ARTA WASH SDN BHD (Dahulunya dikenali sebagai SALAM SINARMAS SDN BHD) (No. Syarikat: 1148565 –T) 1. ) 1. AZLAN BIN AKHTAR (No. K/P: 760218125677) Berniaga sebagai rakan kongsi dalam Abatag Resources) 2. ) 2. TETI ANAK GINOT (No. K/P: 710414

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN GUAMAN NO: BA-22NCVC-411-07/2017 ANTARA ARTA WASH SDN BHD (Dahulunya dikenali sebagai SALAM SINARMAS SDN BHD) (No. Syarikat: 1148565 —T) .. PLAINTIF DAN 1. AZLAN BIN AKHTAR (No. K/P: 760218125677) Berniaga sebagai rakan kongsi dalam Abatag Resources) 2. TETI ANAK GINOT (No. K/P: 710414135543) Berniaga sebagai rakan kongsi dalam Abatag Resources) .. DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN Grounds of Judgment Introduction [1] The plaintiff's ‘claim against the defendants is for damages, premised on a breach of a contract for the sale of laundry a [2] [3] machineries, in the sum RM598,537.10 for total failure of consideration, RM954,760.00 for special damages and general damages to be assessed. The plaintiffs claim was disputed by the defendants, who had counter claimed for the balance sum of the purchase price of the laundry machineries in the sum of RM75,000.90. Having considered the evidence and the submission of the parties, this court had dismissed the plaintiffs claim and allowed the defendants’ counterclaim. The Salient Facts : [4] [5] The plaintiff is in the business of providing laundry services, whilst the defendants are partners carrying on the business of selling and supplying laundry machineries. The plaintiffs claim is premised on a written contract, vide an invoice dated 16.9.2015 and an oral agreement during a meeting with the defendant in August 2015. The plaintiff took the position that apart from the written contract, the parties had an oral agreement in August 2015 on the following matters: (i) that the warranties for the machineries will be for two (2) years, whilst the warranty for the boiler will be for one (1) year. The warranties are for all electrical parts or manufacturing defects; O (ii) that the custom clearance documents shall be provided to the plaintiff; and (iii) that the documents required to obtain the approvals from the relevant authority for the use of the machineries in Malaysia be supplied to the plaintiff. The defendants had disputed the oral agreement, but they did not dispute entering into a written agreement with the plaintiff, vide an invoice dated 16.9.2015 for the sale and purchase of laundry machineries for the sum of RM673,547.00. In the said invoice, the plaintiff had agreed to buy the following items from the defendants: Item Price per| Quantity | Total price item (RM) (RM) 1. 50 kg fully auto washer | 54,500.00 | (1) 54,500.00 extractor , 2. 100 kg fully auto washer | 83,000.00 | (2) 166,000.00 extractor 3 100 kg fully auto steam 42,800.00 | (1) 42,800.00 4 Flatwork ironer 73,800.00 | (1) 73,800.00 5 Auto folder 88,800.00 | (1) 88,800.00 6. Ironing table 4,980.00 (2) 9,960.00 7 Steam generator 3,350.00 (1) 3,350.00 8 Steam boiler 140,000.00 | (1) 140,000.00 9 1 ton softener 9,800.00 (1) 9,800.00 10. 1 ton header 8,000.00 (1) 8,000.00 11. Dryer steam coil 16,000.00 16,000.00 12. Roller drum (‘naik mutu’) 3,800.00 3,800.00 13. Customs & transportation | 51,237.00 51,237.00 14, Flatwork and folder | 5,500.00 5,500.00 [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] installation Total sum 673,547.00 From the total price of RM673,547.00, the plaintiff had paid RM598,537.90, leaving a balance sum of RM75,000.00, which form the basis of the defendants’ counterclaim. The laundry machineries were delivered to the plaintiff's factory in September/October 2015. The laundry machineries were in operation from 16.11.2015 to 23.10.2017, after the machines were set up by the engineer from the manufacturing company in China. On 10.11.2017, an officer from Jabatan Keselamatan Dan Kesihatan Pekerjaan Negeri Selangor (“JKKP”) went to the plaintiff's factory for inspection as the plaintiff “.. telah memohon untuk mendaftarkan kilang dia dibawah peruntukan machinery act..”. From the said inspection, the plaintiff was issued with two (2) notices when two (2) machines were found not registered with JKKP. The plaintiff's position is that the notice prevented the plaintiff from using the boiler that was bought from the defendant as the boiler had no JKKP approvals. The plaintiff then filed this suit against the defendant. “ Findings of the Court [12] [13] [14] [15] Breach of oral agreement Parties are on common ground that they have entered into a contract for the sale and purchase of the laundry machineries as per the invoice dated 16.9.2015. Therefore, the dispute here is only with regard to the oral agreement, if any, and the terms of the alleged oral agreement. It is the pleaded case of