Executor Estate of the late Pusetso Makotoane v Attorney-General and Another (CIV/APN 497 of 97) [1998] LSCA 21 (3 March 1998)
The applicant's failure to comply with statutory requirements for inventory and publication under the Administration of Estates Proclamation No. 19 of 1935 meant that the respondent was not precluded from executing the writ against the estate. The grant of letters of administration alone does not bar a creditor from...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [1998] LSCA 21
- Parties
- Applicant: The Executor, Estate of the Late Pusetso Makotoane; 1st Respondent: Attorney-General; 2nd Respondent: Deputy-Sheriff (Mr. Lemena)
- Court
- Court of Appeal
- Jurisdiction
- Lesotho
- Case Number
- CIV/APN 497 of 97
- Procedural Posture
- Application / Judgment
- Outcome
- Application dismissed
- Legal Topics
- Administration of Estates, Execution of Judgments, Conflict of Interest, Duties of Executor
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
The Executor, Estate of the Late Pusetso Makotoane
Applicant
Attorney-General
1st Respondent
Deputy-Sheriff (Mr. Lemena)
2nd Respondent
Procedural Posture
Application / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a creditor may execute judgment against a deceased's estate before the executor has complied with statutory publication requirements.
- 2 Whether the grant of letters of administration alone bars execution by creditors.
- 3 Whether the executor's failure to comply with statutory duties affects the rights of creditors.
Ratio Decidendi
The applicant's failure to comply with statutory requirements for inventory and publication under the Administration of Estates Proclamation No. 19 of 1935 meant that the respondent was not precluded from executing the writ against the estate. The grant of letters of administration alone does not bar a creditor from pursuing execution of judgment. The application was dismissed for lack of merit.
Court Disposition
Application dismissed
Orders
- Rule nisi discharged
- Applicant to pay costs
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
1 CIV/APN/497/97 IN T HE H I GH C O U RT OF L E S O T HO In the matter between T HE E X E C U T O R, E S T A TE OF T he Late Pusetso M a k o t o a ne A P P L I C A NT and T HE A T T O R N E Y - G E N E R AL T HE D E P U T Y - S H E R I FF ( M r. L e m e n a) 1 ST R E S P O N D E NT 2 ND R E S P O N D E NT J U D G M E NT D e l i v e r ed by the H o n o u r a b le M r. Justice M . M. R a m o d i b e di on the 3rd d ay of M a r c h, 1 9 9 8. T h is is an application for an order c o u c h ed in the f o l l o w i ng t e r m s: " 1- D i s p e n s i ng w i th the R u l es of C o u rt c o n c e r n i ng notices a nd service of p r o c e ss herein on a c c o u nt of the u r g e n cy of this matter. 2- A R u le nisi issue returnable on a date a nd t i me d e t e r m i n a b le by the a b o ve H o n o u r a b le C o u rt calling u p on R e s p o n d e n ts to s h ow c a u s e, if a n y, w hy the following order shall n ot be m a de final: a - S e c o nd R e s p o n d e nt be interdicted forthwith f r om pursuing service, execution, r e m o v al a nd sale in execution of a ny property in the estate of the late P U S E T SO M A K O T O A N E, p e n d i ng the administration of the said estate by the e x e c u t or thereof; b - First R e s p o n d e nt be directed to l o d ge his claim against the estate of the late P U S E T SO M A K O T O A N E, if a n y, w i th the executor of the aforesaid estate. c - R e s p o n d e n ts be interdicted f r om interfering in a ny m a n n er w h a t s o e v er with the d ue administration of the estate of the late P U S E T SO M A K O T O A NE a nd the e x e c u t or thereof, e x c e pt by d ue p r o c e ss of l a w; d - R e s p o n d e n ts be ordered to p ay the costs h e r e of on an A t t o r n ey a nd Client scale. e - Further and/or alternative relief 3 - P r a y e rs 2 (a) & © operate w i th i m m e d i a te effect as interim orders." On the 2 2 nd D e c e m b e r, 1 9 97 my B r o t h er M o f o lo J granted a R u le Nisi as p r a y ed in t e r ms of prayers 1 ,2 (a) a nd (c). After a f ew p o s t p o n e m e n ts the matter w as finally a r g u ed before me on the 24th February, 1 9 9 8. I should mention at the outset that M r. Ntlhoki w ho a p p e a r ed for the Applicant only confined himself to prayer 2 (a) a nd (c). As will be s e en in the course of this j u d g m e nt this w as a wise m o ve i n d e ed in the circumstances of the case. T he story of the litigation in this matter revolves a r o u nd the fact that ( a nd this is c o m m on c a u s e) on the 29th d ay of January 1 9 96 the G o v e r n m e nt of L e s o t ho obtained j u d g m e nt in the s um of M 2 , 2 0 7 , 8 1 0 . 