Corrigan v Kevin P. Kilrane & Co Solicitors (Unapproved) [2020] IECA 93 (08 April 2020)

Corrigan v Kevin P. Kilrane & Co Solicitors (Unapproved) [2020] IECA 93 (08 April 2020)

The Court of Appeal held that while the High Court judge erred in resolving factual conflicts against the appellant for the purposes of the strike-out application, the impugned email was not reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. The statements in the email, even if false, did not impute dishonesty or unfitness to the appellant in the eyes of reasonable members of society, and the occasion of publication was one of qualified privilege. Therefore, the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and the proceedings were properly dismissed under section 34(2) of the Defamation Act 2009.

Citation
[2020] IECA 93
Parties
Plaintiff/appellant: Sean Corrigan; Defendant/respondent: Kevin P Kilrane and Company Solicitors
Jurisdiction
Ireland
Judgment Date
08 April 2020
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court Order Striking Out Defamation Proceedings
Outcome
Appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Defamation, Qualified Privilege, Order 19 Rule 28 RSC, Striking Out Proceedings, Reasonable Cause of Action, Section 34 Defamation Act 2009, Section 18 Defamation Act 2009
Tort Law Defamation Qualified Privilege Order 19 Rule 28 RSC Striking Out Proceedings Reasonable Cause of Action Section 34 Defamation Act 2009 Section 18 Defamation Act 2009

Case Brief

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Parties

Sean Corrigan

Plaintiff/appellant

Kevin P Kilrane and Company Solicitors

Defendant/respondent

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court Order Striking Out Defamation Proceedings

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the statement of claim disclosed a reasonable cause of action for defamation
  2. 2 Whether the impugned email was reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory meaning
  3. 3 Whether the statements were made on an occasion of qualified privilege

Ratio Decidendi

The Court of Appeal held that while the High Court judge erred in resolving factual conflicts against the appellant for the purposes of the strike-out application, the impugned email was not reasonably capable of bearing a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. The statements in the email, even if false, did not impute dishonesty or unfitness to the appellant in the eyes of reasonable members of society, and the occasion of publication was one of qualified privilege. Therefore, the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and the proceedings were properly dismissed under section 34(2) of the Defamation Act 2009.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed

Orders

  • Proceedings dismissed; statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action; statements not reasonably capable of being found to have a defamatory meaning; defence of qualified privilege established