the plaintiff that the oral agreement was entered in August 2015 at Restaurant Daun Pisang Raj, Kuala Lumpur. However, PW7 gave evidence that the meeting was held in July or August, 2015, whilst PW3 and PW5 gave evidence that the meeting was held in July 2015, not August 2015. Therefore, the plaintiff's evidence did not support the plaintiffs pleaded case. In any event, the plaintiff took the position that the term of the oral agreement is that the boiler machines must come with the third party certification, issued by Shanghai Institute of Special Equipment and Technical Research (“third party certification’). The plaintiffs case was that it was during the meeting in August 2015 at Restaurant Daun Pisang Raj, Kuala Lumpur that the defendant had agreed to provide the third party certification. The third party certification is to enable the plaintiff to obtain the JKKP approval for the use of the machine, specifically the boiler. The plaintiff's position is that the third party certification was a fundamental term of the agreement for the sale and purchase of 5 [16] [17] 118] [19] the laundry machineries, as without the third party certification or approval documents, the machineries will not be approved by JKKP and they cannot be used in Malaysia. PW7 gave evidence that without the approval from-JKKP; the use of the boiler would be illegal. Therefore, the plaintiff's case is that because of the failure of the defendant to provide the third party certification, the plaintiff cannot use the said machines, resulting in loss and damages that it is now claiming in this suit. The plaintiff sought to rely on the evidence of PW2, an officer from Jabatan Keselamatan Dan Kesihatan Pekerjaan Negeri Selangor (“JKKP’). PW2 gave evidence that before the boiler can be used/operated, it must be approved by JKKP and JKKP will only approve the use of the boiler machines if the machines have been certified by the Malaysian Government approved agents, the Shanghai Institute of Special Equipment and Technical Research. However, | agree with the defendant that PW2 had no knowledge of the UKKP approval process as he was only dealing with the physical examination of the machineries at the factory. PW2 also agree that “..This particular proses untuk mendapatkan kelulusan adalah di bawah di bahagian lain lah, bukan saya lah, so itu dekat Putrajaya, saya ni dekat pejabat negeri di Selangor.” The plaintiffs witnesses gave evidence that it was during the meeting in July 2015 at Restaurant Daun Pisang Raj, Kuala Lumpur that the defendant had agreed to provide the third party 6 O O [20] [21] certification. PW3 gave evidence to this as he had attended the meeting in July 2015. However, under cross examination he agreed that it was only during the second meeting in May 2016 that the plaintiff raised the issue of the third party certification with the defendant. The plaintiff relied on the evidence of DW3, who has agreed under cross examination that he will provide the documents to enable the plaintiff to -apply for the JKKP approval. However, under reexamination DW3 had corrected himself and had explained that during the July 2015 meeting, the parties had only agreed on the sale of the machineries and the payment of the deposit. Having considered the evidence and the submissions of the parties, | find that the plaintiff had failed to establish, on the balance of probability, that there was an oral agreement requiring the defendants to provide the third party certification during the July 2015 meeting at-Restaurant Daun Pisang Raj, Kuala Lumpur. My reasons are as follows: (i) as early as 14.7.2015, the defendant had emailed the catalogue of the laundry machineries (exhibit D-10), together with the certificates from the manufacturer to the plaintiff and the plaintiff did not object to the same without having the third party certification. Based on the catalogue and on the request of the plaintiff, the defendant had ordered the said machines as per the invoice dated 16.9.2015; (iii) (iv) - the certificates of the machineries were again emailed to the plaintiff by the defendant on 17.1.2016. PW7 gave evidence that he had received the certificates issued by Zhangjiagang Wilford Thermal Company, in respect of the boiler that was purchased pursuant to the invoice dated 16.9.2015. Again, there was no objection raised by the plaintiff with regard to the issue of the 3° party certification; there was the evidence of PW5, Steven who gave evidence that there was no request from the plaintiff to the defendant to obtain the 3™ party certification at the Raj Banana Leaf Restaurant in July 2015 (see page 183/NOP): S565: Now, | am referring to the meeting, Raj Banana Leaf, you said you were aware, and you also said that you were there, at that meeting, was there any discussion