Kughan a/l Murugappan 1. Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri Malaysia 2. Penguasa Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak Batu Gajah Perak 3. Ketua Polis Negara

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: WA-44-123-05/2021 ANTARA KUGHAN A/L MURUGAPPAN DAN TIMBALAN MENTER! DALAM NEGERI ‘PENGUASA PUSAT PEMULIHAN AKHLAK BATU GAJAH PERAK KETUA POLIS NEGARA MALAYSIA , ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENGENALAN [i] Ini adalah merupakan satu permohonan untuk mendapatkan writ of habeas corpus oleh Pemohon yang telah ditahan di Pusat Pemulihan Akhlak, Batu Gajah, Perak (PPA) untuk tempoh dua tahun melalui satu perintah bertarikh 27.08.2021 yang dikeluarkan oleh Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri di bawah Seksyen 6(1) Akta Dadah Berbahaya (Langkah- Langkah Pencegahan Khas) 1985 (Akta) mulai dari 27.8.2021. [2] Setelah mendengar hujahan dari pihak-pihak mahkamah ini telah menolak permohonan ini. [3] | Kedudukan dan prinsip undang-undang berkaitan permohonan writ of habeas corpus adalah jelas sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di bawah Seksyen 11C, Akta dan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914, Chua Kian Voon v Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2020] 1 MLJ 351; [2020] 1 CLJ 74. [4] Didalam kes ini Pemohon telah menimbulkan isu-isu berikut: “(i) Kelewatan 27 hari oleh Pegawai Penyiasat kes fail dalam mengemukakan laporan lengkap menurut Seksyen 3 Akta kepada Pegawai Siasatan dan Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri (TMDN) telah memprejudiskan Pemohon akibat dari pada kelewatan TMDN dalam mengeluarkan Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 27.8.2020 terhadap Pemohon. [5] (iii) (iv) Bagi Kelewatan 13 hari oleh Pegawai Siasatan KDN dalam mengemukakan laporan lengkap menurut Seksyen 5(2) Akta kepada TMDN telah memprejudiskan Pemohon akibat dari kelewatan TMDN dalam mengeluarkan Perintah Tahanan bertarikh 27.8.2020 terhadap Pemohon. Wujud ketidakpatuhan prosidur di bawah Seksyen 3(2)(b) Akta apabila pihak polis gagal mendapatkan kebenaran daripada Pegawai Polis yang berpangkat Penolong Penguasa Polis atau lebih tinggi untuk menahan Pemohon melebihi 48 jam. Wujudnya ketidakpatuhan prosidur di bawah Seksyen 5(3)(c) Akta apabila Pegawai Siasatan gagal memeriksa saksi-saksi kes Pemohon secara bersumpah atau secara berikrar.” isu (i) dan (ii), Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam _ kes Tamilarasan a/| Subramaniam v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 MLJ 147 menyatakan seperti berikut: [15] We are mindful that section 3(2) of the Act speaks of the detention of the detainee for a period of 60 days after his arrest under section 3(1) and not with the timeline within which the investigation and inquiry reports are to be submitted to the Minister under section 3(3) and section 5(4), but it stands to reason that if the arrested person is allowed to be detained in police custody for up to 60 days pending the decision of the Minister under section 6(1), it cannot be a breach of procedure for the Investigating Officer to commence his inquiry at any time within and before the expiry of the 60-day detention period allowed by section 3(2). [16] What is procedurally important is for the investigation report and the inquiry report to be submitted to the Minister before the expiry of the 60-day detention period. That done, there can be no valid complaint of procedural non compliance by the Investigating Officer or the Inquiry Officer. [18] In our view, the proper way to construe section 3(3) and section 5(4) is to read then harmoniously with the preceding subsection 3(2), which allows for the arrested person to be detained in police custody for a period of no more than 60 days after his arrest under section 3(1). In other words, whatever may be the time that the Investigating Officer may take to complete his investigation and whatever may be the time that the Inquiry Officer may take to complete his inquiry, they must submit their respective reports to the Minister under section 3(3) and section 5(4) before the expiry of the 60-day detention period allowed by section 3(2). [19] The provisions of section 3(2) are clear and unambiguous, There is therefore no necessity to lift the legislative veil so to speak to find out what Parliament’s intention was in enacting the provision. It means that any person arrested under section 3(1) may be detained in police - custody for the purpose of investigation for a period of up to: 60 days ‘without an order of detention having been made in respect of him under subsection 6(1)’.... . [20] Thus, reading