PENDAKWARAYA Puan Izalina binti Abdullah Timbalan Pendakwaraya (Jabatan Peguam Negara) Encik Nasar Khan bin Mirbas Khan, Encik Mu'az Al-Awwal bin Mohammad Zafarullah & Encik Anuar Kasyaf bin Md Yusof (Tetuan Mazwan Dee Nasar & Shima) Dato'

A) [1] IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN KUALA LUMPUR CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. MT: WA-41S-34-07/2020 KUALA LUMPUR MAGISTRATES COURT NO: WA-8-83D-5599-06/2020 AHMAD SAIFUL ISLAM BIN MOHAMAD .. APPELLANT AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ... RESPONDENT GROUNDS INTRODUCTION This appeal against conviction and sentence arises out of the conviction of the Appellant at the Kuala Lumpur Magistrates Court after a full trial on a charge under Section 15 (1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’). B) THE CHARGE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The Charge [2] The Appellant was charged with the following: “Bahawa kamu pada 05/01/2019 jam lebih kurang 2.05 pagi, bertempat di tandas W Club Enterprise Sdn Bhd W Hotel, Tingkat 12, No.121 Jalan Ampang, di dalam daerah Dang Wangi, Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, sebagai orang yang tidak di beri kuasa dibawah undang-undang, di dapati kamu memberikan kepada diri sendiri 11-nor-delta-9- tetrahydrocannibinol-9-carboxylic acid ke dalam badan kamu sendiri. Oleh yang demikian itu kamu telah melakukan kesalahan dibawah sek: 15(1)(a) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (’ADB”) yang boleh dihukum dibawah seksyen dan Akta yang sama.” Section 15(1)(a) DDA [3] The offence for which the Appellant was charged under Section 15(1)(a) DDA reads: “15. Self administration (1) Any person who- (a) consumes, administers to himself or suffers any other person, contrary to section 14 to administer to him any dangerous drug specified in Parts Ill and IV of the First Schedule; or shall be guilty of an offence against this Act and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five thousand ringgit or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.” Pertinent Background Facts [4] The prosecution evidence adduced disclosed that on 5.1.2019 at around 12.30 am, SP1, SP2 and a team of police from the Criminal Investigation Anti-Narcotics Division or “Bahagian Siasatan Jenayah Narkotik Daerah Dang Wangi” (“BSJND”) conducted a raid at an entertainment centre known as Pusat Hiburan W Club Enterprise Sdn Bhd, 12'" Floor, W Hotel, Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur. [5] A total of 101 individuals were detained as a result and searched but nothing incriminating was found on them. However, all of them were made to undergo a preliminary urine test (“saringan awal air kencing’). [6] Amongst those detained and made to take a urine test was the Appellant. Before the process of taking the urine was conducted, SP1 gave a briefing concerning the process of taking the urine samples. [7] SP1 instructed all the detainees to give a urine sample of not less than 30 ml. The Appellant was given the opportunity to choose his own urine sample bottle. These bottles were in a plastic wrapper together with 5 set test strips. [8] The Appellant was accompanied to the toilet at the said entertainment centre where he gave his urine sample. After this process was complete, the Appellant brought the bottle and placed it on a table where he himself opened the bottle cover. [9] SPi then conducted a preliminary test or screening test “ujian saringan” by dipping 5 test strips into the Appellant’s urine sample. SP1 found as a result that the Appellant’s urine sample tested positive for drugs of the type “THC”. [10] SP1 informed the Appellant of the result of the preliminary test. SP1 then closed the boitle in front of the Appellant and proceeded to label the bottle. [11] The Appellant placed his signature on the label attached to the bottle and also on a Form known as (“Borang Permintaan Saringan Ujian Air Kencing”) or (“Borang Ujian Pengesahan Dadah (UPD) (P3)’). [12] After completion, SP1 placed a label on the bottle containing the urine together with the together with a blue seal with the Serial No: 0325083 placed around the bottle. [13] SP1 then lodged Dang Wangi Police Report No: 0452/19(P1) in connection thereof. [14] On the same day at 7.00 am, SP1 handed over the exhibits to the Investigating Officer (SP6). [15] At around 8.15 am, SP6 handed over the said bottle together with Form UPD (P30) to SP3 for safekeeping before sending the same over to the Pathology Department, KL Hospital for analysis. [16] SP3 kept the bottle containing the urine samples in a refrigerator in his office. [17] On 7.1.2019, upon the instructions of SP6, SP3 brought the bottle containing the urine sample together with Form UPD (P3) to the Drug & Research Laboratory (“Unit Makmal