I & Anor v Minister for Justice (Approved) [2025] IEHC 426 (23 July 2025)

[ Home ] [ Databases ] [ World Law ] [ Multidatabase Search ] [ Help ] [ Feedback ] [ DONATE ] High Court of Ireland Decisions You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> I & Anor v Minister for Justice (Approved) [2025] IEHC 426 (23 July 2025) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025IEHC426.html Cite as: [2025] IEHC 426 [ New search ] [ Printable PDF version ] [ Help ] THE HIGH COURT [2025] IEHC 426 [Record No. 2024/1437 JR] BETWEEN [I] AND [M] APPLICANTS AND THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Mark Heslin delivered on the 23 rd day of July 2025 Introduction 1. By means of a decision, dated 8 November 2024, the respondent refused to revoke the deportation order made in relation to the second applicant ("the decision"). The second applicant was deported from the State, on 10 December 2024. These proceedings comprise a challenge to the decision. Although the applicants were legally represented when these proceedings commenced, their solicitors came 'off record' in circumstances I will presently outline. The challenge to the decision is articulated exclusively by the first applicant, by means of the affidavits sworn by her; exhibited correspondence written by her, or by the applicants' former solicitors; written legal submissions prepared by the applicants' former legal team; and oral submission, which the first applicant made during hearing. However, there was no equivalent from the second applicant, who chose not to swear any affidavit and who made no attempt to participate (e.g. via video link) at the hearing. Relevant facts 2. To place the applicants' claim in context, it is necessary to understand the relevant history, which I propose to set out in chronological order, as follows. The applicants 3. The first applicant, Ms. [I], is a national of Georgia who arrived in the State on 22 November 2021. She was granted refugee status on 17 May 2023 and resides in this State with her daughter, Ms. [Z], who is a minor. The second applicant, Mr. [M], is also a Georgian national. He arrived in the State, separately, on 1 December 2021, following which he applied for international protection. Relationship 4. At para. 2 of the affidavit sworn on 19 November 2024 by the first applicant (the "grounding affidavit"), she avers, inter alia :- "In December, 2021, the second applicant and I met and later commenced a relationship." At para. 2 of the second affidavit sworn by the first applicant on 4 December 2024 ("the second affidavit"), the following is averred: - "I have been in a loving relationship with the second applicant herein since July, 2023 having first met him in December 2021 shortly after he arrived in Ireland." Questionnaire 5. The second applicant completed the relevant IPO questionnaire and a copy (translated from Georgian to English) appears at exhibit "IB1" to the grounding affidavit. S.35 report 6. On 11 August 2022, the second applicant was interviewed pursuant to s. 35 of the International Protection Act 2015 ("the 2015 Act") and a copy of the record of interview (the "s.35 report") comprises part of exhibit "IB1" to the grounding affidavit. Given that (i) in oral submissions, the first applicant asserted the applicants could not be expected to reside anywhere other than Ireland or Georgia; and (ii) the second applicant has chosen not to swear any affidavit in these proceedings, it is relevant to note that internal pages 10 and 11 of the s.35 report contain, inter alia , the following questions and answers: "Q. 45 - In the questionnaire you stated that you travelled to different countries in the world due to your work. Where did you go and when? A. - I went to most European countries except Australia, U. S. between 2004 and 2020. ... Q.50 - In the S.13 interview you stated that after leaving Georgia in November 2021 you went to Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Netherlands and the U. K. You also stated that you remained in each country for a couple days (sic) before moving on. Have you applied for international protection in any of these countries? A. – All those countries are part of the Schengen area and Georgians do not need visas there. That is why I did not ask for protection." IPO 7. On 27 September 2022, the International Protection Office ("IPO") wrote to the second applicant and informed him that, having considered his application, the IPO was recommending, pursuant to s. 39(3)(c) of the 2015 Act, that he be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration (the "IPO decision"). The said letter enclosed a copy of the report under s. 39 of the 2015 Act (the "s.39 report"). Furthermore, the second applicant was informed that, having considered his case under s. 49 of the 2015 Act, the Minister decided, pursuant to s. 49(4)(b) of the 2015 Act to refuse permission to remain in the State. A report pursuant to s. 49(3) of the 2015 Act, dated 26 September 2022, was also enclosed (the "s.49 report"). Exhibit "IB1" also contains a copy of the s. 39 report, dated 21 September 2022 and the s. 49 report, dated 26 September 2022, respectively. Appeal 8. The second applicant appealed the IPO decision to the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (the "IPAT" or the "Tribunal"). Ordinarily, as Georgia is designated a safe country under s. 72 of the 2015 Act, appeals are 'papers-based'. However, following request, the Tribunal decided to hold an oral hearing on 12 December 2022. IPAT 9. By letter dated 31 March 2023, the second applicant was informed that the IPAT affirmed the recommendation of the IPO that he be refused a refugee declaration and subsidiary protection. This letter enclosed the Tribunal's 20-page decision which contained a detailed assessment of the material facts relied on by the applicant. While the Tribunal accepted the applicant's claim that he was in a romantic relationship with a Ms. [S], the Tribunal rejected the claim that the former spouse of [S] was a criminal who threatened the applicant. Credibility 10. In coming to the view that this material fact was not credible on the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal stated, inter alia :- "The appellant's evidence in respect of this material claim was vague and internally inconsistent. The appellant did not provide any degree of particularisation of the threatening phone calls..." (para. 4.11); "In the appellant's section 35 interview, the appellant was asked about documentary evidence of the threats and he replied, in answer to question 31, that "We only had a landline. We have no mobile phones". The appellant was asked about the inconsistency of that answer with his evidence to the Tribunal that he received calls on a mobile phone. The appellant said he didn't know why that was the answer, that he always had a mobile phone and a landline. This inconsistency has not been explained. Of relevance to the assessment of this material fact is the appellant's submission, post-hearing, of text messages in support of his relationship with [S] which made no reference to threats experienced by either of them where text messages supporting that element of the claim were expressly sought by the Tribunal. The Tribunal expressly referred to that at the hearing and the appellant said that he thought there might be some where the text messages scanned some years ago. It seems to the Tribunal that the ongoing experience of threatening calls by [S] 's former husband and persons acting on his instruction is the type of matter which might have featured in such messages but the appellant has not provided any such evidence nor any evidence of communication with [S] about the assault which was also, as per his claim, as a result of their relationship..." (para. 4.12); "In his evidence to the Tribunal the appellant said that it was [SO] (the former spouse of [S]) calling him as well as other people whereas in answer to question 27 of his section 35 interview he said that he didn't know who the caller was. The appellant replied that there were other callers that he didn't know but that is not the answer he gave during his section 35 interview where he said that he did not know who they were. The answer is very different to the evidence given during the appeal hearing that he had spoken with [SO], the person orchestrating the entire tirade of threats, abduction and assault. The appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation for the internal inconsistency..." (para. 4.13). 11. The Tribunal also rejected on credibility grounds the claim that the applicant was attacked and could not report the attack to the police. In reaching this decision, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence regarding the attack to be insufficiently detailed "as to represent a lived experience" and also found "inconsistencies in the retelling" when compared with previous accounts provided by the applicant. The Tribunal went on to state:- "The appellant was asked by the Tribunal why the claim about when he got into the car was different in his evidence before the Tribunal compared with his section 35 interview. In his section 35 interview the appellant said the men in the car asked for directions to the shop and the appellant got in the car and he became alarmed when the car passed his building. This account is completely different to the appellant's evidence to the Tribunal, where he said he was at his building on his way to the shop when he was asked for directions to Central Road. When the inconsistency was put to the appellant he said he told the same thing to the Tribunal. This is not (sic) does it explain the inconsistency. The Tribunal considers this inconsistency to be significant because it is peculiar to the appellant and in retelling a lived experience, the appellant is recounting from his own memory a significant event. That memory includes where he was when the men in the car asked for direction, where the men in the car were going and then exactly the appellant realised that he was not safe. Those are three markers of that narrative which the appellant did not recount consistently. This is a negative credibility indicator." (para. 4.20); "While the Tribunal accepts that the injury is referred to in the medical report it was not represented in the questionnaire or section 35 interview and that inconsistency has not been explained..." (para. 4.21); "The appellant said that he never said that he went to the police two days after the attack but he did in fact write that at section 4.1 of his questionnaire where there was no reference of his being hospitalised. The appellant did not respond to that inconsistency when put to him." (para. 4.22); "...the appellant made no reference to his injuries or hospitalisation at all in his questionnaire where the only reference is to his having been physically 'abused' in cemetery (sic) . The authenticity of the medical report has not been proven but conversely the appellant has produced a document which is broadly consistent with this evidence before the Tribunal. The appellant is entitled to the positive probative weight of that report albeit such weight is limited where the fact of his injuries and hospitalisation was not canvased earlier in his international protection application nor has the appellant explained the failure to so canvas." (para. 4.23); "In considering the appellant's claim in the round, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the appellant has established his general credibility to the requisite standard." (para. 4.27). 12. In the manner explained in the Tribunal's decision, it was accepted that the applicant is a Georgian man who had a romantic relationship with the mother of his student, which relationship ended before the applicant left Georgia. The Tribunal did not accept that the applicant's former partner's ex-husband was a criminal who threatened him. COI 13. Furthermore, the Tribunal found:- "The COI does not suggest that the accepted facts provide an objective basis for a well-founded fear of persecution." (para. 5.5). S.49(7) review application 14. On 7 April 2023, the second applicant's solicitor submitted representations to the respondent Minister for the purpose of a s. 49(7) review of the permission to remain application. This included supporting documentation comprising of various letters of reference; payslips; and an employment contract. 15. On 2 November 2023, the second applicant submitted representations by email which attached supporting documents, including, a record of participation in an Open University course; various photographs; and 'WhatsApp' screenshots. 16. On 4 March 2024, the applicant sent a further email. 17. It is a matter of fact that, despite making representations to the respondent Minister on 7 April 2023; 2 November 2023; and 4 March 2024, the second applicant did not disclose to the respondent that he was in a relationship with the first applicant, when seeking the s. 49(7) review. Review decision 18. By letter dated 26 March 2024, the respondent issued a decision in relation to the s. 49(7) review, refusing the second applicant permission to remain in the State. In the manner presently discussed in more detail the second applicant was also given notice that he was required to return voluntarily to his country of origin, in default of which he would be deported. Reasons 19. The 11-page statement of reasons which accompanied the s. 49(7) review decision stated, inter alia , the following:- "The applicant illegally entered the State on 01/12/2021 and applied for international protection in the State on the 02/12/2021. The applicant's application for international protection was considered at first instance and the International Protection Office has recommended that the applicant should be given neither a refugee declaration nor a subsidiary protection declaration. According to the applicant's statements, he arrived in the State on 01/12/2021 and, on that basis, has been in the State for approximately 2 years and 4 months at the time of writing this submission. The applicant presented as a single (sic) with no family connections to the State. The applicant stated that he met a person whom he wants to spend his life within the State however, no further information regarding this relationship has been submitted ..." (emphasis added) (p. 3 of 11). 