MFORCE BIKE HOLDINGS SDN. BHD. ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD

WA-22NCC-827-11/2023 Kand. 74 26/02/2026 11:44:03 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF KUALA LUMPUR SUIT NO: WA-22NCC-827-11/2023 BETWEEN MFORCE BIKE HOLDINGS SDN. BHD (Company No: 200601031651 [751410-H]) ...PLAINTIFF AND ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY (MALAYSIA) BERHAD (Company No: 200601015674 [735426-V]) ...DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [1] Before the court is a claim by the Plaintiff, MForce Bike Holdings Sdn. Bhd., against the Defendant, Allianz General Insurance Company (Malaysia) Berhad, for damages in the sum of RM5,796,206.40 arising from a fire incident that occurred on 10.11.2017 at the Plaintiff's warehouse premises located at No. 1000, Jalan IKS Juru, Taman Industri Ringan Juru, 14100 Simpang Ampat, Pulau Pinang. 1 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [2] The Plaintiff claims that the fire destroyed motorcycles and spare parts insured under a Fire Insurance Policy issued by the Defendant. The Defendant repudiated the claim on 22.2.2019, alleging that the claim was fraudulent, exaggerated, and made in bad faith, and that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. [3] A full trial was conducted before this court on 23.6.2025, 24.6.2025, 25.6.2025, and 26.6.2025. The Plaintiff called two witnesses and the Defendant called seven witnesses, including forensic experts, handwriting experts, and insurance professionals. [4] Having heard the evidence and considered the submissions of both parties, I found in favour of the Defendant for the reasons that follow. BACKGROUND FACTS [5] The Plaintiff is a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Act 2016, with its registered address at No. 1485, Jalan Seruling Kawasan Perindustrian Vlador, 14200 Sungai Jawi, Pulau Pinang. The Plaintiff operates a business in distributing, stocking, and providing motorcycle spare parts and motorcycles. 2 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [6] The Defendant is a general insurance company incorporated in Malaysia and is engaged in the business of providing general insurance services. [7] On 12.2.2016, the Plaintiff entered into a fire insurance policy, an unvalued insurance contract (Policy No. 17FPN0000116-00), providing coverage of RM10,000,100.00 for stock in trade of motorbikes and spare parts at the insured premises, subject to specific terms, conditions, and warranties (“the Fire Policy”). The Fire Policy covered the Plaintiff's warehouse premises located at No. 1000, Jalan IKS Juru, Taman Industri Ringan Juru, 14100 Simpang Ampat, Pulau Pinang. The duration of insurance coverage was from 12.2.2016 to 11.2.2017, and the Fire Policy was subsequently renewed for another year until 11.2.2018. [8] It is not in dispute that a fire incident occurred at the Plaintiff's warehouse premises on 10.11.2017. The Fire and Rescue Department (“Fire Department”) attended to the fire incident, and the fire was extinguished in the early hours of that morning. [9] On 28.11.2017, the Plaintiff submitted an initial claim to the Defendant for stock amounting to RM5,373,206.40, comprising 837 units of MZ Moskito 125 rx scooters totalling RM3,766,500.00 and spare parts totalling RM1,606,706.40. 3 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [10] Subsequently, on 22.3.2018, the Plaintiff revised its claim to RM5,796,206.40, comprising 931 units of MZ Moskito 125 rx scooters totalling RM4,189,500.00 and spare parts totalling RM1,606,706.40. In support of its claim, the Plaintiff submitted invoices and delivery orders purportedly issued by two suppliers: P&U Cycle (M) Sdn. Bhd. (“P&U Cycle”) and Tick Hing Jaya Trading. [11] The Defendant appointed MSM International Loss Adjuster (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. as the Loss Adjuster to investigate the fire incident. The Defendant also appointed Forensic Services (M) Sdn. Bhd. to conduct a forensic investigation into the cause and origin of the fire. [12] Following the investigations, the Defendant, through its solicitors Tetuan Othman Hashim & Co., issued a repudiation letter dated 22.2.2019, rejecting the Plaintiff's claim on the grounds that the claim was fraudulent, exaggerated, made in bad faith, and that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. [13] The Plaintiff, through its then solicitors Tetuan Wong Chooi & Mohd Nor, responded by letter denying the allegations and asserting that the Plaintiff was entitled to the insurance payout. 