ABSA Bank Ltd t\a Bankfin v Ramakatane (CIV\APN 358 of 98) [1998] LSCA 89 (3 August 1998)
Due to material disputes of fact regarding ownership, bona fides of the purchase, and estoppel, the matter cannot be resolved on affidavit and must proceed to trial for cross-examination and full ventilation of issues.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [1998] LSCA 89
- Parties
- Applicant: ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Bankfin; 1st Respondent: Jessie Ramakatane; 2nd Respondent: Bertha Ramakatane
- Court
- Court of Appeal
- Jurisdiction
- Lesotho
- Case Number
- CIV\APN 358 of 98
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Application / Interlocutory Judgment Converting Application to Trial
- Outcome
- Application converted to trial; no final orders on merits; no order as to costs.
- Legal Topics
- Instalment Sale Agreement, Ownership of Motor Vehicle, Estoppel, Contempt of Court, Conversion of Proceedings to Trial
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Bankfin
Applicant
Jessie Ramakatane
1st Respondent
Bertha Ramakatane
2nd Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Application / Interlocutory Judgment Converting Application to Trial
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether applicant is entitled to repossession of the motor vehicle
- 2 Whether respondents are bona fide purchasers for value
- 3 Whether applicant is estopped from denying respondents' ownership
Ratio Decidendi
Due to material disputes of fact regarding ownership, bona fides of the purchase, and estoppel, the matter cannot be resolved on affidavit and must proceed to trial for cross-examination and full ventilation of issues.
Court Disposition
Application converted to trial; no final orders on merits; no order as to costs.
Orders
- Proceedings converted into trial; papers filed remain as pleadings.
- Applicant granted leave to move for alternative claim for damages in lieu of value of car.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
1 CIV\APN\358\98 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the Application of: A B SA B A NK L TD t\a B A N K F IN Applicant vs JESSIE R A M A K A T A NE Respondent JUDGMENT Delivered by the Hon. Mr Justice M . L. Lehohla on the 3rd day of August. 1998 W h en this matter originated it w as m o v ed ex parte a nd on urgent basis by the applicant represented by Mr Mphalane w ho a p p e a r ed in C h a m b e rs on 7th O c t o b er 1 9 9 6. Rule Nisi w as granted in terms of prayers 2(a) a nd (b). T he rule in prayer 2(a) w as ordered returnable on 2 8 - 1 0 - 9 6. T he applicant h ad asked for an order : 1. D i s p e n s i ng with the f o r ms a nd periods of service of this application on the g r o u n ds of its urgency. 2. T h at Rule Nisi be issued calling u p on the R e s p o n d e n ts (sic) to s h ow cause, if any, on a date a nd the (sic) time to be determined by this H o n o u r a b le C o u rt w hy an order in the following t e r ms should not be m a de absolute a nd final. (a) T he R e s p o n d e nt should not be ordered to h a nd o v er to the Applicant forthwith a M o t or Vehicle, n a m e ly 1 9 96 engine M e r c e d es N o . 1 0 4 9 9 5 0 2 0 2 7 9 55 Chassis N o. 2 1 0 0 5 5 Z A 0 8 7 8 1 1. E 3 2 0 AT B e nz w i th (b) T he R o y al M o u n t ed Police should not be authorised to assist the D e p u ty Sheriff to seize the aforementioned M o t or vehicle f r om the R e s p o n d e nt a nd h a nd it o v er to the Applicant, © T he R e s p o n d e nt should not be ordered to p ay the costs of this application. 3. That prayers I a nd 2(a) a nd (b) to (sic) operate with i m m e d i a te effect a nd as an Interim Order. On 10th October 1 9 96 this C o u rt h ad the following notes to write on the file cover - " Mr M p h a l a ne for applicant informs court that respondent refuses to c o m p ly with C o u rt O r d er issued on 0 7 - 1 0 - 96 a nd further that he h as b e en served with s e c o nd application for c o n t e m pt w h i ch he holds equally in contempt. Mr M p h a l a ne prays that respondent be c o m m i t t ed to prison for c o n t e m pt till he c o m p l i es with C o u rt O r d e r. O r d e r: Police authority ordered to assist the D e p u ty Sheriff to effect service a nd execution of C o u rt O r d er issued on 7-10-96. Further police (are ordered) to