BADAN PEGUAM MALAYSIA V KERAJAAN MALAYSIA

1 BADAN PEGUAM MALAYSIA v. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, CJ; NIK HASHIM, FCJ; HASHIM YUSOFF, FCJ; AZMEL MAAMOR, FCJ; ZULKEFLI MAKINUDIN, FCJ CIVIL REFERENCE NO: 06-1-2007 (W) 27 DECEMBER 2007 [2008] 1 CLJ 521 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : Judges - Appointment - Whether appointment of Judicial Commissioner contravened Art. 122AB read together with Art. 123 Federal Constitution - Whether said appointment null and void - Whether words "advocates of those courts" in Art. 123 require an advocate to have been in practice for period of ten years pr eceding appointment - Federal Constitution, Arts. 122AB , 123 - Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 3 , 66 - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 3 , 30(1) STATUTORY INTERPRETATION : Constitutio n - Principles of interpretation - Appointment of Judicial Commissioner - Whether contravened Art. 122AB read together with Art. 123 Federal Constitut ion - Whether words "advocates of those courts" in Art. 123 require an advocate to have been in practice for period of ten years preceding appointment - Federal Constitution, Arts. 122AB, 123 - Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 3 , 66 - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 3 , 30(1) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : Constitution - Interpretation - Appointment of Judicial Commissioner - Whether contravened Art. 122AB read together with Art. 1 23 Federal Constitution - Whether words "advocates of those courts" in Art. 123 require an advocate to have been in practice for period of ten years preceding appointment - Federal Constitution, Arts. 122AB, 123 - Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 3 , 66 - Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 3 , 30(1) WORDS & PHRASES : "advocates of those courts" - Federal Constitution, Art. 123 - Interpretation - Whether requires an advocate to have been in practice for period of ten years preceding appointment as Judicial Commissioner The Bar Council ('plaintiff') had filed an originating summons praying for a declara tion that the appointment of one Dr Badariah Sahamid ('Dr Badariah') as a Judicial Commissioner ('JC') of the High Court of Malaya was null and void and of no effect, on the ground that the said appointment was in contravention of Art. 122AB read together with Art. 123 of the Federal Constitution ('Constitution'). The Government of Malaysia ('defendant') subsequently filed a summons in chambers for questions of law relating to the appointment to be referred to this court pursuant to s. 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 . The learned judge allowed the defendant's application and the following constitutional issues were referred to this court for determination: (i) whether the words "advocates of those courts" appearing in Art. 123 of the Constitution require an advocate to have been in practice for period of ten years preceding his/her appointment as a JC under Art. 122AB of the Constitut ion; (ii) if the answer to Question (i) is in the negative, whether the appointment of Dr Badariah as a JC of 2 the High Court of Malaya with effect from 1 March 2007 is valid; and (iii) if the answer to Question (i) is in the affirmative, whether the appointment of Dr Badariah as a JC of the High Court of Malaya with effect from 1 March 2007 is null and void. Per Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ and Zulkefli Makinudin FCJ (dissenting): (1) Even though the Constitution does not provide that to qualify to be appointed as a judge or a JC, an advocate must be a practising advocate having a practising certificate, considering the two categories ie, "an advocate" and "a member of the legal and ju dicial service" together, the more reasonable interpretation that should be given to the word "advocate" is a practising advocate. This is further strengthened by the requirement that an advocate or a member of the judicial and legal service must have been so for ten years. That requirement can only mean to enable the advocate or the officer to gain experience at the Bar or in the service before he is appointed. Otherwise, that requirement serves no purpose whatsoever. Unlike in Singapore where a person who has been a "qualified person" for an aggregate period of not less than ten years is qualified to be appointed a judge, in Malaysia he must have been "an advocate of those courts" for ten years preceding the appointment. The difference