ASPEN VISION CITY SDN. BHD. 1. ) TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH 2. ) TAN LEONG SAN

DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI MALAYSIA (BIDANG KUASA RAYUAN) RAYUAN NOMBOR :P...........0.005 12022: ANTARA TAN LEONG SAN ..Perayu (No. K/P: 540619-07-5493) DAN ASPEN VISION CITY SDN. BHD. ..Responden (No Syarikat 201401027751(110387-X) DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA Di GEORGETOWN NOMBOR GUAMAN: PA-25-44-07/2021 Dalam perkara mengenai keputusan Presiden Tribunal dalam Award Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah (Borang 10) bertarikh 22.04.2021 dalam kes Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah Tuntutan No. TTPRZU/P/0221/20 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Akta Pemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Perlesenan) 1966 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Peraturan 11 Peraturan-Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Perlesenan) 1989 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Peraturan- Peraturan Pemajuan Perumahan (Tribunal Tuntutan Pembeli Rumah) 2002 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 25 dan Jadual 1, Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 53 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA ASPEN VISION CITY SDN. BHD. (No Syarikat 201401027751(110387-X) ...Pemohon DAN 1. TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH KEMENTERIAN PERUMAHAN DAN KERAJAAN TEMPATAN 2. TAN LEONG SAN (No. K/P: 540619-07-5493) ..Responden-responen JUDGMENT (Enclosure 20) INTRODUCTION [1] The Respondent had filed an application (Enclosure 20) in the High Court to quash the Award dated 22.4.2021 delivered by the Tribunal for Homebuyers in Claim Number TTPRZU/P/0221/20 ("the said Award"). [2] On 02.06.2022, this court granted the application (Enclosure 20), and thus the Appellant filed this appeal against the decision. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] On8.05.2017, the Appellant and the Respondent entered into a sale and purchase ("SPA") to buy a unit in a condominium known as Unit No. E-25-01 in Vertu Resort together with a car park ("the said unit") for RM544,000.00 ("the purchase price"). The Appellant had paid only 10% of the purchase price on 26.06. 2016. [4] The SPA is signed by the parties under Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 ("the said Act") and the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 ("the said Regulations”). [5] Under Clauses 4 and 5 of the SPA, the Appellant has to make an instalment as stated in the 3. Schedule of the SPA. [6] The Appellant has tried to get a loan from a bank. By virtue of Clause 11 of the SPA, the Appellant failed to make payment accordingly and the Respondent has forfeited that 10% deposit. [7] The Notice of Demand dated 8.10.2019 and 30.10.12020 was issued as the Appellant failed to pay stages 2 (b), 2 (c), and 2 (d) of the SPA. According to Clause 11 of the SPA, if the Appellant fails to pay any instalment for more than 30 days, the Respondent has the right to terminate the SPA and also charge for a late payment. The termination notice dated 19.06.2020 was issued and the SPA was terminated on 19.07.21. [8] The Appellant filed a claim with the Tribunal for Homebuyers to challenge the Respondent's action, claiming that only 1% can be forfeited under Clause 6(3) of the SPA. According to the Appellant, the inability to obtain a loan due to income is covered by the aforementioned clause of the SPA. The Appellant stated that the Respondent was given proof of inability, so Clause 6(3) of the SPA applies. [9] On 24.04.2021, the Tribunal for Homebuyers determined that the Respondent was not entitled to 10% of the purchase price. The Respondent filed a judicial review ("JR") based on the statutory terms under schedule H, the said Act, and the Regulations because it had been denied 9% of the purchase price. On 22.10.2021 the application for leave was granted. Law on Judicial Review [10] It is an established principle that not all cases filed at the High Court are reviewable. In the case of PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA V. CHIN CHEE KOW & ANOTHER APPEAL [2019] 4 CLJ 561, it was decided that: (1) Not all cases brought before the courts are reviewable. A court must first examine, inter alia, its justiciability. 