

JERSEY / JUDGMENT

T v S (Matrimonial) [2022]

JRC 286 (16 December 2022)

[2022] JRC 286

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judgment

commissioner: 1. The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant is in contempt of Court for alleged breaches of orders made by the Court. 2. The brief background is that the parties were married in 1995 and separated in May 2016. The Defendant commenced divorce proceedings shortly thereafter and, the family wealth being held by the Defendant, the Plaintiff applied for ancillary relief. In its judgment of 15 th January 2019 reported as S v T

[2019] JRC 003, the Court made final orders in respect of the ancillary relief proceedings providing for a clean break between the parties ("the Final Judgment"). 3. On 17 th August 2021, the Plaintiff obtained the signature of the Bailiff to an Order of Justice which contained a number of freezing and disclosure orders against the Defendant and which was served upon her in France, where she lives, on 21 st October 2021. These orders were obtained in support of an application to be made by the Plaintiff to set aside the Final Judgment on the grounds of material non-disclosure on the part of the Defendant. That application was made by the Plaintiff by summons dated 3 rd November 2021 and in a judgment of today's date, the Court has declined to set aside the Final

Judgment.

The Orders 4. It is necessary to set out the orders contained within the Order of Justice ("the Orders") of which the Defendant is alleged to be in contempt: "3. Service of this Order of Justice upon the Defendant shall operate as an immediate interim Order restraining her from removing from the Island of Jersey or in any way disposing of or dealing with or diminishing the value of any of her assets in the Island of Jersey or elsewhere whether in her own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned up to the value of £5,000,000. 4. The prohibition includes the following assets in particular: (a) The net proceeds after payment of any charges of the recent sale of the property known as [Property G], which is understood to have been owned by the Second Party Cited (FTP Properties Limited); (b) The property known as [Property D], which is understood to be owned by the Second Party Cited (FTP Properties Limited) or the net sale money after payment of any charges if it has been sold; (c) The property known as ["Property I"] registered [Redacted], (which comprises a stud farm building and land called ["Property I"],

which is understood to be officially owned by [Redacted], a French Registered company, registered [in] [Redacted] at the Companies registry in [Region 1], registration number [Redacted], registered address: [Redacted]- itself ultimately owned by the First Party Cited (FTP Investments Limited) or the net sale money after payment of any charges if it has been sold; (d) The property known as [Property J], registered [Redacted] (a sixteen bedroom manor house with twenty acres of land) which is understood to be officially owned by [Company M], a French registered company, registered in 2015 [Redacted] at the Companies Registry in [Region 2], registration number [Redacted], registered address: [Redacted]

- itself ultimately owned by the First Party Cited (FTP Investments Limited) or the net sale money after payment of any charge if it has been sold; (e) The following motor vehicles: (i) Lamborghini Aventador, LP700-4, White, 2015 and originally registered as J129980; (ii) Lamborghini Aventador, believed to be a SVJ and purchased in 2019; (iii) Porsche Boxster Spyder, white, purchased in Jersey in 2015 and originally registered as J129219; (iv) Aston Martin Vanquish 2003, black, previously known to be registered as KP51 PAT; (v) Aston Martin Vanquish carbon edition, 2014/15, black, originally registered in Jersey as J22114; (vi) Mercedes G Wagon G63 AMG, Black, purchased in 2015 in Jersey and registered as J128688; (vii) Aston Martin Vanquish S Ultimate 2017/18; and (viii) Mercedes, believed to be a V12 sports car, possibly a S65. 5. This Order applies to assets (whether or not specifically listed) which are in the Defendant's own name and whether they are solely or jointly owned. For the purpose of this Order the Defendant's assets include any asset which she has the power, directly or indirectly, to dispose of or deal with as if it were her own. The Defendant is to be regarded as having such power if a third party holds or controls the asset in accordance with her direct or indirect instructions. 6. The prohibitions set out above shall not apply to the extent that the total unencumbered value of the Defendant's assets in Jersey or elsewhere exceeds £5,000,000. The Defendant may dispose of or deal with them so long as the total unencumbered value of her assets in the Island of Jersey or elsewhere remains above £5,000,000 on top of those monies already held to the order of the Court. Disclosure of information by the Defendant 7. The Defendant shall within fourteen (14) days of service of this order upon her inform the Plaintiff's Advocates in writing of all of her assets, directly or indirectly owned, of whatever nature in the Island of Jersey or elsewhere whether in her own name or not and whether solely or jointly owned, giving the value, location and details of all such assets. Specifically included is a list of all of the assets held by the Defendant with or through any of the following persons or entities: [("D")], FTC Group Holdings Limited, the Parties Cited, Investec Wealth and Investment (Channel Islands) Limited, Investec Bank (Channel Islands) Limited, [Company N]. The Defendant may be entitled to refuse to provide some or all of this information on the grounds that it may incriminate her. In addressing the Order for the disclosure of information provided for in paragraph 7 above the Defendant must specifically disclosure current bank statements for all accounts of which she is a signatory, or actual or potential beneficiary, anywhere in the world. Specifically included, but not limited to, shall be any account held by, for or to her order in the names of [D], FTC Group Holdings Limited, FTP investments Limited, Investec Wealth and Investment