assist the D e p u ty Sheriff to c o m m it the r e s p o n d e nt to prison till such time that C o u rt w o u ld be able to determine the extent of the respondent's alleged c o n t e m p t: Accordingly C o u rt confirms the 2 8 - 1 0 - 96 as the return date on w h i ch if the respondent is ready to p r o c e ed is going to be h e a rd in respect of both the m a in application a nd the s u b s e q u e nt one\s of c o n t e m p t. Signed: M. L e h o h la 1 0 - 1 0 - 96 On 1 4 - 1 0 - 9 6; F or Applicant : Mr M p h a l a ne F or R e s p o n d e n ts : Mr P h a f a ne C o u rt intimates to Mr M p h a l a ne that Mr P h a f a ne sought to get clarification relating to orders of 1 0 - 1 0 - 96 a nd 0 7 - 1 0 - 96 w h e r e u p on C o u rt h ad a s k ed h im to look a r o u nd for Mr M p h a l a ne so that things w h i ch s e e m ed confusing or to h a ve b e en dealt with haphazardly could be straightened up in Mr M p h a l a n e 's presence; s u ch as that the C o n t e m pt Application w as not served on respondent a nd other that in the application for joinder w h i ch w as not in Court's possession at the t i me it s e e m ed it w as uncertain in w h o se n a m es the vehicle w as registered yet respondent w as placed in peril of his liberty nonetheless. As things n ow stand Mr M p h a l a ne assures Court that he has briefly b e en in contact with Mr Phafane a nd they h a ve h ad s o me discussion on the basis of w h i ch Court orders : (1) Suspension of the execution of the arrest order of 1st respondent (2) joinder of respondent's wife (3) confirmation of the return date as 28-10-96 (4) That if it should be found, the vehicle subject-matter of the m a in proceedings, should be kept in the custody of the D e p u ty Sheriff in a really safe place (5) If it is not in respondent's n a m es but his wife's she should disclose w h e re it is so that pending finalisation of m a in application it should be dealt with as in 4 a b o v e. Signed: M . L e h o h l a: 14-10-96" Needless to say the Court is at sea regarding w h at reaction the a b o ve orders have fetched. H o w e v er it heard arguments and paid attention to the submissions m a de by Mr M p h a l a ne for the applicant a nd Mr Fischer for the t wo respondents respectively. On papers relating to the main application the applicant relies on the founding affidavit of V i v i an B a r e nd Bester starting at p a ge 4 of the paginated record. The d e p o n e nt Vivian says he is an e m p l o y ee of the applicant; a nd as s u ch is authorised by the applicant to d e p o se to this affidavit a nd to represent the applicant in launching these p r o c e e d i n gs as per a resolution m a r k ed " V B B" attached to the papers. T he d e p o n e nt at the start of p a r a g r a ph 3 at p a ge 5, describes the r e s p o n d e nt as Mr B . K. R a m a k a t a ne an adult m a le w h o se full a nd further particulars are n ot k n o wn to the applicant save that he resides in M a s e r u, Lesotho. T he C o u rt o b s e r v es that the initials B . K. p r e c e d i ng the n a me R a m a k a t a ne are crossed out in b l ue p en a nd replaced by an initial J also written in blue p e n. M o st significantly w h i le on the s a me p a ge w h e re at the e nd of paragraph 1.3 the initials ( V B B) written in b l a ck p en are initialled or countersigned p r e s u m a b ly by the d e p o n e nt the alteration in p a r a g r a ph 3 is neither initialled n or countersigned. T he C o u rt o b s e r v es that the d e p o n e nt h as h o w e v er initialled or countersigned the b o t t om of e v e ry p a ge of his affidavit a nd that in respect of every alteration a p p e a r i ng in his affidavit V i v i an h as a p p e n d ed his signature s a ve the o ne m e n t i o n ed a b o v e. At p a ge 71 the C o u rt o b s e r v es that in her o p p o s i ng affidavit the d e p o n e nt Bertha R a m a k a t a ne deposes for clarity as she says, in paragraph 2, that the first respondent to w h om she w as subsequently joined as 2 nd respondent is her husband. T h us it w o u ld s e em that since her initial m u st of necessity be B the cancelled initials " B K" at p a ge 5 might not h a ve been entirely accidental w h en placed by Vivian in the first place only to be altered by s o m e o ne else subsequently. F or my final assessment of the case