4 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [14] The Plaintiff commenced this action on 7.11.2023, approximately four years and eight months after the Defendant's repudiation. [15] The parties filed their respective pleadings, and the matter proceeded to trial. RESPECTIVE PARTIES’ PLEADED CASES The Plaintiff’s Case [16] The Plaintiff pleads that it held the aforementioned Fire Policy with the Defendant, covering its factory premises in Simpang Ampat, Penang, for a sum of RM10,000,100.00. The Plaintiff avers that on 10.11.2017, a fire occurred at the premises, resulting in the total destruction of business stock, specifically motorcycles and spare parts. Consequently, the Plaintiff submitted a claim under the Fire Policy for RM5,796,206.40, supported by lists of destroyed stock which included 931 units of scooters and various spare parts. The Plaintiff maintains that it had paid all premiums and complied with all terms of the Fire Policy at all material times. [17] The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant wrongfully repudiated the claim on 22.2.2019 on the grounds that the claim was excessive, fraudulent, and caused by the Plaintiff’s own negligence. The Plaintiff pleads that the Defendant was negligent and breached the insurance contract by failing to 5 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pay the insured sum. Specifically, the Plaintiff argues that the Defendant failed to conduct a transparent assessment, made baseless allegations of bad faith (mala fide) without credible evidence, and ignored the Fire Department’s report which did not attribute the fire to the Plaintiff’s negligence. [18] In response to the specific allegations raised in the Defence, the Plaintiff categorically denies any involvement in arson or fraud. The Plaintiff pleads that it never stored accelerants such as petrol or kerosene at the premises and denies any premeditated planning to set the fire. Addressing the Defendant’s allegations regarding the validity of the claim documents and the unmarketability of the stock, the Plaintiff asserts that the invoices and delivery orders are genuine and denies that the company was in financial distress. Furthermore, the Plaintiff rebuts the Defendant’s argument that the suit is time-barred or that warranties were breached, asserting that it possessed valid fire extinguisher certificates and had responded to the Defendant’s repudiation letter through its former solicitors in July 2020. [19] Ultimately, the Plaintiff claims that as a result of the fire and the Defendant’s refusal to pay, it has suffered losses including the value of the stock and damage to its reputation. The Plaintiff seeks special damages in the sum of RM5,796,206.40, general damages to be assessed by the court, interest at a rate of 5% per annum from the date of filing until judgment, and costs. 6 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The Defendant’s Case [20] The Defendant admits to issuing the Fire Policy to the Plaintiff but denies all liability for the claim, asserting that the Fire Policy is subject to the principle of uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith) and strict adherence to its terms. The Defendant pleads that the fire which occurred on 10.11.2017 was an incendiary fire, deliberately set, rather than accidental. In support of this allegation, the Defendant relies on forensic investigations indicating that the premises’ entrances were intact, implying that the arsonist had access to keys held solely by the Plaintiff’s employee, and that accelerants, namely petrol and kerosene, were found on strategically placed newspapers and cardboards throughout the warehouse. The presence of multiple, unconnected seats of fire is said to suggest premeditated planning. [21] Regarding the insurance claim itself, the Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff submitted a fraudulent, false, or exaggerated claim. The Defendant points to numerous abnormalities in the supporting documents, such as invoices from two different suppliers, P&U Cycle and Tick Hing Jaya Trading, bearing identical signatures. Further, the Defendant alleges that the supplier Tick Hing Jaya Trading had a business registration that expired in 2008, years before the invoices were purportedly issued, and could not be located. The Defendant also disputes the value and age of the stock, noting that while the Plaintiff claimed the scooters were new 2011 models, 7 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal forensic evidence, namely a burnt tyre, suggested that they were manufactured in 2007, and that the manufacturer had ceased operations in 2008. [22] The Defendant further alleges that the Plaintiff had a financial motive for the claim, pleading that the Plaintiff’s financial position was deteriorating, with increasing debts and significantly reduced bank balances. The Defendant argues that the stock claimed, namely MZ Moskito scooters, had no market demand and had been stored for years, rendering them difficult to sell. [23] Finally, the Defendant pleads that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any benefits due to breaches of Fire Policy terms and warranties. This includes an alleged breach of the Fire Extinguishing Appliances Warranty, as investigations revealed no valid, certified portable fire extinguishers at the premises. Additionally, the Defendant contends that the legal action is time-barred, as the Plaintiff failed to commence the suit within three months of the claim’s repudiation on 22.2.2019, as required by Policy Condition 15. Consequently, the Defendant prays for the Plaintiff’s claim to be dismissed with costs. WITNESSES [24] Two witnesses appeared for the Plaintiff as follows: 8 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal a) PW1 is Wong