to compose disputes by settlement or adjudication. Section 33 gives protection to workmen who are parties · to the dispute and does not purport to concern itself with the person concerning whom the dispute arises. Such being the position, the section can throw no light on the meaning of the words "any person" in s. 2(k). Suppose a workman was dismissed and thereupon a dispute arose bet ween the employer and the other workmen in employment concerning such dismissal. Such a dispute would be un doubtedly an industrial dispute. And it is none the less so, though no protection can be given to the dismissed workman under s. 33 for he is already dismissed.

1968

Workmen of .Dima!tucM TtaEetau v. The Managemind tf Dima!tucM P.aEatala

Sarkar J.

· Reference was also made to s. 36 which provides for the representation of the parties to a dispute in a proceeding arising under the Act out of such dispute. Sub-section (1) of s. 36 provides how a workman, who is a party, shall be repre sented and sub-section (2) provides bow an employer who is likewise a party, shall be represented. The section does not It is said provide for representation of any other person. that this shows that the words "any person" must mean only. a workman, because they must mean an employee, past, present or future and only such employees as are workmen can be parties to the dispute under the definitibn. I am unable to agree. Section 36 provides for the representation of workmen besides employers and of no one else, because no one but a party need be represented in the proceedings and under the definition, a party to an industrial dispute must either be an employer or a workman. This section has nothing to do with the person concerning whom the dispute If, however, he is also a party to the dispute, then arises. the section makes a provision for his representation in the proceedings arising out of that dispute as such a party and I have not as one concerning whom the dispute has arisen. . earlier said that there may be a case in which though the person concerning whom the dispute arises is a workman, still he may not be a party to it. The fact that besides an

1200

SUPREl\fE COURT REPORTS

(1968}

1958

employer, the Act makes provision for the representation in the proceedings arising out of an industrial dispute of work- Workmeno/ 1i-~-;a;::;:;; men alone does not show that an industrial dispute can only In my view, therefore s. 36 d t e wor s

arise concerning a workman. fi d" . 1s o no asst.stance m n mg out t e meamng o "any person".

v. Ph<Managemtnto/ . Dim•l:uchi PeaE#alt

f h

h

.

f

.

Sarkar J,

I come now to the last of the reasons advanced for res tricting the natural meaning of the words "any person". It is said that the word dispute in the definition shows that the person raising it must have an interest in it and therefore since the dispute must concern the employment, non-employ ment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of a person that person must be a workman. I confess I do not It is said that this is the view ex follow the reasoning. pressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Chagla C. J. and Shah J. in Narendra Kumar Sen v. The All India Industrial Disputes (Labour Appellate) Tribunal('). I have some difficulty in seeing that this is the view expressed in that case. What happened there was that certain work men raised a dispute against their employer which includ·ed a demand for fixing scales of pay and for bonus not only for themselves but also for the foremen and divisional heads under the same employers who ·were not workmen and this dispute had been referred by the Government for adjudica tion by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal refused to ad judicate the dispute in so far as it concerned the pay and bonus of persons who were not workmen as, according to it, to this extent it was not an industrial dispute. The work men then applied to the High Court for a writ directing the Tribunal to decide the dispute relating to the claims made for the pay and bonus of the persons who were not workmen. The- High Court held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute and refused the writ. Chagla C. J. expressed himself in these words (p. 130):

is connected with the employ "A controversy which terms of employment or ment or non-employment or the with the conditions of labour is an industrial controversy. But it is not enough that it should be an industrial contro-

(') (1953) 55 Born. L.R. 125.