20. I pause to say that the foregoing is factually correct. With regard to the underlined passage, it was entirely accurate for the respondent to state that " no further information " was provided by the second applicant regarding the "relationship". Nor did the first applicant provide any information to the Minister concerning the relationship. In terms of the relevant 'timeline', it will be recalled that, according to the first applicant, she and the second applicant "have been in a loving relationship... since July 2023", i.e. some 8 months prior to the review under s.49(7) of the 2015 Act, which the second applicant called for. The reasons for the s.49(7) review decision also included the following: " General humanitarian considerations Representations have been received on behalf of the applicant claiming that if returned to his country of origin, he will be subjected to a fear of persecution on the basis of his membership of a particular social group and a genuine risk of serious harm in Georgia by reason of death penalty or execution, or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant was granted permission to access the labour market by the LMAU valid from 30/06/2022 and was renewed through to 12/07/2024. The applicant has submitted that he has engaged in employment in the State. The applicant has engaged in volunteer work in the State. The applicant has formed personal relationships in the State and has provided references in support of his character. The applicant attends a church in the State. The applicant stated that he met a person whom he wants to spend his life within the State however, no further information regarding this relationship has been submitted . The applicant's international protection claim was refused by the IPO and affirmed by the IPAT and he was determined to be a person not in need of international protection. The humanitarian considerations of these submissions is noted here. Having considered the information submitted in support of humanitarian considerations in this case, it is concluded that the common good in maintaining the integrity of the international protection and immigration system outweigh the features of this case which tend to support a decision to grant permission to remain to the applicant." (p. 5 of 11). " Proportionality assessment The rights of applicants are not absolute. All rights require to be considered in the context of the factual matrix of the case. The applicant has submitted references and a contract from his employer who attest that the applicant is courteous, hardworking and develops productive working relationships. The applicant has also provided submissions to show he attends church and has volunteered in a community initiatives (sic) and dance classes within his church. This information presents some details of the applicant's associations and personal development in the State, although it is noted that this is limited in nature. Having examined the facts and circumstances, it is not considered that there are exceptional circumstances arising." (p. 8 of 11). 26 March 2024 notice 21. The letter sent by the respondent's department to the second applicant, on 26 March 2024, put the second applicant on notice of the following: "Current status You have now ceased to be an applicant under the 2015 Act and, as such, the permission you were given to remain in the State while your application was being examined has expired ... Voluntary return Under s.48 of the 2015 Act you have the option of returning voluntarily to your country of origin. If you wish to avail of this option, you must notify the Minister within five days of the date of this letter of your intention to return on a voluntary basis. Please note that by availing of the option to leave voluntarily you will not be required to leave the State within the next five days... Deportation If you decide not to return voluntarily to your country of origin, or if you do not let the Minister know within the required timeframe that you have decided to return voluntarily, the Minister will make a Deportation Order in respect of you under s.51 of the 2015 Act. Once this is made and served it will require you to leave the State and remain out of the State indefinitely ..." (emphasis added). No permission to remain in the State 22. This letter was sent by registered post and there is no suggestion that the second applicant did not receive it. Thus, as of 26 March, 2024, it was made 'crystal' clear to the second applicant that he no longer had permission to remain in the State; that he had the option of returning voluntarily to Georgia; and that if he did not take that option, a deportation order would issue. It is common case that the applicants got married over 7 months later, on 6 November 2024. Deportation order - 2 May 2024 23. On 2 May 2024, the respondent signed a deportation order which was served on the second applicant by letter dated 9 May, 2024, sent by registered post. 9 May 2024 letter enclosing deportation order 24. The 9 May 2024 letter, from the Repatriation Division of the respondent's Department to the second applicant, stated inter alia the following: "Following the refusal to give you a refugee declaration, a subsidiary protection declaration and permission to remain in the State under s.47 and s.49 (4) of the International Protection Act, 2014, the Minister for Justice has now made a deportation order in respect of you . The deportation order is made under s.51 of the International Protection Act, 2015. A copy of the order is enclosed with this letter. In making the deportation order the Minister has satisfied herself that the provisions of s.50(Prohibition of Refoulement) of the International Protection Act, 2015 are complied with in your case. The Minister is also satisfied that s.48(5) (Option to Voluntarily Return to Country of Origin) of the International Protection Act, 2015 does not apply in your case. The deportation order requires you to leave the State and to remain outside the State thereafter. You are obliged to leave the State by 09 th June 2024 . Please advise this office of the travel arrangements that you make to comply with the deportation order. If you do not leave the State by 09 th June 2024 you are liable to be deported and the following requirements under the provisions of s.3(9) (a) (i) of the Immigration Act, 1999 (as amended) must be observed: - You are required to present yourself to the member in charge, booth no. 20, Garda National Immigration Bureau, 13/14 Burgh Quay, Dublin 2 on 03 rd July at 14:50PM to make arrangements for your removal from the State... Please also note that failure to leave the State by 09 th June, 2024 is a failure to comply with a provision of the deportation order. As a result, an Immigration Officer or a member of An Garda Siochana may arrest and detain you without warrant in accordance with s.5(1) of the Immigration Act, 1999 (as amended)..." (emphasis added). 25. There is no suggestion in the evidence that the second named applicant did not receive this letter. On any analysis, this letter put the second applicant 'full square' on notice of the fact that the Minister had made an order to deport him; that he was required to leave the State by 9 June, 2024; in default of which he was liable to be deported; and he was required to present himself to the Garda National Immigration Bureau (the "GNIB"), on 3 July, to make arrangements for his removal from the State. 26. Insofar as the first applicant suggests that the applicants were seeking, or awaiting, advice from a former solicitor, the terms of this letter are unambiguous and did not require legal advice to be understood. 27. Insofar as the applicants or either of them may have believed that entering into marriage would render lawful the second applicant's ongoing residence in the State, there is nothing in this letter, or in any other correspondence from the respondent, which would support such a belief. I make this point in light of the contents of the supplemental affidavit sworn by the first applicant on 15 April 2025 wherein (at para. 6) she avers inter alia : "Had we been informed that proceeding with our marriage while remaining in the State while the revocation request was pending could result in his removal, my husband would have left the State voluntarily, and I would have continued the legal process from Ireland to seek his return lawfully and without a deportation order". 28. Insofar as the applicants or either of them believe that it was " proceeding with " their marriage that resulted in the second applicant's " removal " from the State, they are mistaken. The deportation order was made prior to their marriage and the second applicant was removed from the State on foot of it. In the manner presently discussed in this judgment, the Minister gave due consideration to the applicants' marriage before deciding not to revoke the deportation order. However, that is entirely different to the belief, which the first applicant apparently labours under, that it was the marriage which precipitated the deportation. It was not. This mistaken belief also explains why the first applicant's submissions emphasised, repeatedly, the genuineness of the applicants' relationship and marriage. As I say, the question for this Court is not the genuineness of the applicants' marriage. 29. During the course of oral submissions the first applicant referred, at various points, to discussions with solicitors, including (i) what she says she told them; and (ii) what she says they told her. Without criticising the first named applicant, who is not a legal professional, two points must be made. First, as I pointed out during the hearing, there is a difference between (i) what is said by way of argument in support of a case (i.e. submissions); and (ii) facts which have been sworn to be correct (i.e. evidence). Second, even if the entire of the first applicant's oral submissions had been set out on affidavit and had the quality of evidence - and they were not - the applicant's account of what others are supposed to have said, is not admissible to prove the truth of these statements by third parties. 30. The foregoing 'rule against hearsay' exists to ensure fairness and, as counsel for the respondent pointed out, none of the solicitors to whom the first applicant referred were present in court to hear her account. Thus, there was no opportunity for them to give evidence and this Court had no opportunity to test any competing accounts. 31. For the benefit of the applicants, I want to emphasise that the outcome of this case does not hinge on the foregoing. However it is important to say that this Court is in no position to make any findings of fact as to what advice may or may not have been given to the applicants or either of them by any of their former solicitors. What is perfectly clear, however, is that, at all material times from 26 March, 2024, the second named applicant was aware of the fact that he no longer had any entitlement to remain in the State. 32. Returning to the facts, the 9 May letter to the second applicant also enclosed a (6-page) report of the consideration under s. 50 of the 2015 Act. The second applicant did not present to the GNIB, on 3 July 2024, as required. Decisions not challenged 33. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to note that the second applicant has never challenged the lawfulness of:- · the IPAT decision affirming the recommendation by the IPO that he be given neither refugee status nor a subsidiary protection declaration; · the s. 49(7) review decision refusing him permission to remain in the State; and/or · the deportation order. Request to revoke deportation order - 21 May 2024 34. On 21 May 2024, the applicants' solicitors sought to revoke the deportation order stating: "Dear Repatriation Division Further to the deportation order in the above, we are instructed in the above and attach confirmation of our instructions. The applicant is in an established relationship with his fiancée, [I], a declared refugee (person ID...) We refer to the attached letter from Ms. [I], of even date, together with a copy of Ms. [I] 's refugee status declaration and the declaration of her daughter [Z] (DOB ... 2023) The applicant and Ms. [I] have applied to the Registrar of Marriages for a marriage date and we refer to the enclosed email correspondence. We hereby apply for revocation of the deportation order based on the applicant's established relationship and intended marriage with Ms. [I], a declared refugee. You might please advise if we are required to complete the form 3(11) and criminality declaration. Yours faithfully..." (emphasis added). 35. I pause to say that, up to this point, neither of the applicants had provided the respondent with information concerning (i) the first applicant; (ii) her daughter; (iii) the second applicant's "established relationship with his fiancée", Ms. [I]; and/or (iv) that the applicants intended to marry. 36. Insofar as the relevant 'timeline' is concerned, the foregoing information was provided to the Minister for the first time, on 21 May 2024, being:- · 10 months after the " loving relationship" between the applicants commenced, in July 2023; · 2 months after the second applicant was informed, by letter dated 26 March 2024, that he had no longer any right to remain in the State and that a deportation order would issue if he did not leave the State voluntarily; and · 10 days after the second applicant was served, by letter dated 9 May 2024, with the deportation order, dated 2 May 2024. Form 3(11) 37. On 5 June 2024, the second applicant submitted a 'Form 3(11)' seeking to have the deportation order revoked pursuant to s. 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999. This form included, inter alia , the following questions/answers:- " 3.1 Outline in detail any representations setting out any new or changed circumstances for consideration that were not present when the Minister made the deportation order against you [please support your answer with documentary evidence]. Please see correspondence from my solicitor herewith regarding my relationship with and engagement to [the first named applicant] a declared refugee. 3.2 Outline in detail any circumstances that were present prior to the Minister making the Deportation Order against you, that were not made known to the Minister [please support your answer with documentary evidence]. My relationship with [the first named applicant] and her daughter [named]. 3.3 Please outline in detail why the information you outlined in section 3.2 was not submitted to the Minister as part of any representations made pursuant to section 3(6) of the Immigration Act 1999 i.e. before the Minister made the deportation order against you. [please support your answer with documentary evidence]. I was trying with my partner's help to get a meeting with my ... solicitors to get advice on what I needed to submit to the Minister about my relationship with my partner. Unfortunately, I was never given advice on this before my permission to remain application was refused." "established relationship" with [I] and [Z] 38. The completed Form 3(11) was submitted under cover of a letter from the applicants' solicitors which stated, inter alia :- " We rely in this revocation application on the applicant's established relationship with a declared refugee [I] and her daughter [Z] . We refer to Ms. [I] 's letter in which she details the importance of the relationship for her in recovering from her appalling experiences of abuse in Georgia. Having regard to the very particular circumstances of this case, with special emphasis on Ms. [I] 's recognised refugee status and the nature of her protection claim, based as it was on domestic abuse, it is submitted that it would amount to an unjustified interference in the couple's rights to marry and rights to private and family life (Articles 12 and 8 ECHR, Articles 41 of the Constitution) as well as of their personal rights (Article 40.3 of the Constitution) - and also the private, family and personal rights of [Z] , a minor - to refuse to revoke the deportation order." (emphasis added). 