'Justiciability' concerns the limit upon legal issues over which a court can exercise its judicial authority. Non-justiciability, in its administrative law sense, signifies that a matter is not capable of, or susceptible to, judicial review, as well as non-justiciability in the sense of there being no jurisdiction to entertain an issue or to grant approved relief (para 48) [11] The Respondent argues that the Tribunal for Homebuyers does not have jurisdiction. These exceptional cases can be sustained if the Respondent can show that there is a lack of jurisdiction to decide, a failure to perform a statutory duty or a serious violation of principles of natural justice. (see GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA & ANORS V JAGDIS SINGH [1987] 2 MLJ 185. The principle in JADGIS SINGH has been referred and applied by the courts (see: TA WU REALTY SDN BHD V KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI & ANOR [2009] 1 MLJ 555; KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI V MUDAH.MY SDN BHD [2017] 2 MLJ 197 (“MUDAH.MY SDN BHD”); ISKANDAR COAST SDN BHD V KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI [2019] 4 AMR 317; BINTULU LUMBER DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD V KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI [2017] 1 LNS 947; KETUA PENGARAH KASTAM DAN EKSAIS V COACH MALAYSIA SDN BHD [2019] 4 CLJ 454; KETUA PENGARAH HASIL DALAM NEGERI (LHDN) V IBM (MALAYSIA) SDN BHD [2021] 1 CLJ 776. {12] There are four established grounds on which errors of law are committed by an inferior tribunal, which necessitate the intervention of the High Court. They are "illegality", "irrationality", "procedural impropriety" and "proportionality" (which allows for a decision to be struck down on the premise that it was excessive and/or disproportionate to the objective it sought to achieve). However, most case laws emphasise three grounds, as illustrated below, namely, "illegality", "irrationality", and "procedural impropriety”. [13] In the case of PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA V. CHIN CHEE KOW & ANOTHER APPEAL (SUPRA), this landmark decision moved the courts from a position of deciding whether prerogative power existed to deciding if they were being carried out lawfully. Lord Diplock in his speech at p. 401D of the GCHQ case enunciated three classic grounds for judicial review: Judicial review has | think developed to a stage today when... one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground | would call “illegality”, the second "irrationality" and the third "procedural impropriety."... By "illegality" as a ground for judicial review | mean that the decisionmaker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the judges, by whom the judicial power of the state is exercisable. By ‘irrationality’ | mean what can now succinctly be referred to as "Wednesbury unreasonableness” (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no reasonable person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. | have described the third head as "procedural impropriety" rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. [14] The Federal Court case of WONG YUEN HOCK V SYARIKAT HONG LEONG ASSURANCE SDN BHD AND ANOTHER APPEAL [1995] 2 MLJ 753 AT P 757; [1995] 3 CLJ 344 at p 348: In exercising judicial review, the High Court was obliged not to interfere with the findings of the Industrial Court unless they were found to be unreasonable, in the sense that no reasonable man or body of men could reasonably come to the conclusion that it did, or that the decisions of the Industrial Court looked at objectively, are so devoid of any plausible justification that no reasonable person or body of persons could have reached them (see Lord Denning’s judgment in Griffiths (Inspector of Taxes) v JP Harrison (Watford) Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 909 at p 916, and judgment of Lord Diplock in Bromley London Borough Council v Greater London Council and Anor [1983] 1 AC 768 at p 821). (see CHIN PEY LEE & ANOR V TEORI WARISAN SDN BHD & ANOR [2020] 1 MLJ 731) Case analysis {15] In this case, the Respondent contends that the Tribunal for Homebuyers has erred in deciding that Clause 11 of the SPA is subject to Clause 6 of the SPA. The awards are stated as follows: [19] It is the finding