Smith v. O' Donnell & Anor [2004] IEHC 72 (27 April 2004)
The use of the term 'peremptory' in an order for extension of time does not oust the jurisdiction of another judge of equal jurisdiction to consider and grant a further extension under s. 4B(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 as amended. The statutory discretion must be exercised anew on each application, and a prior order cannot fetter this discretion. There was no evidence of unlawful exercise of discretion by the second respondent.
- Citation
- [2004] IEHC 72
- Parties
- Applicant: Richard Smith; Respondent: Judge Thomas O'Donnell; Respondent: The Director of Public Prosecutions
- Jurisdiction
- Ireland
- Judgment Date
- 27 April 2004
- Procedural Posture
- Judicial Review / Judgment on Application for Certiorari and Prohibition
- Outcome
- Application refused
- Legal Topics
- Extension of Time for Service of Book of Evidence, Interpretation of 'peremptory' Orders, Judicial Discretion, Legitimate Expectation, Ultra Vires Actions
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Richard Smith
Applicant
Judge Thomas O'Donnell
Respondent
The Director of Public Prosecutions
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Judicial Review / Judgment on Application for Certiorari and Prohibition
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a 'peremptory' order for extension of time by one District Court judge precludes another judge of equal jurisdiction from granting a further extension under s. 4B(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 as amended
- 2 Whether the second respondent acted ultra vires in granting a further extension without new evidence or change of circumstances
- 3 Whether the applicant had a legitimate expectation that proceedings would be struck out if the Book of Evidence was not served within the peremptory period
Ratio Decidendi
The use of the term 'peremptory' in an order for extension of time does not oust the jurisdiction of another judge of equal jurisdiction to consider and grant a further extension under s. 4B(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967 as amended. The statutory discretion must be exercised anew on each application, and a prior order cannot fetter this discretion. There was no evidence of unlawful exercise of discretion by the second respondent.
Court Disposition
Application refused
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
Sign in to read
Sign in to read the full judgment text
Sign in to read the full judgment text. Downloads and additional research tools may depend on your plan.
Sign in to read the full judgment