(Channel Islands) Limited, Investec Bank (Channel Islands) Limited, FTP Properties Limited, [Company N] and [Company M]. 9. The information provided for at paragraphs 7 and 8 above must be confirmed in an Affidavit exhibiting relevant supporting documentation which must be provided to the Plaintiff's Advocate within twenty-one (21) days of service hereof of the Order upon the Defendant Exceptions 10. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Order does not prohibit the Defendant from spending (a) £10,000 per calendar month towards her ordinary living expenses; (b) £10,000 per calendar month towards her ordinary and proper business expenses; and (c) £20,000 per calendar month on legal advice and representation. Before spending any money the Defendant must tell the Plaintiff's Advocate the amount concerned and where the money is to come from. 11. The Defendant may agree with the Plaintiff's Advocate that the above spending limits should be increased or that this Order should be varied in any other respect but any such agreement must be in writing. 12. The Defendant may cause this Order to cease to have effect if the Defendant provides security by paying the sum of £5,000,000 into Court or makes provision for security in that sum by some other method agreed with the Plaintiff's Advocate." 5. The Order of Justice contained this warning in capital letters: "YOU MUST OBEY THE ORDERS CONTAINED IN THIS ORDER OF JUSTICE. IF YOU DO NOT YOU WILL BE GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE SENT TO PRISON. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO APPLY TO THE COURT TO RECONSIDER THIS ORDER." 6. As can be seen, a number of the assets referred to in the Orders, namely Property G, Property I, Property D and the Property J are all owned through corporate structures and it was not in dispute that these are assets which the Defendant has the power indirectly to dispose of or deal with. The Law 7. The law in this area is well established and was summarised in *BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation v Siciles C. de Bourbon de Deux*

[2019] JRC 199 at paragraphs 38

- 43. We would summarise the applicable principles for the purpose of this judgment as follows: (i) Because contempt of Court may attract a punishment such as imprisonment or a fine, it must be proved to the criminal standard, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt. For the same reason, a person is not to be held in contempt for breaching a court order unless that order is unambiguous as to what is required of him or her. (ii) The question of whether or not a contempt by reason of a breach of a court order has been committed involves an essentially objective test requiring the determination of whether or not the alleged contemnor has acted in a manner constituting a breach of the order. If she has, then a contempt will be established regardless of whether or not she acted contumaciously or with the intention of breaking the order, although whether any, and if so what, punishment ought to be imposed upon her will or may be materially dependent on considerations of that sort. 8. To the extent that we find the Defendant to be in contempt, it is because we are satisfied that the criminal standard has been met in each case. 9. The importance of obeying court orders was explained in *Taylor v Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police*

[2004] JLR 494 at paragraph 30: "... It is of the first importance that orders of the Court should be obeyed. This is not for the purpose of upholding the Court's dignity. The Court makes orders because it believes them to be in the interests of justice. If parties are to be able to rely on the Court resolving disputes between them, they must have confidence that orders will be enforced. If it is open to a party to argue that although he has failed to comply with the Court's order he did not mean to breach the order, there will be endless scope for argument and for parties to try and get out of their obligations to obey the order.... Far better for there to be an absolute rule that orders must be obeyed with mitigation being available as necessary when the breach was not deliberate. 10. The case against the Defendant is based upon the documents before the Court. Pleadings setting out the particulars of the allegations of contempt and the Defendant's response thereto have been filed. At the hearing the Defendant addressed the Court, but she did not give evidence on oath. Suffice it to say she refuted all of the allegations of contempt against her. The alleged breaches Property G 11. Property G was sold on 31 st May 2021 before the imposition of the Orders, as acknowledged in paragraph 4(a) of the

Orders.