of this Tribunal that Clause 11 is subject to Clause 6 of SPA. So, to say that in the event the Purchaser fail to obtain the financial facilities from the Financial Institutions and fail to produce of his eligibilities, then Clause 11 shall come to place, and insofar as the Purchaser obtain the written evidence of his ineligibilities, before completion of the repudiation process. Clause 6 (3) SPA shall stay in force. For avoidance of doubt 10 completion of the repudiation of SPA, shall means that the Respondent/ Developer has duly Repudiates the SPA, forfeit the 10 % equivalent of the Purchase price and refund the residue to the Purchaser/ Claimant. Clause 11(1) (c) SPA referred. [16] The Tribunal for Homebuyers stated that Clause 11 of the SPA is subject to Clause 6 of the SPA, and it is clear that Clause 11 is silent on the position in the event the purchaser obtains proof of ineligibilities and decides that there is a lacuna in law and that Clause 6 (3) of the SPA is applicable. [17] The Respondent submits that Clause 6(3) of the SPA states that this clause must be read together with Clause 6(3) of the SPA and is only applicable if the Appellant wishes to obtain a finance facility to pay the purchase price but is unable to do so within 30 days after receipt of the stamped copy of the SPA. Thereon, the SPA will be terminated in which the Appellant (purchaser) will only be liable to pay 1% of the purchase price. Clause 6(1) of the SPA states as follows: Financial facility 11 lf the purchaser is desirous of obtaining a financial facility to finance the payment of the purchase price of the said Parcel (herein referred to as “the Financial Facility), the Purchaser shall within thirty (30) days after the receipt of a stamped copy of the agreement, make a written application for the Financial Facility to the Developer who shall use its best endeavours to obtain the Financial Facility. [18] In this case, the stamped copy of the SPA was received by the Appellant on 28.07.2017 and he did not make any application to express his intention of obtaining the bank loan within 30 days from 28.07.2017. Following the termination of the SPA on 19.07. 2020, the Appellant provided evidence that he was unable to obtain a bank facility to pay the purchase price. [19] Based on the SPA clauses, this court decided that the Tribunal for Homebuyers misinterpreted Clauses 6 (1) and 6 (3) of the SPA. Because the Appellant did not follow the terms of the SPA, the Respondent has the right to terminate the SPA and forfeit the 10% deposit. The 12 Respondent depends solely on Clause 11 of the SPA because the Appellant failed to comply with Clause 5(1) of the SPA's Third Schedule. Clause 11 of the SPA states as follows: If the purchaser (a) subject to subclause (3). fails to pay any instalment payable under the subclause 5(1) in accordance with the Third Schedule or any part thereof and any part thereof and any late payment charges payable under clause 10 for any period in excess of thirty (30) days after the date of the instalment or late payment The Developer may, subject to subclause (2), annul the sale of the Said parcel and forthwith terminate this agreement ... [20] In this case, the Appellant has failed to pay the instalments payable under Clause 4 and Clause 5 of the SPA under the Third Schedule within 30 days after receipt of the notice from the Developer. 13 [21] Therefore, the Respondent has a right to terminate and forfeit 10% of the deposit, as stated in clause 11 (1) (ii) (B (i) of the SPA. Clause 11 (1) (ii) (B) (i) of the SPA states as follows: (ii) the instalments previously paid by the Purchaser to the Developer, excluding any late payment charges paid, shall be dealt with and disposed of as follows: (B) secondly, a sum to be forfeited to the Developer as follows: (i) Where up to fifty percent (50%) of the purchaser price has been paid, a sum equal to ten (10%) of the Purchase price (ii) .... [22] In any event, the Respondent (developer) must give the Appellant (purchaser) not less than thirty (30) days’ notice in writing via A.R. post to treat the SPA as having been repudiated. Based on the facts of this case, the termination was issued on 19.06.2020 pursuant to Clause 11 (2) of the SPA. But if the Appellant (purchaser), within that period, obtains a loan and pays the difference between the 14 