Carlos and Another v Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho (CIV/T 588 of 95) [1998] LSCA 100 (22 October 1998)

IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter b e t w e en R. C a r l os M r. V an G e r m e rt a nd CIV/T/588/95 First Plaintiff S e c o nd Plaintiff T he G o v e r n m e nt of t he K i n g d om of L e s o t ho T he A t t o r n ey G e n e r al First D e f e n d a nt S e c o nd D e f e n d a nt J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by t he H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice M M. R a m o d i b e di on t he 2 2 nd d ay of O c t o b er 1 9 9 8. T h is is an application for a b s o l u t i on f r om the instance m a de at t he e nd of t he plaintiffs' c a se In o r d er to appreciate t he issues w h i ch arise for determination in this m a t t er it is n e c e s s a ry to refer to t he relevant p o r t i o ns of the pleadings as well as to t he n a t u re of the e v i d e n ce w h i ch h as b e en led t h us far. B o th plaintiffs w ho are citizens of the R e p u b l ic of S o u th A f r i ca w e re at the material t i me in O c t o b er 1 9 93 e m p l o y e es of R o d io S o u th A f r i ca ( P t y) L i m i t ed a c o m p a ny d u ly i n c o r p o r a t ed a c c o r d i ng to t he l a ws of the R e p u b l ic of S o u th Africa. T h ey w e re e m p l o y ed as geotechnical e n g i n e er site m a n a g e rs at the M o h a le D am site, S e n qu R i v er in the L e s o t ho H i g h l a n ds W a t er Project. On the 2 9 th O c t o b er 1 9 93 R o d io e n t e r ed into an a g r e e m e nt w i th L e s o t ho D e f e n ce F o r ce in t e r ms of w h i ch the latter s u p p l i ed to the f o r m er a helicopter on hire to airlift e q u i p m e nt a nd supplies at the M o h a le D am site on 2 nd N o v e m b er 1 9 9 3. T he L e s o t ho D e f e n ce F o r ce also s u p p l i ed a pilot o ne C a p t a in S a m u el M a k o ro for the m i s s i on in q u e s t i o n. T he plaintiffs h a ve alleged in p a r a g r a ph 4 ( e) of their declaration that in the c o u r se of the m i s s i on on the 2 nd N o v e m b er 1 9 93 t h ey w e re c o n v e y ed in the helicopter in o r d er to assist w i th the airlifting of the e q u i p m e nt a nd to indicate to the pilot w h e re t he e q u i p m e nt a nd stores h ad to be delivered. T he helicopter itself w as e q u i p p ed w i th a net for the p u r p o se of c o n t a i n i ng stores e q u i p m e nt or o t h er g o o d s. It is pertinent to o b s e r ve that the net w as i n d e ed part of the a g r e e m e nt b e t w e en the parties. T he plaintiffs h a ve alleged further, a nd this h as b e en r e p e a t ed in their e v i d e n ce before m e, that in the c o u r se of the m i s s i on in q u e s t i on the net w i th its c o n t e n ts w as d r o p p ed f r om the helicopter o n to a p l a t f o r m, w h e r e a f t er it rolled o ff the p l a t f o rm d o wn the m o u n t a i n s i d e. T he pilot t h en d e c i d ed to retrieve the net. T he plaintiffs allege that t h ey a c c o m p a n i ed h im at his insistence w i th a v i ew to assisting h im in s u ch retrieval. in t he c o u r se of carrying o ut the retrieval of t he net in q u e s t i on the helicopter c r a s h ed as a c o n s e q u e n ce of the roters t h e r e of c o m i ng into c o n t a ct w i th the m o u n t a in side. T h is t o ok p l a ce at M o h a le D am site in L e s o t h o. It is plaintiffs' c a se that as a c o n s e q u e n ce of s u ch c r a sh e a ch of t h em s u s t a i n ed s e v e re bodily injuries w h i ch t h ey m a i n t a in w e re c a u s ed by t he n e g l i g e n ce of the pilot w ho w as acting as a s e r v a nt of the R o y al L e s o t ho D e f e n ce F o r ce a nd of the G o v e r n m e nt of the K i n g d om of L e s o t h o. T he first plaintiff c l a i ms d a m a g es totalling M 12 1 61 4 3 2 . 00 for p a in a nd suffering, p e r m a n e nt disability, loss of a m e n i t i es of life, loss of e a r n i n g s, past m e d i c al e x p e n s e s, future m e d i c al e x p e n s e s, cost of a p p l i a n c e s, m o d i f i c a t i o ns to m o t or vehicles a nd b u i l d i ng o p e r a t i o n s. F or his part the S e c o nd Plaintiff c l a i ms d a m a g es totalling M 2 49 8 7 9 . 