Dadah & Penyelidikan”). [18] | SP3 handed over the said Form and the bottle containing the urine sample to SP4 to the "Juruteknik Jabatan Patologi HKL”. SP4 received the said sealed bottle from SP5 on the same day at around 9.28 am. [19] At 9.40 am, SP4 handed over the said bottle containing the urine samples to SP5 for purposes of a preliminary (“screening”) test (“ujian saringan’) and the confirmation test. [20] On the same day, SP5 conducted a preliminary (“screening”) test (‘ujian saringan”) for drugs of the type Cannibinoids/THC as per the application in Form UPD (P3). SP& conducted the test using the immunoassay method. [21] SP5 found that the Appellant's urine sample contained drugs of the . type cannabis or ganja. After the tests, SP5 kept the urine sample of the Appellant in a refrigerator under lock and key. [22] On 10.1.2019, SP5 conducted the confirmation test for the drug cannabis using the Thin Layer Chromatography (TLC) method and found it to contain drugs of the type 11-nor-delta-9-tetrahhydrocannabinol-9- carboxylic acid as listed in Part Ill and Part IV First Schedule, DDA. [23] On 13.1.2019, SP5 issued a Confirmation Drug Report on Drugs in Urine or (“Laporan Ujian Pengesahan Dadah Dalam Air Kencing”) Laboratory No: 9501090 (P7) and handed the same over to the police on 16.1.2019. [24] Atthe end of the prosecution case, the learned Magistrate found that the prosecution had made out a prima facie case and called upon the Appellant to make his defence. [25] The Appellant chose to give sworn evidence and called one other witness. In summary, the Appellant testified that he had shared a cigarette with a friend of his named Zul Afiq when both of them were in a car and headed for W Hotel on the day of the incident. [26] The Appellant said that Zul Afiq had been charged subsequently with an offence under Section 15(1) (a) DDA and had pleaded guilty to the charge. [27] The Appellant said that the police raided a nightclub at the hotel and subjected everyone detained to a urine test. He said that he was instructed by a policeman to take a transparent empty unlabelled container and proceed to the bathroom and urinate inside the bottle. [28] After he urinated into the bottle, he gave the bottle to a policeman outside the bathroom. He did not witness the police conduct any testing on the sample. After a while, he was informed of the outcome of the urine test and was instructed to write his particulars on the label attached to the bottle. [29] The Appellant called Mohd Irwan Bin Osman (SD2) as his witness. $D2 was the Floor Captain at the Wicked Club and he testified that on the night of the police raid he was on duty. [30] SD2 said that he witnessed the police conduct urine tests that night on those present at the said Club. SD2 said that the bottles of urine samples were not marked. [31] SD2 said that he did not hear the Appellants name being called up to go to the bathroom to give a urine sample. SD2 maintained that he did not witness any urine tests carried out on the Appellant. [32] At the end of the defence case, the learned Magistrate found that the Appellant had failed to raise a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case and convicted him of the charge under Section 15(1)(a) DDA. [33] The Appellant was sentenced to a period of eight (8) months imprisonment from date of conviction and also ordered thereafter to undergo supervision by an officer as defined under Section 2 of the Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983 for a period of two (2) years. [34] Being aggrieved by the decision, the Appellant lodged an appeal to this Court. A stay of execution was granted pending the outcome of the appeal. C) ANALYSIS AND DECISION [35] Several grounds of appeal were advanced by learned counsel for the Appellant. Some of these included the fact that the bottles of urine were not marked and that there was a break in the chain of custody of exhibits. [36] | Learned counsel for the Appellant also raised the issue of a human error in respect of the date written on the date of the bottle as well as the deterioration in the quality of the urine sample due to delay on the part of the police in sending the bottle for testing to the Chemist. [37] The allegation that the testing of the urine sample was not conducted in front of the Appellant was also raised. The Sole Issue in this Appeal [38] Notwithstanding the several grounds of appeal alluded to, after reading and perusing the Record of Appeal and after hearing parties’ respective submissions, | am of the considered view that this appeal turns on one point only, namely, whether or not the Inspector General’s Standing Orders F103 “IGSO F103” and the ‘Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 or “Garis Panduan KKM Bil 6/2002” (“Guidelines”) have