is clear. In Singapo re, one does not have to be an advocate at all to qualify to be appointed a judge. He only has to pass the final examination for the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the universities mentioned. So, in Singapore, the requirement to practise does not arise. Unlike in Singapore too, the Constitution makes no reference to the Legal Profession Act 1976 ('LPA') or any other relevant law. So, the meaning to be assigned to the word "advocate" is not confined to the meaning of the same word used in the LPA. In any event, the definition of "advocate and solicitor" in the LPA is not of any assistance. Other provisions in the LPA are not of much assistance either, except that without a practising certificate, a person cannot practise as an advocate and solicitor. If he cannot practise, then, it is meaningless to apply the ten-year requirement to him. It does not serve any purpose. (para 44) (2) The definition of the word "advocate" in s. 3 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 ('IA') also supports the conclusion that the word must mean an advocate having a practising certificate, otherwise he is not "entitled to practise". The requi rement that a person must be an advocate for at least ten years is meant to cover advocates and solicitors who practise law. It is not meant to include people who are "only in name" advocates and solicitors merely by virtue of being admitted to the bar but spend their lives doing something else, whether teaching law, in business or politics. If they are intended to be included, the Constitution would and should have said so, as in Singapore or, more clearly in India, which provides that a "distinguished jurist" is also qualified to be appointed a judge. (paras 45 & 46) (3) Furthermore, this court had only last year, in the case of All Malayan Estates Staff Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors ('Rajasegaran 's case'), interpreted the provision of s. 23A(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ('IRA') to mean a practising advocate and solicitor ev en though that section specifically refers to the meaning of "advocate and solicitor" in the LPA, which only speaks of an advocate and solicitor who has been admitted and enrolled as such. The 3 definition of the word "advocate" in Art. 123 of the Constitution is not restricted to the meaning given in the LPA. The reasoning in Rajasegaran 's case applies with equal, if not greater, force to the present case. If a narrow construction is adopted to interpret Art. 123 of the Constitution in that an advocate need not be in active practice to be eligible for appointment as a judge or as a JC, and applying the principles enunciated in Rajasegaran 's case, it would lead to an absurd consequence in that a person who is ineligible to be appointed as chairman of the Industrial Court (an inferior court) could be appointed as a judge or as a JC of the High Court. (paras 47 & 138) (4) It may be that the time has come for other categories of persons eg, academicians to be included as persons qualified to be appointed as judges especially in such areas of law as intellectual property, conventional and Islamic finance and banking and so on. But that is a matter of policy for the government to decide. It is not right for the court to rewrite the Constitution under the pretext of interpreting it to sneak in someone under the two existing categories when he or she does not really belong to either of them. This judgment is not about the suitability of Dr Badariah to be appointed a JC. Academically, she is definitely one of the most "qualified" persons to be appointed a JC. This judgment is about who is qualified to be appointed a JC or a judge under the existing law, in particular, what is meant by "an advocate" in Art. 123 of the Constitution. (paras 48 & 49) (5) For the reasons given above, Dr Badariah, not having practised law at all since her admission to the Bar, did not qualify to be appointed a JC. Therefore, the answers to Questions (i) and (iii) are in the affirmative. In view of this, the answer to Question (ii) becomes irrelevant. (paras 50 & 51) Bahasa MalaysiaTranslation Of Headnotes Majlis Peguam ('plaintif') telah memfail satu saman pemula memohon deklarasi bahawa perlantikan seorang Dr Badariah Sahamid ('Dr Badariah') sebagai seorang Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya ('JC') adalah batal dan tidak berkesan, atas alasan bahawa perlantik an tersebut melanggar fasal 122AB Perlembagaan Persekutuan ('Perlembagaan') di