J.Harris (Assemblers) v DPP [2012] IESC 6 (01 February 2012)

J.Harris (Assemblers) v DPP [2012] IESC 6 (01 February 2012)

The Supreme Court held that the period of blameworthy delay (14-15 months) was insufficient, in the absence of actual or presumptive prejudice, to warrant prohibition of the trial. The reversal of the burden of proof under s.50 of the 1989 Act did not constitute an additional factor justifying prohibition. The alleged breach of fair procedures in taking uncautioned statements was a matter for the trial judge. The balancing exercise between the right to an expeditious trial and the public interest in prosecuting serious offences did not tip in favour of the applicant. The appeal was dismissed and the High Court order affirmed.

Citation
[2012] IESC 6
Parties
Applicant/appellant: J. Harris (Assemblers); Respondent/respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Jurisdiction
Ireland
Judgment Date
01 February 2012
Procedural Posture
Appeal (judicial Review) / Supreme Court Judgment on Appeal From High Court
Outcome
Appeal dismissed; High Court order affirmed
Legal Topics
Prosecutorial Delay, Right to Fair Trial, Natural and Constitutional Justice, Burden of Proof, Judicial Review, Admissibility of Evidence

Case Brief

Summary, issues, holding and outcome

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Parties

J. Harris (Assemblers)

Applicant/appellant

Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent/respondent

Procedural Posture

Appeal (judicial Review) / Supreme Court Judgment on Appeal From High Court

  1. 1 Whether prosecutorial delay warranted prohibition of trial
  2. 2 Whether failure to caution employees before taking statements constituted breach of fair procedures
  3. 3 Whether reversal of burden of proof under s.50 of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 was a relevant factor in assessing prejudice

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the period of blameworthy delay (14-15 months) was insufficient, in the absence of actual or presumptive prejudice, to warrant prohibition of the trial. The reversal of the burden of proof under s.50 of the 1989 Act did not constitute an additional factor justifying prohibition. The alleged breach of fair procedures in taking uncautioned statements was a matter for the trial judge. The balancing exercise between the right to an expeditious trial and the public interest in prosecuting serious offences did not tip in favour of the applicant. The appeal was dismissed and the High Court order affirmed.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed; High Court order affirmed

Orders

  • Application for prohibition refused
  • Trial to proceed on indictment