39. The 5 June 2024 submissions by the applicants' solicitors included a typed letter, dated 20 May 2024, from the first named applicant to the Minister which stated, inter alia , the following:- "I was granted refugee status in May of 2023. I confirm that I am engaged to [M] and intend to marry him. [M] and I met each other in December 2021, shortly after I came to Ireland. I was given a place to live in the [named] hotel where [M] was also brought in December 2021. We got to know each other there and became friends. Then [M] was transferred to another address, but we called each other quite often, we met periodically and helped each other in many issues such as translations or filling forms for example for a medical card or social payment etc. This friendship slowly turned into love... From July 2023 we became a couple... Due to communication problems, we could not give you timely information about our relationship , although we have a lot of correspondence in Messenger, for whole months and these two years, as well as photos that I have uploaded on my Facebook page and dated with relevant dates, which prove that [M] and I have been a couple for at least one year..." (emphasis added). Marriage 40. Some 5 months after the making of the deportation order, the applicants married, on 6 November 2024. Exhibit "IB1" to the grounding affidavit includes inter alia a copy of the applicants' marriage certificate, dated 6 November 2024. It records the address of each of the applicants as being the same accommodation centre. However, it is accepted by the first named applicant that this is factually incorrect. It is common case that, at the time of the marriage, the applicants were not residing together. Following the marriage ceremony, the second applicant was arrested and detained pending his removal from the State. In short, the factual position is that the applicants have never resided together, be that prior to or after their marriage. Request for release 41. On 7 November 2024, the applicants' solicitors emailed the respondent Minister, enclosing a copy of the marriage certificate and requested the release of the second applicant from detention, pending the determination of the then outstanding revocation application. 42. By email dated 8 November 2024, the repatriation division of the respondent's Department stated:- "The Minister currently has an ongoing intention to deport and is not of the view, as matters stand, that the marriage per se negates that. On that basis the request for the immediate release of Mr. [M] is refused. The s. 3(11) consideration will examine the detail and timing of the parties' marriage and any rights flowing therefrom in the context of relevant precedent." The decision under challenge 43. On 8 November 2024, the second applicant was issued with a decision affirming the deportation order. The respondent's consideration of the facts and circumstances is set out in a detailed (21-page) document comprising the "Examination of file under section 3(11) of the Immigration Act, 1999 (as amended)" ("the examination of file"). Later in this judgment, I will look closely at the contents of the examination of file, in circumstances where it is this decision of 8 November 2024, refusing to revoke the deportation order, which the applicants seek to quash. These proceedings 44. The within proceedings were issued on 20 November 2024 and, by order made on 22 November 2024 (Cregan J.), the applicants were granted leave to challenge the s. 3(11) decision dated 8 November 2024. At that point, the applicants were granted an interim injunction restraining the deportation of the second applicant, until 25 November 2024, being the return date for a motion on notice. Motion 45. The said motion did not issue but, on 25 November, an extension of time was granted within which to issue a motion returnable for 29 November 2024. The Minister gave an undertaking not to deport the second applicant until 29 November 2024. Injunction 46. On 2 December 2024, Ms. Charlene Sadik, assistant principal officer in the repatriation division of the respondent's department swore an affidavit on the respondent's behalf, for the purpose of opposing the second applicant's application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain his deportation, pending the determination of the within proceedings, which application then stood listed for hearing on 5 December 2024. In that affidavit, Ms. Sadik averred inter alia that: "The Minister has a continuing intention to deport the second applicant on foot of a valid and unchallenged deportation order" (para. 17); "...filing a judicial review challenge to a section 3(11) decision does not automatically suspend the operation of the underlying deportation order" (para. 20); "...the second applicant's permission to remain in the State was granted for the sole purpose of enabling him to apply for international protection. He did so, and for that purpose he had his application considered at first instance and by the Tribunal on appeal. Both forums have found that he is not a person in need of international protection" (para. 21); "The Minister also considered and refused his application for permission to remain at first instance and on review. The second applicant has been issued with a valid deportation order which has not been the subject of any challenge, nor have any of the decisions which preceded it been challenged. He did not present to GNIB as directed and he is classed as an evader. Very shortly after being served with the deportation order the second applicant submitted an application to revoke the deportation order. That application has been given an extensive consideration and the Minister has affirmed the validity of the deportation order. His presence in the State is not required for the prosecution of the challenge to that decision" (para. 22). Withdrawn 47. It is clear from the terms of the order made by this Court (Bolger J.) on 5 December 2024 that the injunction application was, in effect, withdrawn and adjourned 'for mention' to 11 December 2024. An order was also made that both applicants pay to the respondent the costs of the hearing of the matter on 5 December 2024, to be adjudicated in default of agreement. Solicitors come off record 48. On 19 December 2024, the applicants' solicitors issued a motion to come off record, which application was grounded on the affidavit sworn, on 19 December 2024, by Mr. Stevroy Steer, solicitor, who made, inter alia , the following averments:- "3. Leave to seek judicial review was granted by Cregan J. on 25 th November, 2024. Thereafter the matter was listed for mention and ultimately for an interlocutory injunction hearing on 5 th December, 2024. Unfortunately, shortly before the commencement of the said hearing before Bolger J. matters came to light which resulted in me forming the view that the professional relationship and the relationship of trust and confidence between my firm and the applicants had broken down irretrievably. 4. I do not wish to prejudice the applicants in the further prosecution of these proceedings in any way. I regret that my firm cannot, however, continue to represent the applicants in these proceedings, as a result." 49. By order made on 17 January 2025, this Court (Phelan J.) declared that the relevant legal firm had ceased to be the solicitors acting for the applicants in these proceedings. Statement of Opposition 50. A statement of opposition was filed on 25 April 2025 and the relevant affidavit of verification was sworn, on 7 April 2025, by Ms. Sadik. New information 51. In her 7 April 2025 affidavit, Ms. Sadik makes, inter alia , the following averments on behalf of the respondent:- "6. In the course of preparing the injunction application, it came to the respondent's attention that another Georgian national, Mr. G. S., had issued judicial review proceedings (2024/658JR) seeking to challenge a decision of the International Protection Appeals Tribunal. It became apparent that Mr. G. S.'s claim for international protection was based on being in a romantic relationship with the first applicant and that he had come to the State to be reunited with her. 7. Given the seriousness of this matter and the fact that this new information appeared to conflict with the assertions made by Ms. [I] that she has been in a relationship with Mr. [M] since July 2023, correspondence was sent to the applicant's legal advisors by letter dated 5 December 2024, (which was communicated to them prior to the scheduled injunction hearing) to give them an opportunity to respond... 8. Arising from the foregoing, the applicants' legal team decided that they could no longer act for the applicants and this was communicated to Ms. Justice Bolger on 5 December 2024 when the injunction motion was called on for hearing. In the circumstances, the court struck out the injunction application and put the matter in for mention on 11 December 2024... 9. The second applicant was deported from the State on 10 December 2024. 10. The applicants' legal team brought a motion to come off record returnable to the 17 January 2025. On that date, by order of Phelan J., the applicants' legal representatives were permitted to come off record. Since then, the first applicant has acted as a litigant in person despite being given the opportunity to seek alternative legal representation. 11. On 30 January 2025 (and re-sent on 7 February 2025), the first applicant sent an email to the CSSO... enclosing documents seeking to explain her relationship with Mr. GS... 12. With respect to the proceedings G. S. v. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) (High Court Record Number: 2024/658JR) on 17 January 2025, correspondence issued from the CSSO to Mr. G. S.'s legal representative setting out the matters of concern... 14. Notwithstanding what has come to light since December 2024, the first applicant is proceeding with the within challenge to the s. 3(11) decision relating to the second applicant. With respect to the s. 3(11) decision affirming the deportation order made against the second applicant, the Minister has given full consideration to all relevant matters including the applicants' family life rights. The marriage is very recent and was entered into at a time when the parties knew the second applicant was to be deported from the State." 52. Exhibit "CS1" referred to in para. 7 of Ms. Sadik's affidavit comprises a copy of the said letter, dated 5 December 2024, from the CSSO to the applicants' former solicitors, which stated, inter alia , the following:- "On 4 th November 2024, Mr. G. S. was granted Leave to challenge a decision of the IPAT refusing him international protection in the State. [named] Solicitors are his acting solicitors. Mr. G. S. claims that as a result of their relationship, he suffered persecution and harm from her ex-husband. For the purpose of his appeal to the IPAT, Mr. G. S. enclosed a copy of Ms. [I] 's Declaration of Refugee Status dated 17 May 2023 in support of his own application. We note at paragraph 9 of Mr. G. S.'s affidavit, which he swore on 13 th May 2024, he avers: 'On 17 May 2023, my partner, [I], was granted a declaration of refugee status by the Minister for Justice. Like me, she had applied for protection on the basis of her experiences with her former partner.' We also note that it is recorded in the section 35 interview that Mr. G. S. claimed to be in a relationship with Ms. [I] and that he came to Ireland to be reunited with her. It also appears that on 23 May 2022, Ms. [I] contacted the International Protection Accommodation Service (IPAS) stating that a fellow Georgian protection seeker, Mr. G. S., with whom she was in a relationship, had recently entered the State and she requested IPAS that he be accommodated with her. As you will appreciate, this new information appears to conflict with the assertions made by Ms. [I] that she has been in a relationship with Mr. [M] since July 2023. In light of the foregoing, we are giving your client an opportunity to provide her representations with respect to her relationships. We would appreciate if your client would set out a timeline with respect to her relationship with Mr. G. S. and Mr. [M] ..." 53. Exhibit "CS3" to Ms. Sadik's 7 April 2025 affidavit comprises copies of emails sent by the first applicant, on 30 January and 7 February 2025, respectively, seeking to explain her relationship with Mr. G. S. wherein the applicant stated, inter alia "... We broke up in May of 2022 and I have no idea what he was sending after that" . The first applicant swore a supplemental affidavit, on 15 April 2025, wherein she made, inter alia , the following averments with regard to Mr. G. S.:- "When my husband was in prison and State representatives sent us a letter saying that my former partner, Mr G. S., had falsely relied on my refugee status to claim protection in his own proceedings I was shocked as I did not know why and how it happened, as I was sure I did not give any confirmation to him or his solicitors to do so. I was with him to (sic) his solicitor...in September of 2024 and I clearly informed her that we were broken up long time ago and we were not going to have any relationship at all and on the (sic) time, I left her office I was sure she understood what I said to her. I confirm unequivocally that I had no knowledge of his actions and did not consent to the use of my name or identity in that context. Our relationship ended over many years ago, in August of 2022, by his decision. (I've already submitted all the documentation that showed that he was using my name without my permission). Upon learning of this misrepresentation, I took immediate steps to contact his legal representatives and submitted documentation to confirm the timeline of events and disassociate myself from his claim. The Chief State Solicitor's Office and the relevant authorities were informed. As a result, Mr. G. S's judicial review proceedings were struck out, and he is no longer pursuing protection in this State on any basis involving me." (para. 4); "I formally request, in the strongest terms, that the Minister exercise the power under section 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999, which allows for the revocation of a deportation order in light of new facts or circumstances. The existence of our marriage, its lawful notification, the awareness of State authorities and my status as a refugee are such compelling factors." (para. 8) Submissions 54. In advance of the hearing, detailed written submissions were provided by the applicants and respondent, dated 30 April and 12 May 2025, respectively. It is fair to say that the applicants' written legal submissions 'mirror' the applicants' 'pre-leave' submissions dated 22 November 2024, which were prepared at a time when the applicants were represented by solicitors and counsel. Both sides supplemented the foregoing with detailed oral submissions at the hearing and, during this