1958

Workmen of Dima1'uchi Tea E8tate v. The Managcmenl ot Dimal-uchi Tea Estate

Sarkar J.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1201

·

·

l

k

d'

d' ff

l d'ff

· h h'

1 erences wit

versy; it must be a dispute; and in my opinion it is not every controversy or every difference of opinion between work- men and employers which is constituted a ispute or 1 er- ence within the meaning of s. 2(k). A workman may have 'd l is emp oyer; a wor man may t eo og1ca feel sympathetic consideration for an employee in his own in- dustry gr in other industry; a workman may feel seriously agitated about the conditions of labour outside our own country; but it is absurd to suggest that any of these factors would entitle a workman to raise an industrial dispute within the meaning of s. 2(k). The dispute contemplated by s. 2(k) is a controversy in which the workman is directly and It must also be a grievance felt by substantially interested. the workman which the employer is in a position to remedy. Both the conditions must be present; it. must be a grievance of the workman himself; it must be a grievance which the employer as an employer is in a position to remedy or set right."

Then he said \p. 131):

"It is only primarily in their own employment, in their own terms of employment, in their own conditions of labour that wcrkmen are interested and it is with regard these that they are entitled to agitate by means of raising an industrial dispute and getting it referred to a Tribunal by the Govern ment under s. 10."

I find some difficulty in accepting all that the learned Chief Justice said. But assume he is right. How does it follow that because an industrial dispute is one in which workmen must be interested it must be concerning them selves? I do not see that it does. Neither do I find Chagla C. J. saying so. In the case before him the dispute con cerned persons who were not workmen and he found on the facts before him that the workmen were not interested in that dispute and thereupon held that the dispute was not an industrial dispute. But that is not saying that an industrial dispute can only be a dispute concerning workmen. Even the observations that I have read .from p. 131 of the report It is not difficult to conceive would not support this view.

1958

Workmen oJ n;~:~~~ the conditions of labour or

v. 1'Ae Manag.,..nt of 1 DimaL.,,.,.i

Ten Estai.

Sarkar J.

1202

SUPRE~IE COURT REPORTS

[1958]

I

"f

· h

· d

Wh

· h

of a dispute concerning the employment of a person who is not a workman which at the same time is one which affects terms of employment of the I shall give examples of such disputes workmen themselves. · ater. at WIS now to pomt out IS t at even 1 an m us- trial dispute has to be one in which workmen are interested, that would be no reason for saying that it can only be a dis pute concerning workmen and that therefore the words "any person" in s. 2(k) must mean only workmen. I also think it right to say now that this argument is not really open to the respondent, for the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is, as I have earlier stated, that the words "any person" do not mean a workman only but mean all persons of the workman class, or past, present and future workmen. Now I find nothing in the judgment of Chagla C. J. to show that workmen can be interested in the work man class or in past or future workmen. On the contrary he says that workmen are interested primarily-and by the word "primarily" I think he means, directly and substantially -only in their own employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour. Reliance on judgment of the Bombay High Court will therefore land the respondent in contradiction.

the

I find great difficulty in saying that it is a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested· in it. The Act does not say so. But it is .said that the word dispute in the definition implies it. No doubt. one does not raise a dispute unless he is interested in it, and as the Act must be taken to have in contemplation normal men it must have assumed that workmen will not raise a dis ·pute unless they are interested in it. But that is not to my mind saying that it i~ a condition of an industrial dispute as contemplated by the Act that workmen must be interested in it. So to hold would, in my opinion, lead to grave difficul ties and might even result in defeating the object of the Act. This I will endeavour to show presently. What I have to say will also show that even assuming that an industrial dispute

1968

Workmenof ~~r;;:;;:;; v. The Managemenl of Dimakuehi TeaEstate

Sarkar J.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1203

is one in which workmen have to be interested, the dispute that we have in this case concerning Dr. Banerjee's dismissal is an industrial dispute for the appellant worlanen are directly and substantially interested in it.

.

h

km

d fi

h. h

I fi d .