the force of law. [39] If so, the Prosecution/Respondent have failed to prove the case against the Appellant and this appeal ought to be allowed and the conviction set aside. [40] As this appeal stands or fall on this one point only, | will not be considering the other grounds raised by the Appellant. In any event, these are adequately and comprehensively set out in the Petition of Appeal filed by the Appellant. Inspector General’s Standing Orders F103 “IGSO F103” [41] The material parts of the |GSO F130 including its introduction reads as follows: 10 “PTKPN F103 (IGSO F103) AKTA PENAGIH DADAH (RAWATAN DAN PEMULIHAN) 1983 1. PENDAHULUAN Akta Penagih Dadah (Rawatan dan Pemulihan) 1983 (Pindaan 1998) digubal bertujuan untuk memberi rawatan dan pemulihan kepada penagih-penagih dadah. Selain merupakan proses rawatan lanjutan yang menitikberatkan pengawasan ke atas penagih-penagih bertujuan memastikan mereka __ tidak mengulangi tabiat penagihan mereka. PTKPN ini adalah bertujuan untuk memastikan segala tindakan ke atas orang- orang kenaan dilakukan mengikut peruntukan-peruntukan yang ditetapkan di bawah Akta ini. 8. TATACARA MENGAMBIL CONTOH AIR KENCING Tatacara pengambilan contoh air kencing dari penagih-penagih yang disyaki adalah seperti berikut:- 8.1 CONTOH AIR KENCING DIAMBIL SEGERA SELEPAS TANGKAPAN 11 Contoh air kencing dari penagih-penagih yang disyaki hendaklah diambil seberapa segera sebaik sahaja selepas tangkapan bagi menentukan keberkesanan ujian. 8.2 PEMILIHAN 2 BUAH BOTOL OLEH PENAGIH YANG DISYAKI Setiap penagih dadah yang disyaki hendak lah diberi sebanyak dua buah botol plastik kosong yang dikhaskan serta baru dan belum pernah digunakan lengkap dengan penutupnya. Penagih berkenaan hendaklah diberi peluang memilih sendiri botol-botol plastik tersebut daripada kotak simpanannya serta ia berpuas hati dengan botol-botol tersebut berkeadaan bersih dan boleh digunakan. Sebuah botol air kencing adalah untuk tujuan ujian awal di peringkat ‘polis jika perlu dan sebuah lagi untuk dihantar ke hospital bagi penganalisaan.” (Emphasis added) 12 Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia (“KKM”) Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 or “Garis Panduan KKM Bil 6/2002” [42] The KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 were issued by the “Bahagian Perkembangan Perubatan Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia’. Its title and introduction read as follows: “GARIS PANDUAN BAGI UJIAN PENGESANAN PENYALAHGUNAAN DADAH DALAM AIR KENCING” GUIDELINES FOR TESTING DRUGS ABUSE IN URINE Introduction (a) This guidelines is intended to be used by all agencies involved in the National Drug Detection Programme and is not applicable to clinical testing; (b) It describes procedures that shall fulfil the necessary criteria in order to guarantee optimum validity of drug detection results; (c) Consideration shall be given to the procedures for collection, transportation, analysis, reporting of results, dispatching of results and storage of samples and records; (d) This guideline shall be read together with the ‘Manual For The Laboratory Detection of Drugs of Abuse in Urine and Guidelines on Cold Turkey Detoxification and Treatment’ 1988. 13 Wherever there is any discrepancy of the fact, the present guidelines shall be referred;” [43] The material portion of the ‘KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002’ is item (c) which reads: “(c) Collection Procedure (i) (ii) At least 30 ml urine sample shall be collected in one bottle or duplicate if screening and confirmation are done in two different places. The requesting officer/referring centre shall keep the second urine sample and shall send the urine sample to the confirmation centre if the screening result is positive; Both the collection personnel and the donor shall keep the urine samples in view at all times prior to it being sealed or labelled. If the second bottle cannot be provided (sample is 30 mi only), testing shall be done on the first sample. Absence of second sample shall be recorded; (iii) At the collection site, if the volume is less than 30 ml, the donor may be given a reasonable amount of liquid to drink e.g. 240 ml of water every 30 minutes, but not to exceed a maximum of 720 ml. The second urine sample shall be collected and mixed with the previous sample, by the donor himself/herself or the collection personnel in front of the donor.” (Emphasis added) 14 [44] By way of summary, the IGSO F103 requires two empty and clean plastic bottles be used for collecting urine sample from the suspected drug défendants. [45] The suspect should be given the choice to select the two bottles. The first bottle of urine sample is to be used for screening purposes by the police. [46] | The second bottle of urine sample is to be sent to the