ruling I will refer to the principal submissions made. 3 challenges 55. There are three aspects to the applicants' challenge to the decision, which can fairly be summarised as follows:- (i) The respondent breached the principle of audi alteram partem ; (ii) Errors of fact and law render the decision unlawful; and (iii) The decision to refuse to revoke the deportation order is unlawful given the respondent's failure to consider the rights of the applicants as a married couple, in accordance with law. A decision under s.3(11) 56. Before looking at each of these, in detail, it is necessary to understand the nature of a decision made pursuant to s. 3(11), which sub-section provides that:- "The Minister may by order amend or revoke an order made under this section including an order under this subsection." Broad discretion 57. As the Supreme Court (Fennelly J.) made clear in T. C. & Anor v. The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2005] 4 IR 109 , at 118:- "On its face, this provision confers a broad discretion, to be exercised in accordance with general principles of law, interpreted in light of the Constitution and in accordance with fair procedures. Otherwise, the respondent is at large." Weaker position 58. In addition to the broad discretion conferred on the Minister, the authorities highlight that a person seeking the revocation of a deportation order is in a weaker position than a person for whom no decision to deport has been made. Bearing in mind that the second applicant neither challenged the decision to deport, nor the IPAT decision which preceded it, the following analysis by MacMenamin J. in CRA v. Minister for Justice [2007] 3 IR 603 (" CRA "), at para. [86], is of relevance:- "Where a deportation order has already been made with full consideration given to all matters under s. 3(6) of the Act of 1999, the position of an applicant who makes an application for revocation under s. 3(11) of that Act must perforce be weaker than that of a person against whom only an intention to deport has been formed, where the requirements of s. 3(6) have not yet been considered. The ability of the court to interfere with the Minister's decision under s. 3, generally provided he has complied with his obligations, is limited, particularly where the applicant was a person who had participated in the asylum process. The scope for review by the court of a decision to revoke a deportation order under s. 3(11) is 'if anything, more restricted still' (per O'Neill J, in Dada v. Minister for Justice [2006] IEHC 140 , (Unreported, High Court, O'Neill J., 3 rd May 2006) ." (emphasis added). 59. I pause to say that, in the present case, a deportation order has been made after a full consideration of all matters including all information and submissions made by the second applicant, who participated fully in the process, which included an oral hearing. Unusual, special or changed circumstances 60. With regard to an application under s. 3(11) to revoke a deportation order, MacMenamin J. went on to hold:- " There must be , in the words of Clarke J. in Kouyape v. Minister for Justice [2005] IEHC 380 (Unreported, High Court, Clarke J., 9 th November 2005) ' unusual, special, or changed circumstances'. Furthermore, the test in law must include one further test which is as to whether the material was capable of being presented earlier . To omit this latter aspect might have the effect of actually encouraging delay in the making of an application for humanitarian leave to remain and might permit the approach which was specifically criticised and rejected by Peart J. in Mamyko v. Minister for Justice (Unreported, High Court, Peart J., 6 th November 2003)." (emphasis added). 'Drip-feed' 61. It will be recalled that the first applicant's letter to the Minister, dated 20 May 2024 (which accompanied the 'Form 3(11)' submitted, on 5 June 2024, by the applicants' then solicitors) stated inter alia: " Due to communication problems, we could not give you timely information about our relationship". In objective terms, the foregoing does not explain the failure to submit information sooner. Bearing in mind the first applicant's averments that she and the second applicant met in December 2021 and have been "in a loving relationship... since July 2023" , there is nothing in the evidence before me which prevented the second applicant from disclosing to the Minister, at a much earlier stage: (i) his "established relationship" with the first named applicant; (ii) his "established relationship" with the first applicant's daughter; and (iii) the applicants' intention to marry. It was not until 20 May 2024, as regards (i), and 5 June 2024, regarding (ii) and (iii), that the Minister was given this information for the first time. I take the view that, as a matter of fact, material was submitted for the purpose of the s. 3(11) application which was capable of being presented earlier and the evidence does not disclose any satisfactory reason for why this information was not provided sooner. In short, I am satisfied that, in the present case, there has been a 'drip-feed' of information, in a manner criticised in a range of authorities, to which I now turn. 62. The proposition that it is impermissible to 'drip-feed' information to the Minister which is available at an earlier date, has been made clear in a range of authorities [see Smith v. Minister for Justice [2013] IESC 4 (para. 5.6); KRA and BMA (A Minor) v. Minister for Justice [2016] IEHC 289 (paras. 55 & 58); KRA and BMA (A Minor) v. Minister for Justice [2017] IECA 284 ; JA (Pakistan) v. Minister for Justice [2018] IEHC 343 (para. 20); KM v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2013] IEHC 566 ; Mamyko v. Minister for Justice [2003] IEHC 75 ; and AZ & Ors v. Minister for Justice [2022] IEHC 511 (para. 60)]. 63. At para. 60 of the judgment in AZ & Ors. v. Minister for Justice Phelan J. made reference to the foregoing authorities and stated:- "...it is clear that the Courts have criticised as undesirable a type of 'drip feed' of information where information which could have been communicated earlier is advanced late in the face of impending deportation." 64. In the same decision, Phelan J. echoed the views expressed by MacMenamin J., in CRA, stating:- "Authorities such as C. R. A . and Kouyape , however, proceed on the undoubtedly correct basis that a refused asylum seeker in respect of whom a deportation order has been made starts from a fundamentally weaker position than someone bringing a challenge at an earlier stage because they have no right to be in the State such that their position in the State is weaker in law the further along the process towards effecting deportation they move ." (emphasis added). A deportation order 65. The nature and purpose of a deportation order was explained by Keane J. (as he then was) in DP v. The Governor of the Training Unit, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors [2001] IESC 113 , as follows:- "The deportation order was an order which meant that the applicant was no longer entitled as a matter of law to remain in this country and was further an order which entitled the State to take any necessary steps to ensure that he did not remain in this country . Those are the twin effects of a deportation order..." (emphasis added). 66. In Sivsivadze v. Minister for Justice [2016] 2 IR 403, [2015] IESC 53 (" Sivsivadze "), the Supreme Court (Murray J.) made clear, at para. [37], that the deportation order made in respect of the relevant appellant:- "...was an executive decision within the powers of the State, exercised by the Minister, as authorised by statute, to deny to the... appellant permission to enter or remain in the State . The judicial authorities to which I have referred make it quite clear that no alien has a right to enter or to remain in the State without lawful permission. So an alien who presents himself or herself at a point of entry to the State may be refused leave to land, or if found unlawfully within the State may be deported by order of the Minister on foot of an existing deportation order or a new one. Deporting an alien, such as the... appellant, in those circumstances, is no more than the application of the law and the exercise of sovereign powers to protect the integrity of the borders of the State by refusing permission to land or to stay. It is not in any sense a punishment or sanction , administrative or otherwise." (emphasis added). 67. At para. [52] in Sivsivadze, the Supreme Court identified the proper approach by the Minister to the consideration of a s. 3(11) application, stating: "As is evident from that provision, although a deportation order made pursuant to s. 3 does not contain any limitation period on the duration of the effect of the order, its effect may be brought to an end at any time should the Minister in his discretion consider it appropriate to do so. The making of a decision to amend or revoke a deportation order by the Minister invariably arises on the application of the person the subject of the deportation order. In any event, the Minister, when the occasion arises for him to make a decision as to whether to amend or revoke such an order, is again bound to exercise his statutory power in a manner compatible with the Constitution. This means that he must take into account all relevant factors, including any fundamental rights concerning the family and any right to family life, where relevant, of those directly affected by such an order . As the learned President correctly pointed out in his judgment in the High Court in this case, s. 3(11) is not to be confined to enabling the Minister to amend or revoke a deportation order only when there has been a change of circumstances arising between the time of "the making of the deportation and the time of its implementation" (although any such change in circumstances would, of course, be relevant factors). Similarly, there is nothing in sub-section 11 of s. 3 to suggest that the Minister is confined to making an amendment or revocation of an order under s.3 subsequent to deportation only when there has been a change of circumstances in the situation of the deportee or those affected by the order, such as members of his family. Whenever an application to revoke a deportation order is made the Minister acts having regard to all the pertinent circumstances of the case and, again, a change of circumstances (or the fact of no change of circumstances) may be relevant, but the important point is that the decision is made having regard to all the relevant circumstances as they are at that time. Whether a decision to make a deportation order (or not to revoke one) interferes with a person's fundamental rights depends on the circumstances of the case. More important, whether any such interference is proportionate or disproportionate must depend on the particular circumstances of the case ..." (emphasis added). Not an appeal 68. I pause at this juncture to emphasise the following, for the benefit of the applicants. As the Supreme Court has made clear in Sivsivadze , it is a matter for the Minister to decide whether a deportation order ought to be revoked, or not, based on the Minister's consideration of the individual circumstances of the case and all relevant factors. These proceedings are not an appeal against the decision made by the Minister and this court has no jurisdiction to substitute its views for a lawfully-made decision by the respondent. The "correct" decision 69. I stress the foregoing because, having listened carefully to the oral submissions, made with conviction and obvious emotion, by the first named applicant, it is clear that at the very 'heart' of this case is her belief that the Minister should have made a different decision. As the first applicant put it during oral submissions:- "I think if the Minister will look at the matter one more time, the Minister will make the correct decision" (emphasis added). 70. It is clear that, from her perspective, the only " correct" decision is for the second applicant to be given permission to reside in Ireland, with her. In arguing for this outcome, the first applicant stressed inter alia the following during oral submissions:- (i) theirs is a genuine relationship; (ii) they have been " dating " since July 2023; (iii) they are a "real couple" ; (iv) the first applicant feels " very sad " without the second applicant; (v) she " really needs his support" ; (vi) she had " a very bad experience " in Georgia, due to her former husband; (vii) the second applicant was " the only person who cared about her "; (viii) he " supported" her, both emotionally and financially; (ix) she trusts the second applicant, including with the care of her daughter; (x) the second applicant gives her " motivation "; and (xi) she emphasises that their love and marriage are both genuine. What this case is not about 71. I want to make 'crystal clear' that the issue which this Court is called upon to determine is not whether two people love each other. Nor is this Court asked to determine whether the applicant's marriage was, or was not, entered into with a view to gaining an immigration benefit. The fundamental questing before this Court is whether the decision under challenge was made in a lawful manner. Power 72. The will of the Irish people, as expressed through legislation enacted by the Oireachtas, is that the Minister, not this Court, has the power to make a decision under s. 3(11). Process 73. I emphasise this because, during the course of oral submissions, the first applicant also urged this Court to come to a different decision than the respondent reached, on 8 November 2024. This Court has no power to do what the first applicant seeks. The Court's role in judicial review is to examine the lawfulness of the decision-making process , not the outcome reached by the Minister or merits of the decision. Outcome 74. Despite this reality, the heart-felt submissions made by the first applicant were directed to the merits of the decision and reflected her obvious conviction that the outcome should be different. As a non-lawyer, this is understandable but the strength of her belief that a different decision should be made does not confer on this Court any power to set aside a lawfully-made decision. Prejudice 75. Before proceeding further, I should also note that, during the course of oral submissions, the first applicant indicated that she had made numerous, but unsuccessful, attempts to secure alternative legal representation for the hearing. The first applicant appeared to be concerned that her lack of legal training might prejudice the outcome of this application. I want to assure her of the contrary, for the following reasons. 