The question that first strikes me, is what is the interest 'bl w 1c wor ? en must ave. n 1t 1mposs1 e to e ne If it cannot be defined, it cannot of course be that interest. made a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute, for we would then never know what an industrial dispute is. Now, "interest", as we understand that word in courts of law, means the well-known concepts of proprietary interest or interest in other recognised civil rights. Outside these the matter becomes completely at large and well nigh impossible ·Of definition. To say that the interest that the -workmen must have is one of the well-known kinds of interest men- tioned above is, to my mind, to make the Act largely infruc- tuous. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act is not dealing with interest as ordinarily understood. It cannot be kept in mind too wel! that the Act is dealing with a new concept, namely, that of the relation between employer and ·employed or to put it more significantly, between capital .and labour, a concept which is undergoing a fast and elemen- tal change from day to day. The numerous and radical amendments made in tne Act since it came on the Statute book not so long ago, testify to the fast changing nature of the concept. Bearing all these things in inind, I find it al- most impossible to define adequately or with any usefulness .an interest which will serve the purposes of the Act. I feel that an attempt to do so will introduce a rigidity which will work harm and no good. Nor does it, to my mind, in any manner help to define such interest by calling it direct and :Substantial. I will

illustrate the difficulty that I feel by an example or two. Suppose a workman was dismissed by the employer and the other workmen raised a dispute about it. Such a dispute comes completely within the definition even assum ing that the words "any person" only refer to persons of the

1204

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958]

Workmen of 1?~':";:;! v. 'l'he Management of

.

?

.

h

1958

Sarl:ar J.

workman class, as the respondent contends. There is there- fore no doubt that such a dispute is an industrial dispute. The question then is what interest have the disputing work- men in the reinstatement of the dismissed workman if they . Dimakuchi must ave an interest. The reinstatement would not in any way improve their financial condition or otherwise enhance Tea Esiate any interest of theirs in any sense of the term, in common use. The only interest that I can think of the workmen having for themselves in such a dispute is the solidarity. of labour. It is only this that if the same thing happens to any one of them, the others would rally round and by taking up his cause prevent the dismissal. Apart from the Act how would the workmen have prevented the dismissal from taking effect? They would have, if they wanted to prevent the dismissal, gone on strike and thereby tried to force the em ployer's hands not to give effect to 'the dismissal. That would have destroyed the industrial peace which the object of the Act is to preserve. It is in order to achieve this ob ject that the Act recognises this dispute as an industrial dis pute and provides for settlement by the methods of conciliation or adjudication contained in it and preserves the industrial peace by preventing the parties being left to their own devices. If what I have described as solidarity of labour is to be considered as direct and substantial interest for the purposes of an industrial dispute, as I conceive is not disputed by any one, then it wilt appear that we have em I will now take an barked on a new concept of interest. other case which in regard to interest is the same as the pre vious one. Suppose the employer engages some workmen at a low rate of wages and the other workmen raise a dis pute demanding that the wages of these low paid workmen be increased. This case would be completely within the definition of an industrial dispute even according to the most restricted meaning that may be put upon the words "any person", namely that they refer only to workmen as defined in the Act, because the dispute concerns the terms of em ployment of such a workman. So this has admittedly to be

its

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1205

·

·

k

· l

held to be an industrial dispute. What then is the interest of the workmen in this dispute? The increase in the wages claimed would not in any manner improve the financia con- dition of the disputing workmen, nor serve any of their T' M v. interest as ordinarily understood. It would however help h · t e wor men m seemg t at t elf own wages were not re ne- h ed by preventing the employer from being able to engage any low paid workman at all. .Apart from this I can think of no other interest that the disputing workmen may have If therefore it is essential that the disputing in the dispute. workmen must have an interest in the dispute, this must be that interest, for, as already stated, the dispute is undoubted- ly an 'industrial dispute.

d

h

1958

Workmen of DimakucM Tea Estale

,, . tie anagemenl o1 Dimakucl!i Tea Estate

Barkar J.