79 for pain a nd suffering a nd loss of a m e n i t i es of life, m e d i c al e x p e n s e s, loss of e a r n i n gs a nd future dental e x p e n s e s. It is pertinent to b e ar in m i nd that the plaintiffs' c l a i ms h a ve b e en b r o u g ht u n d er the c o m m on law. I n d e ed this is c o m m on c a u s e. M o re a b o ut this later. In their p l ea the d e f e n d a n ts h a ve d e n i ed the a l l e g ed n e g l i g e n ce attributed to the pilot in question. T h ey p l e ad in the alternative that in the e v e nt of the C o u rt finding that the pilot w as n e g l i g e nt t h en s u ch n e g l i g e n ce did n ot c a u se or contribute to the accident. T he d e f e n d a n ts h a ve p l e a d ed in the further alternative that in t he e v e nt of the C o u rt f i n d i ng that t he pilot w as n e g l i g e nt a nd that s u ch n e g l i g e n ce c a u s ed or c o n t r i b u t ed to t he a c c i d e nt t h en t he first plaintiff w as n e g l i g e nt in that he failed to w e ar a seatbelt specially p r o v i d ed a nd available in t he helicopter a nd that s u ch n e g l i g e n ce c o n t r i b u t ed to his injuries. A g a in the d e f e n d a n ts h a ve p l e a d ed in t he further alternative that in t he e v e nt of the C o u rt finding that they are liable to e a ch of t he plaintiffs t h en t he liability of the d e f e n d a n ts is limited to the s um of M 40 0 0 0 . 00 in r e s p e ct of e a ch plaintiff in t e r ms of R e g u l a t i on 4 of t he C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o n s, 1 9 7 8, r e ad w i th Article 22 in S c h e d u le I t h e r e of it b e i ng a l l e g ed that t he plaintiffs w e re c o n v e y ed in c i r c u m s t a n c es g o v e r n ed by t he p r o v i s i o ns of t he said R e g u l a t i o n s. As earlier indicated b o th plaintiffs g a ve e v i d e n ce on their o wn b e h a lf clearly relying on the c o m m on l a w. T h ey testified that t h ey w e re n ot on t he helicopter for hire or r e w a rd b ut fortuitously at t he r e q u e st of t he pilot T h ey d id n ot call a ny w i t n e s s es b ut c l o s ed their c a s e. At the c l o se of plaintiffs' c a se A dv P e n z h o rn S . C. for t he d e f e n d a n ts applied for absolution f r om the instance m a i n ly on t he g r o u nd that plaintiffs' c l a i ms b a s ed p u r e ly on c o m m on l aw as t h ey a d m i t t e d ly a r e, are u n t e n a b le in the light of the C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 r e ad w i th the principal A ct n a m e ly T he C a r r i a ge By A ir A c t, 1 9 7 5. N ow it h as l o ng b e en the l aw that the test to be a p p l i ed in d e t e r m i n i ng w h e t h er absolution f r om the instance s h o u ld be g r a n t ed at the close of the c a se for the plaintiff is w h e t h er there is e v i d e n ce u p on w h i ch a C o u r t, a p p l y i ng its m i nd r e a s o n a b ly to s u ch e v i d e n ce m i g ht (not s h o u l d) find for the plaintiff. T he l e a d i ng c a se in this r e g a rd is G a s c o y ne v P a ul a nd H u n t er 1 9 17 T PD 1 70 at 1 73 p er De Villiers J P. As I s ee it, it is further instructive to n o te that "the C o u r ts h a ve frequently e m p h a s i s ed that a b s o l u t i on s h o u ld n ot be g r a n t ed at the e nd of the plaintiffs e v i d e n ce e x c e pt in very clear cases, a nd that q u e s t i o ns of credibility s h o u ld not n o r m a l ly be investigated until the C o u rt h as h e a rd all the e v i d e n ce w h i ch b o th sides h a ve to offer" H o f f m an & Z e f f e r t t: t he S o u th A f r i c an L aw of E v i d e n c e: 4 th E d i t i on at p a ge 5 0 8. I m i g ht a d d, of c o u r s e, that e a ch c a se m u st d e p e nd on its o wn particular c i r c u m s t a n c es as for e x a m p le w h e re the sole p o i nt for d e t e r m i n a t i on by the C o u rt is the interpretation of a statute the C o u rt m i g ht as w e ll r e s o l ve the m a t t er at the c l o se of plaintiffs c a se or e v en earlier by w ay of e x c e p t i on rather t h an e n g a ge in a full scale h e a r i ng of the e v i d e n ce for the o t h er side w i th its a t t e n d a nt c o n s e q u e n c es s u ch as i n c o n v e n i e n ce to the i n n o c e nt party a nd the C o u rt as well as u n n e c e s s a ry costs o c c a s i o n ed thereby. It is u p on the a b o ve m e n t i o n ed principles that I a p p r o a ch this m a t t e r. In d o i ng so I h a ve not lost sight of the s u b m i s s i on by A dv S e l v an S . C. for the plaintiffs to the effect that w h e re a C o u rt is f a c ed w i th a difficult p o i nt of l aw as in this c a se it is better to c o n c l u de t he c a se rather t h an g r a nt a b s o l u t i on f