76. The 'statement of grounds' which articulates the claim was drafted with obvious skill and care, by trained lawyers, at a time when the applicants were represented by solicitors and counsel. The same can be said of the written legal submissions prepared for the 'leave' application, upon which the applicants continue to rely. Furthermore, the outcome of an application for judicial review, such as this, is determined, not on the basis of oral evidence or the manner in which legal submissions are put, but by the application of relevant legal principles to the particular facts. As to the legal principles, the legal submissions prepared for the 'leave stage' identify authorities relied upon and put the applicants' case in clear terms. I have also had the benefit of considering the joint-book of legal authorities as well as written legal submissions from the respondent. As to the facts, they emerge from a consideration of the affidavits exchanged between the parties and, it is fair to say, that there is no material dispute in relation to any of the facts. 77. Having made the foregoing clear, it is appropriate to refer, for the benefit of applicants who are not legally represented, to certain well-established legal principles which apply to judicial review, before looking in some detail at the decision under challenge. In J. W. & Ors. v. The Minister for Justice and Equality & Ors . [2020] IEHC 500 , Mr. Justice Humphreys (at para. 12) helpfully brought together the following principles which the applicants may well be unaware of:- (i) there is a presumption of validity for administrative decisions : per Finlay P., as he then was, in In re Comhaltas Ceoltóirí Éireann (Unreported, High Court, 5th December, 1977) and per Keane J., as he then was, in Campus Oil v. Minister for Industry and Energy (No. 2) [1983] I. R. 88 at 102; (ii) there is a presumption that material has been considered if the decision says so : per Hardiman J. in G. K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2002] 2 I. R. 418, [2002] 1 ILRM 401 ; (iii) the State has a wide discretion in immigration matters : per Keane C. J. for the court in In re Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Bill 1999 [2000] IESC 19 , [2000] 2 IR 360 (paras. 82-83), citing Costello J., as he then was, in Pok Sun Shum v. Ireland [1986] I. L. R. M. 593 at 599; (iv) the common good includes the control of non-nationals , and the normal system of application to enter the State is from outside: per Hardiman J. in F. P. v. Minister for Justice [2002] 1 IR 164 at p. 174; (v) judicial review is not an appeal on the merits and it is not for the court to step into the shoes of the decision maker : per Finlay C. J. in the State (Keegan) v. Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] I. R. 642 at 654; per Denham J., as she then was, in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3 , [2010] 2 IR 701 at 743; and per Clarke J., as he then was (McKechnie and Dunne JJ. concurring), in Sweeney v. Fahy [2014] IESC 50 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 31st July, 2014), at paras. 3.8 to 3.15; (vi) the weight to be given to the evidence is quintessentially a matter for the decisionmaker : per Birmingham J., as he then was, in M. E. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2008] IEHC 192 (Unreported, High Court, 27th June, 2008) at para. 27; (vii) the onus of proof remains on the applicant at all times : per Denham J. [as she then was] in Meadows v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2010] IESC 3 , [2010] 2 IR 701 at 743; (viii) it is not for the applicant to dictate the procedures to be adopted : per Ryan P. (Peart and Hogan JJ. concurring), in A. B. v. The Minister for Justice and Equality [2016] IECA 48 (Unreported, Court of Appeal, 26th February, 2016) at para. 43; (ix) an applicant does not have a legal entitlement to a discursive narrative decision addressing all submissions : per Clarke J., as he then was (Fennelly and MacMenamin JJ. concurring), in Rawson v. Minister for Defence [2012] IESC 26 (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1st May, 2012) at para. 6.9; (x) a judicial review applicant is confined to what is pleaded : while the view of Costello P. regarding the circumstances of amendment of pleadings evolved significantly since McCormack v. Garda Síochána Complaints Board [1997] 2 IR 489 , at 503, his view that the scope of judicial review is limited by the order granting leave remains fundamental; and (xi) a judicial review applicant must plead with specificity : O. 84, r. 20(3) that an "assertion in general terms" is inadequate, but the applicant must "state precisely each such ground, giving particulars where appropriate" . Examination of file 78. The reasons for the respondent's decision not to revoke the deportation order are set out in the 20-page 'examination of file'. Pages 1 and 2 begin with relevant background and, among other things, the following is stated:- "Mr. M provided his address as that of a private accommodation at ... Dublin 8 and has not notified the Minister of any address change since." 79. The address provided by the second applicant to the Minister was not the same as the first applicant's address. As I noted earlier in this judgment, the applicants' marriage certificate records them both as residing at the same accommodation centre, which was not correct. There is no suggestion that the second applicant gave the Minister notice of change of address. It is common case that the applicants did not reside together before or after marriage. 80. It is fair to say that, during the hearing, the focus of the challenge to the decision was on the applicants' marriage and the claim that the Minster failed to consider the rights of the applicants as a married couple. The applicants' written submissions with regard to this challenge begin, as follows: " Grounds (e) 4 and 5 - The Respondent's Consideration of Rights 27. Certiorari is sought as the respondent erred manifestly in law and in fact and acted unreasonably and irrationally in reaching a decision on the application without considering the rights of the applicants in accordance with law. The applicants, as a lawful married couple and family within the meaning of article 41, have constitutionally protected rights and the respondent was obliged to consider and decide the application made to him with due regard for the following right (sic) a. The rights of the applicant to reside in Ireland. b. The rights of the first applicant to marry and found a family. c. Th obligation on the state to guard with special care the institution of marriage. d. The fact that cohabitation the capacity to live together is a natural incident of marriage and the Family and that the refusal of the application will prevent cohabitation in Ireland and make it difficult, burdensome, or even impossible anywhere else for so long as the permission stands refused. 81. The central contention made by the applicants is that the Minister's consideration was inconsistent with the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in the judgment of O'Donnell J. (as he then was) in Gorry v. Minister for Justice [2020] IESC 55 (" Gorry "). 82. Keeping the foregoing in mind, internal p. 2 of the examination of file records that representations were received from the solicitors on record for Mr. [M] seeking to revoke the deportation order. This is followed by the Minister's consideration, under a range of headings, the first being: "Correspondence/Representations submitted for consideration under section 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999 (as amended)" . 83. From pp. 2 to 4, inclusive, representations made by or on behalf of the applicants are set out accurately and engaged with fully. These include (i) representations dated 20 May 2024 and 5 June 2024 sent by email by the applicants' solicitors; (ii) the enclosures comprising of the 20 May 2024 letter from Ms. [I]; emails of 2 April and 16 May 2024 from the Marriage Registrar to Ms. [I]; the refugee status declarations of Ms. [I] and her daughter [Z] dated 17 May 2023; and (iii) representations received by email on 7 November 2024 from the applicants' solicitors to the effect that "In circumstances where the applicant's wife is a declared refugee, there cannot reasonably be a concluded intention to deport the applicant and accordingly we request that he be released pending a determination of the outstanding revocation application" . 84. The examination of file also notes the submissions made by email on 7 November 2024 by the first applicant, stating:- "...she claims, inter alia, great upset and distress at the arrest of Mr. [M] following their marriage ceremony. It is pleaded on her behalf and on behalf of their daughter that Mr. [M] not be returned to Georgia because 'I don't know who (sic) to live without him'." 85. The respondent also noted a submission by the applicants' legal representative to the effect that "...persecution of the applicant's wife (and/or child) constitutes a threat to the life of freedom of the applicant and/or inhuman or degrading treatment of the applicant within the meaning of s. 50 IPA and that accordingly deportation would breach the Minister's obligation with respect to non-refoulment" . 86. At p. 4, it was recorded, accurately, that the representations fell to be considered pursuant to s. 3(11) and it was stated, inter alia , that: "All documentation and information received by and on behalf of Mr. [M] in support of his revocation request has been read and fully considered." I pause to say that the significance of the foregoing statement is clear, given the principle established in G. K. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform , to which I referred earlier. In the manner presently discussed, the foregoing was not simply a 'formulaic' statement. Rather, the very careful consideration given by the respondent is entirely obvious from any objective reading of the decision as a whole. The examination of file proceeded to state, inter alia , the following:- "Mr. [M] initially requested the Minister to revoke the Deportation Order made against him on 2 nd May 2024 on the basis of an established relationship with Ms . [I] and on the basis of personal and family rights; it was represented that to refuse to revoke the deportation order would amount to an unjustified interference in the couple's rights to marry (the parties have legally married which renders this submission now moot) and rights to private and family life (Articles 12 and 8 ECHR, Article 41 of the Constitution) as well as of their personal rights (Article 40.3 of the Constitution) - and also the private, family and personal rights of [Z], a minor. It is contended that Mr. [M] 's intended (and newly acquired) marital status merits consideration in this regard." 87. There followed a reference to a range of authorities including Kouaype v. Minister for Justice [2005] IEHC 380 , para. 4.12; KRA v. Minister for Justice (No. 1) [2016] IEHC 289 ; Smith & Ors v. Minister for Justice (Unreported, Supreme Court, 1 February 2013); and KRA and OEA (A Minor suing by his Mother and Next Friend CRA) v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] 3 IR 603 (per MacMenamin J. at para. 87). There is no suggestion that the decision-maker misdirected themselves in relation to the proper approach to a s. 3(11) application. 88. At the foot of internal p. 5, and throughout pp. 6 and 7, there is a consideration of the application in light of Articles 40 and 41 of the Constitution. It should be emphasised, however, that the case made by the applicants takes no issue with the Minister's consideration of the applicants' personal and private rights. Following a careful analysis, the decision-maker came to the view that "...no special circumstances exist as regards Mr. [M] 's private life/association/autonomy which prevails over the State's interests in controlling its borders" and that "...a decision by the Minister to affirm the deportation order in respect of Mr. [M] does not constitute a breach of the right to respect for his personal rights under Article 40 of the Constitution" . 89. Pages 8 to 10, inclusive, contain a detailed analysis under the heading "Married couple/Family life (including a minor child)" . Having accurately summarised the relevant submissions and background facts, the decision proceeded as follows:- "I acknowledge that the parties are now legally married in the State, having done so in a civil ceremony at the Registrar's Office in Dublin 2 on 6 th November 2024. It was not submitted until the receipt of the parties' marriage certificate of even date if Ms. [I] divorced from her husband and was eligible to be married in this State. A copy of the parties' marriage certificate has now been provided which records her civil status as 'divorced'. It is accepted that the couple constitute a family within the meaning of Article 41 of the Constitution. It is recognised that a decision affecting the lives of a married couple in a fundamental way demands close scrutiny and requires justification under the Constitution. The Minister's decision must set out the matters and considerations which are considered to justify an outcome which may impact on a married couple and family." 90. I pause to say that the foregoing approach reflects the guidance given by the Supreme Court in Gorry . The examination of file continued, as follows: "Mr. [M] 's file was examined on the 26 th March, 2024 whereby a Review of the decision not to grant him permission to remain in the State was conducted. This decision included a limited consideration of his case based on the limited information provided by Mr. [M] pertaining to his family life and relationship at that time. Thereafter, on the 2 nd May, 2024, Mr. [M] became the subject of a deportation order". (emphasis added). 91. In the manner examined earlier in this judgment, the foregoing accurately describes the applicants' failure to provide, until after a deportation order had been made, information which was available in advance of that, concerning the relationships in question, which information he relied upon when seeking the revocation of the deportation order. The analysis proceeded to state: " On the 20 th May, 2024, it is submitted by Mr. [M] 's solicitors that he is in an established relationship since July 2023 and was engaged, intending to be married. In Ms. [I] 's letter of May 2024, she confirms their relationship commenced in July 2023, the couple having met in December, 2021. It is not stated when the parties became engaged. It is not submitted that the parties are cohabiting. Following the arrest and detention of Mr. [M] it is now recorded on the marriage certificate that both parties reside at ... accommodation centre... A non-citizen does not have a right to reside in Ireland and does not acquire such a right by marriage to an individual with stamp 4 permission to reside in the State. However, the State is required to have regard to, and to respect, cohabitation by a married couple in its decision-making. The State is not obliged by the requirement to protect the institution of marriage to accord any automatic immigration status consequent on a marriage or establishment of a long-term relationship." 