D. -v- DPP [2008] IESC 47 (23 July 2008)

D. -v- DPP [2008] IESC 47 (23 July 2008)

The applicant failed to demonstrate specific, irreparable prejudice to his defence arising from delay or lack of specificity. The periods of delay and the manner in which the charges were framed did not, in the circumstances, create a real and serious risk of an unfair trial for most counts. However, in the case of one count with a seven-year span and a single incident, the lack of specificity justified prohibition. The appeal was dismissed except as to that count, and the cross-appeal was allowed in part.

Citation
[2008] IESC 47
Parties
Applicant/appellant: D. D.; Respondent/respondent: Director of Public Prosecutions
Jurisdiction
Ireland
Judgment Date
23 July 2008
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review / Supreme Court Appeal and Cross Appeal
Outcome
Appeal dismissed; cross-appeal allowed in part.
Legal Topics
Prohibition of Criminal Trial, Delay (complainant and Prosecutorial), Prejudice to Fair Trial, Specificity of Charges, Sexual Offences, Judicial Review
Criminal Law Constitutional Law Prohibition of Criminal Trial Delay (complainant and Prosecutorial) Prejudice to Fair Trial Specificity of Charges Sexual Offences Judicial Review

Case Brief

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Parties

D. D.

Applicant/appellant

Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent/respondent

Procedural Posture

Judicial Review / Supreme Court Appeal and Cross Appeal

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether complainant delay, prosecutorial delay, prejudice, or lack of specificity as to time require prohibition of the applicant's criminal trial on certain counts.

Ratio Decidendi

The applicant failed to demonstrate specific, irreparable prejudice to his defence arising from delay or lack of specificity. The periods of delay and the manner in which the charges were framed did not, in the circumstances, create a real and serious risk of an unfair trial for most counts. However, in the case of one count with a seven-year span and a single incident, the lack of specificity justified prohibition. The appeal was dismissed except as to that count, and the cross-appeal was allowed in part.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed; cross-appeal allowed in part.

Orders

  • Trial to proceed in relation to counts 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, and 19.
  • Prohibition granted only in relation to count 5 (G. T.).