U.V. v Y.Z. (Hague Convention, rights of custody, wrongful removal) (Approved) [2026] IEHC 293 (16 April 2026)

[ Home ] [ Databases ] [ World Law ] [ Multidatabase Search ] [ Help ] [ Feedback ] [ DONATE ] High Court of Ireland Decisions You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> U. V. v Y. Z. (Hague Convention, rights of custody, wrongful removal) (Approved) [2026] IEHC 293 (16 April 2026) URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC293.html Cite as: [2026] IEHC 293 [ New search ] [ Printable PDF version ] [ Help ] APPROVED REDACTED FOR PUBLICATION harp graphic. THE HIGH COURT IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD ABDUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTODY ORDERS ACT 1991 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION AND IN THE MATTER OF P (A CHILD) BORN ON [REDACTED] [2026] IEHC 293 Record No. 2025/22 HLC Between: U. V. APPLICANT AND Y. Z. RESPONDENT Judgment of Ms. Justice Nuala Jackson delivered on the 16 th April 2026. INTRODUCTION 1. The child, P, the subject of the within proceedings is 4 years old, having been born on the [REDACTED]. The Applicant and the Respondent are married to one another (Date of Marriage: [REDACTED] 2021) and remain so married although they have lived separately since in or about April 2024. It is not in dispute that P was habitually resident in Japan until removed from that country and brought to Ireland by the Respondent in or about late October 2025. Proceedings seeking the return of P to Japan were instituted by the Applicant mother on the 17 th December 2025, the assistance of the Japanese Central Authority having been sought by her on or about the 11 th November 2025 and a request for return having been transmitted to the Irish Central Authority on or about the 2 nd December 2025. The return is sought pursuant to the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 1980 ("the Convention"). MATTERS AT ISSUE 2. In so far as the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention are concerned, these being the matters to be proved by the Applicant: There is no dispute as to the habitual residence of the child being in Japan; There is no dispute that the Applicant had rights of custody in respect of P at that time and that the removal was in breach of such rights of custody. 3. The final proof required by Article 3 is in dispute. The Respondent disputes that the Applicant was actually exercising such rights of custody at the time of the removal. 4. In so far as the defences available under the Convention are concerned, there are two such raised by the Respondent. He asserts that (a) There is a grave risk that the return of P to Japan would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation; (b) The Applicant was not actually exercising her rights of custody at the time of the removal. 5. This case therefore necessitates a consideration of the distinct references to the exercise of rights of custody as a requisite proof by the Applicant under Article 3 and as a defence under Article 13. 6. I am most grateful to Counsel for their considered, comprehensive and most useful submissions, oral and written, in relation to these matters. EVIDENCE 7. A number of Affidavits were filed in this matter which was heard on affidavit evidence only. The Affidavits which I have considered are: Affidavit of Gemma Trautt sworn on the 16 th December 2025; Replying Affidavit of Y. Z. sworn on the 10 th February 2026; Replying Affidavit of U. V. sworn on the 25 th February 2026; Affidavit of Y. Z. sworn on the 12 th March 2026; Affidavit of Gemma Trautt sworn on the 23 rd March 2026. 8. There was some delay in relation to translations of documents and additional translations were provided to me subsequent to the hearing date. 9. The first Affidavit of Ms. Trautt, solicitor for the Applicant, contains the usual formal proofs. The Application for Assistance in the Child's Return is exhibited. This document states that the Respondent removed the child to another part of Japan, without the consent of the Applicant, in or about June of 2024. It asserts that the child resided in that place and attended nursery school there. It states that the Applicant was only able to have irregular contact with the child thereafter but that contact ceased on or about the 10 th August 2025. A lack of contact and lack of means of contact is asserted with it having been confirmed to the Applicant on the 31 st October 2025 by the police authorities in Japan that P had entered Ireland on the 30 th October 2025. The Affidavit avers that the Respondent is from a third country and has no Irish connections. It appears that the Respondent and P are living in Ireland in temporary accommodation. It appears from affidavits filed by the Respondent that international protection has been applied for by the Respondent. 10. In his Affidavit sworn on the 10 th February 2025, the Respondent father puts the exercise of custody rights by the Applicant in respect of P at the time of his removal from Japan at issue. The defence of grave risk is also averred. 11. It is common case that the parties cohabited in an apartment of the Applicant until April 2024 when the Applicant was admitted to hospital in respect of mental health difficulties. The Respondent and P remained living in the apartment during the hospitalisation of the Applicant. She was released from hospital in or about June 2024 at which time the Respondent left the apartment with the child and the Applicant returned to live there. The Respondent moved to reside elsewhere (within Japan) with the child. The Applicant continued to have access with P until August 2025. There would not appear to have been any communication between the parties from September 2025. The Applicant had previously taken steps to commence court proceedings in relation to access but it would appear that national procedures required an address for service for such procedure to be advanced. The Applicant asserts that she did not have such address and the Respondent acknowledges this to be the position (paragraph 15). The Respondent avers that he was supported by the police in keeping this address private from the Applicant due to allegations of child abuse and domestic violence. The Respondent avers that despite having met with him on numerous occasions, the Applicant did not serve or even mention these proceedings. It seems to be accepted that the Applicant took steps to bring child arrangement matters before the national courts in 2024 but the Respondent avers to a lack of knowledge of such steps. The Respondent states that he wishes to remain in Ireland and that he chose Ireland specifically based on the welfare of P. It would appear that the parties suffered considerable stress during the Covid pandemic (in common with many others) but the Respondent would appear to have become involved in altercations with third parties which culminated in police involvement and criminal and/or compensatory consequences. The Respondent avers that he was wrongly accused and unfairly treated in this context. 12. I am mindful that in submissions the Respondent critiques "the courts and child protection systems in Japan" . The submissions reference country reports prepared by Human Rights Watch and asserts that these state: "Japan's pre-trial criminal justice system has long been criticized for "hostage justice" in which suspects who maintain their innocence or remain silent are detained for prolonged period to get them to confess." 13. The submissions also reference, "the prevalence of xenophobic attitudes in Japanese society, and issues in relation to migration" asserted to be confirmed from the same source. It is clear from uncontested evidence that the Respondent had interactions with the Japanese criminal law and was involved in criminal proceedings. These did not involve the Applicant. The matters concerned third parties, strangers and the Applicant's parents. I do not consider these matters to be germane to this case. The Respondent resided in Japan over many years. He entered into family life there and was occupationally employed there. As will be addressed below, in so far as matters concerning the Applicant and their child, the Respondent would appear to have been supported by the police in his desire not to reveal his and, more importantly, the child's address to the Applicant despite her requests that this be revealed. There is no independent evidence before me to support unfairness experienced by the Respondent pertaining to matters at issue in the within proceedings. The fundamental basis of the Convention being comity as between the Contracting parties is long established. 