r om the instance. I find C o u n s e l 's s u b m i s s i on v e ry attractive a nd i n d e ed tempting but the other side of the coin is of c o u r se that the C o u rt c a n n ot shirk its responsibility to resolve legal issues no m a t t er h ow difficult they m i g ht be a nd the sooner it determines the matter the better. I n d e ed s o me p e o p le m i g ht be t e m p t ed to ask, by w ay of a loose e x a m p l e, if a m an is legally d o o m ed to h a ng w hy p r o l o ng his death a n y w a y? It is no d o u bt c o n v e n i e nt at this stage to e x a m i ne the relevant portions of the Carriage By A ir A c t, 1 9 75 a nd the C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 in so far as they c o n c e rn this case. T he C a r r i a ge By A ir A ct 1 9 75 T he h e ad note to this A ct sets out to " g i ve effect to certain c o n v e n t i o ns relating to international C a r n a ge by A i r, to e n a b le certain of the rules contained in s u ch C o n v e n t i o ns to be applied, w i th adaptions, to other c a s es of c a r n a ge by Air; a nd for related p u r p o s e s ." Section 3 (1) of the A ct provides that the provisions of the W a r s aw C o n v e n t i o n, 1 9 2 9, the W a r s aw C o n v e n t i on as a m e n d ed at the H a g u e, 1 9 5 5, a nd the Guadalajara C o n v e n t i o n, 1 9 6 1, shall h a ve effect a nd the force of l aw in L e s o t ho (irrespective of the nationality of the carrier, the aircraft or the c l a i m a n t ), so far as those provisions relate to the rights a nd liabilities of carriers, the carrier's servants or agents, p a s s e n g e r s, c o n s i g n o r s, c o n s i g n e es a nd other persons, with respect to carriage by air as specified in subsection ( 2) w h i ch in turn stipulates that the W a r s aw C o n v e n t i o n, 1 9 29 shall a p p ly to s u ch international c a r r i a ge by air as is d e f i n ed in that C o n v e n t i o n. It a l so e m p o w e rs the Minister, in t e r ms of S e c t i on 8 of the A c t, to certify w h i ch states a re parties respectively to t he three C o n v e n t i o ns referred to a b o v e. N ow S e c t i on 4 w h i ch is on limitation of liability significantly p r o v i d es that s u ch limitation as is p r o v i d ed in Article 22 in the First S c h e d u le to t he A ct a p p l i es w h a t e v er the n a t u re of the p r o c e e d i n gs by w h i ch liability m ay be e n f o r c ed a n d, in particular - " ( a) t h o se limitations a p p ly w h e re p r o c e e d i n gs are b r o u g ht by a w r o n g d o er to obtain a contribution f r om a n o t h er w r o n g d o e r, a nd (b) the limitation for e a ch p a s s e n g er in p a r a g r a ph ( 1) of the said Articles 22 a nd VI applies to the a g g r e g a te liability of the carrier in all p r o c e e d i n gs w h i ch m ay be b r o u g ht against h im u n d er the l aw of L e s o t h o, together w i th a ny p r o c e e d i n gs b r o u g ht against h im outside L e s o t h o ." T h en c o m es the i m p o r t a nt section n a m e ly S e c t i on 6 of t he A ct w h i ch p r o v i d es that w i th r e s p e ct to a ny c a s es of c a r r i a ge by air w h i ch a re n ot g o v e r n ed by the C o n v e n t i o ns referred to a b o ve (viz. S e c t i on 3 of t he A c t) the M i n i s t er m ay m a ke r e g u l a t i o ns a p p l y i ng the rules, w i th a ny e x c e p t i o ns or m o d i f i c a t i on specified by h i m. In t e r ms of s u b s e c t i on 2 of Section 6 the r e g u l a t i o ns so m a de shall include the p r o v i s i o ns of Articles 23 a nd 24 of t he S e c o nd S c h e d u le a nd of S e c t i o ns 4, 5 a nd 7 of the A ct w i th " a ny a d a p t a t i o n s ." N ow in 1 9 78 a nd p u r s u a nt to the p o w e rs c o n f e r r ed on h im by S e c t i on 6 of t he C a r r i a ge By A ir A c t, 1 9 75 the M i n i s t er m a de C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 w h i ch dealt w i th local or non-international carriage by air. T h i s, in my v i e w, the M i n i s t er w as perfectly entitled to do in as m u ch as S e c t i on 6 of the principal A ct clearly e m p o w e r ed h im to m a ke regulations w i th " a ny e x c e p t i o ns or m o d i f i c a t i on specified by h i m ." T he A ct o b v i o u s ly g a ve h im carte blanche to m o d i fy or e x t e nd the international carriage by air regulations or rules to local or n o n - i n t e m a t i o n al carriage by air. I p r o c e ed t h en to e x a m i ne t he R e g u l a t i o ns in so far as