If this is sufficient interest to constitute an industrial dispute I fail to see why the workmen have no sufficient interest in a dispute in which they claim that a foreman who is particularly rude and brutal in his behaviour should be removed and they should have a more human foreman. This is surely a matter in which the workmen raising the dispute have a personal and immediate interest and not, as in the last case, an interest in the prevention of something happen ing in future, which conceivably may never happen at all. Such an interest is plainly nearer to the ordinary kinds of interest than the interest in solidarity of labour or in the prevention of future harm which in the preceding paragraphs have been found to be sufficient to sustain an industrial dis pute. The dispute last imagined would undoubtedly be an industrial dispute if the foreman was a workman for then it would be entirely within the definition of an industrial dispute. · Now suppose the foreman was not a workman. Can it be said that then the dispute would not be an indus trial dispute? Would the interest of the workmen in the dis pute be any the less or in any way different because the foreman whose dismissal was demanded was not a workman? I conceive it impossible to say so. Therefore if interest is the test, the dispute that I have imagined would have to be

1958

Workmen. of ~;:"i

1206

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958J

held to be an industrial dispute whether or not the foreman concerned was a workman.

km

h .

d h

t e wor

Now assume that the dispute did not arise out of a Th< Ma,.;;;..,,111 of demand for the dismissal of a foreman but against his dis- Dimakuchi missal on the ground that he was a particularly kind and TeaEatate sympat et1c man an en were happy to work Sarkar J. In such a case the interest of the workmen in under him. the dispute would be the same as their interest in the dispute demanding the foreman's dismissal. They would be demand ing his reinstatement in their own interest; they would be their work would be easy demanding it to make sure that and smooth and that they would be happy in the discharge of it Such a dispute therefore also has to be held to be an industrial dispute, and as in the last case, it would make no difference for this purpose· that the foreman concerned was not a workman.

If this is right, as I think it is, then similarly the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee would be an indus trial dispute for the workmen have sufficient personal and immediate interest in seeing that they have a doctor of their liking to look after them. It is indeed the case of the work men that by his devotion to duty and good behaviour Or. Banerjee became very popular with the workmen. Whether the contention of the workmen is justified or not and whether it would be upheld by the Tribunal or not, are who!Jy diffe rent matters and do not affect the question whether in an It is industrial dispute the workmen must l)e interested. enough to say that I find no reason to think that the appel· lant had no interest in the dispute concerning the dismissal of Dr. Banerjee. Therefore, I would hold that even if it is necessary to constitute an industrial dispute that workmen must have an interest in it, the dispute before us is one in which the appellants' have a direct and substantial interest and it is an industrial dispute.

For myself however I would not make the interest of the workmen in the dispute a condition of the existence of an industrial dispute. The Act does not do so. I repeat that

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1207

In my view, it would be impossible to define such interest. such a condition would defeat the object of the Act. It is said that otherwise the workmen would be able to raise dis putes in which they were not interested. Supposing they did, the Government is not bound ·to refer such disputes for ad )~dication. Take a concrete case. Suppose the workmen raise a dispute that the manager of the concern should have a higher pay. It would be for the Government to decide whether the dispute should be referred for adjudication or not. The Government is not bound to refer. Now, how is the Government to decide? That must depend on the Government's evaluation of the situation. That this is the intention is clear from the object that the Act has in view. I will here read from the judgment of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association case(') what the ob ject of the Act is.

It was said at pp. 331-332.

1968

Workmen of DimaL'UChi Tea Estate v. Tke Managem•11t of Dimal,ucki TeaEalale

SarkarJ.

"We shall next examine the Act to determine its scope. The Act is stated in the preamble to be one providing for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Any industrial dispute as defined by the Act may be reported to Government who may take such· steps as seem to it ex pedient for promoting conciliation or settlement. It may refer it to an Industrial Court for advice or it may refer it to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The legislation substi tutes for free bargaining between the parties a binding award by an impartial tribunal. Now, in many cases an industrial dispute starts with the making of number of de. mands by workmen. If the demands are not acceptable to the employer-and that is what often happens-it results in a dismissal of the leaders and eventually in a strike. No machinery for reconciliation and settlement of such disputes can be considered effective unless it provides within its scope a solution for cases of employees who are dismissed in such conditions and who are usually the first victims in an indus If reinstatement of such persons cannot be trial dispute.