That order would only bite upon the proceeds of sale, if there were any, as at 31 st October 2021 when the Order of Justice was served upon the Defendant and, if the proceeds of sale were still held by the Defendant, then she would have to disclose the same pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Orders as a current asset of hers. In her lists of assets filed on the 10 th of December 2021 she made no reference to her holding any proceeds of sale. 12. However, at a hearing on 19 th May 2022, the Commissioner was concerned as to the financial position of the Defendant, which appeared to have deteriorated, and she was ordered to file a fourth affidavit the purpose of which was to give clarity to the Court as to her current financial position and to deal in particular with "what has happened to the sale proceeds of [Property G] and [Property I] and where the same are now held." 13. In her fourth affidavit of 13 th June 2022, the Defendant responded as follows in relation to Property G. "It was sold by me for £850,000 in 2021. The proceeds of sale have been exhausted and I have nothing left. The sale took place after the Final Judgment and before these current proceedings were commenced and as far as I am concerned, this has nothing to do with the Plaintiff and his continued fishing exercise." 14. The Defendant did therefore file an affidavit with the bare minimum of an explanation, but does that amount to compliance with the order of the 19 th May 2022? 15. In *Realkredit Danmark A/S v York Montague*

[1998] WL 1042171 (1998) the English Court of Appeal was concerned with an alleged failure to comply with an unless order for the provision of a list of documents which are or had been in the possession custody or power of the defendant. A list had been filed which the Plaintiff alleged was deficient. It was held that the test was whether the list served was illusory, the Court of Appeal giving this explanation: "... Interestingly there is no reported case of an action being struck out as a result of a list being incomplete. But there is in the much litigated field of Further and Better Particulars, where, in *Reiss v Woold*

[1932] 1 QB 557 at pages 559-560 the Court of Appeal approved a passage from the judgment of Devlin J who said:- 'So construed, 'default' refers to a default in the delivery of a document within the specified time. I do not, of course, mean that any document with writing on it will do. It must be a document made in good faith and which can fairly be entitled 'particulars'. It must not be illusory: ... That is the test, in my judgment, and not as the plaintiff contends, whether each demand for particulars has been substantially met.' ... In the present case the court was only concerned with whether the unless order had been complied with. The lenders had conceded that the valuer's affidavits would have justified the making of an order for specific discovery. ... Instead, the court was invited by the valuers to embark upon a wide-ranging critique of the list which had been served, and asked to conclude in the face of the affidavit evidence to the contrary that it did not amount to compliance with an unless order. Of course, none of the other procedural routes open to the valuers would have served their purpose which was to have the action against them dismissed. I do not think the judge should have accepted the valuers' invitation.'" 16. That reasoning can be usefully applied by way of analogy to the situation here. The Defendant has filed a document, but this was an order of the Court seeking an account of what had happened to the proceeds of sale and in our view, the terse response of the Defendant that the proceeds had been "exhausted", combined with her comment that this has nothing to do with the Plaintiff, is illusory and does not amount to compliance. The order was not made at the instance of the Plaintiff, but at the instance of the Court. £850,000 is a substantial amount of money and the Court is none the wiser as to what the Defendant did with those proceeds after their receipt on the 31st May 2022. 17. We find, therefore, that the Defendant is in contempt of Court in her response to the order of 19 th May 2022. Property I 18. This property was sold on 11 th April 2022 for €600,000 some eight months after the imposition of the

Orders.

In her fourth affidavit, the Defendant explained that the proceeds had been paid into an account of her husband. Following the sale there was litigation in France between the Plaintiff and Defendant in which he attempted unsuccessfully to attach the proceeds of sale, but this is irrelevant to the position under the Orders. 19. The Defendant could only have disposed of Property I during the currency of the Orders with the consent of the Plaintiff or if her assets exceeded £5M after the sale. This is an important issue in that unless that sum was exceeded, the Defendant also came under the provisions of paragraph 10 of the Orders which exempted certain expenditure and imposed an obligation upon her to tell the Plaintiff's Advocate before spending any money, the amount involved and where the money is to come from. It was accepted by the Defendant that she had not complied with this provision on the basis that it did not apply because her assets did exceed £5M. 20. The Court took the view, without the benefit of any authority, that whilst an allegation as to contempt of Court had to be proved to the criminal standard, to the extent that the Defendant maintained she was not bound by the Orders because she had assets over £5M, the burden was upon her to satisfy the Court on the balance of probabilities that this