purchase price and the financial facilities, the SPA cannot be terminated. [23] Based on the foregoing, this court agrees with the submission of the Respondent that Clause 6 of the SPA should be read disjunctively from Clause 11 of the SPA. Based on the facts of this case, the Appellant can only show proof after the SPA is terminated after 30 days as stated in Clause 11(3) of the SPA. It is clear that the Appellant has failed to comply with Clause 11(3) of the SPA. It is not for the Appellant or this court to rewrite the SPA. [24] On the issue of "first in time", the maxim is only applicable where there are two equities. For example, over land, the first shall prevail. In this case, the termination was done before the Appellant submitted the said bank letters to show proof that he was unable to secure a bank loan. The issue of a Notice of Forfeiture to forfeit the 10% after the Appellant showed the proof had no effect as it was done after 30 days according to clause 11 of the SPA. The finding of the Tribunal for Homebuyers on this issue cannot stand and must be set aside. 15 [25] In making its decision, the Tribunal for Homebuyers also considered the irrelevant factor. The fact that the Appellant failed to follow Clauses 4, 5, 6 and 11 of the SPA and warrants the to terminate the SPA and forfeited 10% of the Deposit was not dully considered. The Tribunal for Homebuyers in fact considered that the Appellant, a senior citizen living on his pension, had collected a sum of RM 54,400.00 from the Respondent, being the "Subscription & Reload of ASPEN PRIVILAGE CARD", which is "irrelevant." In the case of CHAI SAU YIN V. KOK SENG FATT [1966] 2 MLJ 54; [1966] 1 LNS 25 where it was held that — Ohne This, however, is a court of law and nota court of morals and it is on that basis that the case must be decided.” [26] The Appellant submits that the case of PJD REGENCY SDN BHD V TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR AND OTHER APPEALS [2021] 2 MLJ 60 should be applied by this court. In that case, it was held as follows: [1] The phrase ‘social legislation’ attached to the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 (‘the HDA 1966’) and its ensuing subsidiary legislation ie the Housing 16 Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 (‘the HDR 1989’) is not merely a fanciful label. In disputes between home buyers and housing developers, its significance lies in the approach taken by the courts to tip the scales of justice in favour of the home buyers given the disparity in bargaining power between them and the housing developers. [33] With the greatest of respect, it is our view that the submission is untenable. When it comes to interpreting social legislation, the state having statutorily intervened, the courts must give effect to the intention of Parliament and not the intention of parties. Otherwise, the attempt by the legislature to level the playing field by mitigating the inequality of bargaining power would be rendered nugatory and illusory. [36] From the above, we would summarise the principles on the interpretation of social legislation as follows: (a) statutory interpretation usually begins with the literal rule. However, and without being too prescriptive, where the provision under construction is ambiguous, the courts will determine the meaning of the provision by resorting to other methods of construction foremost of which is the purposive rule (see the judgment of this court in All 17 Malayan Estates Staff Union v Rajasegaran & Ors [2006] 6 MLJ 97); [2021] 2 MLJ 60 at 78 (b) the literal rule is automatically displaced by the purposive rule when it concerns the interpretation of the protective language of social legislation; and (c) for the avoidance of doubt, it is important to emphasise that even where a term or provision of a social legislation or a_ statutory contract enacted thereunder is literally clear or unambiguous, the court no less shoulders the obligation to ensure that the said term or provision is interpreted in a way which ensures maximum protection of the class in whose favour the social legislation was enacted. [27] The Appellant also relies on the case of COUNTRY GARDEN DANGA BAY SDN BHD V TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR [2020] MLJU 81 [COA] to support the argument that, the Tribunal for Homebuyers decision of