baca bersekali dengan fasal 123 di situ. Berikutnya, Kerajaan Malaysia ('defendan') telah memfail saman dalam kamar bagi merujuk persoalan undang -undang berkaitan dengan perlantikan tersebut ke mahkamah ini di bawah s. 84 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 . Yang arif hakim membenarkan permohonan defendan dan isu -isu perlembagaan berikut telah dirujuk ke mahkamah ini untuk penentuan, iaitu: (i) sama ada perkataan-perkataan "peguambela mahkamah -mahkamah tersebut" di dalam fasal 123 Perlembagaan mengkehendaki seseorang peguambela perlu beramal selama sepuluh tahun sebelum ia boleh dilantik sebagai seorang JC di bawah fasal 122AB Perlembagaan ; (ii) jika jawapan kepada Soalan (i) berbentuk negatif, sama ada perlantikan Dr Badariah sebagai seorang JC Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya berkuatkuasa dari 1 Mac 2007 sah; dan (iii) jika jawapan kepada Soalan (i) afirmatif, sama ada perlantikan Dr Badariah sebagai JC Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya berkuatkuasa dari 1 Mac 2007 adalah tak sah dan batal. Diputuskan (menolak tuntutan plaintif) 4 Oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad KHN dan Zulkefli Makinudin HMP (menentang): (1) Walaupun Perlembagaan tidak memperuntukkan bahawa bagi melayakkan diri untuk dilantik sebagai seorang hakim atau JC, seseorang peguambela hendaklah seorang peguambela yang beramal dan memiliki sijil amalan, mengambilkira kedua -dua kategori "seora ng peguambela' dan "seorang pegawai perkhidmatan kehakiman dan perundangan' secara bersekali, tafsiran yang lebih munasabah yang harus diberi kepada perkataan "peguambela" adalah seorang peguambela yang beramal. Ini diperkukuhkan dengan kehendak bahawa seo rang peguambela atau seorang pegawai perkhidmatan kehakiman dan perundangan hendaklah berada dalam kedudukannya itu selama sepuluh tahun. Kehendak ini adalah semata -mata bagi membolehkan peguambela atau pegawai berkenaan mendapat pengalaman yang secukupnya di Bar atau dalam perkhidmatan sebelum beliau dilantik. Jika dikatakan sebaliknya, maka keperluan ini akan menjadi sia -sia sahaja. Tidak seperti di Singapura, di mana seseorang yang menjadi 'seorang yang layak' untuk tempoh agreget tidak kurang dari sepul uh tahun adalah layak untuk dilantik sebagai seorang hakim, di Malaysia beliau mestilah telah menjadi "seorang peguambela mahkamah -mahkamah tersebut' selama sepuluh tahun sebelum dilantik. Perbezaannya jelas. Di Singapura, seseorang langsung tidak perlu menjadi seorang peguambela untuk layak dilantik sebagai seorang hakim. Beliau hanya perlu lulus peperiksaan akhir ijazah Sarjana Muda Undang - Undang dari universiti -universti yang disebutkan. Jadi, di Singapura, keperluan beramal adalah tidak berbangkit. Juga , tidak seperti di Singapura, Perlembagaan tidak membuat sebarang rujukan kepada Akta Profesion Undang-Undang 1967 ('LPA') atau mana -mana undang -undang lain yang relevan. Jadi, maksud yang harus diberi kepada perkataan "peguambela" tidak boleh terhad kepada maksud perkataan sama yang digunakan di dalam LPA. Walaupun begitu, tafsiran "peguambela dan pe guamcara" di dalam LPA tidak membantu langsung. Lain-lain peruntukan di dalam LPA juga tidak membantu sangat, kecuali bahawa tanpa sijil amalan seseorang tidak boleh beramal sebagai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara. Jika beliau tidak boleh beramal, maka adalah sia -sia untuk menggunapakai keperluan 10 tahun kepadanya. Ia tidak memberi apa-apa guna. (2) Definasi perkataan "peguambela" di dalam s. 3 Akta -Akta Tafsiran 1948 dan 1967 ('IA') juga menyokong konklusi bahawa perkataan tersebut mestilah bermaksud seorang peguambela ya ng mempunyai sijil amalan, jika tidak ia tidak "berhak untuk beramal". Keperluan bahawa seseorang mesti menjadi seorang peguambela untuk tempoh sepuluh tahun adalah dimaksudkan kepada peguambela dan peguamcara yang beramal. Ia tidak bermaksud untuk merangkumi orang -orang yang menjadi peguambela dan peguamcara "atas nama sahaja" disebabkan mereka telah diterima -masuk ke badan peguam tetapi menghabiskan hidup mereka dengan membuat sesuatu yang lain, sama ada mengajar undang -undang, berniaga atau berpolitik. J ika mereka ini dihasrat untuk dirangkumi, maka Perlembagaan tentunya akan menyatakan demikian, seperti yang berlaku di Singapura, ataupun lebih jelas lagi di India, yang memperuntukkan bahawa seorang "distinguished jurist" adalah juga layak untuk dilantik sebagai hakim. 