bearing in m i nd the usual haste and omissions that a c c o m p a ny preparation of applications of this nature, these observations w o u ld deserve d ue consideration. Vivian avers that on 28th M a r ch 1 9 96 a nd at R a n d b u rg the applicant represented by E u g e ne v an Blerk and Aletta Pretorius (the purchaser) personally entered into a written Instalment Sale A g r e e m e nt for the sale to the purchaser of the M e r c e d es B e nz car referred to in the notice of motion. T he Court has been favoured with c o py of the A g r e e m e nt m a r k ed A n n e x u re "A". It appears from the papers that the purchaser failed to m e et the terms of the A g r e e m e nt w h i ch required of her to p ay R 4 07 5 2 0 - 00 being the total recoverable a m o u nt o w i ng and payable in terms of the agreement in 60 equal monthly instalments of R6 7 9 2 - 00 each with the first such instalment p a y a b le on 1st M ay 1 9 96 a nd m o n t h ly thereafter. W h en it c a me to the notice of the applicant that the purchaser's account h ad fallen into arrears a nd she h ad failed to effect the necessary p a y m e n ts to the applicant the applicant's inquiries led it to believe that the purchaser h ad disposed of the m o t or vehicle in question to the 1st respondent. This w as in breach of the terms of the A g r e e m e nt between the applicant and the purchaser. In fact the selling price received by the purchaser's husband's business styled Exclusive B o ys T o ys C C; w as not utilised to settle the a m o u nt o w i ng to the applicant by the purchaser. Suffice it to say as at the time of d r a w i ng the papers the purchaser w as in arrears with her instalment in the s um of R 21 2 9 7 - 35 and the outstanding a m o u n ts w e re in the total of R 3 81 6 9 7 - 8 0. T h e r e u p on the applicant cancelled the a g r e e m e nt w h i ch h ad b e en entered on 28th M a r c h, 1996. T he deponent avers that having tried relentlessly to discover the w h e r e a b o u ts of the vehicle till recently establishing that it w as in the possession of the I st respondent w ho resides in Lesotho, he points out on behalf of the applicant that (1) the applicant is the o w n er of the m o t or vehicle; (2) a ny right to possession w h i ch the purchaser h a d, h as b e en validly terminated; (3) the respondent is in unlawful possession of the m o t or vehicle; (4) the applicant is entitled to possession a nd delivery of the m o t or vehicle; (5) at no time did the purchaser or Exclusive B o ys T o ys CC h a ve a ny authority f r om the applicant to dispose of the vehicle or h a nd it to a third party. In her o p p o s i ng affidavit the s e c o nd respondent B e r t ha R a m a k a t a ne states that on 17th April, 1 9 96 she a nd her h u s b a nd w e nt to Exclusive B o ys T o ys CC exclusively run by Aletta Pretorius the wife of O k k ie Pretorius. B e r t ha herself b o u g ht a nd paid for the purchase of the m o t or vehicle in question in the s um of R 3 90 0 0 0 - 00 cash price. A n n e x u re ( B R 1) at p a ge 82 is the c o py of the sale invoice dated 17th April, 1 9 9 6. Bertha says on being a w a re of the applicant's claim she contacted a Mr R o n n ie F l y nn w ho is e m p l o y ed as a s a l e s m an by C l o se Corporation a nd w as informed that the vehicle w as delivered to the s h o w r o om floor of C l o se Corporation e nd of M a r ch 1 9 96 by C a r go M o t o rs a well k n o wn M e r c e d es B e nz dealer in the G a u t e ng A r e a. It is the contention of 2 nd respondent that j u d g i ng f r om the o p en a nd u n c o n c e a l ed m a n n er in w h i ch the C l o se Corporation w as dealing with the vehicle a nd the full k n o w l e d ge a nd a w a r e n e ss of B en V an der W a lt of applicant's offices the applicant is e s t o p p ed f r om alleging that 2 nd respondent's acquisition of o w n e r s h ip of this vehicle is questionable. Further that since it is well k n o wn that Exclusive B o ys T o ys CC trades in luxury cars a nd the Applicant at all material times w as a w a re that C l o se Corporation w as dealing with this vehicle as stock in trade with a v i ew to selling it a nd w as h a p py to go along with the a r r a n g e m e nt as long as outstanding balances w e re settled the Applicant is p r e c l u d ed f r om d e n y i ng that Exclusive