14. While this was undoubtedly a difficult time, the relationship between the parties does not appear to have been unusual in the context of being a young couple with a young baby in the midst of world turmoil. Indeed, the Respondent avers that, subsequent to the criminal engagement: "It was a huge relief to return home to the Applicant and P. We cared for him together, while I also worked as a teacher during the day." 15. It is common case that the Applicant suffered mental health issues which culminated in her hospitalisation in April 2024. This would appear to have commenced after P's birth and the Respondent avers that it was initially thought to be postpartum depression. He says that her behaviour became erratic. The parties would appear to have separated for a while in 2022 following a disagreement. A letter of apology written by the Respondent is exhibited by him but he denies fault and says that he only wrote the letter because of the Applicant's threats not to return and he missed his child. He says that the abusive behaviour was, in reality, on the part of the Applicant and that the letter was written by him in circumstances of duress. It is a most contrite letter of apology but one which the Respondent now appears to have resiled from and which he presents as being written in circumstances in which it was not fully and freely written. 16. There was a serious altercation between the Respondent and the Applicant's parents shortly the period of separation. There was also an incident where a picture was broken intentionally by the Applicant. The child was in the vicinity at the time and the Respondent avers that harm could easily have befallen him although it does not appear that the child was harmed. The altercation with the parents of the Applicant resulted in a criminal conviction and criminal sanction of the Respondent. I believe that the letter of apology above was written in the context of such criminal proceedings (it is headed "Letter of Apology to Dad" but does contain apologies in respect of his behaviour towards the Applicant also). The factual circumstances surrounding this event is hugely disputed but he deposes to reconciliation between the spouses and a resumption of cohabitation in 2023. The parties would appear to have moved to a different place to live and some distance appears to have been created between the parties and the Applicant's family of origin. Clearly, both parties were involved with the care of the child during this period. The mental health of the Applicant, which would appear to have improved, would appear to have, again, disimproved in 2023 and especially so towards the end of 2023. There is reference to the Applicant being very distressed and pointing a knife at the Respondent and the child. The averments of the Respondent indicate that the Applicant was most distressed at this time and demonstrably had psychiatric difficulties. The Respondent exhibits a contemporaneous message where the Applicant states: "P's safety is the higher priority. I didn't point the knife at you. I wanted to kill myself. The best solution would be to take him and leave Japan." She also messages that "Getting treated is my first priority." 17. She was admitted to hospital relatively shortly thereafter. 18. It would appear that the Respondent adopted a restrictive approach to visiting the hospital with P. He references the general atmosphere in the hospital as being "very dark" and that P was distressed. However, at this time, P was a child of just over 2 years. It would appear that visits by P (and I believe the Respondent although this is unclear) to the hospital ceased. 19. The Respondent references a sighting of the Applicant near P's nursery during her period of hospitalisation. This is presented in a most sinister fashion. He expresses being alarmed and in fear of kidnapping. Messages are exhibited which demonstrate the Respondent querying the child's safety and the Applicant referencing the absence of promised visits and video calls and her fear that P "will forget about me" . 20. Subsequent to the Applicant leaving hospital, the Respondent moved with the child to another town and the address at which they were residing was not given to the Applicant. He avers that this was due to his fears that she would kidnap P. It would appear that he did not permit P to be alone with the Applicant thereafter. It is clear that the Applicant wished to have P back living with her. The Respondent opposed this due to concerns regarding P's safety. It would appear that registration and civil entitlements for P became confused in this context. 21. The Affidavit of the Applicant of the 25 th February 2026 seeks to supplement the prior Affidavit of Ms. Trautt and to reply to the Affidavit of the Respondent above. She details conflict between the Respondent and various civil authorities in Japan. There is substantial dispute in relation to the allegations made by the Respondent against her – 22. She states that the Respondent became irritable in the context of the Covid 19 lockdown. She references abusive behaviour on his part in relation to third parties and consequences arising in the criminal law sphere (these consequences are not denied by the Respondent but he asserts that they were unmerited and represent societal bias towards him). It is common case that the Respondent spent three months in prison arising from altercations with third parties being neither the Applicant or her family. This period was shortly after the birth of P. It appears that compensation was paid to the third parties involved. Exhibited documents include legal fees discharged in dealing with these complaints. Exhibited messages indicate that the Respondent required some hospital treatment after his release from prison. I have no information concerning the nature of this treatment. It is clear from messages that the parties, both of them, were under considerable stress at this time. This is not to be viewed as unexpected - they had a new baby, the Respondent had been incarcerated and would appear to have had some health issue and the world was in the middle of a pandemic. 23. The Applicant references abusive behaviour on the part of the Respondent towards her. She states that the incident of the 7 th September 2022 (the broken picture and the physical row with the Applicant's parents) occurred in the context of her parents coming to speak with the Respondent about this behaviour which resulted in a physical altercation between the Respondent and the parents. She says that this was the same date as the incident in which she smashed the framed marriage certificate, an act which she accepts she did. She states that her actions at this time occurred in the context of a bilateral altercation between the parties. It is clear that the police authorities were involved and criminal consequences ensued for the Respondent. A criminal sanction was imposed and the Respondent would appear to have written letters of apology in aid of sentence reduction. 24. There would appear to be agreement that there was a period of separation thereafter followed by a reconciliation in the summer of 2023. 25. She asserts that his abusive behaviour recommenced towards the end of 2023. Her account of the knife incident is considerably different to that of the Respondent and is minimised. She states that she was preparing food and that "I did wave it as I replied to the Respondent" . This would not appear consistent with her messages which state that the actions with the knife were in the context of a suicidal ideation. 26. She admits admission to a psychiatric hospital and says that this was at the insistence of the Respondent. The hospital record is exhibited. This record states: "Following pregnancy and childbirth in 2022, conflict with the husband worsened. Due to the relationship, the patient experienced significant mood swings, emotional instability, anxiety and insomnia. Because of a strong desire from the husband for inpatient treatment and for the purpose of maintaining distance from the husband the patient was admitted to this hospital on April 27, 2024. Through medication and environment adjustment, symptoms showed improvement." 27. There is also reference to behavioural assessment in the context of treatment received. 28. It is averred that P was brought to visit her on only three occasions while she was in hospital. 