between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the plaintiff to obtain, for the defendant to obtain the 3° party certification? J: No. S56: My next question Mr. Steven, was there any request by ‘the plaintiff to the defendant to obtain 3° party certification from Shanghai Institute of Special Equipment and Technical Research, at this meeting? d: No. the conflicting evidence of PW3, Magenthiran under cross examination, where he agreed that the meeting in July 2015 was only to discuss the purchase of the machineries and the payment of the deposit: O (v) (vi) (vii) S831: No no, Mr Magenthiran, | just asking this question, | am not asking anything else, my question is, were there any discussion about the defendant getting approval from the JKKP? At this meeting ya, that mean in this meeting in July? In raj Banana Leaf? , d: Ok, we discuss about purchasing machine and even the deposit, but the day, | am not sure, the day | think we have not talking about JKKP, but once we order ... However, PW3 then reiterated his stand that the issue of the third party certification was raised in the July 2015 meeting, but later he agreed that the JKKP issue for the boiler was only raised during the second meeting in May 2016; added to that, the plaintiff had accepted the delivery of the laundry machines, including the boiler, (without the third party certification) without any protest in September 2015. ' The boiler came with certificates issued by Zhangjiagang Wilford Thermal Company, not from Shanghai Institute of Special.Equipment and Technical Research; that after having accepted delivery of the laundry machineries, including the boiler, the plaintiff had proceeded to operate the said laundry machineries from September 2015 until 23.10.2017; and the plaintiff only requested for the drawings of the boiler for the purpose of JKKP approval in May 2016, as can be seen from D14, D15 and .D18, the Whatsapp conversation 9 O between the defendant, Azlan and Aman Singh. By this time, the boiler documents were already with the plaintiff: Date/exhibit | Defendant (Azlan) Plaintiff (Aman Singh) 20.5.2016 09:09 09:14 (D14) Where is the boiler| Boiler Drawing is with drawing? Magen. Getting it today | 21.5.2016 15:29 16:03 (D15) Drawing Will get it soonest. . Boiler? 2.6.2016 10:47 Where is the boiler drawing. [22] lf indeed the plaintiff was concerned about the third party certification and took the position that without the third party certification the boiler cannot be used, then the plaintiff should not have used the boilers before getting the certification from the authorities. Indeed it was the evidence of PW7, Aman Singh that it would be illegal to use the boiler without the JKKP approvals. . [23] However, it is not in dispute that the laundry machines were already in operation. PW5 gave evidence that the laundry machineries were ready for use from the end of 2015 and continued to run until 2017. This was confirmed by DW1 who gave evidence that the machines were in operation as at 23.10.2017. DWi1, Mr. Ding Zhi Lin, the engineer from China who attended to after sales services in Malaysia, gave evidence that he had attended to the machines at the plaintiffs factory and had 10 [24] [29] [26] confirmed that the laundry machines had been in operation. PW7 even gave evidence that the machines were breaking down on a regular basis, as can be seen from the Whatsapp messages between Azlan and Aman Singh. Added to that, SP3 gave evidence that he was engaged by the plaintiff to set up and operate the plaintiffs laundry business in August 2015, together with Mr. James as the marketing manager and Mr. Satish as the laundry manager. If indeed the laundry business were not in operation, why were these people employed at such an early stage. In fact, DW1 (Ding Zhi Lin) gave evidence that when he inspected the machines, they have been used for 4,799.14 hours up to 23.10.2017 and had washed up to 504,918 pieces of linen. However, the plaintiffs witnesses gave evidence that the plaintiff did not actually operate the machines, including the boiler, but were only conducting a test run. To me, it is highly incredible and improbable that the plaintiff was conducting a test run for nearly two years, from September 2015 up to October 2017. This is especially so when SP7 gave evidence that there was nothing in the contract between the plaintiff and the defendants to allow a test . run of the machines. In fact, PW2, Al Mukmin gave evidence that he went to the plaintiff's factory on 10.11.2017 because the plaintiff was applying to register the factory and he had issued the notices to the plaintiff for various breaches of the law. Therefore, if indeed the third party certification was an important/fundamental term of the alleged oral 11 [26] [27] agreement, the