B o ys T o ys CC h ad the authority to sell this vehicle. S he avers that u n d er the circumstances s he is a b o na fide purchaser a nd c h a r g es that the applicant while h a v i ng c o n d o n ed the practice that they are otherwise estopped f r om regarding as irregular, w as only stung to the quick w h en Exclusive B o ys T o ys C C 's business struck a b ad patch a nd consequently Aletta a nd her h u s b a nd disappeared without race. S he finally states that on 2 nd July 1 9 96 the vehicle in question w as sold to M i ke S o l o m o ns of Seretse A v e n u e, G a b o r o ne in B o t s w a na for a p u r c h a se price of R 3 10 0 0 0 - 00 a nd prays that for this reason alone the application be dismissed with costs. S he says the applicant w as m a de a w a re of the fact that the vehicle h ad b e en sold prior to the filing of this opposing affidavit a nd w as no longer in her possession. T he 2 nd respondent is largely supported by the 1st r e s p o n d e nt in her contentions. T h is support h as a bearing m a i n ly as to the propriety of h a v i ng c h a r g ed the 1st respondent with c o n t e m pt of court. N e e d l e ss to say starting f r om p a ge 58 o n w a r ds J o h a n n es N i c o l a as N el disclaims the purported sale of the vehicle to a S o l o m o ns in B o t s w a n a. He avers that he secured the cooperation a nd efforts of the B o t s w a na police concerning the individual called S o l o m o ns or the alleged address he is said to h a ve b e en resident at. In fact N e) discovered that no such road or street existed in G a b o r o ne B o t s w a n a. He a n n e x ed " J N N 3" a recent central street plan of G a b o r o ne in support of his averments. Ordinarily w h en the C o u rt is in a situation w h e re it d o es not k n ow w h i ch type-writer to believe in m o t i on proceedings the approach advocated in l aw is that the application should be dismissed. B ut in this matter w h e re it could not be said the applicant m u st h a ve k n o wn w h en m o v i ng this application the sort of defences raised w o u ld arise it w o u ld be imprudent to adopt that approach especially w h en gleaning from the D e p u ty Sheriffs averment that there is a suggestion that the 2 nd respondent w as advised by her lawyer to suppress the truth regarding the whereabouts of the vehicle in question. A s s u m i ng the truthfulness of the respondents' averments as to acquisition of the vehicle it w o u ld m a ke 2 nd respondent a b o na fide o w n er though. I indicated at the beginning that the 1st respondent w as put in peril of suffering consequences of a C o n t e m pt of Court charges w h en it turned out that the applicant m ay well h a ve m e a nt his wife w h en applying the cancelled B . K. initials before R a m a k a t a ne at p a ge 5 paragraph 3 because the tenor of the applicant's case is for retrieval of its vehicle from w h o e v er w as keeping it. Available evidence suggests that the car m ay have been in the possession of the 2 nd respondent w ho is the person claiming she acquired it by purchase. T he Court is not satisfied that the defence is such that the applicant m u st h a ve k n o wn the intricate g o i n g s - on w h i ch turn out to h a ve s u r r o u n d ed this matter. C o n s e q u e n t ly the only option through w h i ch issues m ay be ventilated in a m a n n er that w o u ld enable the Court to reach a just decision w o u ld be by converting proceedings herein into a trial w h e re cross-examination w o u ld help achieve that end. 1 order mero motu therefore that (1) p r o c e e d i n gs be converted into trial a nd p a p e rs filed r e m a in as pleadings; (2) the applicant is granted leave to m o ve C o u rt for an alternative claim for d a m a g es in lieu of the value of its car; (3) the prayer for inclusion of an alternative claim a nd the application in pursuit of order 2 a b o ve respectively to be filed a nd m o v ed within 14 d a ys of this O r d e r; (4) all pleadings to be closed by not later than 31st A u g u s t, 1 9 9 8; (5) O r d er (1) of 1 4 - 1 0 - 96 s u s p e n d i ng execution of the arrest order of 1st respondent r e m a i ns of full force a nd effect; (6) there will be no order as to costs. J U D G E 3rd August, 1 9 98 For Applicant: Mr M p h a l a ne For Respondents : Mr Fischer and Mr Phafane