Namboso v Board of Governors Motsekuoa High School (CIV/A 4 of 97) [1998] LSCA 40 (8 May 1998)
No valid contract existed as the required approval by the Principal Secretary for Education was not obtained, but the respondent was unjustly enriched by the appellant's services and is liable to compensate her.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [1998] LSCA 40
- Parties
- Appellant: Sarah Namboso; Respondent: Board of Governors Motsekuoa High School
- Court
- Court of Appeal
- Jurisdiction
- Lesotho
- Case Number
- CIV/A 4 of 97
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Judgment on Appeal
- Outcome
- appeal upheld
- Legal Topics
- Employment Contract Validity, Approval of Contracts in Grant Aided Schools, Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Sarah Namboso
Appellant
Board of Governors Motsekuoa High School
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Judgment on Appeal
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a valid contract of employment existed between the appellant and respondent without approval of the Principal Secretary for Education
- 2 Whether the respondent was unjustly enriched by the appellant's services
Ratio Decidendi
No valid contract existed as the required approval by the Principal Secretary for Education was not obtained, but the respondent was unjustly enriched by the appellant's services and is liable to compensate her.
Court Disposition
appeal upheld
Orders
- Appeal upheld with costs in favour of the appellant.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
CIV/A/4/97 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between: S A R AH N A M B O SO A P P E L L A NT and B O A RD OF G O V E R N O RS M O T S E K U OA H I GH S C H O OL R E S P O N D E NT J U D G M E N T D e l i v e r ed by t he H o n o u r a b le C h i ef Justice Mr J u s t i ce J. L. K h e o la on t he 8th d ay of M a y, 1 9 9 8. T h is is an a p p e al against the j u d g m e nt of the learned C h i ef M a g i s t r a te in w h i ch he d i s m i s s ed the appellant's c l a i ms in the m a in a nd in t he alternative w i th costs. In this action the appellant c l a i m ed f r om the r e s p o n d e nt a s um of M 1 0 , 0 0 0 - 00 b e i ng the r e m u n e r a t i on d ue to h er for service s he r e n d e r ed as a teacher at M o t s e k u oa H i gh C o u rt b e t w e en F e b r u a r y, 1 9 93 a nd D e c e m b e r, 1 9 9 4. It is c o m m on c a u se that d u r i ng the relevant p e r i od the appellant w as p a id an a m o u nt of M 2 , 5 0 0 - 00 w h i ch t he r e s p o n d e nt s a ys w as an a l l o w a n ce b e f o re h er contract w as formally a p p r o v ed by the Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i o n. It is c o m m on c a u se that the r e s p o n d e nt p u r p o r t ed to e n g a ge the appellant as a teacher at a salary of M l, 2 3 3 - 36 p er m o n t h. T he appellant p r o d u c ed a d o c u m e nt s he t e r m ed a contract of e m p l o y m e nt to s u p p o rt h er c l a im (Exhibit " A " ). E x h i b it " A" is a f o rm prescribed by R e g u l a t i on 5 ( 5) of T he T e a c h i ng R e g u l a t i o n s, 1 9 83 a nd a p p e a rs in the Sixth S c h e d u le to the said R e g u l a t i o n s. It reads as follows: "A teacher's contract shall be p r e p a r ed substantially in the f o rm prescribed in the Sixth or S e v e n th S c h e d u le subject to s u ch m o d i f i c a t i o ns as m ay be n e c e s s a ry in particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s, a nd shall be entered into before a s s u m p t i on of d u ty by the teacher." It is not in dispute that Exhibit " A" w as n ot p r e p a r ed substantially in the f o rm prescribed in the S e v e n th S c h e d u le b e c a u se the r e q u i r e m e nt that b o th the Educational Secretary a nd the Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i on did not a p p r o ve the purported contract of e m p l o y m e nt by affixing their signatures in the appropriate spaces p r o v i d ed on the prescribed f o r m. T he c r ux of the matter is w h e t h er a valid contract did c o me a b o ut w i t h o ut the a p p r o v al of b o th the Educational Secretary a nd the Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i o n? In my v i ew no valid contract w as created w i t h o ut the said approval. W h at is clear f r om Exhibit " A" is that the parties w ho w e re attempting to enter into a contract w e re the R o m an Catholic