1

) [1949] F.C.R. 321.

(

1208

SUPREi\fE COURT REPORTS

[1958]

1958

Workmen oj Di11lllkuchi Tea Estate

brought about by conciliation or adjudication, it is difficult, if not impossible, in many cases to restore industrial peace which is the object of the legislation" ..

Tl1' Man!;'""'"' of !j:,_'"'!;~'(.~;•

Sarkar J,

This is the view of the object of the Act that is accepted by all including the decisions in Narendra Kumar Sen's case(') and United Commercial Bank case('). In Narendra Kumar Sen's case(') Chagla C. J. said· at p. 130:

"The Industrial Disputes Act was enacted, as Mr. Desai rightly says, to bring about industrial peace in the country, to avoid conflicts between employers and labourers, to pre vent strikes and lock-outs, to see that the production in our country does not suffer by reason of constant and continuous labour troubles".

Therefore in deciding whether to refer or not, the Govern ment is to be guided by the question whether the dispute is such as to disturb the industrial peace and hamper produc tion. I find· no difficulty in thinking that the Government would realise that there was no risk of the peace being dis turbed or production being hampered by the dispute raised by the workmen demanding a higher salary for the manager, for being normal men the workmen were not likely to suffer the privations of a strike to enforce their demand for a cause of this nature. The Government must be left to decide this primary question for itself, and therefore the Government must be left to decide in each case whether the workmen had sufficient interest in the dispute. If Government thought that the workmen had no such interest as would lead them to disturb industrial peace by strike or otherwise if the dis pute was not ended, the Government might not in its discre tion refer the dispute for adjudication by a tribunal. It must be left free to decide as it thinks best in the interest of It is not for the Court to lay down rigid princi the country. ples of interest which interfere with the Government's discre tion, for that might defeat the object of the Act. If the Government feels that the dispute is such that it might lead to the disruption of industrial peace, it is the policy of the Act that it should exercise its powers under it to prevent

(') (1953) 55 Born. L.R. 125.

(') [1962] 1 L.L.J. 782.

S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

1209

f

·

k

h

1958

· d

d h

· 1 d'

1spute an

Workmen of lJimal:uchi Tea Estate

JJim"''"c1,; ~!.'ea E•tate Sarkar J.

that. Assume a case in which the workmen raised a dispute without having what the court considers sufficient interest to t ere ore, on t e matter ma e it an m ustna c~min~ to the court the dispute was held not. to be an indus- Tlie Jlla~~Y'T'•'"'' trial dispute. Upon that the Governments hands would be tied and it would not be able to have that dispute resolv- ed by the processes contemplated in the Act. Suppose now that, the workmen then go on strike and industrial peace is disturbed aad production hampered. The object of the Act would then have been defeated. And why? Because it was said that it was not a dispute in which the workmen were interested and therefore not a dispute which was capable of being adjusted under the provisions of the Act. It would be no answer to say that the workmen would not go on strike If they would not, neither would the Govern- in such a case. ment refer the dispute for adjudication under the Act and it would not be necessary for the court to decide whether the workmen were interested in the dispute or not or whether the dispute was an industrial dispute or not. Therefore, I think that it is not necessary to say that a dispute is an indus- trial dispute within the meaning of the Act only when work- men are interested in it. Such a test of an industrial dispute would niake it justiciable by courts and also introduce a rigidity in the application of the Act which is incompatible With the fast changing concepts it has in view and so defeat It is enough to assume that as normal the object of the Act. men, workmen would not raise a dispute or threaten indus- trial peace on account of it unless they are interested in it.