50 ( t wo million, t wo h u n d r ed a nd s e v en thousand, eight h u n d r ed a nd ten Maloti a nd fifty Lisente) against the late Pusetso M a k o t o a ne w ho w as the Applicant's h u s b a n d. F or the a v o i d a n ce of d o u bt I should m e n t i on that the j u d g m e nt w as obtained during the lifetime of the said Pusetso M a k o t o a n e. Although the Applicant has not told the C o u rt the date on w h i ch her h u s b a nd sadly passed a w ay I am satisfied f r om the p a p e rs before me (again this is c o m m on cause) that on the 14th N o v e m b er 1 9 96 the Applicant w as granted letters of administration of the estate in question by the M a s t er of the H i gh C o u rt pursuant to the Administration of Estates Proclamation N o. 19 of 1 9 3 5. P r e s u m a b l y, therefore, the Applicant's h u s b a nd p a s s ed a w ay b e t w e en the 29th January 1 9 96 w h en j u d g m e nt w as granted against h im a nd the 14th N o v e m b er 1 9 96 w h en the Applicant w as granted letters of administration. On the 28th February 1 9 97 the First R e s p o n d e nt s u ed out a writ of execution against the deceased's estate in the aforesaid s um of M 2 , 2 0 7 , 8 1 0 . 5 0. T he D e p u ty Sheriff's charges in the matter as reflected on the writ itself apparently a m o u n t ed to the s um of M 1 1 0 , 4 4 8 . 5 5. On the 10th D e c e m b er 1 9 97 a nd pursuant to the writ in question the D e p u ty Sheriff ( S e c o nd R e s p o n d e n t) duly took an inventory of certain items of m o v a b le property of the deceased's estate. O n ce m o re this is c o m m on cause. N ow in the light of the foregoing factors it is Applicant's contention, if I understand it correctly, that the First R e s p o n d e nt is precluded f r om pursuing a nd executing the writ in question by virtue of the fact that it w as issued after she h ad already b e en appointed executrix of the estate. It is her contention that the First R e s p o n d e nt is obliged to obtain an order of the Court before he c an execute the j u d g m e nt in question. This is perhaps an appropriate stage therefore to refer to Sections 4 4, 46 a nd 47 of the Administration of Estates Proclamation N o. 19 of 1 9 35 on w h i ch the Applicant so heavily relies for her stance in the matter. It proves convenient to reproduce t h em in full. Section 44 provides as follows : " E v e ry executor shall, as soon as letters of administration h a ve b e en granted to h i m, m a k e, subscribe and transmit to the M a s t e r, an inventory showing the value of all the property belonging to the estate; a nd if he c o m es to k n ow thereafter of any property w h i ch is not contained in any inventory lodged by h im with the M a s t er he shall m a k e, subscribe, and transmit to the M a s t er an additional inventory s h o w i ng the value thereof a nd shall find such further security as the Master m ay direct under Section thirty-nine of this Proclamation." ( my underlining). 5 . Sadly for the Applicant it is c o m m on cause that she h as failed to c o m p ly with the provisions of this section ever since the 14th N o v e m b er 1 9 96 w h en she w as granted letters of administration to date. This is a delay of m o re than a w h o le year a nd I h a ve no hesitation in holding that the delay w as grossly unreasonable a nd contrary to the letter a nd spirit of the Administration of Estates Proclamation 19 of 1 9 35 wherein time is of the essence in order to safeguard the interests of creditors. U n d ue delay in m a k i ng the necessary inventory a nd administering the estate will no doubt often result in the dissipation of the estate itself to the prejudice of creditors. That m u st be discouraged at all costs. N o w, section 46 of the Administration of Estates Proclamation N o. 19 of 1 9 35 reads as follows: "Every executor shall, so s o on as he h as entered on the administration of the estate cause a notice to be published in the Gazette a nd in a n e w s p a p er circulating in the district in w h i ch the d e c e a s ed ordinarily resided or if not resident in the Territory at the time of his death in a n e w s p a p er circulating in a district w h e re the deceased o w n ed property, calling u p on all persons having claims against the d e c e a s ed or his estate to lodge the s a me with m at executor within such period f r om the date of the latest publication of the notice as is therein specified, not being less (save as in section sixty-six of this proclamation is provided) than thirty d a ys or m o re than three m o n t h s, as is d e e m ed by the executor proper in the particular circumstances of e a ch case. All claims w h i ch w o u ld be capable of proof in case of the insolvency of the estate