M. (P.) v. Malone [2002] IESC 46 (07 June 2002)

M. (P.) v. Malone [2002] IESC 46 (07 June 2002)

The Supreme Court held that the delay from 1992 to 2000 was inordinate and unjustifiable, not explained by any conduct of the applicant or special circumstances, and that the applicant's constitutional right to a reasonably expeditious trial outweighed the public interest in prosecution. The delay caused unnecessary stress and anxiety, and the case did not fall within the special category where delay is excusable. The trial was prohibited.

Citation
[2002] IESC 46
Parties
Applicant/appellant: P. M.; Respondent: District Judge Miriam Malone; Respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Jurisdiction
Ireland
Judgment Date
07 June 2002
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review / Appeal From High Court to Supreme Court
Outcome
appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Delay in Prosecution, Right to Expeditious Trial, Sexual Offences, Judicial Review, Prosecutorial Delay
Criminal Law Constitutional Law Delay in Prosecution Right to Expeditious Trial Sexual Offences Judicial Review Prosecutorial Delay

Case Brief

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Parties

P. M.

Applicant/appellant

District Judge Miriam Malone

Respondent

Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent

Procedural Posture

Judicial Review / Appeal From High Court to Supreme Court

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether inordinate delay in prosecution violated the applicant's constitutional right to a reasonably expeditious trial
  2. 2 Whether the delay was justified or explicable by the conduct of the complainant or the State
  3. 3 Whether the delay caused prejudice to the applicant sufficient to prohibit the trial

Ratio Decidendi

The Supreme Court held that the delay from 1992 to 2000 was inordinate and unjustifiable, not explained by any conduct of the applicant or special circumstances, and that the applicant's constitutional right to a reasonably expeditious trial outweighed the public interest in prosecution. The delay caused unnecessary stress and anxiety, and the case did not fall within the special category where delay is excusable. The trial was prohibited.

Court Disposition

appeal allowed

Orders

  • Order of the High Court set aside
  • Order of prohibition granted restraining the Director of Public Prosecutions from proceeding with the prosecution of the remaining charges