section 3(2) and 5(4) in tandem with. section 3(2), the Investigating Officer and the Inquiry Officer - have 60 days to complete their investigation and inquiry before submitting their reports to the Minister under section. - 3(3) and 5(4). There is therefore a timeline within which the reports under sections 3(3) and 5(4) are to be submitted to the Minister, although the Minister has yet to prescribe the period: within which the Investigating Officer and the Inquiry Officer : are to do so in exercise of his power under section 22(2) of the Act.” [6] Di dalam kes di hadapan mahkamah pada hari ini, Pemohon telah ditahan di bawah Seksyen 3(1) pada 1.7.2020 dan Perintah Tahanan telah dikeluarkan oleh TMDN pada 27.8.2020. [7] Berpandukan kepada keputusan dalam kes Tamilarasan yang dipetik di atas, jelas bahawa tiada sebarang pelanggaran prosidur oleh kedua-dua Pegawai Penyiasat kes fail mahupun Pegawai Siasatan KDN . memandangkan laporan lengkap yang berkaitan telah disiapkan dan dikemukakan kepada TMDN dalam tempoh 60 -hari sebagaimana yang ditetapkan di bawah Seksyen 3(2) Akta. Kes Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914 adalah berkaitan. [8] Bagi isu seterusnya iaitu (iii) dan (iv), begitu juga isu (i) dan (ii) yang telah dijelaskan di atas, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes yang sama telah menyatakan bahawa apa-apa yang berlaku sebelum perintah. tahanan dikeluarkan adalah tidak releven dan. bersifat akademik. Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan: [31] As the term implies, procedural non compliance means failure to abide by the procedural rules laid down by the governing statute, in this case the Act. The following observation by this court in Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914 at page 930- 931, albeit made in relation to amendments made to the relevant statute, are on point: ..... [32] Further to that, it has been held by this courtin L Rajanderan R Letchumanan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2010] 7 CLJ 653 that any irregularity for non compliance with the procedure prescribed by section 3(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act is not relevant matter for consideration when it has been superseded by the Minister’s detention order under section 6(1). The reason is because any question on the legality or propriety of the arrest or detention of a detainee at the investigation stage is not a relevant consideration, nor is it a precondition for the Minister to make the detention order. This is what the court said at paragraphs [9]-[11]: 79] The cases referred to above illustrate the principles upon which the courts will consider in allowing for judicial review on an executive detention order. It may be stated this way. A writ of habeas corpus must be directed only against the current detention order even if the earlier arrest of the detainee is irregular. The court is also not concerned with the vagueness, sufficiency or relevancy of the grounds of detention which is the sphere of the subjective exercise of the Minister's discretion under various executive detention legislations unless mala fide on his part is shown (see Karam Singh v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri (Minister of Home Affairs), Malaysia [1969] 1 LNS 65 see also Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Karpal Singh [1988] 3 MLJ 29). Any questions on the legality or propriety of the arrest or detention of a detainee at the investigation stage is not relevant consideration nor is it a pre- condition to the order of detention of the Minister. [10] Only when the statute requires an act to be a condition precedent to the making of a detention order can a valid complaint be made against that detention. Under the Act there are two conditions precedent for the Minister to consider before making a detention order. These are found in s. 6(1) of the Act..... [11] The scheme under the Act (similarly under the POPOC) is that before a detention order is directed, the police would need to conduct an investigation which includes the power to detain any suspected persons. The manner on conducting the investigations and arrest at this stage, is neither a condition precedent nor a matter which has a direct link with the detention order and thus not a ground for judicial review. Previous cases such as Koh Yoke Koon v Minister of Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor [1987] 1 LNS 67, which held that a detention order made against a suspect who had been illegally detained by the police at the investigating stage are no longer good law since this is not a procedural non-compliance of a condition precedent to nullify the detention order. (see also the Federal Court case Lee Kew Sang v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 CLJ 914).’ [33] That is exactly what the present appeal is all about, which is a challenge by the appellant on the legality or propriety of the investigation process carried out by the Investigating Officer. This is untenable as whatever defect, if any, in the investigation process carried out by the Investigating Officer has been superseded by the issuance of the detention order by the Minister on 27.4.2020 and is therefore irrelevant. As decided in L Rajandran, any application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus must be directed at the current or pre-existing detention of the arrested person and not after the expiry or extinguishment of his detention period: See also Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Nasharuddin Nasir [2004] 1 CLJ 81 which was followed recently by this court in Goh Leong Yong v ASP Khairul Firoz Rodzuan & Ors [2021] 1 LNS 994; [2021] 1 MLJU 1403.” [9] Ketika pendengaran permohonan ini, peguam bijaksana bagi Pemohon telah berhujah menggesa mahkamah ini untuk menggunapakai kes Dhinesh a/| Tanaphlil vy Lembaga Pencegahan Jenayah dan 2 yang Lain [05(HC)-12-01/2021(B)] yang telah diputuskan oleh: - Mahkamah Persekutuan. Namun begitu alasan penghakiman penuh masih belum diperolehi untuk menjelaskan alasan mengapa permohonan writ of habeas corpus di dalam kes tersebut dibenarkan. [10] Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Malaysian Motor Insurance Pool v Tirumeniyar Singara Veloo [2020] 1 MLJ 440 menyatakan seperti berikut: ‘[81] Uppermost in our minds is the fact that the Federal Court decision in Saw was delivered without any written judgement. [82] Without a written judgement the Federal Court’s reasons for allowing the appeal as alluded fo in the editorial - note, is in our view purely speculative, and cannot be regarded as authoritative and/or binding. We would therefore disagree with the plaintiff that the Court of Appeal erred and “was in breach of stare decisis” when it did not consider itself bound . to follow Saw.” 10 [11] Mahkamah ini sekali merujuk kepada kes Tamilarasan a/f Subramaniam v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2021] 6 MLJ 147 di mana mahkamah menyatakan: ‘[43] We were referred by Datuk N Sivananthan to two decisions of this court in Kanageswaran a/l Siwarpikasam v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & 2 lagi Criminal Appeal No 05-178-08 of 2017(B) and Collins Nwanganga v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri & 2 lagi Criminal Appeal No 05-251-10 of 2017(B), which according to learned counsel this court: allowed both appeals on the ground that the Advisory Board's refusal to exercise its power to summon the witnesses. on application by the appellants was a wrong exercise of discretion. _ [44] | It is unfortunate that we do not have the benefit of the written grounds of judgment in the two cases. Without the °° grounds, it is impossible to know exactly why this court allowed the habeas corpus applications by the two appellants in the two. cases, not that we do not believe what learned counsel was telling us from the Bar table. [45] In Visnu a/ Telagan v Timbalan Menteri Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Ors [2019] 6 MLJ 1; [2019] 9 CLJ 177 this court observed as follows at para [40]: 11 [40] The respondents arqued that the Federal Court there had heard a similar argument on this point and refused the detainee a writ of habeas corpus. As at the date of our decision in this appeal, no written grounds had been delivered in respect of that case and we are therefore unable to glean any reason why such a decision was made. Therefore, we did not see how the said judgment lent any support to the respondent’s case. Surely, in arriving at our decision, we had to consider and apply the law according to the facts and circumstances of this case.’ [12] Dalam keadaan ini, mahkamah ini adalah terikat dengan keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Tamilarasan yang merupakan kes terkini berkaitan isu-isu yang ditimbulkan oleh Pemohon dalam kes ini. - [13] Berdasarkan alasan yang dinyatakan di atas, permohonan writ of habeas corpus Pemohon dit (DATO’ AZHAR ABDUL HAMID) PESURUHJAYA KEHAKIMAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI JENAYAH 7 KUALA LUMPUR Bertarikh : 9hb. Disember 2021 12 Pihak-Pihak: Peguambela bagi Pemohon Jay Moy Wei Juin Tetuan Jay & Jay Bagi Pihak Responden Farah Edzlin Binti Yusop Khan bersama Anasuha Atiqah Binti Mat Said Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Kementerian Dalam Negeri. 13