29. She avers to an entitlement to leave the hospital during the day and that she arranged with the teacher at the nursery school to visit P there. She states that this was not prohibited or irregular or clandestine. Hospital rules are exhibited which indicate that free entry and exit are permitted during daytime hours save if restricted due to medical necessity. There is no evidence of such restriction being imposed on the Applicant. She avers that she was concerned about confrontation when she observed the Respondent and vice versa so she left to avoid this. The rationale behind the visit to P is deposed to namely that she felt vulnerable, was fearful that her child would be moved to live elsewhere and that her contact with him would be curtailed in this context and she wished to see P. 30. Very importantly, the circumstances of her discharge from hospital are addressed by way of exhibit. This is dated June 2024 and references " Adjustment disorder " and states: "Based on the above diagnosis, the patient's symptoms such as depressive mood and mood swing caused by the burdens of daily life, have improved through inpatient treatment. The patient is capable of returning to work and can perform their duties without any issues starting from July 16, 2024." 31. She states that she contacted the police to ascertain her rights in relation to her objection to P moving to live in another town. I do not know what transpired in this regard save that the child was moved to reside elsewhere despite the objections of the Applicant to this. 32. It is common case that the child moved to the other place. The Applicant had no address in relation to his place of habitation. She avers to unsatisfactory contact dictated by the Respondent. She says that she "put up" with this as "otherwise she would not get to speak to [her] son at all." 33. She deposes to seeking legal advice in July 2024. Legal documentation is exhibited which appears to indicate that an address for the Respondent was needed to commence proceedings and that an application to compel provision of such address could not be made until the proceedings issued. This seems to be a somewhat circular approach permitting little progress to be achieved. However, the exhibited correspondence from the lawyer supports this as being the position. Directly contrary to the averments of the Respondent, messages are exhibited which indicate that the Respondent was requested by her to provide his address. These messages indicate many such requests being made of the Respondent. 34. Photographs of visits with P and a list of dates are provided. Dates of access visits are exhibited but these were of limited duration and much curtailed. She avers to the conditionality of access related to provision of monies. The exhibits of the Respondent support that this was the position. 35. It is averred that access was ceased in the context of disagreement relating to the place of registration of the child and that the Respondent refused access until a Power of Attorney to enable re-registration was executed by the Applicant. The Respondent contends that the Applicant abandoned access during this period of 3-month period from February to April 2025. 36. The incident in the park on the 10 th August 2025 is denied and a different version is set out. The Applicant contends that there was no danger to the child save that distress was caused by the aggression of the Respondent towards her. 37. The period after the 5 th September 2025 is of particular importance as it is on this date that the Respondent asserts that the Applicant ceased exercising her rights of custody. It is common case that this was the last correspondence between the parties, being an email from the Applicant to the Respondent. She avers that she awaited a reply which did not come. Both parties assert that they were blocked or communication was otherwise disabled by the other such that correspondence was not possible. The actions of the Applicant after this date are therefore of importance given that there was no direct communication, for whatever reason. The Applicant contacted the police in early October and sought a welfare check on the child. There is reference in this written correspondence to the Respondent's telephone being disconnected. She requests that the child be taken into protective custody. The police replied to her in late October indicating that the child was in Ireland. 38. A medical report is exhibited in relation to the current health status of the Applicant. This confirms that the Applicant is capable of caring for the child. 39. The Respondent swore a short second affidavit on the 12 th March 2026. The primary purpose of this Affidavit is to exhibit contemporaneous messages which were exhibited previously relating to the incident with the knife in 2024. This indicates that the Applicant acknowledges an event, that she acknowledges her need for treatment, that she suggests that taking P from Japan might be best, that she has an awareness of the deterioration in her mental health. She states that the action concerned was aimed at taking her own life and not meant as an endangerment to the Respondent or P. She acknowledges that P's safety is the highest priority. These messages demonstrate that the averment of the Applicant in relation to this event, as I have commented previously, is inaccurate and seeks to diminish the event. The timing being relatively proximate to her hospitalisation, diagnosis and treatment in respect of an adjustment disorder must also be borne in mind. 40. The final Affidavit is that of Ms. Trautt of the 23 rd March 2026. This exhibits the entirety of the messaging thread between the parties relative to the February 2024 incident. The entirety of the thread evidences a relationship in crisis, the Applicant experiencing mental illness and lack of agreement concerning S with court proceedings being threatened. 41. This concludes the Affidavits sworn herein but there is one further source of real evidence to which I must refer. At the hearing, the Applicant raised the issue of ongoing contact between the Applicant and P and I was considerably concerned that the Applicant and her child of tender years had been without contact since the commencement of the within proceedings although no motion in respect of access had been sought by her. Counsel for the Applicant informed me that correspondence seeking access had been sent but no reply had been received to this. I therefore adjourned the matter so that instructions for a reply to the request letter (dated the 19 th February 2026) could be taken and, hopefully, amicable resolution of this issue achieved. I listed the matter on an adjourned date so that access could be addressed if agreement was not achieved. When the matter came back before me, I was informed that no agreement had been reached and the exchange of letters pertaining to access was provided to me by both parties. The request letter of the 19 th February 2026 sought video contact. The reply (which came subsequent to the hearing there being no response proximate to receipt of the letter) is dated the 20 th March 2026. This letter quotes the instructions of the Respondent: "During our time in Japan, I allowed supervised visitation between P and [the Applicant] with the expectation that they would be temporary and that we would sit down and discuss the issues between us and reach a peaceful agreement to benefit P. That time never came, and [the Applicant] made no attempt to come to any agreement with me in spite of multiple attempts on my part to facilitate her and meet her outstanding demands for such a meeting. [The Applicant disappeared from P's life twice in 2025 of her own free will for about two months each time. This did more than anything else to damage her image as a mother and emotionally distance P from her. The second time, she also stopped talking to me altogether. I had no idea what her intentions were, just that being part of P's life was not a priority. According to Japanese law, because I willingly provided [the Applicant] with access to P while I was simultaneously seeking assistance from various child welfare organizations regarding her abuse of P, their interpretation of our situation was that there was no longer a threat and they all chose to stop supporting us. I was not told about this legal stipulation until it was too late. Due to the above, due to the extreme measures I had to take as P's father just to restore his medical coverage and schooling (and all of the person loss that came with it), due to the amount of time that has passed, how that time and change of environment has given me a more educated perspective on what had been happening to us, and how during that time [the Applicant] has done nothing but attempt to frame my care and support of P while being backed into a corner as kidnapping, I cannot in good conscience, taking P's wellbeing into the highest consideration, respond to any requests from [the Applicant], her family, or anyone representing her for as long as we are placed under duress by her. Should [the Applicant] choose to communicate with use in a diplomatic fashion, by first and most importantly dropping all legal action against us, and also by vocalizing a desire to seek a peaceful solution with all of us, that it will be possible to consider her requests and work with her towards a permanent stability that benefits P first and foremost." 