evidence did not show the plaintiff insisting on having the said certification and that the plaintiff had already operated the boiler machine even without the obtaining .the certification. The plaintiff only requested for the drawings of the boiler for the purpose of JKKP approval in May 2016, as can be seen from D14, D15 and D18. By this time, the document is already with the Plaintiff. The plaintiff however sought to rely on PW2, Al Mukmin’s evidence that when he went to the plaintiff's factory on 10.11.2017, the boiler “... tidak digunakan, masih dalam keadaan packaging, baru turun daripada kontena.” The plaintiff therefore submits that it is “clear from Mukmin’s testimony that the plaintiff could not use the - boiler as there was no JKKP approvals and that the defendants had failed to give the plaintiff the necessary 3 party certification from the authorized entity appointed by the Malaysian Government in China” (see paragraph 43 of the plaintiff's written submission). | am of the considered opinion that this submission by the plaintiff is untenable, as PW2 evidence clearly contradicts the evidence of all the other plaintiff's witnesses who had confirmed that the boiler which was purchased from the defendant had already been installed in the plaintiffs factory and was actually operational: PW5 S840; So the boiler that was purchased from the defendant was installed in the plaintiff's factory? J: Yes, this was the equipment. 12 O S46: So do you have personal knowledge of this when this installation was done? J: Ya, was there. S847: Ok Mr. Steven, what happen after the installation of this boiler? Can you explain fo court? After they did the installation of the boiler, what happen after that? | mean you said the other machines can’t operate unless the boiler is? J: Ya, we tested all the machines. $48: All the other machine was also in operation is it ready? d: Ya, it started operate it, because the boiler was ready. | S94: ..| was only asking the boiler from the defendant, was it operating, is that correct? J: Ya. PW3 S72: So from September 2015 when the machinery was delivered till April 2015, were the machines being used? J: We testing and the... $73: Was it being used? 13 [28] d: Test. S74: Test? What is the meaning of test? Is it operating? J: Operating test running. PW7 845; ls this the boiler, the installation of the boiler at the plaintiff factory? J: Ya this is the boiler S46: Installation of the boiler at the plaintiff factory, you agree ya? J: All right. S47: What was the date of the installation, do you remember Mr. Aman? J: Somewhere in November 2015 S48: Now after the received of the machineries in 2018, did the plaintiff used the machineries? J: Yes. We use the machineries to do test run. In Teras Kimia Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 4 MLRH 429, the issue before the court is whether, in the absence of a written contract, a binding contract subsists, based on communications between parties and the conduct of parties. Justice Nallini Pathmanathan (now FCJ) applied the test in RTS ‘Flexible Systems Ltd v Molkerei Alois Muller GmbH & Co KG 14 [29] [30] [2010] 3 All ER 7 on the position of law on the question of whether ‘a binding contract subsist. The relevant part of the judgment of Lord Clarke SCJ reads as follows: “The general principle are not in doubt. Whether there is a binding contract between the parties, and, if so, upon what terms depends upon what they have agreed. It depends not upon their subjective state of mind but upon the consideration of what was communicated between them by words or conduct and whether that leads objectively to a conclusion that they intended to create legal relations and had agreed upon all terms which they regarded or the law requires as essential for the formation of legally binding relations.....” (emphasis added) Therefore, the task of this court is to ascertain objectively, whether on the basis of the communications as well as the conduct between the parties, there was a valid oral agreement subsisting, requiring the defendant to provide the third party certification during the August 2015 meeting at Restaurant Daun Pisang Raj, Kuala Lumpur. Based on the reasons enumerated above, | find that there were no communications requiring the same, as the defendant had emailed the catalogue of the laundry machineries (exhibit D-10), together with the certificates from the manufacturer to the plaintiff as early as 14.7.2015, and there were no objections from the plaintiff. From the conduct of the parties, the plaintiff had used or operated 15 [31] [32] the machines from end of 2015, up to October 2017, without the JKKP approvais. Therefore, having considered all the evidence, | am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove, on the balance of