hospital for a confirmation test after the first bottle is tested positive for drugs. The second bottle must be properly sealed and secured. [47] By way of summary, the KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 require that the urine sample must at least contain 30 ml. and shall be collected in one bottle or duplicate if screening and confirmation are done in two different places. [48] The first bottle is used for screening test. If the screening result is positive, the second bottle of urine sample which is kept by the requesting officer will be sent to the confirmation centre which is the Chemistry Department for a confirmation test. 15 [49] It is not in dispute that here the screening and confirmation were done in two different places. [50] The only issue to be determined, therefore, as indicated earlier, is whether these Guidelines i.e. the IGSO F103 and the KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 have the force of law. Two conflicting cases [51] Two Court of Appeal cases dealing with a similar issue were cited in arguments, namely, Noor Shariful Rizal Bin Noor Zawawi v PP [2017] 3 MLJ 460 (“Noor Shariful’) and PP v Rosman Bin Saprey & Anor [2018] 4 MLJ 139 (“Rosman Bin Saprey”) respectively. [52] Needless to say, in the course of submissions, the Appellant placed reliance on Noor Shariful while the Respondent urged this Court to follow Rosman Bin Saprey instead. [53] In Noor Shariful’s case, the Court held that both the IGSO F103 and the KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 (“Guidelines”) had the force of law. In so deciding, the Court inter alia, held that the standing orders made by the Inspector-General of Police, which necessarily include the IGSO F103 16 acquires its statutory power from section 97 of the Police Act 1967. Therefore, it has the force of law. [54] The Court also held that the guidelines under the caption ‘Urine Collection’ had made reference to the DDA. The scheme of the guidelines was formulated in collaboration with the DDA and also the Drug Dependanis (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983. [55] As the guidelines was formulated in line with both the aforesaid Acts, it was held, therefore, that it has the force of law. [56] In Rosman Bin Saprey, however, the Court held that the IGSO F103 and the KKM Guidelines were not legal documents which required mandatory compliance by the police or medical personnel and would not be detrimental if not complied with. |GSO F103 was made under the powers given by section 97 of the Police Act 1967. [57] ‘It held that it is only administrative and is not intended to have legal effect, compared to the regulations or rules of the DDA. The IGSO F103 is issued only for the use of the police and is classified as confidential or confidential documents. 17 [58] The Court further held that the IGSO F103 is for the use of police officers while the KKM Guidelines are for the use of health and medical officers. Both instruments could not form and possess the force of law as only the Minister is authorised by the DDA to make rules and regulations pertaining to the enforcement and execution of provisions contained in both the Acts and the requirements of the gazette to be complied with. [59] The Court further held that the power of the Inspector General of Police and the Director General of Health Malaysia shall not exceed and usurp the powers of the Minister. {60] The High Court is of course bound by a decision of a Court standing in the hierarchy above it, in this case, the Court of Appeal. The present dilemma facing this Court is that it is confronted with two conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal. Stare Decisis [60] The dilemma can be resolved by turning to the decision of the Federal Court (FC) in the case of Dalip Bhagwan Singh v PP [1998] 1 MLJ 1 for guidance. 18 [61] In Dalip Bhagwan Singh, the FC had to inter alia, deal with the question of whether in an appeal against acquittal at the close of the case of the prosecution, can an appellate judge refuse to apply with or without assigning any reason, latest decision of the Supreme Court on a point of law and adopt an earlier decision of the Federal Court? [62] In answering the question in the negative, the FC through the erudite judgement of Peh Swee Chin FCu, in examining the concept of stare decisis and the judicial hierarchy held: “In this connection, it is interesting to refer to Cassell & Co v Broome [1972] AC 1027 at p 1054. It was held that courts in the lower tiers below the Court of Appeal could not rely on the per incuriam rule applied by the Court of Appeal for itself, but could choose between two conflicting decisions. We may add that they may so choose, whatever the dates of the conflicting decisions, as such dates do not matter