Chong Wan, the Plaintiff’s Assistant Store Manager, who served as the Assistant Human Resources Manager at the time of the material events. His evidence primarily relates to the supervision and security of the insured premises, the discovery of the fire, and the status of the fire extinguishing appliances. He testified that he was the sole individual entrusted with the keys to the premises and was at home sleeping when the fire occurred, only learning of it at 7.30 a.m. after missing an earlier notification. While acknowledging that the Fire Department classified the fire as incendiary, he denied the Plaintiff’s involvement and highlighted suspicious elements suggesting external intrusion, such as cut marks on the gate lock and barbed wire, and the discovery of a black jerry can at the guardhouse that did not belong to the Plaintiff. He also testified that the premises had valid fire extinguishers with certificates renewed in January 2017 and clarified that while newspapers were kept at the guardhouse, they were not stored inside the warehouse where the forensic team found burnt paper residues. b) PW2 is Tan Beow Khim, the Plaintiff’s Finance Manager. Her evidence primarily relates to the administration of the Fire Policy, the submission and verification of claim documents, and the financial standing of the Plaintiff. She testified that she was 9 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal responsible for maintaining the Fire Policy renewals and compiling the claim documents after the fire, which involved verifying unsigned invoices and delivery orders by stamping them on behalf of the Plaintiff and coordinating with suppliers, namely Tick Hing Jaya Trading and P&U Cycle, to obtain their signatures. Additionally, she rebutted the Defendant’s allegation that the fire was motivated by financial distress, asserting that the company was financially stable and had recorded a 28% increase in net profit after tax for the 2016/2017 financial year. [25] Seven witnesses appeared for the Plaintiff as follows: a) DW1 is PB Rohaizal bin Abdul Aziz, a Fire Officer from the Operations and Rescue Division of the Fire Department who served as the Operation Commander during the incident. His evidence primarily relates to the firefighting operation conducted on 10.11.2017, the submission of the Fire Report (D1) and Station Diary (D2), and the accessibility of the premises upon the fire brigade’s arrival. He testified that upon arriving at the scene, he observed a large fire in the middle of the factory and instructed his team to gain entry to extinguish it. However, he stated that he could not confirm whether the premises were locked or whether his team had to break in, noting that the Station Diary did not record a forced entry and that he was 10 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal managing the operation from the perimeter. He further clarified that his role was limited to the firefighting operation and that he had no personal knowledge regarding the findings in the separate Fire Investigation Report prepared by the forensic unit. b) DW2 is Anand Ghnavello, a Mechanical Engineer and forensic expert previously employed by Forensic Services (M) Sdn Bhd. His evidence primarily relates to the forensic investigation regarding the origin and cause of the fire at the Plaintiff’s premises at Lot 1000, Jalan IKS Juru. He testified that he conducted a comprehensive forensic examination of the incident and presented his findings in Expert Forensic Reports dated 26.5.2018 and 18.10.2018, concluding that the fire was incendiary due to the presence of accelerants and multiple unconnected seats of fire. c) DW3 is Tan Sok Ling, a former Consultant Chemist at Forensic Science Malaysia Sdn Bhd. Her evidence primarily relates to the scientific analysis of debris samples collected from the Plaintiff’s premises at Lot 1000, Jalan IKS Juru. She testified that she analysed the samples collected by the forensic expert, Anand Ghnavello, and outlined her findings in reports dated 20.11.2017 and 18.12.2017, which confirmed the presence of accelerants, namely petrol and kerosene, in the debris. 11 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal d) DW4 is Linthini A/P Gannetion, a Document Forensic Expert employed by Approved Forensic Sdn Bhd. Her evidence primarily relates to the forensic document examination and comparative analysis of questioned signatures found on invoices submitted by the Plaintiff. She testified that she utilised established forensic methodologies to examine signature specimens extracted from two distinct sets of invoices issued by separate corporate entities, namely P&U Cycle and Tick Hing Jaya Trading, and presented her findings in a report dated 20.5.2024, which concluded that the signatures bore significant similarities in form and design, suggesting that they were likely signed by the same person. e) DW5 is Tan Chiap Yeong (Thomas), the General Manager at MSM International Adjusters (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, appointed by the Defendant to investigate the loss. His evidence primarily relates to the adjustment of the loss, the investigation into the cause of the