92. I pause, once more, to observe that the foregoing analysis is entirely consistent with the principles outlined in Gorry [see, in particular, paras 63 to 75, inclusive of the judgment under the heading " VII. The Significance of Marriage "]. From the middle of page 9 of the examination of file, the analysis continued as follows: "A decision to make a deportation order in respect of Mr. [M], after appropriate consideration of the facts, is not invalid merely because it affects the spouses' desire to cohabit in Ireland and it would be more difficult to live together in another country. The parties met at a time when both the status of Mr. [M] and Ms. [I] (and her daughter) was precarious. The parties, by their own admissions contained within 'became a couple' in July 2023 at a time when the status of Mr. [M] was precarious; family life was created at a time when the status of Mr. [M] was precarious. Thereafter, Mr . [M] became the subject of a deportation order on the 2 nd May, 2024 and he was notified of the making of a deportation order. It was a choice for Mr . [M] to enter into a marriage in the State in the full knowledge that a deportation order had been made in his name. The parties became married in full knowledge and awareness that Mr. [M] was the subject of an extant deportation order." 93. The foregoing analysis is factually accurate. Guided by the principles articulated in Gorry , it seems to me that this was precisely the type of assessment which the respondent was entitled, indeed obliged, to conduct. The analysis continued as follows: "It is accepted that the best interests of [Z] are a relevant consideration. However, this has to be balanced against the overall public interest and the particular facts of the case. I acknowledge that Mr. [M] commenced involvement in the child's life from as early as July 2023 when the parties submit they commenced their relationship and I acknowledge the submission that the child has no relationship with her father. There is no information presented that the parties reside together as a family unit. It has been verified by Repatriation Division, with IPAS, that Ms. [I] resides with her daughter in [location] that Mr. [M] does not. Without information to the contrary, it is reasonable to accept that Ms. [I] has acted as primary carer for her daughter since her birth and continues to do so. I have considered the rights of [Z] noting that the welfare of the dependant child are a primary consideration. Save for limited assertions in Ms. [I] 's letter of support, there is no verifiable evidence presented to demonstrate that Mr. [M] has any level of involvement in the life of Ms. [I] 's eleven-year old daughter such that would render a decision to affirm the extant deportation order detrimental to the child's welfare. No information has been put forward to suggest that [Z] 's welfare would be negatively affected by the deportation of Mr. [M]. Although the rights of the family and the dependent child are a primary consideration, it is considered that in the particular circumstances of the case, the child's best interest are outweighed by the rights of the State. All factors relating to the position and rights of the family/couple has been considered and these have been considered against the rights of the State. In weighing these rights, it is submitted that the factors relating to the rights of the State are weightier than those factors relating to the rights of the family/couple. In weighing these rights, it is submitted that a decision to make a deportation order in respect of Mr. [M] is not disproportionate as the State has the right to uphold immigration law and ensure the economic well-being of the country . (sic?) Therefore, it is submitted that a decision by the Minister to affirm a deportation order in respect of Mr. [M] is not in breach of the family rights under Article 41, Article 42, or Article 42A and 42A no. 1 of the Constitution, extending to him and/or his family, as outlined and considered above." (emphasis added) . 94. The foregoing was a finding which was open to the respondent to make. The Minister plainly conducted a proportionality exercise which involved a careful consideration of the applicants' rights. The applicants have not established that there is any error of fact or law in the respondent's decision making process. For the sake of completeness, I should note at this juncture that there has been no challenge to the manner in which the respondent considered the rights of the minor , Ms. [Z]. The careful analysis by the respondent did not end there, however. 95. From the bottom of page 10, the examination of file proceeded to set out a " Consideration under S.3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 having regard to Article 8 ECHR". a HaH Having cited Article 8, the respondent considered the right to respect for private life and the relevant assessment is set out between pages 11 and 12, inclusive. In these proceedings the applicant raised no issue with the respondent's assessment of private life rights. In the manner explained in the examination of file, it was " ...not accepted that any exceptional circumstances arise such that would render this decision to affirm the extant deportation order a breach of Article 8". 96. Pages 13 to 19, inclusive, comprise a most comprehensive analysis of the right to respect for family life under Article 8(1). Having accurately set out the relevant factual background and made reference to the various submissions, including a summary of the points made by the first applicant in her typed letter dated 20 May 2024, the following was stated from the bottom of internal page 14, onwards: "Due to his relationship with his spouse, it is accepted that a decision to make a deportation order in respect of Mr. [M] will constitute an interference with the right to respect for his family life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR. However, it is noted that his family life was created at a time when the status of Mr. [M] was precarious and in full knowledge that his deportation was a realistic prospect. I acknowledge that the couple are married at the instant consideration. However, the relationship commenced in July 2023, the couple having met in December 2021 as set out in the letter submitted by Ms . [I]. It is not stated when the parties became engaged. It is not submitted that the parties are cohabiting. Following the arrest and detention of Mr. [M] representations have been received by email dated the 7 th November, 2024 from [named] Solicitors confirming his marriage to Ms. [I] in the State on the 6 th November, 2024. A copy of the parties' marriage certificate has been provided which records that the parties married at the registrar's office in Dublin 2. It further records that Ms. [I] is a [job title] and her civil status is 'divorced'. It is now recorded on the marriage certificate that both parties reside at ... accommodation centre... though no such change of address for Mr. [M] was ever notified to the Minister despite there being a legal obligation to do so. It is not accepted that the parties are currently cohabiting." 97. There was no error of fact in the analysis, which continued by noting that the parties met at a time when their status was precarious; the applicants became a couple when the status of the second applicant was precarious; and the family life was created at this time, all of which is correct. The decision maker went on to note that: " The parties became married in full knowledge and awareness that Mr. [M] was the subject of an extant deportation order and that the possibility of their residing together in [the] future was aspirational given her refugee status and his deportation order". 98. The consideration of the right to respect for family life continued, as follows:- "It is recognised that a decision affecting the lives of a married couple in a fundamental way demands close scrutiny and requires justification. The Minister's decision must set out the matters and considerations which are considered to justify an outcome which may impact on a married couple and family. A non-citizen does not have a right to reside in Ireland and does not acquire such a right by marriage. However, in its decision-making, the State is required to have regard to, and to respect, co-habitation by a married couple. The State is not obliged by the requirement to protect the institution of marriage to record any automatic immigration status consequent on a marriage or establishment of a long-term relationship. A core aim of the Minister in controlling the entry, exit and residence of foreign nationals in the State is to maintain social order and to protect the fundamental rights of citizens and the integrity of the State. Mr. [M] has remained in the State without the permission of the Minister since the 9 th June 2024 which was the date set down for Mr. [M] to have left the State. In weighing the rights of Mr. [M] against those of the State, it is submitted that a decision to make a deportation order in respect of Mr. [M] is not disproportionate as the State has the right to uphold the integrity of the immigration system subject to international agreements and to ensure the economic well-being of the State. It is submitted that having considered the overall facts of the facts. The factors relating to the rights of the State are weightier than those factors relating to the rights of the individual family. A majority of the Supreme Court held in Gorry that there was no prima facie constitutionally protected right to co-habit in the State for marital couples (though in that case it related to a marriage to an Irish citizen). It is useful to apply the rationale used in Gorry in this case by way of analogy replacing the Irish Citizen aspect with that of the fact that the applicant's wife is a recognised refugee in the State. However, it was held that in making a decision on an application to revoke a deportation order in such circumstances, the Minister was required to have regard to: (a) the right of an Irish citizen to reside in Ireland (in this case a refugee); (b) the right of an Irish citizen (refugee) to marry and found a family; (c) the obligation on the State to guard with special care the institution of marriage; and (d) the fact that cohabitation is a natural incident of marriage and the family and that deportation will prevent cohabitation in Ireland and may make it difficult, burdensome, or even impossible anywhere else for so long as the deportation order remains in place." 99. I pause to say that the respondent made no error of fact and had regard to relevant considerations when conducting a careful analysis. Contrary to the applicants' assertions, the Minister's analysis was guided by and consistent with the principles articulated in Gorry. From the bottom of p. 16, the decision continued, as follows:- "(a) The right of a refugee to reside in Ireland: It is recognised that Ms. [I] is entitled to reside in Ireland, but her right to continue to reside in the State remains unaffected by the deportation order issued to her husband. Ms. [I] originally arrived to the State and claimed international protection and was granted international protection viz-a-viz her country of origin Georgia. Clearly, as a refugee, she and her husband cannot be expected to contemplate residing in Georgia together, however, they were aware of that fact when they were engaged to be married and chose nonetheless to enter into their marriage. They were also aware of the fact that Mr. [M] had a deportation order and would be unable to reside in Ireland. (b) The right of the refugee to marry and found a family: Ms. [I] 's right to marry is unrestricted, as is her right to found a family. Ms. [I] has in fact already full exercised her right to marry in marrying Mr. [M] and the State has not interfered with that right. Mr. [M] was on notice since 26 March 2024 of the fact that he would receive a deportation order. As such, when he and Ms .[I] married on 6 November 2024, they did so in possession of that knowledge and in the knowledge that there was a distinct possibility that Mr. [M] would be deported from the State to Georgia during their marriage and that they would have to face the prospect of living apart or that their married life may have to be outside of Ireland should they wish to cohabit as a married couple. (c) The obligation on the State to guard with special care the institution of marriage: The State has not infringed its obligation in this regard in the context of this case and no assertions have been made by the applicant that the State's obligations have been neglected. (d) The fact that cohabitation is a natural incident of marriage and the family and that deportation will prevent cohabitation in Ireland and may make it difficult, burdensome or even impossible anywhere else for so long as the deportation order remains in place: While it is accepted that cohabitation may be a natural incident of marriage and that deportation will prevent cohabitation, the circumstances which prevail in relation to Mr . [M] and Ms .[I] is that they currently do not reside together. Both gave [named accommodation centre] as their place of residence, for the purposes of their marriage, to the Registrar but this is not a fact that is verified for the purpose of the registration of a marriage. It has been verified by Repatriation Division that Mr . [M] has not been residing in [accommodation centre] to date, that only Ms . [I] and her daughter reside there. In the event of Mr . [M] 's deportation to Georgia, it is open to Ms. [I] to naturalise as an Irish citizen, something she is eligible to apply for at the end of November 2024 and, as an Irish citizen, could move to any other European country with her husband and reside there pursuant to EU Treaty Rights. It has not been submitted that it would either be difficult, or burdensome or impossible for the married couple to cohabit elsewhere in those circumstances. This would involve a short period of separation." 100. The applicants' claims that the respondent (i) breached the audi alteram partem principle; and (ii) erred in fact or law, are made with reference to the last paragraph which I have quoted. As put in the applicants' written legal submissions:- " Ground (e) 2. - Audi Alteram Partem 22. The respondent determined the case before her on the basis that, at the end of November 2024, the first applicant could " naturalise as an Irish citizen " and could move to " any other European country with her husband " which would " involve only a short period of separation ". The respondent acted in breach of fair procedures in making findings on the basis of speculation as to possible future acquisition by the first applicant of Irish citizenship through naturalisation, without having put the applicants on notice of this intended finding and inviting submissions to be made in respect of same, in circumstances where it could not reasonably have been foreseen by the applicants that the respondent would engage in speculation/conjecture of this nature in considering the application to revoke the deportation order in respect of the second applicant... ... Ground (e) 3. - Errors of Fact and Law 25. In determining the case before her on the basis that, at the end of November, 2024, the first applicant could " naturalise as an Irish citizen " and could move to " any other European country with her husband " which would involve only a " short period of separation " the respondent erred in law and/or fact and or took into account irrelevant considerations and/or failed to take into account relevant considerations. The first applicant has no entitlement to naturalisation but may only apply to the respondent to exercise her discretion to grant the certificate of naturalisation. Furthermore, the average processing time for an application for naturalisation is 19 months. In addition, the granting of an application for naturalisation, the acquisition of citizenship and indeed a passport invariably entail further delays. In the event that the first applicant is granted a certificate of naturalisation, this does not confer an untrammelled right to reside in any other European country with her husband but rather is dependent on her being able to meet the qualifying criteria prescribed by directive 2004/58 EC. In the premise the respondent erred manifestly in law and in fact and acted unreasonably and irrationally in arriving at this conclusion and the decision was invalid and/or disproportionate." 