42. I have concluded that there is considerable disparity between the facts as represented in this letter and the evidence before me. In addition, it is a matter of very considerable concern that the Respondent's attitude is to preclude even remote contact between P and his mother. I made orders in this respect but I do not know if they have been complied with. On any assessment of the evidence herein, it is inexplicable how it can be asserted that remote contact with his mother would be contrary to P's best interests. Hugely concerning is the suggestion therein that access should be contingent upon the Applicant "dropping all legal action against us" . RELEVANT FACTS IN DISPUTE 43. (i) The Applicant contends and avers that she did not consent to the child moving to live elsewhere in Japan in June 2024. The Respondent avers that this movement of the child was decided and agreed upon by both parents long before the move actually occurred. The Respondent contends that this was agreed on the advice of the Applicant's medical professional. However, there is an inconsistency in the Affidavit of the Respondent (paragraph 10) as he avers: "Just days before I left the apartment with P, the Applicant claimed that I was taking P by force and tried to get the police to stop me. After explaining the situation to the police, and after they conferred with child services, they allowed me to take P with me as we had previously agreed." 44. Invoking the assistance of the police to prevent the removal of the child at this time, would not appear consistent with the Applicant consenting to or being in agreement with the move. The contemporaneous evidence in the exhibits demonstrates consistency as regards the Applicant's lack of consent to such move by the child. I do not believe that much turns on this point of dispute given that the child did move and lived in the new location with the Respondent for in excess of one year thereafter and access occurred between the Applicant and P while P was so residing. 45. (ii) That access ceased in August 2025 and communication between the parties ceased in September 2025, the Applicant voluntarily so doing. The cessations are not in dispute but the reason(s) for such cessation are disputed. The Respondent asserts that he sent numerous messages over this period to the Applicant to encourage contact but that she refused. Messages are exhibited. These demonstrate disagreement between the parties in relation to financial support. There is a message of the 10 th August 2025 in relation to an access event. Further messages of the 15 th August seek to set out conditions for future access visits. The tone and content of messages is supportive of the relationship between the parties being negative. A message of the 17 th August 2025 demonstrates considerable frustration on the part of the Applicant in relation to access. It indicates that an access visit is envisaged on that day. The Respondent's response is "when you confirm the money and the time, we'll go out and meet you," and this is followed by further dispute concerning finances. The messages of that date (17 th August 2025) end with the following from the Applicant: "Aren't you letting us see each other this week either?! This is psychological abuse of P. You've no right to keep a mother away from her child." 46. A message of the 24 th August 2024 asks if the Applicant is coming for access and mandates that she must bring at least a stated sum of money. The response from the Applicant asks that P be brought to meet her and she states that she will invoke the assistance of the police. It is clear from this message exchange that the Applicant is desperate to see P as she states, "I need to check P is OK." 47. The message of the 28 th August, from the Respondent, is concerning. "Our schedule is literally full. My obligations to P and the students I teach means I do not have a single moment to spare, even on the weekends. It's a challenge to keep up with P's lessons and other preparations. So we cannot just stop what we're doing and meet you unless you are actually doing something to help us. If you're still repaying me, then that's a good enough reason to stop what we're doing for a few hours. That means more money I can use to give P things that will make his life better, like some educational toys I want to buy for him." A sum of money which the Applicant "need[s] to bring" is then specified. 48. The response of the 28 th August 2025 again indicates desperation. Inter alia, this message states "and you'll only let me see my child in exchange for money. If I don't bring money, I can't see him. That's what you're saying." 49. The messages in the following days continue in this vein. It is also clear from these messages that the Applicant lacks information about the nursery school which the child is attending and she seeks such information. The Respondent seeks that she contributes towards the fees in respect of such nursery school. Again, on the 31 st August, the Respondent messages the Applicant saying: "Because you failed to indicate a time and location as you always have, and because you failed to demonstrate your willingness to resume being financially supportive of a child you are legally responsible for, we no longer have time to meet today." 50. The Applicant responded stating that access is every Sunday and that she has so informed the Respondent. Subsequent messages repeat that access is contingent upon financial provision, the extent of which the Applicant disputes. On the 31 st August the Respondent messages, "Let me know when you actually want to visit with P again. Just as before, state your requested day and time and confirm that you are bringing at least half of the money you owe so far and I will do what I can to make ourselves available." 51. These messages can only be described as unfortunate. I obviously am not in a position to make any assessment of the veracity of the positions being adopted but I cannot determine that these messages support the averment of the Respondent that he was encouraging access and that these encouragements were being refused by the Applicant. I find that it is simply impossible to so interpret them. I do not find the messaging between the parties in any manner supportive of the Applicant having voluntarily relinquished contact with P. On the contrary, she is consistently trying to arrange and improve upon the contact which she wishes to take place. 52. At hearing, Counsel for the Respondent accepted that the date of the cessation of exercise of custody rights by the Applicant was the 5 th September 2025 (some eight weeks prior to the removal to Ireland). As this is an important issue in this case given that the Applicant is being put on proof of exercise and the defence of non-exercise is being raised, I consider it appropriate to recite the message from the Applicant of that date in full (although, of course, it must be considered in light of the totality of the prior messages): "You just don't get it. It's not a case of "Do you want to see him this week?" It's every day! I want to see P every single day! I want to live with him. "Do you want to spend a little time with him on weekends?" Who? What good it that? Do you really think that's enough?! Your actions are child abuse. For God's sake, feel some guilt about this! Bring him back to [name of town]. Stop this abduction." 53. I do not consider that these messages support the averment that "the Applicant's contact with P was curtailed by her own actions, in circumstances where she unilaterally decided to cease visits with P and to stop all communication with me" (paragraph 13) and "The Applicant's abandonment of S was completely unforced and unwanted" (paragraph 14). It appears to me that these messages demonstrate a parent who is desperate to see her child and to have extensive contact with her child and who is becoming increasingly frustrated and distressed by the lack of such contact. 54. (iii) Was an address required to institute proceedings in respect of child arrangements? The exhibited letters from the lawyer indicate that such address was required. The messages to the Respondent by the Applicant indicate that she requested the address. The Respondent acknowledges that she did not have the residential address of the child and that this was with the imprimatur of the police. There is clear inconsistency in the averment of the Respondent that he did not know of the proceedings and the exhibited contemporaneous messages from the Applicant to him referencing such proceedings. 