De Roiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4 (19 January 2001)

De Roiste v. Minister for Defence [2001] IESC 4 (19 January 2001)

The Supreme Court held that the applicant's 29-year delay in seeking judicial review was both inordinate and inexcusable. The applicant failed to demonstrate good reason for the delay, as his initial consultation with a solicitor showed capacity to act. The trauma and psychological effects, while acknowledged, did not justify the prolonged inaction. The balance of justice favored dismissal due to prejudice to the respondents from the death of key witnesses and faded memories. The court affirmed that judicial review is a discretionary remedy, and the applicant's conduct disentitled him to relief.

Citation
[2001] IESC 4
Parties
Applicant/appellant: Donal de Roiste; Respondents: Minister for Defence, Ireland and the Attorney General
Jurisdiction
Ireland
Judgment Date
19 January 2001
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review / Supreme Court Appeal on Preliminary Issue of Delay
Outcome
Appeal dismissed; order of the High Court affirmed.
Legal Topics
Judicial Review, Delay and Laches, Natural Justice, Certiorari, Discretionary Remedies, Statute of Limitations
Administrative Law Constitutional Law Military Law Judicial Review Delay and Laches Natural Justice Certiorari Discretionary Remedies +1 more

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

More case intelligence is available

Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.

Full judgment text Downloadable case file Legal principles 4 Authorities cited 20 Party arguments 2 Amounts and remedies 1
Sign in to unlock

Parties

Donal de Roiste

Applicant/appellant

Minister for Defence, Ireland and the Attorney General

Respondents

Procedural Posture

Judicial Review / Supreme Court Appeal on Preliminary Issue of Delay

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether a 29-year delay in seeking judicial review of a compulsory military retirement is inordinate and inexcusable
  2. 2 Whether the balance of justice requires the proceedings to be dismissed due to delay and potential prejudice to the respondents
  3. 3 Whether trauma and psychological effects constitute good reason to extend time for judicial review

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the applicant's 29-year delay in seeking judicial review was both inordinate and inexcusable. The applicant failed to demonstrate good reason for the delay, as his initial consultation with a solicitor showed capacity to act. The trauma and psychological effects, while acknowledged, did not justify the prolonged inaction. The balance of justice favored dismissal due to prejudice to the respondents from the death of key witnesses and faded memories. The court affirmed that judicial review is a discretionary remedy, and the applicant's conduct disentitled him to relief.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed; order of the High Court affirmed.

Orders

  • Applicant's proceedings dismissed for inordinate and inexcusable delay.
  • No extension of time for judicial review granted.