was the case. 21. The Defendant asserted that her asset position was as follows: Assets S Estimated Value Comments Property D £3,000,000 Under Offer Property J €3,136,627 Family home stud farm at rear Car Collection £2,751,000 Valued by Jacksons Horses £500,000 Very poor market 2021 £90,000 Horsebox tractor and tools Jewellery and Fine Art £1,500,000 Estimated Loans to Property D and RDC Valuables I cannot value as seized by Huissier and I do not know where and even though they know not returned and no itinerary £3,000,000 Total Assets £13,9778,751 Total Liabilities £360,000 HP on cars Net Assets £13,617,751 22. We take each of these assets in turn. Property D 23. The only valuation for Property D produced by the Defendant was by D2 Real Estate dated 10 th December 2021. It valued the freehold interest of Property D at £2,138,000. There was evidence that a car storage business ultimately belonging to the Defendant and her husband, which occupied part of the property, was being separately marketed for sale as a business for £1,000,000, but we were shown no accounts or particulars of sale that would ordinarily accompany a sale of such a business. The particulars of sale of the property by the agents Cooper Brouard provided by the Defendant make no reference to an incumbent business for sale and does not state the selling price of the property. A confirmation by the agents, in correspondence with Advocate Mistry (then acting for the Defendant), that the freehold was being marketed at £3,500,000 and the business for £1,000,000 (a total of £4,500,000) was entirely unsupported. 24. In the Court's view, only £2,138,000 could be attributed to the value of this asset. As it was owned through a corporate structure by the Defendant and her husband jointly, only half of that sum could be attributed to the Defendant, namely £1,069,000. Property J 25. The Defendant relied on a short letter from a French firm of estate agents, Leggett Ommibilier, of 6 th December 2021 which valued Property J at €3,200,000, which at current exchange rates would equate to some £2,700,000. The Defendant claimed to have spent some £3m on this property (not supported by any independent evidence), but even so this is a very substantial increase over the cost of the property in 2015 of €973,000 and its valuation in 2018 of €696,000-see paragraph 44(iv) of the Final Judgment. 26. The Plaintiff, on the other hand, provided a formal and very detailed valuation by Remi Serais, an "Expert Immobilier FNAIM" and member of the Company of Judicial Experts of the Court of Appeal of Caen, dated 10 th May 2022, valuing the property at €1,086,000, which at current exchange rates would equate to some £942,000. 27. The Court accepts the formal valuation procured by the Plaintiff as the most reliable evidence of the value of this property. Again, as this asset is owned through a corporate structure by the Defendant and her husband jointly, only half of that sum can be attributed to the Defendant, namely £471,000. The car collection 28. The Defendant's high-end value car collection featured in the Final Judgment with the cars then being attributed a value of £1,206,000. To support her current valuation of £2,751,000, the Defendant produced a valuation by ATD Automotive Detailing Limited, a Guernsey company that provides car storage, washing and detailing services, which valued the cars at £1,800,000. The Defendant had, for example, valued the Lamborghini SVJ Coupé at £1,062,500 as against ADT's valuation of £485,000. 29. The Defendant had also procured, but placed no reliance on, a valuation by Jacksons in Guernsey dated 26 th October 2021 of £1,288,000. Jacksons had valued the Lamborghini at £380,000. 30. The Court accepted the valuation by Jacksons as the most reliable evidence of the value of these cars as they are a well-known firm of car dealers in business for many years in Guernsey and Jersey. Although some of