t h ey a re relevant to this c a s e. T he C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 7 8. Section 2 of the C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 significantly p r o v i d es as follows: " 2. ( 1) T h e se regulations shall apply to the carriage of persons, b a g g a ge or c a r go by air w h i ch - (a) is not g o v e r n ed by a ny of the C o n v e n t i o ns n a m ed in section 3 of the Carriage by Air A ct 1 9 7 5; a nd (b) is p e r f o r m ed either - (i) for r e w a rd or hire by a ny p e r s on or b o dy or the State; or (ii) gratuitously by an air transport u n d e r t a k i ng ( 2) F or the p u r p o s es of these regulations, m a il a nd postal p a c k a g es shall be r e g a r d ed as c a r g o ." C o n s i s t e nt w i th the intention to m o d i fy t he r e g u l a t i o ns to a p p ly to b o th intentional a nd local or n o n - i n t e m a t i o n al c a r r i a ge by air t he M i n i s t er inserted S e c t i on 3 of t he C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 w h i ch r e a ds as f o l l o w s :- " 3. ( 1) S c h e d u le I ( w h i ch r e p r o d u c es the S e c o nd S c h e d u le to the A ct as e x c e p t ed a nd m o d i f i ed for the p u r p o se of these regulations) shall apply to all c a s es of carriage by air d e s c r i b ed in regulation 2 e x c e pt t h o se m e n t i o n ed in sub-reguiation ( 2 ). ( 2) S c h e d u le II ( w h i ch r e p r o d u c es the T h i rd S c h e d u le to the A ct as e x c e p t ed a nd m o d i f i ed for the p u r p o se of these regulations) shall a p p ly to t h o se c a s es of carriage by air d e s c r i b ed in regulation 2 in w h i ch the "actual carrier" is not "contracting carrier" as these e x p r e s s i o ns are d e f i n ed in S c h e d u le II " ( my underlining). It is i m p o r t a nt t h en to e x a m i ne s o me of the relevant Articles w h i ch w e re i n c o r p o r a t ed in S c h e d u le I. It s h o u ld be n o t ed that w i th t he e x c e p t i on of A r t i c le I all t he o t h er Articles a re i n d e ed identical w i th t h o se of t he C o n v e n t i o ns on international carriage by air. Article I clearly stipulates that this S c h e d u le (i.e. S c h e d u le I) applies to all Carriage By A ir specified in regulation 2 Article 17 spells out the liability of the carrier in the following terms:- " Article 17 T he carrier is liable for d a m a ge sustained in the event of the death or w o u n d i ng of a passenger or a ny other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident w h i ch caused the d a m a ge so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of a ny of the operations of embarking or disembarking." Article 22 (1) sets out the limit for w h i ch the carrier is liable in the following w o r d s :- "Article 22 (I) In the carriage of persons, the liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited to the s um of fourty (sic) thousand rand. W h e r e, in accordance with the l aw of the Court seised of the case, d a m a g es m ay be a w a r d ed in the form of periodical p a y m e n ts the equivalent capital value of the said p a y m e n ts shall not e x c e ed forty thousand rand. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the p a s s e n g er m ay a g r ee to a higher limit of liability." Article 23 p r o v i d es as f o l l o ws : "Article 23 ( 1) A ny provision tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a l o w er limit t h an that w h i ch is laid d o wn in this S c h e d u le shall be null a nd void, but the nullity of a ny s u ch provision d o es n ot involve the nullity of the w h o le contract, w h i ch shall r e m a in subject to the provisions of this S c h e d u l e ." Article 24 r e a ds as f o l l o ws :- "Article 24 (1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 a nd 19 a ny action for d a m a g e s, h o w e v er f o u n d e d, c an only be brought subject to the conditions a nd limits set out in this S c h e d u l e. (2) In the cases c o v e r ed by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply, without prejudice to the questions as to w ho are the p e r s o ns w ho h a ve the right to bring suit a nd w h at are their respective rights." As I h a ve said earlier it is pertinent to b e ar in m i nd in d e t e r m i n i ng this m a t t er that the C a r r i a ge By A ir A ct 1 9 75 as w e ll as t he C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 a re identical, w o rd for w o r d, w i th the aforesaid W a r s aw C