the interior tribunal only can be reviewed on the grounds of illegality, irrationality and possibly proportionality. Where as in this case, the Tribunal for Homebuyers has appreciated all the facts and also the SPA and the Housing Act. 18 Pending this decision, the Federal Court has set aside the decision of the COA in COUNTRY DANGA BAY (supra). Therefore, on this issue, this court is bound by the latest case decided by the Federal Court in COUNTRY GARDEN DANGA BAY SDN BHD v TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR [2022] MLJU 678, which held that: [40] Upon comparing, it is clear to us that although both subsection 16N (2) of the Act and subsection 99(2) of Act 599 set the time frame for a claim to be made, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Act 599 is very wide and genera! and not limited to the purchase agreement or its terms. Whereas under the Act, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is confined to the SPA. There has to be a SPA for a claim or complaint to be made under the Act. The SPA is a condition precedent for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. [41] In Southville City Sdn. Bhd. v Chua Teck Kee & Anor (2019) | LNS 1018, the High Court observed and we agreed: “The court also refers to section 16N(2) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 where it states that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be limited to a claim that is based on a cause of action arising from 19 the sale and purchase agreement entered between the homebuyer and the housing developer. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is only confined to the four corners of the SPA and does not include any purported agreement nor conduct outside the SPA.” (emphasis added). [42] Hence we found the Tribunal was wrong when it varied the content of specifications under the SPA entered into between the appellant and the second respondent using paragraph (e) of subsection 16Y (2). The power under section 16Y(2)(e) is in our view, a power of rectification to comply with the statutory terms provided in the Schedule. As such, we agreed with learned counsel for the appellant that the Tribunal would have no power to rectify the SPA by the addition or exclusion of terms inconsistent with the statutory terms provided in either Schedule G or H of the Regulations. The power of the Tribunal to vary or set aside the contract wholly or in part under section 16Y(2)(e) of the Act is only when there is a clause in the SPA which is inconsistent with the statutory terms of the Schedule. 20 [43] In Encony Development Sdn. Bhd. v. Robert Gooch (2016) 2 MLJ 400 the Court of Appeal, in rejecting the recognition of collateral contracts, held: “(41) The SPA between the respondents and the appellant, who is a housing developer, is governed by a statutory form of contract ..... As such, the provisions in the SPA are not merely contractual, but are in effect statutory provisions, as they are actually provisions of Schedule H of the regulations, which have been imposed by law upon the parties. (42) There appears to be no evidential or legal basis to justify the existence of representations or assurances that sit alongside this statutory form SPA, and which are binding on the parties, as the learned judge found.” (emphasis added). [44] We agree with the decision of Encony, supra. We were of the view that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over matters following outside the SPA in the form of collateral contracts, representations or warranties. [45] In this appeal, we opined the Tribunal was wrong in taking into consideration the display model instead of the SPA. 21 [64] For the reasons alluded to above, we unanimously allowed the appeal. We found the decision of the Tribunal was irrational and unreasonable, and that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the issue to be decided could have arrived at it. The decision was also tainted with illegality. [28] On the issue of the new facts, this court is bound by the decision of MALAYAN BANKING BHD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ‘MAYBAN FINANCE BHD’) V. BOO HOCK SOON @ BOO CHOO SOON [2013] 2 MLJ 843, Per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA at page 854 (paragraph 35): “Be that as it may, the defendant guarantor ought not to be allowed