55. (iv) Allegations of violence and abuse are made by the Applicant against the Respondent and by the Respondent against the Applicant and in relation to the child 56. Alleged violence of the Applicant: · mood swings and anger outbursts during pregnancy with P. Violent acts including throwing of items; · th September 2022: alleged that the Applicant threw a framed picture on the floor shattering glass in the vicinity of the child. This would appear to have occurred in the context of an altercation between the parties. He avers that he asked the Applicant to leave for a period after this incident and she did so; · leaving with the child and forcing him to write a letter of contrition and acknowledging misconduct although he had not misconducted himself; · an incident of violence between the Respondent and the Applicant's parents in or about 2022. This would appear to have occurred in the apartment of the parties; 57. There is considerable conflict about this incident which seems to have resulted in criminal proceedings and the conviction of the Respondent. The Respondent disputes this conviction and disputes any blame for this event on his part. He avers that the Applicant's parents were at fault. P would appear to have been present for the altercation and fell in the context of it. The Applicant would appear to have had little involvement in these events. The Respondent had a period of incarceration arising from this. · an incident with a knife which the Respondent avers threatened the safety of the child and his safety. 58. I have considered all of the evidence relating to these events. The event concerning the parents indicates that the police authorities took action against the Respondent and not the parents. The two incidents involving the parties (and the child) are admitted by the Applicant but the parties' versions of these events is different. I find that the evidence of the Applicant is somewhat unsatisfactory in relation to these two incidents. In relation to the first, she does not deal with the impact on the child and in relation to the latter, her averments (that there was but a waving of the knife in the context of the preparation of food). However, it is clear that no steps to seek police intervention or to seek court relief in relation to domestic violence was sought in relation to these events and both occurred in the context of a period of psychiatric illness on the part of the Applicant for which she has received in patient treatment and in relation to which I have medical evidence supporting her recovery. 59. Alleged violence of the Respondent: The Applicant so asserts and the Respondent denies. The interventions of the police authorities and criminal sanction supports such acts of violence. The letter of apology supports such acts of violence. 60. Alleged violence by the Applicant towards P: The picture incident and the knife incident are referenced and considered above. The only other such incident is the August 2025 incident during access. I do not consider that this incident as deposed to by either of the parties is at a level which engages grave risk under the Convention. 61. Additionally, the Respondent avers that the mood and sleeping patterns of the child improved when away from the Applicant, that he is brighter, calmer and verbalises better when away from his mother. However, he also avers that; "Whenever he was around the Applicant, he immediately recognised her, was happy to see her and enjoyed spending time with her ...". 62. (v) Allegations of prejudice against foreigners in Japan. He references: "... an indifferent system that would not hear me because I was a foreigner, a male or both." (paragraph 19) 63. He avers that justice was refused him in Japan. He references reports of incidents to the authorities in Japan and communications are exhibited. These consist of comprehensive Letters of Incident. They relate to the events of the 10 th June 2024 when the Respondent observed the Applicant close to the nursery school of P. I note that in this regard, the Respondent's statement states, inter alia: "According to the doctors at [name] Hospital, [the Applicant] suffers from a kind of stress-related psychosis. She cannot process normal amounts of stress and as a result she becomes emotionally unstable." 64. There is also correspondence with childcare services. This letter is undated and references the Respondent's view that involuntary committal at a mental health facility with "much stronger treatment than she is currently getting" being required. In this letter he concludes: "I realize how this may sound like a rash response, but I have seen behaviour like this lead to real harm towards other children in Japan and America." 65. A further letter is sent to the hospital in which the Applicant is receiving treatment. This appears to be by way of complaint concerning the same incident. The final exhibit appears to be a complaint to the nursery school concerning this incident. 66. There is nothing exhibited in relation to the response to these correspondences. They clearly set out the views of the Respondent in relation to the mental health of the Applicant and the appropriate treatment of it. However, the Respondent clearly is not a medical professional and these letters were sent at a time when the Applicant was hospitalised and in receipt of treatment; the Respondent would appear to have unilaterally decided not to bring P to visit with her and there is no evidence that the Applicant did anything which would be likely to harm P who was in the care of his nursery school at the time. The evidence seems to indicate that the police were supportive of the Respondent when he moved to live elsewhere with the child. I have dealt with the submissions in relation to alleged shortcomings in the Japanese criminal justice and bias towards foreigners previously herein. There is no evidence that the Respondent was in any way unfairly or inappropriately treated in the context of relations with the Applicant and concerning P. Indeed, it is the requests for assistance from the police and other authorities by the Applicant which appear not to have yielded results. 67. (vi) Allegations of unreasonable behaviour and inadequate parenting against the Applicant. 68. The Respondent asserts a failure to financially support P and also lack of appropriate supervision at times when the child was with the Applicant. I do not find the evidence to support anything in this regard which is relevant to the issues for determination by me. THE LAW 69. There was little disagreement between the parties in their submissions to me as to the applicable legal principles relevant to this case. Exercise of rights of custody 70. As previously indicated, the issue of exercise of rights of custody arises in two separate contexts in this case as it is raised by the Respondent in the context of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. It is for the Applicant to establish in the first instance that she was exercising rights of custody sufficient to enable her to pursue her claim. Thereafter, if that threshold is met, the burden is on the Respondent to establish, by way of Article 13 defence, that the failure to exercise such rights of custody was sufficient in that context. 71. In relation to Article 3, the authorities indicate that the bar to be reached is a low one. The less onerous standard required by Article 3(b) was acknowledged by MacGrath J. in MW v. JC [2020] IEHC 260 ('MW v JC'). Counsel for the Respondent accepted that such less exacting standard applied in this regard. In Re H (Minors) Abduction: Custody Rights [1991] 2 FLR 262, Lord Brandon stated: "In my view Art 3(b) must be construed widely as meaning that the custody parent must be maintaining the stance and attitude of such a parent, rather than narrowly as meaning that he or she must be continuing to exercise day to day care and control ..." 72. The applicable test in this regard was considered by Finlay Geoghegan J. in MJT v. CC [2014] IEHC 196 where she stated: "An Applicant for an order for the summary return of a child to it State of habitual residence pursuant to the Convention must, in my judgment, put before the Court prima facie or preliminary evidence that the removal or retention of the child was wrongful within the meaning of the Convention. This follows from the purpose and wording of the Convention and underlined by the above explanations. Where the allegation is that the removal was in breach of the applicant's rights of custody (as in these proceedings), Article 3 requires such evidence of the Applicant's de jure rights of custody and also that, as a matter of fact the Applicant was actually exercising his rights of custody. There appears to have been limited consideration by the courts of this issue and as to what facts will be considered as preliminary evidence of the actual exercise of custody rights for the purposes of Article 3(b) of the Convention. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern from the decision to which my attention was drawn by counsel and one other that, firstly, the courts take a very liberal view as to what will constitute the exercise of custody rights, and secondly, that it does require the demonstration by the applicant/parent that he either did or attempted to maintain contact or a relationship with his child" (Paragraphs 19 and 20) 73. She continued at Paragraph 29 to state: "The authorities to which I refer simply require him to show that he kept or sought to keep regular contact or a relationship with this child ...." 74. The Applicant in her submissions referred me to the guidance of the Perez Vera report in this regard being that the provision: "requires that the applicant provide only some preliminary evidence that he actually took physical care of the child, a fact which normally will be relatively easy to demonstrate." 75. In the context of Article 13, the authorities clearly demonstrate that the challenge to the exercise of rights of custody is a defence and that burden of proof is consequently upon the Respondent. In MW v. JC , MacGrath J., referencing the decision of McGuinness J. in MSH v. LH (Child Abduction: Custody) [2003] IR 390, referenced: "the determination of whether, as per McGuinness J., it has been clearly and unequivocally established by the Respondent that the Applicant has not exercised rights of custody and whether this is consistent, or inconsistent with maintaining the stance and attitude of a custodial parent." (Paragraph 68) 76. The authorities, [1] demonstrate that imprisonment resulting in extremely curtailed access with a child did not amount to such non-exercise. An application to the courts for access made after a long delay and shortly prior to removal was found to be sufficient in the MW v. JC case. In the authorities cited to me, the inaction or non-exercise of parental role was of far longer duration and of an entirely qualitatively different nature than is the position in this case. In submission, it was accepted by the Respondent that the time periods in this instance were much shorter in duration but it was contended that "the Applicant has not made meaningful efforts to maintain a relationship with her son ..." . For reasons stated below, I do not accept this to be the position on the evidence before me. 77. The defence was successful in NJ v. EO'D [2018] IEHC 662 where Ni Raifeartaigh J. stated: "31. It seems to me that the present case involves a situation where the father did not, at least from April 2016, in any serious way seek to maintain a relationship with the child or maintain the stance and attitude of a custodial parent. The provision of finance, through weekly payments, whether adequate or inadequate, or by lump sum payments into a trust fund for the child, is not evidence which satisfies this test as it does not support a finding that the father wished to maintain a personal relationship with the child herself. The accidental encounter between the applicant and his daughter on the 6th July 2017 is certainly not, in my view, the exercise of a right of access, contrary to what was contended for on behalf of the applicant. Since this was a chance encounter and not even initiated by the applicant, it could not possibly be characterised as an attempt to sustain a relationship with the child. Further, as between April 2016 and July 2017, a period of approximately 15 months, the applicant did not see his child. This does not appear to be in dispute, and certainly what the applicant himself said to the police in September 2016 corroborates this. The applicant's main argument appears to be that the respondent was preventing him from having access to the child. It is also true that two non-contact orders were made against him. However, the applicant brought no court application seeking access or any form of rights or decision-making power in respect of the child herself. It was not suggested that he made any attempt to make arrangements through the social services, notwithstanding that the order dated January 2017 specifically referred to the social services as the medium through which contact with the mother could be made. Nor did he make any request to the English courts to assist him in the face of what he considered to be unreasonable refusals on the part of the respondent. Further, he failed to do so despite his knowledge of the respondent's frequent trips to Ireland with the child, and having been advised by the authorities in September 2016 about what avenues to pursue if he were concerned about child abduction. The height of his case in support of his being an "active and engaged father" is that he was constantly making telephone contact with the mother, requesting access to the child and rebuffed, in circumstances where he took no concrete steps, using the relevant authorities, to secure access. Finally, although it is more minor than the other matters, the applicant does not contradict the evidence that on the three occasions he was informed that his daughter was in hospital, he failed to attend or make further inquiries as to her welfare. In all of the circumstances, it seems to me that it could not be said that at the time of the child's removal to Ireland, the applicant was "exercising" his rights of custody within the meaning of the Convention. Notwithstanding that I must adopt a liberal approach to the "exercise of rights of custody", I find myself unable to reach the conclusion, on the evidence before me, that this applicant was exercising rights of custody at the time of the child's removal to Ireland." (Paragraph 31) Grave risk 78. The Supreme Court in A. S. v P. S. (Child Abduction) [1998] 2 IR 244 endorsed the two stage requirements stated by Wall J. in Re. K. (Abduction: Child's Objections) [1995] 1 F. L. R. 977 at page 987: "The authorities are clear that the burden here is on the mother [Respondent] and that the test is a high one. Grave risk is not, of course, to be equated with consideration of the paramount welfare of the child. The obvious reason for this is that I am not deciding where and with whom these children should live. I am deciding whether or not they should return to the USA under the Convention for their future speedily to be decided in that jurisdiction. 36 However, to come within Article 13 (b) there has to be a grave risk of substantial harm to the children. Furthermore, and crucially in this context, the court is entitled to have regard to the practical consequences of its own order and accordingly any risk of harm can properly be reduced or in some cases extinguished by undertakings or by reliance on court procedures in the Convention State . . ." 79. The applicable legal principles were also discussed in the widely accepted authority of In Re E (Children) (Abduction: Custody Appeal) [2011] 2 FLR 758 . 80. As stated by Whelan J. in CMW v SJF [2019] IECA 227 , the correct approach to this defence is: "54. In the Supreme Court decision P. L. v E. C. (Child abduction) [2009] 1 IR 1 , which also involved allegations of child sexual abuse, it stated at paras. 54-55: "... Such disputed allegations form the normal material for ruling by the family courts in the jurisdiction of habitual residence. ... The correct approach to the treatment of this issue is very well established in the case-law. It is not the purpose of the Hague Convention that hearings of Convention applications should turn into inquiries as to the best interests of the child. The normal presumption is that issues of that sort (which will extend to all aspects of child welfare including custody and access) will be decided by the courts of the country of habitual residence. It is the fundamental objective of the Convention to discourage the abduction of minors from the jurisdiction of the courts which have jurisdiction to decide those issues. The courts of the country to which the child has been removed must order the return of the child, unless one of the Convention exceptions is established. A court is not entitled to refuse to make such an order based on the general considerations of the welfare of the child. It is, naturally, implicit in this policy that our courts must place trust in the fairness and justice of the courts of the other country." 55. The burden to establish intolerability is a stringent one because of the actual terms of Art. 13(b) of the Hague Convention. The standard of proof is that of the ordinary balance of probabilities. In evaluating the evidence, the Court must have regard to the limitations necessarily involved in summary proceedings pursuant to the Hague Convention process. 