fire, and the verification of the Plaintiff’s financial standing and claim documents. He testified that he prepared three reports dated 31.12.2017, 11.9.2018, and 8.10.2018, concluding that the fire was incendiary and likely involved someone with key access, as the premises were secure upon the fire brigade’s arrival. He further highlighted significant abnormalities suggesting the claim was fraudulent, including the 12 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Plaintiff’s deteriorating financial health, the unmarketable nature of the 931 MZ Moskito scooters, which were claimed as new but found to be old models manufactured in 2007 or registered units, and the submission of invoices from a supplier, Tick Hing Jaya Trading, whose business registration had expired on 20.5.2008, years before the purported transactions in 2011. f) DW6 is Amir Firdaus Suraj bin Abdullah, the Head of Claims Special Unit at the Defendant’s company. His evidence primarily relates to the lodging of a police report regarding the Plaintiff’s insurance claim and the grounds for suspecting fraud. He testified that on 19.1.2024, he lodged a police report on behalf of the Defendant to request an investigation by the Commercial Crime Investigation Department, citing that the claim was tainted by fraudulent elements based on the findings of the loss adjuster and forensic expert, which determined that the fire on 10.11.2017 was incendiary due to the presence of accelerants and strategically placed combustibles. He further noted that the claim was repudiated due to these suspicious circumstances, numerous discrepancies in the claim documents, and breaches of policy terms including Condition 15. 13 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal g) DW7 is Tham Yu Chuen (Joanne), a Claims Examiner at Allianz General Insurance Company (Malaysia) Berhad. Her evidence primarily relates to the terms of the Fire Policy, the grounds for the repudiation of the Plaintiff’s claim on 22.2.2019, and the findings of the loss adjusters and experts regarding fraud and policy breaches. She testified that the Defendant rightfully repudiated the claim because the fire investigation concluded that the incident on 10.11.2017 was incendiary, evidenced by the presence of accelerants and the fact that the premises were intact, suggesting insider access. She further asserted that the claim was fraudulent and exaggerated due to significant anomalies, such as identical signatures found on invoices from two different suppliers and the fact that the scooters claimed as new 2011 models were actually manufactured in 2007 by a company that ceased operations in 2008. Additionally, she gave evidence that the Plaintiff is time-barred from this suit under Policy Condition 15 because the Plaintiff failed to commence action within three months of the rejection letter, and that the Plaintiff breached the Fire Extinguishing Appliances Warranty (RW.91-1A(i)) by failing to possess valid certificates for its portable fire extinguishers. 14 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ISSUES TO BE TRIED [26] The parties filed a Statement of Agreed Issues to be Tried on 26.3.2024, identifying thirteen issues for the court’s determination: a) Issue 1: Whether the Plaintiff's claim amounting to RM 5,796,206.40 is the amount of damages the Plaintiff is entitled to claim following the fire that occurred in accordance with the insurance policy entered into by the Plaintiff with the Defendant. b) Issue 2: Whether the cause of fire at the risk premises on 10.11.2017 was incendiary fire and/or deliberately set fire and/or arson. c) Issue 3: Whether there are irregularities and/or malpractices and/or discrepancies in the Plaintiff's claim. d) Issue 4: Whether the Plaintiff's claim is false and/or exaggerated and/or involves fraud. e) Issue 5: Whether the Plaintiff's claim is inconsistent with the documents provided, the information provided, and the Adjuster's investigation. 15 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal f) Issue 6: Whether the Plaintiff's claim was made in bad faith (mala fide). g) Issue 7: Whether the Plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure when submitting the said claims. h) Issue 8: Whether the Plaintiff breached the terms and conditions of the Fire Policy. i) Issue 9: Whether the Plaintiff breached the perils/clauses/warranties/memorandum of the Fire Policy. j) Issue 10: Whether all benefits under the Fire Policy can be forfeited because this action, brought on 7.11.2023, has exceeded 3 months after the repudiation of the Plaintiff's claim on 22.2.2019. k) Issue 11: Whether the Defendant is entitled to deny liability on the basis of a breach of the terms and conditions of the Fire Policy. l) Issue 12: Whether the Defendant is entitled to deny liability on the basis of a breach of the perils/clauses/warranties/memorandum of the Fire Policy if such allegations exist and need to be proved. 