Aga Khan v. Firestone [1991] IEHC 3; [1992] ILRM 31 (25th July, 1991)

Aga Khan v. Firestone [1991] IEHC 3; [1992] ILRM 31 (25th July, 1991)

A binding oral contract for the sale of Gilltown was concluded between Aga Khan and the Firestones on 27 November 1989, and the letter of 1/4 December 1989 constituted a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Akazawa's first refusal option was not supported by consideration and was unenforceable; it did not create an interest in land. Therefore, Aga Khan was entitled to specific performance, and Akazawa was entitled only to damages in lieu of specific performance.

Citation
[1991] IEHC 3
Parties
Plaintiff: Karim Aga Khan; Defendant: Bertram R. Firestone; Defendant: Diana M. J. Firestone; Plaintiff: Yoshika Akazawa
Jurisdiction
Ireland
Procedural Posture
Civil / High Court Judgment After Trial
Outcome
Specific performance granted to Aga Khan; Akazawa's claim for specific performance dismissed; Akazawa entitled to damages in lieu of specific performance; costs awarded as specified.
Legal Topics
Specific Performance, Statute of Frauds, First Refusal Option, Consideration, Memorandum of Contract

Case Brief

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Parties

Karim Aga Khan

Plaintiff

Bertram R. Firestone

Defendant

Diana M. J. Firestone

Defendant

Yoshika Akazawa

Plaintiff

Procedural Posture

Civil / High Court Judgment After Trial

  1. 1 Whether a binding verbal contract for sale of land existed between Aga Khan and the Firestones on 27 November 1989
  2. 2 Whether the letter of 1/4 December 1989 constituted a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds
  3. 3 Whether Akazawa's first refusal option was enforceable and constituted an interest in land

Ratio Decidendi

A binding oral contract for the sale of Gilltown was concluded between Aga Khan and the Firestones on 27 November 1989, and the letter of 1/4 December 1989 constituted a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Akazawa's first refusal option was not supported by consideration and was unenforceable; it did not create an interest in land. Therefore, Aga Khan was entitled to specific performance, and Akazawa was entitled only to damages in lieu of specific performance.

Court Disposition

Specific performance granted to Aga Khan; Akazawa's claim for specific performance dismissed; Akazawa entitled to damages in lieu of specific performance; costs awarded as specified.

Orders

  • Order for specific performance of the contract of 27 November 1989 in favour of Aga Khan against the Firestones
  • Closing date for completion fixed at six months from judgment