56. It is clear from the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that a potential defence pursuant to Art. 13(b) offers an exception to the requirement pursuant to the Convention to return a child summarily to the jurisdiction of habitual residence once wrongful removal has been established. It is an exception furthermore that must be narrowly construed in light of the plain language of the sub-section. The burden of proof rests on a respondent to Hague Convention proceedings to discharge the evidential burden of establishing that a summary return, in and of itself, would result in grave risk of the minor being exposed to either physical or psychological harm, or being otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. The concept of intolerability connotes substantial and not trivial circumstances. Art. 13(b) must be construed within the human rights framework and in light of the decision in Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland it must be interpreted having regard to the child's best interests." 81. The Court of Appeal in C. A. -v- C. A. [2010] 2 IR 162 summarised the evidential burden as follows, at paragraph 21: "[T]he evidential burden of establishing that there is a grave risk that the return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place him or her in an intolerable situation is on the person opposing the order for return, in this case the mother, and is of a high threshold. The type of evidence which must be adduced has been referred to in a number of decisions as 'clear and compelling evidence'." 82. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in P. L. -v- E. C. [2009] I IR 1 stated, at paragraph 55: "The correct approach to the treatment of this issue is very well established in the case-law. It is not the purpose of the Hague Convention that hearings of Convention applications should turn into inquiries as to the best interests of the child. The normal presumption is that issues of that sort (which will extend to all aspects of child welfare 38 including custody and access) will be decided by the courts of the country of habitual residence... The courts of the country to which the child has been removed must order the return of the child, unless one of the Convention exceptions is established. A court is not entitled to refuse to make such an order based on the general considerations of the welfare of the child. It is, naturally, implicit in this policy that our courts must place trust in the fairness and justice of the courts of the other country." 83. In the case of IP v. TP [2012] IEHC 31 , Finlay Geoghegan J. cited with approval certain dicta of the courts in England and Wales, including the case of Re E (Children) [2011] UKSC 27 . The learned Judge stated: "Intolerable is as has been stated 'a strong word' and when applied to a child must mean 'a situation which this particular child in these particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate' (In re D [2007] 1 AC 619 at para. 52. In In re E, the Court, at para 34, having referred to this definition observed: "Every child has to put up with a certain amount of rough and tumble, discomfort and distress. It is part of growing up. But there are some things which it is not reasonable to expect a child to tolerate. Amongst these, of course, are physical or psychological abuse or neglect of the child herself. 84. Finlay Geoghegan J. continued, at paragraph 40, to state: "... the defence provided for in Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention is one which should be given a restricted application but that does not mean it should never be applied at all. The burden of proof is the ordinary balance of probabilities. It is for them to adduce the evidence to substantiate the exception ..." 85. It is without doubt that grave risk may arise not only from one event but based on cumulative events. This is made amply clear from the decisions of Q v Q [2023] IEHC 183 (Gearty J.) and AA v. RR [2019] IEHC 442 (Donnelly J.). 86. The appropriate calibration of the best interests of children in the context of the Convention has been considered in Neulinger and Shuruk v Switzerland [2010] ECHR 1053 and X v. Latvia (ECtHR, 26 November 2013), the Court stating in the latter: "107. In consequence, the Court considers that Article 8 of the Convention imposes on the domestic authorities a particular procedural obligation in this respect: when assessing an application for a child's return, the courts must not only consider arguable allegations of a "grave risk" for the child in the event of return, but must also make a ruling giving specific reasons in the light of the circumstances of the case. Both a refusal to take account of objections to the return capable of falling within the scope of Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention and insufficient reasoning in the ruling dismissing such objections would be contrary to the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention and also to the aim and purpose of the Hague Convention. Due consideration of such allegations, demonstrated by reasoning of the domestic courts that is not automatic and stereotyped, but sufficiently detailed in the light of the exceptions set out in the Hague Convention, which must be interpreted strictly (see Maumousseau and Washington, cited above, § 73), is necessary. This will also enable the Court, whose task is not to take the place of the national courts, to carry out the European supervision entrusted to it. 108. Furthermore, as the Preamble to the Hague Convention provides for children's return "to the State of their habitual residence", the courts must satisfy themselves that adequate safeguards are convincingly provided in that country, and, in the event of a known risk, that tangible protection measures are put in place." Discretion 87. The authorities clearly establish that, even where an Article 13 defence is established, this Court has a discretion to nevertheless order the return of the child. This is essentially a further manifestation of the respect and comity afforded by the court of the place of removal to/retention in to the court of the jurisdiction from which the child came and the fundamental premise of the Convention that issues relating to the appropriate child arrangements are best addressed in the court of habitual residence of the child, to which place the child should be returned, absent extreme circumstances justifying the remaining of the child. 88. In B v B [1998] 1 IR 299 Denham J. stated: "Factors to be considered include: The habitual residence of the child at the time of the removal. The law relevant to her custody and access. These two first factors raise the issue of the comparative suitability of the competing jurisdictions: whether the decisions as to the best interest of the child should be taken in an English or Irish court: in light of the Hague Convention. The overall policy of the Convention and its objective to secure protection for rights of access. In this latter regard the fact that the mother of a two-year-old girl has not had access other than on the day of the court hearing of the child is a relevant consideration, though not decisive on its own. The object of the Convention to ensure that the rights of custody and of access under the law of one contracting state are effectively respected in the other contracting states. The circumstances of the child, information relating to the social background of the child, as stated in the final paragraph of art. 13 of the Hague Convention. The nature of consent of the appellant. Was it consent to the removal of the child from England for some time or in effect a waiver of custody of the child until she was 16? In this regard the circumstances of the making of the consent are relevant. The litigation in England and the decision of the 5th August 1996, by the English High Court, Family Division, that V. B. be a ward of court, that the respondent return the child to that jurisdiction, and that V. B. reside with the appellant. The matter of undertakings, which are settled law in this jurisdiction, especially in relation to very young children." 89. The matter was further considered by the Court of Appeal in M v. M [2023] IECA 126 . Donnelly J. stated: "The exercise of discretion must be operated in accordance with the legal principles that have emerged from the case law. These principles are derived from the policies underpinning the Convention. On one view these policies might seem to be in tension, but it has been recognised that the discretion vested in a court to refuse to return on the basis of the objection of the child is also a policy of the Convention. As the Supreme Court (Finlay Geoghegan J.) identified in MR v AR: "Where a court is satisfied of the first two questions, it should then clearly turn to a consideration of the exercise of the discretion given to it by Article 13 of the Convention. That discretion must be exercised with due regard for the general policies and objectives of the Convention. As stated, these include general policies which favour the prompt return of children for the purpose of the courts of their habitual residence deciding custody disputes but also include a policy that where a child objects, a court may refuse to return the child." ... 