5 (3) Lagipun, baru setahun yang lalu mahkamah ini di dalam kes All Malayan Estates Staff Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors ('kes Rajasegaran ') telah mentafsirkan peruntukan s. 23A(1) Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 ('IRA') sebagai bermaksud seorang peguambela dan peguamcara yang beramal, walaupun seksyen tersebut secara khus us merujuk kepada maksud "peguambela dan peguamcara" di dalam LPA, yang hanya bercakap mengenai seorang peguambela dan peguamcara yang telah diterima -masuk dan disenaraikan sebegitu. Definasi perkataan "peguambela" di dalam fasal 123 Perlembagaan tidak terhad kepada maksud yang diberi di dalam LPA. Taakulan di dalam kes Rajasegaran terpakai dengan kekuatan yang sama, jikapun tidak lebih lagi, kepada kes semasa. Jika tafsiran yang sempit dipakai bagi mentafsir fasal 123 Perlembagaan dalam ertikata seorang peguambela tidak perlu menjadi pengamal yang aktif untuk layak dilantik sebagai seorang JC, dan menggunapakai prinsip yang diutarakan di dalam kes Rajasegaran, ia akan menjurus kepada akibat yang absurd kerana seorang yang tidak layak untuk dilantik sebagai pengerusi Mahkamah Perusahaan (sebuah mahkamah inferior) masih boleh dilantik sebagai seorang hakim atau JC Mahkamah Tinggi. (4) Mungkin sudah sampai masanya bagi kategori orang yang dikira layak dilantik sebagai hakim diperluaskan bagi merangkumi para ahli akademik terutama untuk bidang -bidang seperti undang -undang harta intelektual, perbankan dan kewangan Islam dan konvensional dan lain -lain. Namun, itu adalah satu perkara polisi yang harus ditentukan oleh kerajaan. Adalah salah untuk mahkamah menulis semula Perlembagaan di bawah pretext mentafsirkannya bagi tujuan menyeludup seseorang ke dalam dua kategori sedia ada sedangkan beliau sebenarnya tidak berada da lam mana -mana kategori tersebut. Penghakiman ini tidak berkaitan dengan kesesuaian Dr Badariah dilantik sebagai seorang JC. Dari segi akademik, beliau tentunya antara orang yang paling "layak" dilantik sebagai JC. Penghakiman ini adalah mengenai siapa yang layak dilantik sebagai seorang JC atau seorang hakim di bawah undang -undang sedia ada, terutama apa yang dimaksudkan dengan "seorang peguambela" di dalam fasal 123 Perlembagaan. (5) Atas alasan-alasan yang diberi, Dr Badariah, kerana tidak pernah beramal sebagai peguam sejak mula diterima -masuk ke Badan Peguam, adalah tidak layak untuk dilantik sebagai seorang JC. Oleh itu, jawapan kepada Soalan (i) dan (iii) adalah afirmatif. Dengan itu, jawapan kepada Soalan (ii) adalah tidak relevan. [Appeal from High Court, Kuala Lumpur; Originating Summons No: R2-24-63-2007] Case(s) referred to: All Malayan Estates Staff Union v. Rajasegaran & Ors [2006] 4 CLJ 195 FC (refd) Attorney General o f the Commonwealth, ex relatione McKinley v. Commonwealth of Australia [1975] 135 CLR 1 (refd) 6 CP Agarwal v. CD Parikh [1970] SC AIR 1061 (refd) Dato' Menteri Othman Baginda & Anor v. Dato' Ombi Syed Alwi Syed Idrus [1984] 1 CLJ 98 (Rep); [1984] 1 CLJ 28 FC (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v. Nordin Salleh & Anor [1992] 1 CLJ 72 (Rep); [1992] 2 CLJ 1125 SC (refd) Dr Mohd Nasir Hashim v. Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia [2007] 1 CLJ 19 CA (refd) Dupont Steels Ltd & Ors v. Sirs and Ors [1980] 1 WLR 142 (refd) Kamariah Ali & Yang Lain lwn. Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan dan Satu Lagi [2004] 3 CLJ 409 FC (refd) M Samantha Murthi v. The Attorney -General & Ors [1982] CLJ 213 (Rep); [1982] CLJ 241 FC (refd) Malaysian Bar v. Dato' Kanagalingam Veluppillai [2004] 4 CLJ 194 FC (refd) Merdeka University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia [1981] CLJ 191 (Rep); [1981] CLJ 175 HC (refd) Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher [1980] AC 319 (refd) Syed Mubarak Syed Ahmad v. Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2000] 3 CLJ 659 CA (refd) Tan Tek Seng v. Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor [1996] 2 CLJ 771 CA (refd) Legislation referred to: Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance 1948, s. 2 Advocates Ordinance (Sabah Cap 2), s. 9 Courts of Judicature Act 1964, s. 84 Federal Constitution, Arts. 8(1), 122AB, 122B, 123(b) Industrial Relations Act 1967, ss. 23(1), 23A(1) Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967, ss. 2, 3, 17A, 65, 66 Legal Profession Act 1976, ss. 3 , 10 , 13(1) , 18 , 21(1) , 28A , 28B , 29(1) , 30(1) , 35(1), (2) , 36(1), 37, 38(g) Sarawak Advocates Ordinance (Cap 110), s. 9 7 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore [Sing], art. 96 Indian Constitution, art. 