probability, that there was an oral agreement in August 2015 with regard to the third party certification. Warranties not provided _ On the issue of warranties, parties were on common ground that the machineries came with a two (2) year warranty, except for the boiler which came with a one (1) year warranty for electrical parts or manufacturing defects. The plaintiff's submission was that since the defendant did not cross examine the plaintiff's evidence that the warranties were not provided, then this issue is deemed admitted by the defendant. However, the evidence of PW7, Aman Singh clearly showed that warranties were provided: S70: ! am referring to page 1, 2 and 3 bundle B specific to page 3, can you please read to the court at the bottom half, after balance amount payable, terms and condition? d: Yes ferms and condition, not very clear $71: Please read what is stated there? J: Quotation, all price in ringgit Malaysia and included transportation (door to door service), the validity 7 days, delivery 4 to 6 weeks, payment 50% deposit balance 50% before delivery. Warranty, all machines come with 2 years warranty 16 0 [33] [34] except boiler one year warranty, warranty include all electrical parts or manufacturing defect only, spare part delivery cost will be charge to buyer. S72: Now, is this the warranty by the defendant to the plaintiff? What is stated? d: Yes, what is stated here. 873: Is that right? Is this the warranty by the defendant to the plaintiff? d: Yes. Damages In view of my findings above, there is no basis to award damages in this case as the plaintiff has failed to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that there was a breach of an oral agreement pertaining to the third party certification. However, if | am wrong in respect of the above findings, | am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving its damages. In order for the plaintiff to be able to claim damages, the plaintiff must prove the damage and it is not enough to merely write down the particulars and rely on the same. In Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor. v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 1 CLJ 15, the Federal Court held as follows: “Before we embark upon a detailed consideration of the specific issues which arise for decision, there are three 17 [35] preliminary matters which, at the outset, require emphasis. Firstly, that part of the judgment which provides that the vendor shall pay to the purchaser damages to be assessed for wrongful termination of the agreement with costs and that Tan Sri Khoo and the vendor shall pay to the purchaser damages to be assessed for breaches of the. undertakings, even though affirmed on appeal, can in no way relieve the purchaser of satisfying the fundamental requirement of having to prove its loss (if any) arising from those breaches. To hold otherwise would amount to dispensing with proof of quantum altogether, and that.cannot be the law. In so saying, we reminded of the words of Lord Goddard in Bonham — Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd 64 TLR 177 at p. 178: Plaintiffs must understand that if they bring actions for damages it is for them to prove their damages; it is not enough to write down the particulars, so to speak, throw them at the head of the court, saying: ‘this is what I have lost, | ask you to give me these damages’ They have to prove it”. In Popular Industries Ltd v. Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 133; [1989] 3 MLJ 360, the Court held at p. 367: 18 [36] ‘It is axiomatic that a plaintiff seeking substantial ‘damages has the burden of proving both the fact and the amount of damages before he can recover. If he proves neither, the action will fail or he may be awarded only nominal damages upon of the contravention of a right. Thus nominal damages may be awarded in all cases of breach of contract (see Marzetti v. Williams 109 ER 842). And, where damage is shown but its amount is not proved sufficiently or at all, the court will usually decree nominal damages. See, for example Dixon v Deveridge (1825) 2 C & P 109; 172 ER 50 and Twyman v. Knowles 138 ER 1183” The plaintiff's claim for damages is based on the purported oral agreement under section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950. With regards to section 74 of the Contracts Act 1950, in Malaysian Rubber Development Corp Bhd v Glove Seal Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 569 SC, it was held by Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ at page 575/b-e: “In considering the above question, it is important to bear in mind that the normal measure of damages for breach of contract in this country is prescribed by s 74(1) of the Contracts Act 1950, which is the statutory enunciation of Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex 341 (Teoh Kee Keong v Tambun Mining Co Ltd [1968] 1 MLJ 39; Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd Kuala Terengganu v Mae Perkayuan Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 2 MLJ 76, SC). In essence, the section states that the party may recover any loss or damage 19 [37] [38] [39] for any breach which: (a) naturally arose in the usual course of things; or (b) which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it. For the-sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that our courts have treated the position under the second limb of the section to be similar to the second limb of Hadley v Baxendale, which is, the party may recover damages which may ‘reasonably be supposed to have been in contemplation of both the parties, at the time they made the contract’ (emphasis added) Premised on the settled principles above, | will now deal with the pleaded issues on damages. On the issue of damages, the plaintiff is claiming for the following special damages: (i) | monthly use of funds - RM220,864.00 (ii) factory rentals - RM119,000.00 (iii) salaries of workers — RM773,500.00 (iv) rental of staff hostel — RM14,920.00 The above amounts were extracted from the audited account of the plaintiff, exhibit P24. The plaintiff submits that the sum of RM220,864.00 is the cost of 1% per month from the advances from the directors to operate the 20 [40] [41] [42] laundry in the sum of RM1,299,287.00. However, apart from the fact that the financial report (P24) merely states “Amount due to directors”, there was no evidence if the amount was for the laundry operations. The plaintiff was also claiming for factory rentals, staff hostel rentals and salaries of workers. This is clearly against the position taken by the plaintiff during this trial that the machines were not for commercial use but were only for testing. If the machines were only for the purpose of testing, there is absolutely no necessity to employ and house the workers. In any event, from the said financial report, the plaintiff was shown to have made a revenue of RM894,901.00 for the period 16.6.2015 to 30.11.2016. This shows that the plaintiff was commercially operational during that period, despite not having the JKKP’s approval. The plaintiff was also claiming for the refund of RM598,537.00, on the basis that there was a total failure of consideration. In view of my finding that there was no oral agreement on the requirement of the third party certification, this claim is untenable. Added to that, the plaintiff had used the laundry machineries since September/October 2015 up to October 2017. There had not been any attempt to return the machines and the plaintiff had been using them as their own. As such, since the plaintiff had accepted the machines, had retained and used them, they cannot now claim for a refund. 21 [44] [45] [46] As such, based on the reasons enumerated above, | am of the considered opinion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the fact and the amount of damages that it had claimed. Defendant’s Counterclaim It is not in dispute that from the total purchase price, RM75,000.00 -remain outstanding, and this formed the basis of the defendants’ counterclaim. On this balance of purchase price for RM75,000.00, PW1, Dato’ Shanmuga agreed that he has not paid the balance purchase price of RM75,000.00. This evidence was supported by the evidence given by PW7: $286: . | Do you agree that the plaintiff owes the defendant RM75,000? Plaintiff owed the defendant RM75,000 for, on the machine? There are still outstanding sum of RM75,000 owing by the plaintiff to the defendant? YA: Do you agree to that? d: Yes. Based on the above admission by the plaintiff's witnesses, | had allowed the defendant's counterclaim of RM75,000.00. 22 Conclusion [47] Based on the reasons enumerated above, | find that the plaintiff had failed to prove its case on the balance o of probabilities. AS. such, the plaintiffs claim is dismissed and the defendants’ counterclaim for RM75,000.00 is allowed. u (AZIZAH HAJI NAWAWI) JUDGE HIGH COURT MALAYA Appellate and Special Powers Division 2) SHAH ALAM Dated: 9 November 2020 For the Plaintiff : Datuk Ravinder Singh Sodhi A/L Manmohan Singh Sodhi Tetuan Sodhi Chambers For the Defendant : R. Yogeswari Tetuan R. Yogeswari & Co. 23 Cases Referred: 1. Teras Kimia Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2014] 4 MLRH 429 2. Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor. v. Plenitude Holdings Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 1 CLJ 15 3. Popular Industries Ltd v. Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 133; [1989] 3 MLJ 360 4. Malaysian Rubber Development Corp Bhd v Glove Seal Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 569 SC 24