these cars were still apparently registered in the name of the Defendant's son, the Court accepted that all of the car collection belonged beneficially to the Defendant. The horses 31. There was some inconsistency in the number of horses which the Defendant said were owned at different times, and although the Defendant provided no independent valuations, the Court took into account her now extensive involvement in the equine industry and accepted her current valuation of £500,000. The horses were ultimately owned jointly with her husband and therefore only half of that amount could be attributed to her, namely £250,000. The court also accepted her valuation of the horse box, tractor and tools at £90,000 of which one half only would be attributable to the Defendant, namely £45,000. Jewellery and Fine Art 32. Despite the absence of formal valuations, the Court was prepared to accept the Defendant's estimated valuation of £1.5M. Loan to Property D and RDC 33. The Defendant did not clarify how the loan figure of £3M was divided between these two entities or whether the loans were due to her alone, or to herself and her husband. The loan to the company owning Property D could only be taken into account to the extent that it had assets to meet the same. On the assumption that its sole asset was the property Property D, then the loan would only be good to the extent of the value of that property. It would be double counting for the Defendant to list as an asset both the value of the property Property D and the amount of the loan due by the company that owns Property D, assuming the property is the only asset of the company. There was no information as to which RDC entity owed money to the Defendant or its recoverability. The Court was not able to attribute any value to these loans. 34. The Court has therefore valued the assets of the Defendant as follows: (i) Property D £1,069,000 (ii) Property J £471,000 (iii) The car collection £1,288,000 (iv) The horses and horse box £295,000 (v) The Jewellery and Fine Art £1,500,000 Total £4,623,000 35. From this must be deducted the Hire Purchase liability on the cars (owned by the Defendant) of £360,000 giving a net figure of £4,263,000. The Defendant did not list any other liabilities she may have. 36. In listing her assets, the Defendant had included her valuation of the Property J in Euros and not in Sterling, and had omitted the fact that the Property J, Property D and the horses were jointly owned. She did produce a letter from her husband dated 3rd June 2022 in which he said that for the purposes of the Defendant providing security in order to lift the injunctions, he agreed to allocate his half of the joint matrimonial assets (a term which he did not define) to the Defendant. However, he added that in the event that the Court set aside the Final Judgment, his consent would be withdrawn. Bearing in mind that the purpose of the Orders was to give security to the Plaintiff should the Final Judgment be set aside, this rendered the letter valueless. 37. Accordingly, we find that the Defendant has not persuaded us on the balance of probabilities that she had assets of £5M following the sale of Property I on 11th April 2022 and therefore that sale was in breach of the Orders and a contempt of Court. 38. At current exchange rates, the sale proceeds of Property I of €600,000 would equate to some £520,000 so that even before the sale, the Defendant's assets were valued at under £5M and it follows that from at least that date, there is a continuing contempt in the failure of the Defendant to comply with the requirements of paragraph 10 of the Orders. The situation is compounded by the fact that the Defendant did not retain the proceeds of sale, but instead gifted the same (as we understand it) to her husband. 39. The fact that, subjectively, the Defendant may have believed that the sale of Property I left her with assets of £5M is a matter for mitigation but it is of course incumbent upon the Defendant to

ensure her compliance with the Orders. List of assets 40. Paragraph 7 of the Order of Justice required the Defendant to produce a list of all of her assets within fourteen days of service of the Order of Justice to be confirmed by affidavit within twenty-one days. 41. Following service of the Order of Justice on 21 st October 2021, the Defendant was given an extension to comply with this order to th November 2021. The list was not produced until the filing of her first affidavit on 10 th December 2021. We accept that the Defendant was therefore in breach of the Court's order to this extent, and therefore in contempt of Court. Inadequate nature of the list of assets 42. The Plaintiff raises numerous issues as to the inadequacy of the list of assets provided by the Defendant and inconsistencies between the list produced on 13 th December 2021 and that produced with her fourth affidavit on 13 th June 2022. 43. We are not going to set out those arguments, because there is an important distinction between the failure to file a list of assets at all or a list that is illusory on the one hand, and criticisms of the list that has been filed. The Plaintiff's criticisms of the Defendant's lists of assets could have led to the making of further orders but they do not, in our view, sound in contempt. Failure to provide bank statements 44. Under paragraph 8 of the Order of Justice, the Defendant was required to disclose her current bank statements. The Defendant was granted an extension until 17 th November 2021, but no bank statements were produced either on that date or with her first affidavit of 10 th December 2021. Bank statements were produced under cover of correspondence on 18 th February 2022, following the Court's clear rejection at a hearing on 4 th February 2022 of arguments put forward by the Defendant that she was not required to do so (see the published judgment of the Court of 2 nd March 2022 T v S and Ors