to the Court of Appeal itself.” [63] The reference in Dalip Bhagwan Singh to the English case of Cassel & Co v Broome clearly illuminates the way for this Court to follow. [64] It is clear from the judgement in Dalip Bhagwan Singh that a High Court faced with two conflicting decisions can choose which to follow _ regardless of which case took precedence in time. 19 [65] In Noor Shariful’s case the Court of Appeal speaking through Zamani A Rahim JCA reasoned as follows: “[39] There are several standing orders covering various police jobs such as the maintenance of station diaries, the procedure to hold an identification parade in criminal cases which is regulated by the IGSO Part D 226, and the procedure to collect urine samples from suspected drug dependants which is housed in the IGSO F103. The standing orders made by the Inspector-General of Police, which necessarily include the IGSO F103 acquires its statutory power from s 97 of the Police Act 1967. Therefore, it has the force of law. [40] The KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 under the caption ‘Urine Collection’ has made reference to the Dangerous Drugs Act 1 952. The scheme of the KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002 was formulated in collaboration with the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 and also the Drug Dependants (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983.” [66] | confess that | find the reasoning employed in Noor Shariful’s case that the IGSO F103 acquires its statutory power from Section 97 of the Police Act 1967 and, therefore, has the force of law, to be compelling. [67] Similarly, | find that as the KKM Guidelines was formulated in collaboration with the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 and also the Drug Dependanis (Treatment and Rehabilitation) Act 1983, they also have the force of law. 20 Constitutional dimension [68] The Court of Appeal in Noor Shariful’s case, besides holding that the Guidelines have the force of law, went further and also added a constitutional dimension by holding that there had been an infringement of Article 5 and Article 8 of the Federal Constitution for failure to adhere to the Guidelines. [69] [70] [71] These articles are reproduced as follows: Article 5(1) provides — ‘No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with law’. Article 8(1) provides — ‘All persons are equal before the law and entitled to equal protection of the law. The Court in Noor Shariful’s case also held: “Following the Federal Court case of Re Tan Boon Liat @ Allen & Anor Et Al; Tan Boon Liat v Menteri Hal Enwal Dalam Negeri & Ors [1977] 2 MLJ 108, the expression ‘in accordance with law’ in art 5(1) of our Constitution is said to be wide enough to include procedural law.” The Court of Appeal in Noor Shariful’s case still further held: 21 “[50] The appellant was deprived of the procedural law which gives him of the right of a second test — confirmation test. The magistrate and learned JC, by ruling that one bottle of the appellant’s urine sample was sufficient, was contrary to the IGSO F103 and the KKM Guidelines Bilangan 6/2002. The appellant, accordingly, did not have a fair trial and arts 5(1) and 8(1) were violated. The appellant did not get what the procedural law said he should get. He had lost a chance of being acquitted which was reasonably opened to him. Thus justice has been miscarried — commonly called ‘miscarriage of justice’. Justice is justice in accordance with law as enshrined in arts 5(1) and 8(1) of the Federal Constitution. The High Court case of Australia in Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493 was referred to by Gopal Sri Ram FCJ in Lee Kwan Woh, where Fullagar J said at p 514 in the following terms: ... every accused person is entitled to a trial in which the relevant law is correctly explained to the jury and the rules of procedures and evidence are strictly followed. If there is any failure in any of these respects, and the appellant may thereby have lost a chance which was fairly opened to him of being acquitted, there is, in the eye of the law, a miscarriage of justice. Justice has miscarried in such cases, because the appellant has not had what the law says that he shall have, and justice is justice according to law.” (Emphasis added) [72] | wholeheartedly agree and subscribe to the approach taken in Noor Shariful’s case with respect to the constitutional dimension. If “life” pursuant 22 to Article 5 encompasses much more than mere “animal existence”, procedural compliance must be taken to be an integral part of “life” within the meaning of Article 5. [73] There also must have been a good and compelling reason for requiring two bottles to be taken. [74] The first test or the “ujian saringan” or screening test taken by the police is what may be termed as a “presumptive test”. On the other hand, the test taken by the Chemist attached to the Chemistry Department or “Jabatan Kimia’” is the “confirmation test’. [75] The screening test or presumptive test is done by inserting a test strip or strips into the bottle containing the urine. Foreign material is thus inserted into the bottle and the urine sample. [76] The use of only one bottle, therefore, leaves open the room for the possible contamination of the sample which may impact the confirmation test undertaken by the Chemistry Department. 