o n v e n t i on as a m e n d ed at the H a g ue in 1 9 5 5. N ow the real a nd sole q u e s t i on w h i ch arises for d e t e r m i n a t i on in this m a t t er is w h e t h er the A ct a nd the R e g u l a t i o ns as they a p p ly to L e s o t ho p r o v i de t he e x c l u s i ve c a u se of action a nd sole r e m e dy in respect of c l a i ms for loss, injury a nd d a m a ge sustained in the c o u r se of, or arising o ut of, carriage by air. If the a n s w er is in the affirmative t h en it s t a n ds to r e a s on that t he plaintiffs' c l a i ms w h i ch h a ve b e en b r o u g ht for d a m a g es at c o m m on l aw for p e r s o n al injury m u st be d i s m i s s e d. As I see it therefore the w h o le q u e s t i on is o ne of interpretation of t he relevant statutes a nd the W a r s aw C o n v e n t i on as a m e n d ed at the H a g ue in 1 9 5 5. At the outset I s h o u ld like to s ay that these statutes a nd the C o n v e n t i on m u st be interpreted purposively a nd m e a n i n g f u l ly no m a t t er h ow difficult the task m ay be -I c o n f e ss that this is a v e ry c o m p l ex issue for w h i ch there is no p r e c e d e nt in the country. A c c o r d i n g ly I shall t a ke the liberty to s e ek g u i d a n ce f r om foreign jurisdictions w i th similar legislation to o u rs a nd in d o i ng so it is i m p o r t a nt to o b s e r ve that as far as o ur n e i g h b o u r i ng c o u n t ry is c o n c e r n ed n a m e ly the R e p u b l ic of S o u th A f r i c a n, there a re no C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns in that c o u n t ry C o n s e q u e n t ly there a re no relevant c a s es for c o n s i d e r a t i on in that c o u n t ry as far as this c a se is c o n c e r n ed I n d e ed this is o ne a r ea w h e re L e s o t ho is u n d o u b t e d ly o ne step a h e ad of the R e p u b l ic of S o u th Africa. N or do I think that this C o u rt c an derive a ny assistance f r om the U n i t ed States l aw in v i ew of the conflicting nature of authorities there on w h e t h er the C o n v e n t i on p r o v i d es an exclusive c a u se of action for injuries sustained d u r i ng carriage by air. I n d e ed the S u p r e me C o u rt there h as t w i ce refrained f r om a d d r e s s i ng the issue. I h a ve accordingly h ad to turn to the U n i t ed K i n g d om w h i ch fortunately h as exactly the s a me A ct a nd C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns as o u r s. D e c i s i o ns in that jurisdiction are therefore highly p e r s u a s i ve to this C o u r t. T wo of s u ch decisions a re in point a nd they are S i d hu a nd O t h e rs v British A i r w a ys 1 9 97 (1) A LL ER 1 93 a nd F e l l o w es (or H e r d) a nd a n o t h er v C l y de H e l i c o p t e rs Ltd. 1 9 9 7 ( 1) A LL ER 7 7 5. B o th are d e c i s i o ns of the H o u se of L o r d s. S i d h u 's C a se ( s u p r a) T h is c a se w as b a s ed on the C a r r i a ge By A ir A ct 1 9 61 of the U n i t ed K i n g d om w h i c h, as I h a ve said a b o v e, is exactly identical to o u r s. T he appellants (plaintiffs a nd the p u r s u e r) w e re p a s s e n g e rs on an international flight o p e r a t ed by the R e s p o n d e nt airline. T he airline left L o n d on on I A u g u st 1 9 90 a nd l a n d ed in K u w a it for refuelling on 2 A u g u st 1 9 90 after Iraqi forces h ad b e g un i n v a d i ng K u w a it d u r i ng the G u lf W a r. T he airport w as a t t a c k ed by Iraqi forces w h i le the p a s s e n g e rs i n c l u d i ng the appellants w e re in the airport t e r m i n a l. T h ey w e re t a k en as prisoners a nd r e m o v ed to B a g d a d. T he appellants w e re released several w e e ks later a nd r e t u r n ed to the U n i t ed K i n g d o m. On 3 0 th July 1 9 93 the appellants b r o u g ht an action against British A i r w a ys in the C o u n ty C o u rt c l a i m i ng d a m a g es for p e r s o n al injury alleging that the British A i r w a ys w as negligent in h a v i ng l a n d ed the aircraft in K u w a it after hostilities h ad started a nd that c o n s e q u e n t ly they h ad suffered physical a nd p s y c h o l o g i c al d a m a g e. T h ey also c l a i m ed for lost b a g g a g e. T he trial court dismissed the appellants' c l a im on the g r o u nd that their sole r e m e dy w as u n d er the C o n v e n t i o n. T h is decision w as u p h e ld by the C o u rt of A p p e al h e n ce a further a p p e al to the H o u se of L o r d s. M e a n w h i le the p u