80. In MR v AR, Finlay Geoghegan J. indicated that there were some general considerations that must be taken into account, but she emphasised that each case was to be assessed "having regard to the individual facts and circumstances of the child, the parents and other family circumstances". Great care therefore must be taken with general statements of policy. 81. At para 65 of MR v AR, Finlay Geoghegan J. went on to give general guidance as to how a court ought to exercise its discretion while noting that each case is decided on its facts. In this paragraph, the Supreme Court identified the reason why there was a balancing between those policies requiring return and the individual circumstances of the child who objects to return. The balancing is to determine "what is, in the limited sense used, in the best interests of the child at that moment." The Supreme Court said that the weight to be given to the general Convention policies favouring return and to the objection of the child may vary with time. The further one is from a prompt return, the less weighty the general Convention policies will be. Counsel for the father correctly identified promptness in court procedures as an important factor in the Convention policy and said that this case was not one to be determined on a delay basis such as the case of DM v VK [2022] IECA 207 ." 90. In the NJ v. EO'D case referenced previously, Ni Raifeartaigh J. discussed the exercise of discretion in the context of the non-exercise of rights of custody defence. She found to be of relevance the fact that the Respondent mother had always been the primary carer of the child, that the child was very young and had not started school before coming to Ireland, that the Respondent mother had family and other supports in Ireland which she did not have in the place of habitual residence where she was struggling financially. Reference was also made to the sub-optimal behaviour of the Applicant in the place of habitual residence resulting in complaints to the authorities and domestic violence relief being ordered against him. The learned Judge concluded: "It seems to me that the best interests of the child would be served by having her primary carer in a situation where she has peace of mind and a stable environment in which to raise the child." CONCLUSION 91. (a) Having considered the evidence herein, I conclude that the Applicant had and was at all material times exercising her rights of custody within the meaning of that term pursuant to Article 3 and Article 13 of the Convention. She was physically visiting P until the 10 th August 2025 and she was continuing to seek to have a greater role in his life thereafter. She consistently and repeated to execute a power of attorney which would diminish and surrender elements her parental decision-making role. The message sent on the 5 th September 2025 could in no sense be interpreted as that of a parent ceasing to exercise rights of custody. Thereafter, she contacted the police seeking that the child be removed by them into protective custody and the response indicated that the child had been unilaterally removed to Ireland. I do not interpret the communications from the Respondent to the Applicant as evidencing an encouragement or facilitation of access. They are transactional and negotiatory in nature demonstrating continuing conditionality and in no way supportive of maintaining the mother child relationship. The recent correspondence of the Respondent in relation to access demonstrates a continuation of this approach. On the evidence before me (in particular contemporaneous messages), I conclude that the Applicant has been endeavouring to have her exercise of rights of custody result in a significant amelioration of her contact with P since a time prior to her admission to hospital in April 2024 and this has continued to the present time. 92. (b) I do not conclude that the defence of grave risk has been established. The law in this regard is very clear. The test requires two separate elements to be addressed, the first being the level of threat and the second being whether, if such threat exists, it is one that cannot be protected by the authorities of the place of habitual residence. I do not believe that the treat in this instance in any way goes even close to the standard of risk required. There are two events of significance, taking the evidence at its height. One relates to the breaking of the framed document and the other relates to the knife. Both of these events occurred in the context of relationship stress (which must have been contributed to by the abusive events which resulted in serious criminal sanctions against the Respondent) and on the cusp of the Applicant's admission to hospital for treatment for an adjustment disorder. She underwent a period of treatment and has provided a medical report indicating that these issues have abated. Subsequent to her treatment, the only event presenting any degree of risk raised by the Respondent relates to an incident during an access visit in August 2025 where the child was playing in a puddle and the Respondent indicates that he was endangered by cars passing nearby. The Applicant denies the Respondent's version. This is not an event which would reach the level of conduct or incident required for the establishment of grave risk pursuant to the applicable authorities. I also find that the second part of the test is not satisfied. There is no evidence that the Respondent was not assisted by the Japanese authorities. Indeed, on the contrary, these authorities would appear to have assisted him in keeping the residential address of the child from the Applicant. The evidence, in fact, indicates that it is the Applicant who has received little assistance from the authorities. She has not been able to have proceedings issued to regulate contact and child arrangements despite attempting so to do over a long period. She has sought to engage the assistance of the police on various occasions and has been unsuccessful in this regard. In this regard, it must be recognised that it is palpably false that the Applicant did not seek that an address would be provided by the Respondent for the purposes of issuing proceedings and it is also false that the Respondent was not aware that she was endeavouring to institute proceedings in 2024 and required that he provide an address for this purpose. There are a number of messages in the post-April 2024 period where she seeks this address and tells the Respondent that this is for the purpose of commencing proceedings. No address was provided. Clearly, had it been, the proceedings could have issued and the Japanese courts could have proceeded to address child arrangements with both parents having regard to the child's best interests. The Respondent chose not to permit this path of travel but rather to act unilaterally culminating in the child's removal to a third country without informing the Applicant or even making contact with her thereafter. I conclude that far from the Respondent not having adequate supports in Japan to address any risk arising, the Respondent would appear to have benefitted far more from such supports than did the Applicant. His behaviour interfered with the invocation of judicial support by the Applicant. 93. (c) In conclusion, having regard to the best interests of P, had I concluded that the grave risk defence was engaged (which I have not done), I would exercise my discretion in favour of return as I believe this to be in the best interests of P. The unilateral severance of the relationship between the child and the Applicant which the Respondent has advanced and maintained I conclude to be unsupported by the objective facts herein. To move a small child from his home, his community, his country and, most importantly, his other parent to reside in a country with which the family has no connection and as an applicant for international protection is difficult to comprehend. To seek to obliterate a parent from a child's life consequent upon an episode of mental ill health for which treatment has been received and which should engender support and not an opportunity to take parental advantage I conclude to be entirely unacceptable and to be entirely contrary to the welfare of the child. 94. (d) I therefore order the return of P to Japan and this should occur without delay. I will hear from the parties as to the timing and the circumstances in which this should occur. I will list this matter at 11 am on the 21 st April 2026 to hear from the parties in this respect and in respect of any other matters arising. [1] MSH v LH (Child Abduction: Custody) [2003] IR 390 (McGuinness J.) BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC293.html