101. Several observations seem appropriate. First, it is incorrect for the applicants to suggest that the application to revoke the deportation order was "determined" on the "basis" suggested. The applicants have taken a single paragraph from a 21- page decision and contend, incorrectly, that the reasoning in that paragraph alone was the basis for the decision. It was not. The decision must be read as a whole and doing so demonstrates the Minister's consideration of a wide range of relevant factors, including, all information and submissions furnished by or on behalf of the applicants; their rights; and the legitimate interests of the State. 102. As Mr. Justice MacMenamin held (at para. 82) in CRA : - " Section 3 is not an interactive process . The requirements of natural justice and the statutory requirements are satisfied once the respective deportee has been afforded an opportunity to make submissions and these submissions have been considered by the Minister..." (emphasis added). 103. More recently, in P. O. v The Minister for Justice [2015] 3 IR 164, the Supreme Court (MacMenamin J.) made the following clear: "[16] What is involved in making decisions of this type is not a policy decision, but rather involves the exercise of a margin of appreciation relating to the facts of individual cases. As has been pointed out in a number of High Court authorities, the Minister, in considering an application under s.3(11), the Minister has two duties. She must consider carefully and fairly the reasons put forward for revocation. She must also verify that there has been no change in circumstances since the making of the deportation order, either insofar as concerns the applicants, or the situation in the country of origin, which would bring into play any of the statutory prohibitions for the return of a failed asylum seeker to the country of origin. There is no obligation to embark on a new investigation or inquiry, or to enter into an exchange of observations or replies with an applicant ." (emphasis added). 104. In M. E. O. v Minister for Justice [2012] IEHC 394 (" MEO ") Mr. Justice Cooke considered a challenge to a deportation order in which one of the pleaded grounds was that: - "The specialised material relied upon by the Minister ought to have been disclosed to the applicant in advance in compliance with fair procedures". 105. At para. 91, the learned judge stated: "The complaint is made that some of the sources consulted by the Minister were available only on subscription. In the judgment of the Court that fact of itself does not give rise to an obligation to put such material to an applicant for comment. It all depends on the content and effect of the information in relation to the assertions made in the representations... In the judgment of the Court, in the absence of reliance upon particular material which contradicts any specific and essential statement of fact relied upon by the applicant which is pertinent to the applicant's personal situation or condition, there is no obligation upon the respondent to enter into consultation with an applicant or to give advance notice for the purpose of comment or rebuttal of publicly accessible material of this general character, intended to be relied upon in setting out the grounds for rejection of representations and for making a deportation order. (See in that regard the judgment of Finlay-Geoghegan J. in Muresan v Minister for Justice & Others ; [2004] 2 I. L. R. M 364 and by analogy the judgment of this Court in A. A. [Iraq] v. Minister for Justice & Others [2012] IEHC 222 )." (emphasis added). 106. It seems to me that the principles outlined in MEO , in the context of a challenge to a deportation order, must apply with equal force to a challenge to the refusal to revoke a deportation order under s.3(11) of the 1999 Act. I take this view in circumstances where, as touched on earlier, the authorities make clear that an applicant under s.3(11) is in a weaker position than the applicant in M. E. O . On this point, it is useful to return to the judgment of MacMenamin J. in CRA, wherein the learned judge stated: - "[79] The status of a person who has failed to secure a declaration of refugee status and who makes representations to the Minister was described by Hardiman J. in the Supreme Court in F. P. v Minister for Justice [2002] 1 IR 164 , at p.172 as being: - "... Persons whose application for asylum had been rejected at first instance and on appeal. They lacked any entitlement to remain in the country save that deriving from the procedures they were operating i.e. a right to await a decision on a request not to be deported..." Their position is therefore weaker in law than prior to such determination ." (emphasis added). 107. To note, entirely correctly, that the applicant would soon enjoy the right to apply to naturalise as an Irish citizen was not an error of fact. Contrary to the applicants' written submissions, the respondent did not state that the second applicant had an entitlement to naturalisation. On the contrary, with regard to naturalisation, the phrase used by the Minister was: "something she is eligible to apply for at the end of November 2024" (emphasis added). 108. Furthermore, the criteria for naturalisation, can be found in publicly-available legislation and, as the applicants were well aware, on the internet, where information regarding processing times can also be found. The Minister did not reach the decision on the basis of any erroneous finding that naturalisation was a right, or would be secured in a specific timeframe. For understandable reasons, the applicants' submissions do not acknowledge that, later in the same decision (internal page 19) the Minister states the following: "...in the longer term Ms. [I] may naturalise..." (emphasis added). The reality that the relevant information was publicly available to the applicants is illustrated by the fact that exhibit 'IB2' to the grounding affidavit comprises a 'print-out' of information from the respondent's website, on the topic of becoming an Irish citizen by naturalisation, which the first applicant 'down-loaded'. 109. Even if I am entirely wrong in the view that the potential naturalisation of the first applicant within a relatively short timeframe was not the basis for the decision, in light of the principles articulated in this Court's decisions in CRA and MEO, and in the Supreme Court's judgment in PO, I am satisfied that there was no duty on the respondent, in advance of coming to the decision, to put the applicants 'on notice' of and to invite submissions on, the question of the first applicant's future naturalisation/the time a naturalisation application may take, which information was publicly available to the applicants. 110. I take a similar view in relation to the element of the Minister's reasoning wherein the respondent observed that "as an Irish citizen" the first applicant "could move to any other European country with her husband and reside there pursuant to EU Treaty rights. It has not been submitted that it would be either difficult, or burdensome or impossible for the married couple to cohabit elsewhere in those circumstances. This would involve a short period of separation". It is not in dispute that, were the first applicant to become a naturalised Irish citizen, it would be open to her to move to other countries as the decision accurately stated. The free movement rights enjoyed by citizens of the European Union is publicly known. Furthermore, and importantly, it is a matter of fact that no submission or evidence was proffered, by or on behalf of either of the applicants, that it would be difficult, burdensome or impossible for them to cohabit elsewhere as a married couple (i.e. in a 3 rd party country other than Ireland or Georgia). 111. It will also be recalled that, during his interview on 11 August 2022 pursuant to s.35(12) of the 2015 Act, at which the second applicant had the benefit of an interpreter, he provided the following information: "Q. 45 - In the questionnaire you stated that you travelled to different countries in the world due to your work. Where did you go and when? - I went to most European countries except Australia, U. S. between 2004 and 2020 . ... Q.50 - In the S.13 interview you stated that after leaving Georgia in November 2021 you went to Poland, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Netherlands and the U. K. You also stated that you remained in each country for a couple days (sic) before moving on. Have you applied for international protection in any of these countries? – All those countries are part of the Schengen area and Georgians do not need visas there. That is why I did not ask for protection ." (emphasis added). 112. On the second applicant's account he has travelled, over the course of many years, to most European countries without the need for any visa. During the course of oral submissions at the hearing, the first applicant suggested that her husband would only be able to reside in such countries for a maximum of 3 months at a time. It is important to make 3 points in relation to this submission. 113. First, these proceedings are a challenge to the decision made by the Minister. The applicants did not proffer any evidence or submissions which the Minister failed to consider appropriately when coming to the decision. On the contrary, as the examination of file noted, entirely accurately: " It has not been submitted that it would either be difficult, or burdensome or impossible for the married couple to cohabit elsewhere...". 114. Second, although the first applicant made oral submissions to the effect that the second applicant could only reside in a range of 3 rd party countries (i.e. neither Georgia, nor Ireland) for a maximum of 3 months at a time, she provided no evidence to support this submission. 115. Third - and leaving aside the absence of any evidence as to the factual situation, and leaving aside the question of whether the first applicant's oral submission is consistent with the information given by the second applicant during his s. 35, interview - if, as the first applicant submits, the second applicant can reside in 3 rd party countries for up to 3 months at a time, it suggests that family life in countries other than Georgia or Ireland is possible, albeit difficult, or burdensome. During the course of oral submissions, the first applicant made clear that this is not the type of family life she wants. That may be so, but it does not render the Minister's decision unlawful, in my view. 116. In short, the applicants have not established either a breach of the audi alteram partem principle; or that the Minister erred in fact or in law or acted unreasonably/irrationally in arriving at the decision. Bearing in mind that the third aspect of the applicants' challenge is an alleged failure to consider the applicants' rights in accordance with law, the Minister's careful analysis of relevant factors proceeded (from the bottom of internal p. 17 of the decision) as follows:- "In Gorry O'Donnell J. stated: 'I do not agree that there is a right to cohabit in Ireland . Nor is the decision to cohabit in Ireland within the exclusive authority of the Family. It adds little except confusion, therefore, to speak of a right to decide to cohabit in Ireland. Even if there is a right, or such a decision is within the authority of the Family, then there is a clear difference between the decision and its implementation.'" 117. I pause to say that the foregoing is a verbatim quote from para. 22 of the Gorry decision and illustrates the detailed assessment conducted by the Minister, with reference to the relevant legal principles. Quoting, verbatim from para. 74 of Gorry , the examination of file continued as follows:- "Nevertheless, in the context of immigration, when it is asserted on credible evidence that the consequences of a decision is that the exercise of a citizen's right to reside in Ireland will mean not just inability to cohabit in Ireland with a spouse to whom that person is validly married and where, moreover, it may be extremely burdensome to reside together anywhere else, it would fail to have regard to and respect for the institution of Marriage not to take those facts into account and give them substantial weight..." 118. Applying the foregoing principles to the facts in this case: (i) the applicants did not furnish the respondent with credible evidence that it would be extremely burdensome to reside together elsewhere; (ii) there was no failure on the part of the respondent to take any facts into account; and (iii) the Minister did not fail to have regard to, and respect for, the applicants' marriage, when conducting a careful analysis of the application to revoke the deportation order, part of which included the consideration of the applicants' rights, in particular, as a married couple. Quoting further from para. 74 of the Gorry judgment, the decision under challenge continued as follows:- " ' The length and durability of the relationship may also be a factor since it tends to remove the possibility that the marriage is one directed in whole or in part to achieving an immigration benefit, and at the same time reduces the risk that any permission will establish a route to circumvent immigration control...' When this reasoning is applied by analogy to the facts of Mr. [M]'s and Ms. [I]'s marriage, it is clear the couple cannot reside in Georgia in light of her refugee status, however they were aware of this and the fact of his imminent deportation when they entered into the marriage. As for the length and durability of the marriage, it is correct to say that the marriage is a new one. Mr. [M] was notified in March 2024 that he would be receiving a Deportation Order. His Deportation Order was signed on 2 nd May 2024, they notified their intention to marry on 10 th June, the parties were interviewed by the HSE on 29 th October and they married some days later. It is therefore not possible "to entirely remove the possibility that the marriage is one directed in whole or in part to achieving an immigration benefit". No weight can therefore be attributed to the length of the marriage in this instance in weighing whether the parties' family rights are infringed." (emphasis added). 