C h u r ch a nd the appellant. T he R o m an Catholic C h u r ch w as represented by R e v. Julius M a h u la w ho is the M a n a g er of the M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o o l. He untertook to p ay the salary of the appellant but this undertaking w as conditional b e c a u se it d e p e n d ed on the approval of the Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i on w ho w as to consider w h e t h er the appellant h ad the prescribed qualifications for the post she w as applying for. He w o u ld also h a ve to ascertain that the f u n ds to p r o v i de for a grant in aid w e re available. T he salaries of G o v e r n m e nt aided schools are paid by the G o v e r n m e nt f r om m o n i es allocated by Parliament for that p u r p o s e. R e g u l a t i on 5 (5) of T he T e a c h i ng Service Regulations, 1 9 86 provides that the contract shall be entered into before a s s u m p t i on of duty by the teacher. T he contract c a n n ot be regarded as c o m p l e te before the approval of the Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i on h as b e en obtained b e c a u se he is the o ne w ho is responsible for the p a y m e nt of the teachers' salaries in all G o v e r n m e nt aided schools. In the present case the appellant a s s u m ed duty before the contract h ad b e en properly entered into. It is unfortunate that the appellant w o r k ed for s u ch a long t i me without a salary. T he Principal Secretary is not a party to the present appeal a nd we do not k n ow w hy he withheld his approval. It m ay be that there w e re no f u n ds for s u ch a post or that he f o r m ed the opinion that the appellant w as not properly qualified. We shall n e v er k n ow the reason b e c a u se the appellant did not sue h i m. In his j u d g m e nt the learned C h i ef Magistrate c a me to the conclusion that M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o ol w as a G o v e r n m e nt Controlled S c h o o l. T h is is not correct. It is a grant aided school a nd its proprietor is the R o m an Catholic C h u r c h. This fact is clearly indicated in Exhibit " A ". T he R o m an Catholic C h u r ch w as represented by its duly authorised agent, R e v. Julius M a h u l a. T h e re is no d o u bt that M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o ol is the property of the R o m an Catholic C h u r ch a nd it receives grant in aid. I a g r ee w i th the learned C h i ef Magistrate that there w as no valid contract b e t w e en the appellant a nd the r e s p o n d e nt a nd that the dismissal of the action b a s ed on the alleged contract should be c o n f i r m ed on appeal. T he n e xt issue is that of unjust enrichment. Mr S o o k n a n a n, c o u n s el for the respondent, submitted that if the C o u rt finds e n r i c h m e nt t h en clearly it is the G o v e r n m e nt of L e s o t ho w h i ch is the funder of teachers w h i ch h as b e en enriched a nd n ot the respondent. He submitted that the l aw is as follows: If a principal is enriched as a result of a purported contract entered into on his b e h a lf by a p e r s on professing to h a ve authority to do so a nd he fails to ratify the unauthorised act, the principal will be liable to the extent he h as b e en enriched. He is n ot liable on the contract at all, but simply in t e r ms of the ordinary doctrine of unjust e n r i c h m e n t. He further referred to the case of R e id a nd o t h e rs v. W a r n er 1 9 07 T. S.961 at pp 9 7 4 - 9 75 w h e re Innes, C. J. said: "It s e e ms to me a s o u nd principle that w h e re an agent has, without authority, b o r r o w ed m o n ey on behalf of a principal, a nd w h e re that m o n ey h as b e en spent for the u se a nd benefit of the principal, the latter is liable to r e p ay it, unless he refuses to a c c e pt the benefit a nd takes steps to restore matters to their original position." T h e re are other cases in w h i ch the s a me principle w as stated. In K n o ll v. S. A. F l o o r i ng I n d u s t r i es L t d. 1 9 51 ( 1) S . A. 4 04 ( T . P . D .) T he h e a d n o te r e a ds as follows: " S e m b l e: If a p e r s o n, t h i n k i ng he w as authorised to do so, that he h ad b e en e n g a g ed by the o w n e r, b o na fide d o es w o rk to his h o u se by w h i ch he h as benefited - b e en enriched-in a certain a m o u nt it w o u ld be unjust for t he o w n er to be e n r i c h ed at the e x p e n se of the builder