r s u er b r o u g ht h er action in the C o u rt of S e s s i on in S c o t l a nd c l a i m i n g, inter alia, d a m a g es at c o m m on l aw for b r e a ch of an i m p l i ed condition of the contract that British A i r w a ys w o u ld t a ke r e a s o n a b le care for h er safety. In d ue c o u r se the L o rd O r d i n a ry d i s m i s s ed h er action on the g r o u nd that the C o n v e n t i on e x c l u d ed r e c o u r se to a ny c o m m on l aw r e m e d y. U n d a u n t ed by this decision the p u r s u er r e c l a i m ed b ut the I n n er H o u se of the C o u rt of S e s s i on d i s m i s s ed h er r e c l a i m i ng m o t i on as a result of w h i ch s he t oo a p p e a l ed to the H o u se of L o r d s. T he H o u se of L o r ds d i s m i s s ed the a p p e a ls in q u e s t i on on the g r o u nd that the C o n v e n t i on p r o v i d ed the exclusive c a u se of action a nd sole r e m e dy for a p a s s e n g er w ho c l a i m ed for loss, injury a nd d a m a ge sustained in the c o u r se of, or arising o ut of, international c a r n a ge by air n o t w i t h s t a n d i ng that that m i g ht leave c l a i m a n ts w i t h o ut a r e m e dy a d d i ng categorically that w h e re the C o n v e n t i on did n ot p r o v i de a r e m e d y, no r e m e dy w as available. B e c a u se of the i m p o r t a n ce of this decision it is n e c e s s a r y, I think, to q u o te the c o n c l u d i ng r e m a r ks of L o rd H o pe of C r a i g h e ad in his s p e e ch to the H o u se of L o r d s. I do so e v en at the risk of o v e r b u r d e n i ng this j u d g m e n t. T h is is w h at he said at p a ge 2 1 2- "I believe that the a n s w er to the question raised in the present case is to be found in the objects a nd structure of the convention. T he language used a nd the subject matter with w h i ch it deals d e m o n s t r a te that w h at w as sought to be achieved w as a uniform international c o d e, w h i ch could be applied by the courts of all the H i gh Contracting Parties without reference to the rules of their o wn d o m e s t ic l a w. T he convention d o es not purport to deal with all matters relating to contracts of international carriage by air. B ut in those areas w i th w h i ch it deals - a nd the liability of the carrier is o ne of t h em - the c o de is intended to be u n i f o rm a nd to be exclusive also of a ny resort to the rules of d o m e s t ic law. An a n s w er to the question w h i ch leaves claimants without a r e m e dy is not at first sight attractive. It is tempting to give w ay to the a r g u m e nt that w h e re there is a w r o ng there m u st be a r e m e d y. T h at i n d e ed is the foundation u p on w h i ch m u ch of o ur o wn c o m m on l aw has b e en built up. T he b r o ad principles w h i ch provide the foundation for the l aw of delict in Scotland a nd of torts in the English c o m m on l aw h a ve b e en d e v e l o p ed u p on these lines. No s y s t em of l aw c an a t t e m pt to c o m p e n s a te persons for all losses in w h a t e v er circumstances. B ut the assumption is that, w h e re a b r e a ch of duty h as c a u s ed loss, a r e m e dy in d a m a g es o u g ht to be available. A l o n g s i de these principles, h o w e v e r, there lies another great principle, w h i ch is that of f r e e d om of contract. A ny p e r s on is free, unless restrained by statute, to enter into a contract with another on the basis that his liability in d a m a g es is e x c l u d ed or limited if he is in b r e a ch of contract. Exclusion a nd limitation clauses are a c o m m on feature of c o m m e r c i al contracts, a nd contracts of carriage are no exception. It is against that b a c k g r o u n d, rather than a desire to provide r e m e d i es to enable all losses to be c o m p e n s a t e d, that the convention m u st be judged. It w as not designed to provide r e m e d i es against the carrier to enable all losses to be c o m p e n s a t e d. It w as d e s i g n ed instead to define those situations in w h i ch c o m p e n s a t i on w as to be available. So it set out the limits of liability a nd the conditions u n d er w h i ch A claims to establish that liability, if disputed, w e re to be m a d e. balance w as struck, in the interests of certainty a nd uniformity. All the o b v i o us cases in w h i ch the carrier o u g ht to accept liability w e re provided for. B u t, as o ne of the F r e n ch delegates to the W a r s aw C o n v e n t i o n, M r. Ripert, o b s