shall be d e e m ed to be claims of creditors for the purposes of this Proclamation." ( my underlining). O n ce m o re the Applicant defaulted a nd failed to c a u se a t i m e o us notice to be published in the Gazette a nd in a n e w s p a p er as stipulated in the section. It is c o m m on c a u se that the first publication in a n e w s p a p er w as only m a de in the M o A f r i ca N e w s p a p er on the 21st a nd 28th N o v e m b er 1 9 97 w h i ch w a s, o n ce m o r e, m o re than a w h o le year after the Applicant h ad b e en granted letters of administration. R e g a r d i ng publication in the G a z e t te it is again c o m m on c a u se that s u ch publication w as only m a de on the 19th D e c e m b er 1 9 9 7. T he Applicant claims that she h ad no control or final say over the publishers a nd that the delay w as not of her o wn m a k i n g. T he C o u rt is not impressed. T he A p p l i c a nt h as n ot told the C o u rt w h at steps she took, if a n y, to c a u se the necessary publications to be m a de a nd if so w h e n. In the circumstances I am left with the u n c o m f o r t a b le feeling that the Applicant w as playing for time. At a ny rate I am satisfied that the delay in effecting the necessary publications w as grossly unreasonable. This leads me to section 47 of the Administration of Estates Proclamation N o. 19 of 1 9 3 5. T h at section provides as follows: " No p e r s on w ho h as obtained the j u d g m e nt of a ny C o u rt against a ny deceased person in his lifetime or against his executor shall s ue out or obtain a ny process in execution of that j u d g m e nt before the expiration of the period notified in the G a z e t te in m a n n er p r o v i d ed in section forty-six of this proclamation, a nd no person shall thereafter within six m o n t hs after the grant of letters of administration obtain a ny p r o c e ss in execution of a ny such j u d g m e nt without first obtaining an order of the C o u r t ." ( my underlining). In my v i ew the underlined w o r ds in this section are v e ry crucial a nd i n d e ed decisive. W h at this then m e a ns is that before this section c an avail the e x e c u t or of an estate the requirements of Section 46 m u st first be fulfilled n a m e l y, the e x e c u t or m u st c a u se a notice to be published in the G a z e t te a nd in a n e w s p a p er circulating in the district in w h i ch the d e c e a s ed ordinarily resided or w h e re he o w n ed property as the case m ay be calling u p on all p e r s o ns h a v i ng c l a i ms against the d e c e a s ed or his estate to l o d ge s u ch claims with the e x e c u t or within the t i me specified in the publication (provided that s u ch time shall not be less t h an thirty d a ys or m o re t h an three m o n t hs f r om the date of the publication). Y et the facts in the instant c a se h a ve s h o wn b e y o nd d o u b t, a nd again this is c o m m on cause, that on the 28th February 1 9 97 w h en the First R e s p o n d e nt s u ed out a writ in the matter the Applicant h ad not yet c o m p l i ed w i th the provisions of Section 46 by causing a notice to be published in the G a z e t te a nd in a n e w s p a p er inviting creditors to c o me f o r w a rd a nd l o d ge their c l a i ms w i th her. A c c o r d i n g ly I hold that there is nothing in Section 47 that prohibits a creditor f r om suing out a writ before the publication in question is m a d e. It is only after s u ch publication h as b e en m a de that a creditor is obliged to await the expiration of the period notified in the Gazette. C o n v e r s e ly I hold that the granting of letters of administration a l o ne is not sufficient to prohibit a creditor f r om suing out a writ in execution of j u d g m e nt against the d e c e a s ed or his executor. I am fortified in the v i ew that I take in this m a t t er by the fact that at c o m m on l aw a creditor h as the right to institute an action against an executor of a solvent estate. By the s a me token a creditor u n d er c o m m on l aw h as the right to p u r s ue a nd e x e c u te a writ in respect of a j u d g m e nt he h as obtained against a d e c e a s ed or his executor. S ee D a v i ds v Estate Hall 1 9 5 6 ( 1) SA 7 7 4. M a c d o n a l d, F o r m an & C o. L td V V an A s w e g en a nd A n o t h er 1 9 63 ( 3) SA 1 7 3. H a v i ng considered the Administration of Estates P r o c l a m a t i on N o. 19 of 1 9 35 as a w h o le I am satisfied that there is n o t h i ng to indicate that the Legislature intended to deprive a creditor of his c o m m on l aw right to p u r s ue a nd e x e c u te a writ in r e s p e ct of a j u d g m e nt he h as lawfully o b t a i n ed against the d e c e a s ed or his executor before the