a nd the latter c o u ld in equity c l a im the a m o u nt by w h i ch t he o w n er h ad b e en enriched. It d o es n ot s e em essential in s u ch an action to b r i ng in the principles of n e g o t i o r um gestor. As the original contractor h ad failed to c o m p l e te t he building of a h o u se for the d e f e n d a n t, the latter contracted w i th h er h u s b a n d, to w h om s he w as m a r r i ed out of c o m m u n i ty of property a nd w ho w as a builder, to complete the house, w h i ch he did. Defendant's h u s b a nd h ad contracted with the plaintiff c o m p a ny to put in certain floors in regard to w h i ch it rendered h im an account. He failed to p ay a nd the plaintiff sued the defendant, w ho it discovered w as the building o w n er a nd o w n er of the house, claiming, inter alia, (9) "that the said w o rk a nd materials w e re d o ne a nd furnished by the plaintiff for the benefit of the defendant as n e g o t i o r um gestor on the instructions of her h u s b a n d, in the b o na fide belief that her said h u s b a nd w as the o w n er of the said property. (10) T he expenses incurred by the plaintiff aforesaid w e re necessary and/or useful and the said property of the defendant has b e en enhanced in value and the defendant has b e en unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff." It appeared that defendant h ad m a de provision for the full cost of the building by a loan from a building society a nd that this h ad b e en exhausted by her h u s b a nd in building the house. A magistrate having found that the principles of n e g o t i o r um gestor applied a nd h a v i ng g i v en j u d g m e nt for the plaintiff, in an appeal, In order to s u c c e ed that plaintiff h ad to p r o ve that the defendant h ad b e en unjustly enriched at its e x p e n s e. Further, as she h ad not b e en so enriched, that the plaintiff w as not entitled to recover f r om her." As far as the l aw is c o n c e r n ed I entirely agree w i th M r. S o o k n a n a n. In the present case it is c o m m on cause that the appellant r e n d e r ed her services as a teacher at M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o ol for the entire relevant period. H er services w e re accepted by the proprietor of M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o o l. It s e e ms to me that it w as the proprietor of M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o ol w ho benefited f r om the services of the appellant in the sense that the children w ho c a me to its school got tuition free of c h a r ge at the e x p e n se of the appellant. I do not agree with the s u b m i s s i on that it w as the G o v e r n m e nt of L e s o t ho w h i ch w as enriched b e c a u se education is its responsibility. T h at is not correct. M o t s e k u oa H i gh S c h o ol is a grant-aided school a nd that m e a ns it receives s o me financial aid f r om p u b l ic f u n d s. A id is h e lp g i v en to t he proprietor of a s c h o ol in the f o rm of salaries to the teachers at a grant-aided s c h o o l. T h at is t he r e a s on w hy the contract m u st be a p p r o v ed by t he Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i on b e f o re it c an be r e g a r d ed as valid. It is the Principal Secretary w ho m u st s ee that there are f u n ds available to p ay the grant-in-aid. He m u st c h e ck t he b u d g et a nd m a ke s u re that no teacher shall a s s u me d u ty b e f o re there is a s s u r a n ce that h e / s he shall be p a id i n a s m u ch as his/her salary is p r o v i d ed for in t he b u d g e t. I h a ve already f o u nd that it is t he r e s p o n d e nt w h i ch w as unjustly e n r i c h e d. In a ny c a se t he p u r p o r t ed contract E x h i b it " A" w as entered into by t he appellant a nd t he R o m an C a t h o l ic C h u r ch a nd t he G o v e r n m e nt of L e s o t ho w as n ot a party to it. E v en after t he Principal Secretary for E d u c a t i on h as a p p r o v ed t he contract by affixing his signature to it he d o es n ot m a ke t he G o v e r n m e nt of L e s o t ho a p a r ty to s u ch a contract. Be that as it m a y, t he doctrine of unjust e n r i c h m e nt d o es n ot d e p e nd on the validity or invalidity of t he contract. In the result, the a p p e al is u p h e ld w i th costs. J. L. K H E O LA C H I EF J U S T I CE 8th M A Y, 1998 F or Appellant F or R e s p o n d e nt - M r. S o o k n a n an - M r. Z. M da 10