e r v ed (minutes, p 7 3) w h en the definition of the period of carriage w as b e i ng discussed, there are an infinite variety of cases not all of w h i ch c an be put in the s a me formula. No d o u bt the d o m e s t ic courts will try, as carefully as they m a y, to apply the w o r d i ng or art 17 to the facts to enable the p a s s e n g er to obtain a r e m e dy u n d er the convention. B ut it is c o n c e d ed in this c a se that no s u ch r e m e dy is available. T he conclusion m u st be therefore that a ny r e m e dy is e x c l u d ed by the convention, as the set of uniform rules d o es not provide for it. T he d o m e s t ic courts are not free to provide a r e m e dy according to their o wn l a w, b e c a u se to do this w o u ld be to u n d e r m i ne the convention. It w o u ld lead to the setting alongside the convention of an entirely different set of rules w h i ch w o u ld distort the operation of the w h o le s c h e m e. T he convention is, of course, tightly d r a wn on these matters. This h as b e en d o ne in the interests of the carrier, w h o se e x p o s u re to these liabilities without the f r e e d om to contract out of t h em w as a W e re principal c o n s e q u e n ce of the s y s t em w h i ch it laid d o w n. r e m e d i es outside the convention to b e c o me available, it w o u ld encourage litigation in other cases to restrict its application still further in the h o pe of obtaining a better r e m e d y, against w h i ch the carrier w o u ld h a ve no protection under the contract. I am in no d o u bt that the c o n v e n t i on w as designed to eliminate these difficulties I see no e s c a pe f r om the conclusion that, w h e re the c o n v e n t i on h as not p r o v i d ed a r e m e d y, no r e m e dy is available." I respectfully associate m y s e lf w i th t h e se r e m a r ks w h i ch a re i n d e ed a p p o s i te to the instant c a se F e l l o w es or H e r d 's c a se ( s u p r a) T h is c a se is a l m o st identical to the instant c a se in all m a t e r i al respects. L i ke the present c a se it w as b a s ed on the C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns (referred to as the O r d er in that part of the w o r ld n a m e ly the U n i t ed K i n g d o m ). Significantly t h o se R e g u l a t i o ns are identical, w o rd for w o r d, to o ur C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 7 8. Briefly the facts of that c a se s h ow that Sgt. M a l c o lm H e rd w as killed in a helicopter c r a sh on 2 4 th J a n u a r y, 1 9 9 0. At the t i me of his d e a th he w as a m e m b er of the Police Helicopter U n it of the Strathclyde Police force his duties b e i ng to carry o ut aerial surveillance a nd detection w i t h in Strathclyde. T he r e s p o n d e n ts C l y de H e l i c o p t e rs Ltd. s u p p l i ed t he helicopters u s ed by t he Helicopter U n it in t e r ms of a contract. On the fateful d ay Sgt. H e rd a nd t wo colleagues w e re carrying o ut their duties on b o a rd o ne of the hired helicopters a nd d u r i ng the flight they e n c o u n t e r ed a n ow s t o rm as a result of w h i ch the pilot w ho w as an e m p l o y ee of the r e s p o n d e n ts b e c a me lost, an e n g i ne failure o c c u r r ed a nd the helicopter c r a s h ed a g a i n st a b l o ck of flats in G l a s g ow resulting in Sgt. H e rd sustaining fatal injuries. T he appellants t h en s u ed the r e s p o n d e n ts for reparation in respect of the d e a th of Sgt. H e rd b a s i ng their c l a im on allegations on c o m m on l aw n e g l i g e n ce on the part of the r e s p o n d e n t s' part. T he first a p p e l l a nt s u ed in h er capacity as S gt H e r d 's w i d ow w h i le the s e c o nd appellant s u ed as Sgt. H e r d 's m o t h e r. T he r e s p o n d e n ts m a i n t a i n ed that the c l a im in respect of c o m m on l aw n e g l i g e n ce is e x c l u d ed by the a f o r e s a id C a r r i a ge by A ir A c ts ( A p p l i c a t i on of p r o v i s i o n s) O r d er 1 9 6 7. T he r e s p o n d e n t s' d e f e n ce w as u p h e ld by the L o rd O r d i n a ry ( L o rd M i l l i g a n) a nd on a r e c l a i m i ng m o t i on t he S e c o nd D i v i s i on of t he C o u rt of S e s s i on c o n f i r m ed the j u d g m e nt of the L o rd O r d i n a r y. It w as against the latter d e c i s i on that the a p p e l l a n ts t h en a p p e a l ed to the H o u se of L o r d s. F or its part the H o u se of L o r ds d i s m i s s ed the a p p e al on t he g