requisite notice a nd publication referred to in S e c t i on 46 of the p r o c l a m a t i o n. T he executrix (the A p p l i c a n t) in the instant c a se is in no better position. In fairness to M r. N t l h o ki he h as c o n c e d e d, a nd rightly so in my v i e w, that the first p a rt of S e c t i on 47 c a n n ot assist his client. It is t he s e c o nd part of the section that gives h im s o me m e a s u re of h o pe a nd he s u b m i ts therefore that t he First R e s p o n d e nt w as prohibited f r om p u r s u i ng the writ in q u e s t i on by virtue of the fact that t h e re is n ow publication in the G a z e t te albeit belatedly. As earlier stated it should be r e m e m b e r ed that the publication in the G a z e t te w as o n ly m a de on the 1 9 th D e c e m b er 1 9 97 l o ng after the writ in q u e s t i on h ad a l r e a dy b e en set in m o t i o n. In my v i e w, the w o rd thereafter a p p e a r i ng in the s e c o nd part of S e c t i on 47 relates to the situation d e s c r i b ed in S e c t i on 46 n a m e ly that the e x e c u t or m u st first c a u se a notice to be p u b l i s h ed in the G a z e t te a nd in a n e w s p a p er circulating in the district in w h i ch the d e c e a s ed ordinarily resided or the district w h e re the latter o w n ed property as the c a se m ay be before the creditor c an be p r e c l u d ed f r om s u i ng o ut a writ. B ut e v en t h en the p e r i od within w h i ch he is so p r e c l u d ed is n ot unlimited. It is a p e r i od of n ot less t h an thirty d a ys or m o re t h an three m o n t hs (as is d e e m ed by the executor) f r om the date of the publication. A c c o r d i n g ly I h o ld that w h e re m e re is no s u ch publication w i t h in the statutory p e r i od stipulated in S e c t i on 46 as is the c a se h e r e, there is no n e ed for the creditor to o b t a in an o r d er of court first before pursuing a writ in his favour. I reiterate that the grant of letters of administration alone is not a bar to a creditor suing out a writ in execution of judgment. To hold otherwise w o u ld not only be contrary to the letter a nd spirit of the Proclamation but w o u ld also lead to an a n o m a l o us situation w h e r e by executors w o u ld simply sit back and play for time while holding letters of administration as a w e a p on of terror so to speak to the prejudice of creditors. As I see it therefore it w as i n c u m b e nt u p on the Applicant as executrix of the deceased's estate to have caused the necessary publications to be m a de "as s o on a s" she h ad been granted letters of administration on 14th N o v e m b er 1996. If she h ad d o ne that the First R e s p o n d e nt w o u ld h a ve b e en precluded f r om pursuing the writ in question within six m o n t hs after the grant of letters of administration. As it is she failed dismally to c o m p ly with the relevant requirements of the proclamation a nd h as got only herself to b l a m e. Regrettably this C o u rt cannot c o me to her assistance. W h i ch brings me to the question of conflict of interests. M r. Ntlhoki h as rightly conceded, in my v i e w, that there is obviously a conflict of interest in this matter b e t w e en the Applicant's duty as executrix of the estate a nd her personal interest in the estate as the wife of the deceased. I h a ve no d o u bt in my m i nd that this explains the inordinate delay by the Applicant in c o m p l y i ng with the provisions of the Administration of Estates Proclamation N o. 19 of 1 9 35 as s h o wn a b o v e. S he naturally finds herself in a d i l e m ma that if she m a k es an inventory a nd advertises for creditors in the Gazette and in a n e w s p a p er she m ay well lose property in w h i ch she has clear interest. T he a n o m a ly is that the l aw as it stands presently permits her to act as executrix of her late husband's estate nonetheless. It is for that reason that legislation is necessary to grant p o w er to the M a s t er of the H i gh Court to exercise his/her discretion in fitting cases of conflict of interests to appoint a neutral p e r s on as executor/executrix. Until that h as h a p p e n ed h o w e v er all executors including those with vested interest m u st realise that they are e x p e c t ed to display u t m o st g o od faith a nd h o n e s ty in their discharge of their duties as administrators of t he d e c e a s e d 's estate. In all the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that there is no m e r it in this application. A c c o r d i n g ly the R u le is discharged a nd the application d i s m i s s ed w i th costs. M . M. R a m o d i b e di J U D GE 3rd M a r ch 1998 F or Applicant : M r. Ntlhoki F or First R e s p o n d e n t: M r. Putsoane