23 Penal consequences [77] As the charge and of course the consequences under the relevant provision of the DDA are penal in nature, they must be strictly construed and the benefit of any doubt must be accorded to an accused person. [78] | therefore, find that as the Appellant here had been deprived of his procedural rights to have two bottles of urine sample taken, and the right of a second test, he had lost a fair chance of being acquitted which was reasonably opened to him. Operation of presumption [79] | would venture to add that the right to the procedural requirement of having two bottles taken was all the more important in light of the fact that the presumption under section 37(k) DDA applies to a person charged under s 15(1)(a) DDA. [80] Section 37(k) DDA reads: “37. Presumptions In all proceedings under this Act or any regulation made thereunder- 24 (k) if a person is charged for an offence of consuming a dangerous drug or administering a dangerous drug to himself or suffering any other person to administer a dangerous drug fo him, and any dangerous drug is found in the urine of the person charged as a result of a urine test conducted under section 31A, the person shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, to have consumed the drug or to have administered the drug to himself or to have suffered any other person to administer the drug to him in contravention of this Act or its regulations.” [81] _ It is to be noted from a close reading of the sub-section that the presumption is only activated after the outcome of a urine test conducted on the suspect. [82] It is thus vital that the urine test is conducted in accordance with prescribed procedure and that the integrity of the sample taking process is not compromised or left to chance. [83] At the risk of repetition, the taking of only one bottle of urine leaves open the possibility of contamination as the same sample is used both by 25 the police for the “ujian saringan’” or preliminary/screening test and by the Chemist for the confirmation test. [84] It is evident that the presumption under Section 37(k) DDA needs to be rebutted on a balance of probabilities which is of a higher standard than merely to raise a reasonable doubt. See Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372. [85] This is, therefore, a more compelling reason why the process of. taking the urine sample must be conducted with strict compliance with procedure which in this case are the “Guidelines” and that the possibility of contamination of the samples be minimised if not obliterated altogether. Evidential perspective [86] In addition there is also an evidential perspective to be considered here. The taking of two bottles of urine sample will impact on the issue of whether or not the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to d ischarge its burden of proving each and every essential ingredient of the case. [87] Given the nature of the charge, it is imperative that the prosecution adduces cogent evidence to prove that the substance alleged to be self- administered was in fact a dangerous drug. 26 [88] By relying upon only one bottle of urine sample and for the reasons given above, the prosecution falls short of its duty to discharge the burden placed upon it. Decision [89] Based upon the reasons given above, the failure here to take two bottles of urine sample meant that the prosecution had failed to prove the offence against the Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. [90] _In the premises, | find that the failure by the police to abide by the “Guidelines” in omitting to take two bottles of urine has rendered the conviction flawed. [91] This appeal is allowed and the convictioris set aside. (Ci FAWRENCE SEQUERAH ) JUDGE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR me Dated: > November 2021 27 Counsels: For the Respondent For the Appellant 28 Puan Izalina binti Abdullah Deputy Public Prosecutor (Attorney's General Chambers) Encik Nasar Khan bin Mirbas Khan, Encik Mu’az Al-Awwal bin Mohamad Zafarullah & Encik Anuar Kasyaf bin Md Yusof. (Messrs Mazwan Dee Nasar & Shima) Dato’ Nicholas Kow Eng Chuan, Encik Emile Ezra bin Md Hussain & Encik Lim Yee Jiun, Ricky. (Messrs Kow, Lau & Ezra)