119. In the foregoing manner, the Minister engaged in precisely the kind of careful assessment which the Supreme Court suggested in Gorry. There was no error of fact in the analysis, nor was it vitiated by error of law. In light of the respondent's reference to "weighing" matters, it is important to recall the principle articulated in M. E. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal, referred to earlier in this judgment. For the benefit of the applicants, who are not lawyers, this Court has no power to tell a decision-maker who, as in this case, has taken account of all relevant factors and ignored none, that they should have given more, or less, weight to one or more of those factors. That would be to usurp the role of the decision-maker. It would be for this court to exceed its jurisdiction. 120. It is fair to say that much of the first applicant's oral submissions were to the effect that her relationship with the second applicant is a genuine and loving one, with their romantic relationship going back to July 2023. Her submissions included:- - It is true the marriage was after the deportation order; - But our relationship was not new; - Our relationship started a long time ago; - It was just a natural next step to get married. 121. The first applicant also submitted, inter alia , that, although not her first marriage, it was the second applicant's first marriage. She also referred to his plans for where they would marry, submitting, inter alia , that "His dream was to go to see the Northern Lights" , also submitting that a Georgian national did not need a visa to travel to Iceland. The first applicant submitted that "Our marriage was already planned" , albeit in a different way. 122. What I took from her submission is that, at some unidentified point, but prior to the making of the deportation order, the applicants had already decided to marry and intended to make a trip to see the Northern Lights, but accelerated their plans to marry after the deportation order issued. In oral submissions, the first applicant also conveyed the impression that the decision to marry more quickly than originally intended was made following discussions with a solicitor. In the manner touched on earlier, there is simply no evidence before the Court on the question of what advice was, or was not, given to the applicants or either of them. 123. Returning to the analysis by the decision-maker, the respondent was entirely correct to say that "The marriage is a new one" and the applicants have not established any legal error in the manner in which the Minister considered and weighed the evidence. There was no error of fact, or law, in the Minister's statement that it was not possible to " entirely " remove the possibility that the marriage was one directed in whole or in part to achieving an immigration benefit. Indeed, it would seem from the first applicant's oral submissions that the applicants believed that their marriage would prevent the deportation of the second applicant. 124. It was also clear from the first applicant's oral submission that she believes the position to be as follows: (i) my marriage to the second applicant is a genuine one ; (ii) the Court should make such a finding ; and (iii) on foot of the Court's finding that the marriage is genuine, the second applicant should be allowed to remain in Ireland . 125. With respect, this is to misunderstand both the role of this Court and, indeed, of the decision-maker. The question in these proceedings is not whether, or not, the applicants entered into a 'marriage of convenience' (as defined in Regulation 28 of the Irish European Communities (Free Movement of Persons) Regulations 2015 (SI 5484/2015) ("the 2015 Regulations"). The question for this Court is whether the Minister's decision to refuse to revoke the deportation order was made lawfully. Nor did the Minister make a finding of a marriage of convenience. Rather, the Minister carefully looked at all relevant factors including the length of the marriage, in the context of coming to a decision as to whether to revoke, or not, the deportation order. 126. Returning to the decision itself, the examination of file continued (from the bottom of internal p. 18), as follows:- "O'Donnell J. further stated in Gorry : 'More difficult again is the type of situation which might be said to present itself in the facts of the Gorry case. It may be said, in some cases, that the provision refusing entry may have the effect of preventing a married couple from cohabiting since Ireland is the only country where that can, as a matter of law or fact, occur and is, moreover, the home of one of the parties. There may be many reasons why a couple may not be able to cohabit, or to do so as, or where, they may like, and that may be a consequence of the marriage they have made. The parties remain married and it does not fail to respect that institution or protect it if cohabitation is made more difficult, or even impossible, by a decision of the State for a good reason....' The fact that Mr. [M] and Ms. [I] may be required to reside elsewhere other than Ireland in the event that he is deported, where there is no evidenced impediment to do so, is not a failure of the State authorities to respect the institution of marriage or indeed their marriage. The facts that: The marriage was a short one, the couple do not have an unqualified right to reside in Ireland, the possibility of contemplation of an immigration advantage cannot be entirely removed and in the longer term Ms. [I] may naturalise leading to the possibility of residence elsewhere, all lead to a conclusion that the parties' family rights pursuant to Article 41 of the Constitution will not be breached by the refusal to revoke the deportation order. Save for limited assertions in Ms. [I]'s letter of support for Mr. [M], there is no evidence presented to demonstrate that Mr. [M] has any level of involvement in the life of Ms. [I]'s 11-year-old daughter such that would render this decision to affirm the extant deportation order a breach of Article 8. All information has been considered and it is not accepted that any exceptional circumstances arise such that would render this decision to affirm the extant Deportation Order a breach of Article 8. Accordingly, a decision to affirm the Deportation Order in respect of Mr. [M] does not constitute an interference with the right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR." 127. The foregoing quotation from Gorry (which appears at p. 18 of the decision) was a verbatim extract from para. 73 of the Supreme Court's judgment. There was no error of fact made by the decision-maker in describing the evidence considered. Nor have the applicants established that there was any error of law made in the analysis by the Minister. Contrary to what is asserted, there was a lawful consideration of rights under both the Constitution and Article 8 ECHR, which analysis complied with the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Gorry . 128. From the bottom of p. 19 to the foot of p. 20, the examination of file addressed "Humanitarian considerations" . No issue was taken with the manner in which the Minister conducted this assessment, which identifies the second applicant's circumstances and engages with the submissions made, stating, inter alia :- "It is not accepted that Ms. [I] 's child is now the child of the applicant by virtue of their marriage. It is further not accepted that because Mr. [M] 's new wife has a pre-existing fear of persecution in Georgia on the basis of which she has international protection, that Mr . [M] has automatically established a threat to the life and freedom of Mr. [M] or that there is a possibility of inhuman or degrading treatment in his country of origin. Refugee status is not automatically transferable by marriage. It is an individual assessment based inter alia on a subjective fear of persecution. It is not accepted that marriage to Ms. [M] per se is sufficient to establish or sustain any such threat or resulting fear, in particular, given that it can hardly be widely known that the parties are even married. Having duly considered all of the circumstances of this case, and noting that the decision as to whether to revoke or affirm the deportation order is within the discretion of the Minister, it is considered that the Minister's right to affirm the deportation order for the purpose of controlling immigration is weightier than any humanitarian considerations that might justify permitting Mr. [M] to remain in the State. Conclusion I have considered these submissions and enclosures advanced on behalf of Mr. [M] who was unsuccessful in his applications for international protection in the State. Mr. [M], who has been legally represented, became the subject of a deportation order on 2 nd May 2024 which remains valid at law and uncontested at this time. I find no information indicating that the Minister should depart from the earlier order which was made in respect of Mr. [M]. Recommendation Mr . [M] has been given an individual assessment and due process in all respects. All correspondence submitted by and on behalf of Mr. [M] to support this application for revocation of the deportation order made in respect of him pursuant to section 3(11) of the Immigration Act 1999, as amended, has been fully considered at this time. Therefore, I conclude that the deportation order made in respect of Mr. [M] on 2 nd May 2024 should be affirmed." 129. A careful consideration of the evidence in this case demonstrates that, with respect to the application to revoke the deportation order, all relevant factors were properly considered in accordance with the Supreme Court's guidance in Sivsivadze v. Minister for Justice . As the 'head note' of the reported decision makes clear, the Supreme Court held, inter alia :- "...1. That, as there was nothing in s. 3(1), s. 3(11) or the 1999 Act itself restricting the constitutional obligation of the first respondent to exercise the discretion to make a deportation order proportionately in the circumstances of any individual case , it cannot be said that the provisions were unconstitutional because they would necessarily involve an adverse impact on family rights as guaranteed by the Constitution; 2. That, insofar as in the particular circumstances of a case a deportation order might interfere with constitutional family rights of those concerned, it was a matter for the first respondent to decide whether a consideration of those rights meant that a deportation order ought not to be made or ought to be revoked . Any such decision adverse to the deportee or her family was subject to scrutiny as to its proportionality under the Constitution in the circumstances of the case..." (emphasis added) . 130. The evidence before this Court makes clear that a careful consideration of the applicants' rights formed part of the Minister's analysis and proportionality exercise was conducted by the Minister, lawfully, with reference to the individual circumstances of the case. The respondent undertook a very detailed consideration of all representations made by or on behalf of the applicants. This included a full consideration of, and respect for, all rights arising under the Constitution and the ECHR. The respondent neither acted unreasonably nor irrationally in the sense in which those terms are used in judicial review. The applicants have not established that the Minister made any error of fact or law. 131. For reasons which are perhaps understandable, the focus of the first applicant was on the applicants' rights as a married couple and on her wish for the Minister to make a different decision. With respect, what the first applicant may not sufficiently appreciate is that the fact of marriage, alone, does not create immunity from immigration decisions, in this case a deportation order. That is not to criticise. It is simply to point out that the difficult decisions which the respondent must make involve the careful consideration of a wide range of factors, including, the State's legitimate interest in the control of immigration. 132. It is clear that the applicants' fundamental objection is to the outcome, but they have fallen well short of establishing that the process followed by the Minister was flawed in any way. In short, the process followed by the respondent was lawful; the decision was open to the Minister to make; and it was not vitiated by error of fact or law. 133. To the extent that the first applicant submits that the effect of the decision not to revoke the deportation order is to prevent the second applicant from travelling, or residing, outside of Georgia, she has, with respect, not furnished any evidence to support that assertion. It should also be noted that the Minister's decision was made under domestic i.e. Irish legislation, specifically, the 1999 Act. 134. Whereas the first applicant asks this Court to cancel her husband's deportation order and to give him permission to remain in the State, this Court has no jurisdiction to do so. 135. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am satisfied that the applicants have not established any entitlement to relief. 136. In opposing the applicants' claim, para. 12 of the respondent's statement of opposition, dated 25 April 2025, comprised the following plea:- " 12. Without prejudice to the foregoing, if necessary, this Honourable Court ought to consider that the applicants' conduct and lack of candour with the State authorities , in circumstances where it has since come to light that the first applicant was in a relationship with another Georgian national who made an application for international protection in the State on the basis of being in a relationship with her, ought to bar them from the grant of any relief on discretionary grounds ." (emphasis added). 137. Whilst the evidence discloses that there was a 'drip feed' of information to the Minister, that fact has played no part in the outcome of these proceedings. For the reasons detailed in this judgment, I have found that the applicants are not entitled to any relief. That being so, the question of the exercise of this Court's discretion to refuse relief does not arise. Therefore, it does not seem to me to be necessary to make any further findings with respect to the applicants' candour or conduct. 138. This application must be dismissed and, in circumstances where the Minister has been entirely successful, the respondent enjoys a presumptive right to an order for costs. 139. I propose to list the matter for before me at 10:30 am next Wednesday, 30 July 2025, for the purpose of making final orders, including as to costs. In advance of 30 July, the parties have liberty, but are not required, to exchange short written submissions on the question of costs should they wish. If, prior to 30 July, the parties agree the terms of a final order, a draft should be provided to the Registrar forthwith. 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