to challenge the correctness of the certificate of indebtedness because the defendant guarantor has not alluded to this in any of his affidavits in reply nor was there any averment that there were manifest errors in the said certificate. A submission from the bar on this very crucial issue will not be entertained by this court (Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281; [1995] 1 CLJ 609 (CA); and Abdul Razak 22 Ahmad v Majlis Bandaraya Johor Bahru [1995] 2 MLJ 287; [1995] 2 AMR 1174; [1995] 4 CLJ 339 (HC))” [29] The Appellant also contends that the Respondent should not be permitted to gain benefit and "unjust enrichment" as determined in the case of DREAM PROPERTY SDN BHD v. ATLAS HOUSING SDN BHD [2015] 2 CLJ 453 where the Federal Court held that: [110] ...The theoretical foundation of the right to restitution remedy as it is understood today is that it is founded on the law of unjust enrichment which fall outside the domains of contract and tort. The law of contract/tort and the law of unjust enrichment are conceptually distinct. Unjust enrichment describes a cause of action.... The courts have found it necessary to make available, independent of the law of contract and civil wrongs, for the restoration of benefits on the grounds of unjust enrichment.“ [30] This court relied on the finding made by Azahar Mohamed FCJ in the case of DREAM PROPERTY SDN BHD V. ATLAS HOUSING SDN BHD (SUPRA), where the court made the _ following observations: 23 '[117] The principle underlying the cases of Banque Fianciere de la Cite v. Parc (Battersea) Ltd and Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v. IRC is that, in the context of the present case, a cause of action in unjust enrichment can give rise to a right to restitution where it can be established that: (a) the plaintiff must have been enriched; (b) the enrichment must be gained at the defendant's expense; (c) that the retention of the benefit by the plaintiff was unjust; and (d) there must be no defence available to extinguish or reduce the plaintiff's liability to make restitution.’ [31] The SPA expressly states that the 10% deposit is non- refundable. This court concludes that the Respondent received no additional benefit or "unjust enrichment" at the expense of the Appellant. Because the purchase agreement was derived from a statutory contract, it could not be amended by the parties, and thus the developer and the purchaser were bound by the terms of the statutory contract of sale, as decided by the Federal Court in the case 24 of PJD REGENCY SDN BHD V TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR [2021] MLJU 41. Conclusion [32] Based on the above reasons, the court allowed the application in Enclosure 20 with the cost of RM3,000.00 subject to allocator and set aside the award of the Tribunal for Homebuyers. AZIZAN Mp./ARSHAD Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya at Pulau Pinang Dated: 5 December 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: —, “\ Lee Kok Hao, Nicole Koh, Chew Xin Yee ONG & MANECKSHA (PENANG) 200, Lebuh Victoria, 10300 George Town, Pulau Pinang 25 Counsel for the First Respondent: Jabatan Peguam Negara, Bahagian Guaman Aras 6, No.45, Persiaran Perdana, 62100 Putrajaya Counsel for the Second Respondent: Venu Kumar TETUAN SUBRAMANIAM & SHAFIQ (GEORGETOWN) Lorong Berjaya, Pulau Tikus, 10350 Georgetown, Penang Cases referred to: 1. PEGUAM NEGARA MALAYSIA V. CHIN CHEE KOW & ANOTHER APPEAL [2019] 4 CLJ 561 2. WONG YUEN HOCK V_ SYARIKAT HONG LEONG ASSURANCE SDN BHD AND ANOTHER APPEAL [1995] 2 MLJ 753 AT P 757; [1995] 3 CLJ 344 at p 348 3. CHIN PEY LEE & ANOR V TEORI WARISAN SDN BHD & ANOR [2020] 1 MLJ 731 4. CHAI SAU YIN V. KOK SENG FATT [1966] 2 MLJ 54; [1966] 1 LNS 25 5. PJD REGENCY SDN BHD V TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR AND OTHER APPEALS [2021] 2 MLJ 60 6. COUNTRY GARDEN DANGA BAY SDN BHD V TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR [2020] MLJU 81 [COA] 7. COUNTRY GARDEN DANGA BAY SDN BHD v TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR [2022] MLJU 678 26 8. MALAYAN BANKING BHD (FORMERLY KNOWN AS ‘MAYBAN FINANCE BHD’) V. BOO HOCK SOON @ BOO CHOO SOON [2013] 2 MLJ 843 9. DREAM PROPERTY SDN BHD v. ATLAS HOUSING SDN BHD [2015] 2 CLJ 453 10. PJD REGENCY SDN BHD V TRIBUNAL TUNTUTAN PEMBELI RUMAH & ANOR [2021] MLJU 41 27