r o u nd that the limitations of liability set o ut in articles 17 a nd 22 a p p l i ed to the c a r r i a ge of Sgt. H e rd w h om t h ey r e g a r d ed as a p a s s e n g e r. M o re i m p o r t a n t ly t he H o u se of L o r ds effectively u p h e ld the r e s p o n d e n ts d e f e n ce that t he a p p e l l a n t s' c l a im in r e s p e ct of c o m m on l aw n e g l i g e n ce w as e x c l u d ed by t he c a r r i a ge by air regulations. E m p h a s i s i ng the n e ed for u n i f o r m i ty of interpretation of t he c o n v e n t i on a nd the c a r r i a ge by air r e g u l a t i o ns L o rd H o pe of C r a i g h e ad o n ce m o re significantly e x p r e s s ed h i m s e lf in the f o l l o w i ng w o r ds at p a ge 7 93 of his s p e e ch to the H o u se of L o r d s :- " A l t h o u gh this decision m ay s e em harsh in the present c a s e, it s h o u ld not be forgotten that o ne of the a d v a n t a g es of excluding the rules of the c o m m on l aw is that the U n i t ed K i n g d om rules are d e s i g n ed to i m p o se liability on the carrier without p r o of of fault in respect of the d e a th of or injury to passengers a nd to nullify contractual provisions the effect of w h i ch w o u ld be to relieve the carrier of liability or to restrict his liability in a m o u n t. T h e se are significant a d v a n t a g e s, as it m ay be v e ry difficult to prove w h e re fault lies w h en an aircraft h as b e en d e s t r o y ed in an air crash a nd all those w ho w e re on b o a rd the aircraft h a ve lost their lives, and in v i ew of the opportunities w h i ch w o u ld otherwise be available to those w ho provide carriage by air to exclude or restrict their liability, In M ' K ay v Scottish A i r w a ys Ltd. 1 9 48 SC 2 54 at 2 63 the L o rd President ( C o o p e r) r e m a r k ed on the a m a z i ng w i d th of the conditions a nd the effort w h i ch h ad evidently b e en m a de to create a leonine bargain u n d er w h i ch the passenger took all the risks a nd the carrier accepted no obligations. In that case a mother's claim for d a m a g es for her son's death w as held to h a ve b e en excluded by the conditions printed on the ticket w h i ch h ad b e en issued to the s on as a fare-paying passenger. A bargain of that kind w o u ld n ow be vulnerable to the provisions of the Unfair Contract T e r ms A ct 1 9 7 7, but the rules in S ch I to the 1 9 67 order provide greater certainty so that both parties to the arrangement m ay n ow k n ow w h e re they stand and can m a ke their o wn arrangements with their insurers accordingly." I find m y s e lf in respectful a g r e e m e nt w i th these r e m a r ks a nd I accordingly h e r e by respectfully discern the n e ed to a d o pt t h em in the instant matter. I n d e ed as A dv P e n z h o rn S. C. rightly p o i n t ed o ut o ne h as s y m p a t hy with the plaintiffs but regrettably the l aw is the l a w. I h a ve a c c o r d i n g ly c o me to the inevitable c o n c l u s i on that the C a r r i a ge By A ir R e g u l a t i o ns 1 9 78 read w i th the C a r r i a ge By A ir A ct 1 9 75 as well as the aforesaid carriage by air c o n v e n t i o ns provid exclusive c a u se of action a nd sole r e m e dy in respect of c l a i ms for loss, injury a nd d a m a ge sustained in the c o u r se of, or arising out of carriage by air, I consider therefore that by failing to pitch their c l a im within the a m b it of the R e g u l a t i o ns a nd by s i m p ly relying on c o m m on l aw n e g l i g e n ce the plaintiffs h a ve m i s c o n s t r u ed their c a u se of action a nd r e m e dy a nd h a ve m i s s ed the b o at in the process. On t he q u e s t i on of costs there c an be no d o u bt in my m i nd that if t he d e f e n d a n ts h ad p r o c e e d ed by w ay of e x c e p t i on this m a t t er w o u ld h a ve b e en r e s o l v ed m o re expeditiously w i t h o ut m u ch i n c o n v e n i e n ce to t he C o u r t. In fairness to A dv P e n z h o m S . C, he c o n c e d es this point. A c c o r d i n g ly I c o n s i d er that it w o u ld be unfair to s a d d le the plaintiffs w i th all t he c o s ts of the instant matter. In all the c i r c u m s t a n c es of the c a se therefore t he application for absolution f r om t he instance is granted. T he plaintiffs shall p ay h a lf of d e f e n d a n t s' costs. M . M. R a m o d i b e di J U D GE 2 2 nd O c t o b er 1 9 98 F or Plaintiffs : F or D e f e n d a n ts : A dv S e l v an S . C. A dv P e n z h o rn S . C.