[2022] JRC 056 at paragraph 45). 45. We accept that the Defendant was, therefore, in breach of the Orders to that extent and accordingly in contempt of Court. 46. The Plaintiff goes on to raise questions as to the adequacy of the bank statements that were produced and the possible existence of other bank statements that had not been disclosed. Again, the Defendant's belated compliance with this order was not illusory and, in our view, these questions do not sound in contempt. Missing French companies 47. When the Defendant provided her list of assets with her affidavit on 10 th December 2021, she set out a list of six corporate entities and one unincorporated business. Open-source searches carried out by the Plaintiff with Infogreffe revealed three additional French companies to which no reference had been made by the Defendant, namely Company W, Company Y and Company Z, incorporated on 14 th September 2021, 16 th March 2021 and 20 th May 2022 respectively. The first two companies were not mentioned in the list provided on 10 th December 2021, the third company being incorporated subsequently. No mention was made of all three companies in the list of assts she provided with her fourth affidavit on 13 th June 2022. 48. In her pleading filed by Advocate Mistry, the Defendant stated that all three companies are dormant and non-trading entities, established for future purposes. She said that for the avoidance of doubt, these entities hold no assets, do not trade and are dormant. 49. However, at the hearing the Defendant informed the Court that Company W was established for accounting purposes to receive and pay away the winnings from horse races, Company Y was established to pay salaries and is funded for that purpose and

Company Z was established to receive the proceeds of sale of Property D (which has yet to take place) and reinvest in real property. The Plaintiff's case is that the failure to disclose these companies in either the first or fourth affidavits constitutes a clear breach of her obligations under paragraph 7 of the Orders. 50. The results from the Plaintiff's search on Infogreffe show the Defendant as a director of these companies, but do not show who the other directors may be and, in particular, who is the owner of these companies.

Accordingly, we cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence before us that they are, in fact, assets of the Defendant. The issue of ownership has not been expressly canvassed or conceded. 51. The inconsistency between the explanation given in her pleading and the information given to the Court at the hearing is unsatisfactory, to say the least, and could give rise to further questions, but taking into account that this allegation must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, we are not satisfied that it sounds in contempt.

Conclusion

52. In summary, we find proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Defendant is in contempt of Court in respect of the following: (i) Her response to the order of the 19 th May 2022. (ii) The sale of Property I on 5 th April 2022. (iii) Her failure to comply with paragraph 10 of the Orders from at least the 5 th April 2022. (iv) Her failure to comply with paragraph 7 of the Orders to provide a list of her assets by the extended date of 17 th November 2021. (v) Her failure to comply with paragraph 8 of the Orders to disclose her current bank accounts by the extended date of 17 th November 2021. 53. When this judgment is handed down, the Court will decide what penalty should be imposed upon the Defendant for these findings of contempt having heard in particular from the Defendant in terms of her mitigation. The penalties range from a reprimand, to a fine or to a sentence of imprisonment. [Having handed down this judgment and heard from the parties] 54. The Court has considered the mitigation put forward by the Defendant carefully, including her apology, her state of ill health, the operation she undertook earlier this year and the drugs she has been taking as a result of that operation. We have also taken into account what she says about her difficult financial position although, in our view and contrary to what she has asserted before us, she has not made her financial position clear to the Court save that she has substantial assets in terms of property in France and Guernsey, cars and horses. We also take into account that she has very recently broken her leg. 55. The Court cannot condone parties failing to comply with orders it has made, and these contempts and, in particular, those set out at paragraphs 52(i), (ii) and (iii) are, in our view, serious. A substantial fine is warranted, therefore. Ordinarily we would have in mind a penalty of £100,000 but, having taken into account what the Defendant has said in mitigation, we are going to reduce that to £50,000. In view of what she said about her financial position, we are going to give her until 31st March 2023 close of business for that fine to be paid. We also order her to pay the costs of the Plaintiff of and incidental to the contempt proceedings on the indemnity basis, to be taxed if not agreed.
- Authorities S v T

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- [2019] JRC 003. BNP Paribas Jersey Trust Corporation v Siciles C. de Bourbon de Deux
- [2019] JRC 199 . Taylor v Chief Officer of States of Jersey Police
- [2004] JLR 494 Realkredit Danmark A/S v York Montague [1998] WL 1042171 (1998). Expert Immobilier FNAIM" T v S and Ors
- [2022] JRC 056 Page Last Updated: 09 Jan 2023 Back to top About JLIB Accessibility Contacts Disclaimer Feedback Privacy policy Site map © Jersey Legal Information Board 2001- This website is not compatible with your web browser. You should install a newer browser . If you live in Jersey and need help upgrading call the States of Jersey web team on 440099. BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
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