I wish however to make it.clear, should any doubt exist as to this, that I do not intend to be understood as saying· that the question whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not is never justiciable by courts of law and that a dispute is an industrial dispute only if the Government says so. Such a larger question does not arise in this case. All that I say is that it is not a condition of an industrial dispute that workmen must be interested in it and 110 question of interest

1210

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1958]

JDss

falls for decision by a court if it can be called upon to decide Workm'" of whether a dispute is an industrial dispute or not. The ques- J f r,,,,. E,101, I>i1n,tkuchi · t10n o mterest can on y be o pract1ca value m that it helps 7,"·' >l•n:g,wnt of the Governmen_t '? ~ecide whether a dispute should be

· J

f ·

·

referred for ad1ud1cahon or not.

ni 0nuk«chi 1',·t: J~'J;lrtle

Then it is said that if workmen were allowed to raise a dispute concerning a person who was not a workman, then it would be possible" for such a person to have his dispute with the employer adjudicated through the workmen. This case was put. Suppose the. manager wanted his salary to be increased but could not make the employer agree to hi~ de mand, he could then instigate the workmen and make them raise a dispute that his salary should be increased and if such a dispute is an industrial dispute and the award goes in favour of the workmen then the result would be that the Act could be used for settling disputes between the manager and his employer, a dispute which the Act did not intend to con cern itself with. So it is said that the words "any person" in s. 2(k) cannot include an employee who is not a workman. I am unable to agree. First, in interpreting an Act, the Court is not entitled to assume that persons would use its provisions dishonestly. The words in the Act cannot have a different meaning than their natural meaning because otherwise there would be a possibility of the Act being used for a purpose for which it was not meant. The remedy against this possibility is provided· in the Act, in that it has· given complete freedom to the Government not to refer such It is .not necessary to meet a somewhat remote a dispute. apprehension that the Act may be used for purposes other than those for which it was meant, to construe its language in a manner different from that which it plainly bears. Lastly, in doing this many cases like those earlier mentioned includ ing the present, which are dearly cases of industrial disputes would have to be excluded in the attempt to prevent by in terpretation a remote app1ehension of a misuse of the Act. This would do more harm than good.

S.C.R.

SUPRKl\m COUHT H.EPOR'l'S

1211

I have therefore come to the conclusion that a dispute con cerning a person who is not 1l workman may be an industrial dispute within s. 2(k). As it has not been said that the dispute with which we are concerned is for any other reason not an industrial dispute, I hold that the Industrial Tribunal had full jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute and should have done so.

I would therefore allow the appeal and send the case back to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in accordance with Jaw.

1958

JYorkmen of Dimakuelfi Tea. Estate v. Tl1e .lla1wgem•.nt uf JJimakuchi 2'ea EstaJe

Sutkar ./.

ORDER OF THE COURT

In view of the opinion of the majority, the appeal

is

dismissed-: But there will be no order as to costs.

Appeal dismissed.

SANTOSH KUMAR

v.

BHAI MOOL SINGH

1958

Fr-bruury 5.

(S. R. DAIS C. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BOSE JJ.)

Negotiable Instruments-Summary Suit on dishonoured cheque-Application for leave to defend-Triable issue-Failui-e to produce documentary evidence-If 11enders defence va.gue and not bona fide-Grant of conditional leave-Discretion of Court, Interference with-Code of Civil Procedure, 0. XXXVII, rr. 2 and 3.

the appellant under The respondent filed a suit against the basis of a 0. XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedur·e on cheque for Rs. 60,000 drawn by the appellant in favour of the respondent which, on presentation to the Bank, had been disho noured. The appellant applied under r. 3 of 0. XXXVII for that the leave· to appear and defend the suit on the ground cheque had been given only as a collateral security for the price of goods supplied, that the goods had been paid for by cash payments and by other cheques 11nd that the cheque in question had served its end and was without consi L/S4SCI-2(a)

therefore