124(3) Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) [Sing], s. 2 Other source(s) referred to: Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edn, p 55 Jagadish Swarup, Legislation and Interpretation, pp 479-480 Counsel: For the plaintiff - Robert Lazar (Mark Lau with him); M/s Sivananthan For the defendant - Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail A -G's Chambers (Dato' Kamaludin Md Said, Azizah Nawawi & Suzana Atan SSFC with him) Reported by Suresh Nathan JUDGMENT Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ: [1] By an originating summons dated 27 July 2007, the Bar Council ("plaintiff") prayed for "a declaration that the appointment of Dr. Badariah bte Sahamid as a Judicial Commissioner of the High Court of Malaya is null and void and of no e ffect on the ground that the said appointment is in contravention of Art. 122 AB read together with Art. 123 of the Federal Constitution." [2] On 27 August 2 007, ie, one day before the matter was scheduled to be mentioned before the learned judge of the High Court, the Government of Malaysia ("defendant") filed a summons in chambers for questions of law relating to the appointment be referred to this court pursuant to s. 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 . On 18 September 2007, after hearing the parties, the learned judge allowed the defendant's application and referred the constitutional issues to this court for its determination. The issues are as follows: i. Whether the words "advocates of those courts" appearing in Article 123 of the Federal Constitution requires an Advocate to have been in practice for a period of ten years preceding his/her appointment as a Judicial Commissioner under Article 122AB of the Federal Constitution? ii. If the answer to Question I is in the negative, is the appointment of Y.A. Dr. 8 Badariah Sahamid as a Judicial Commissioner of the High Court of Malaya with effect from 1 Mac 2007 valid? iii. If the answer to Question I is in the affirmative, is the appointment of Y.A. Dr. Badariah Sahamid as a Judicial Commissioner of the High Court of Malaya with effect from 1 Mac 2007 null and void? [3] We heard the arguments on 22 October 2007 and reserved our judgments. This is my judgment. [4] The facts are not in dispute. Dr. Badariah Sahamid graduated with a first class honours degree in law from the University of Malaya on 17 June 1978. That qualification renders her to be a "qualified person" within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act 1976. In 1979, she was conferred with a Masters in Law by the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), the University of London. Having completed her pupilage and having satisfied the requirements of the Act, on 26 September 1987, she was admitted as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya. However, she never applied for nor obtained a practising certificate that would enable her to practise as an advocate and solicitor. Instead, she served as a lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the University of Malaya from 14 January 1980. On 10 April 1992 she became an Associate Professor and on 31 December 2006 a Professor, until her appointment as a Judicial Commissioner of the High Court of Malaya. No doubt she has a very impressive academic credential. However, the issue before this court is one of law, simply put, whether she is, in law, qualified for the said appointment. That calls, in particular, for the interpretation of Arts. 122AB , 122B and 123. Article 122AB , in substance, provides that the Yang di -Pertuan Agong may "appoint to be judicial commissioner... any person qualified for appointment as a judge of the High Courts;...." [5]Article 122B provides for the appointment of judges of Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Courts. [6] Regarding the qualification of a person to be appointed as a judge of the High Courts, Art. 123 provides: 123. A person is qualified for appointment under Article 122B as a judge of the Federal Court, as a judge of the Court of Appeal or as a judge of any of the High Courts if: (a) he is a citizen; and (b) for the ten years preceding his appointment he has been an advocate of those courts or any of them or a member of the judicial and legal service of the Federation or of the legal service of a State, or sometimes one of sometimes another. [7] Prior to 16 September 1963 that article read as follows: 123. A person is qualified for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court if: (a) he is a citizen; and