16 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal m) Issue 13: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to obtain any relief sought. [27] Notwithstanding the above issues, from the facts of the case, defences relied on by the Defendant and the submissions of parties, the court frames the following main issues for deliberation which this court considers pivotal to the resolution of this case. a) Whether the Plaintiff has proved its claim on a balance of probabilities by adducing credible and properly verified documentary and oral evidence, and whether the Defendant is precluded by the principle of approbation and reprobation from challenging the authenticity of the documents relied upon by the Plaintiff. b) Whether the testimony of PW1 and PW2 is credible and reliable such that it can safely be relied upon to establish the Plaintiff’s case. c) Whether, on a balance of probabilities, the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance, rather than by an unknown third party. d) Whether the Plaintiff has proved that it suffered any actual pecuniary loss in respect of the motorcycles and spare parts allegedly destroyed in the fire. 17 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal e) Whether, in the event the court finds fraud, forgery, absence of actual loss, and deliberate arson, the Plaintiff is nevertheless entitled to recover the alternative sum of RM2,145,776.75 based on the Adjuster’s preliminary assessment and report. f) Whether the Plaintiff acted in bad faith and breached the duty of utmost good faith under the insurance contract by submitting forged documents, advancing a fraudulent and exaggerated claim, and giving misleading evidence with intent to deceive the Defendant. g) Whether the three-month time limitation clause in Condition 15 of the Fire Policy is void and unenforceable under Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950, and if so, whether the Plaintiff’s action, though filed within the statutory six-year limitation period, should nevertheless be barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. h) Whether, in the event of a finding of the claim being fraudulent and the Plaintiff having breached of Condition 15 and other terms of the Fire Policy, the Defendant was entitled in law to repudiate liability and forfeit all benefits under the policy. 18 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal i) Whether allegations of fraud in this civil action must be proved beyond reasonable doubt or merely on a balance of probabilities. j) Whether the Plaintiff had a financial motive to commit fraud. [28] The court’s analysis will be structured on the framed issues above. The Issues to be Tried as filed will be revisited for determination upon the court’s findings being made on the issues above framed by this court. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS OF THE COURT Whether the Plaintiff's Claim is Supported by Credible Evidence [29] The Plaintiff submits that it has adduced sufficient documentary and oral evidence to establish its claim. The Plaintiff relies on invoices, delivery orders, and the testimony of PW1 and PW2. The Plaintiff further argues that the Defendant cannot now challenge the authenticity of these documents when the Defendant's own adjusters and forensic investigators relied on these very documents during their assessments. The Plaintiff contends that the Defendant cannot “approbate and reprobate” by accepting the documents for investigation purposes but then rejecting them as fabricated when the outcome was unfavourable to the Plaintiff. 19 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [30] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has failed to substantiate its claim with credible evidence. The Defendant argues that the invoices and delivery orders are fabricated, that the Plaintiff's witnesses gave inconsistent and evasive testimony, and that the Plaintiff failed to call material witnesses to corroborate its case. The Defendant contends that the fact that its adjusters and investigators examined the documents does not preclude the Defendant from subsequently challenging their authenticity based on the findings of those very investigations. [31] Having carefully considered the evidence and the submissions of both parties, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove its case on a balance of probabilities. My reasons are as follows. [32] First, the invoices and delivery orders submitted by the Plaintiff purportedly from P&U Cycle and Tick Hing Jaya Trading remain classified as Part C documents. No maker of these documents was called to testify to verify their authenticity. The Plaintiff's failure to produce the original documents or to call the suppliers as witnesses raises serious doubts about the authenticity of these documents. [33] The law is well established that documents cannot be admitted as evidence until their authenticity has been properly verified. In Live Capital Sdn. Bhd. v Pioneer Conglomerate Sdn. Bhd. [2025] 4 MLJ 420, the Federal Court 20 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal held that a document cannot be admitted as evidence until it has been properly proved, and that the authenticity of documents must be verified by calling the maker of such documents to testify. In that case, the witness who tendered the documents was not the maker and therefore not in a position to verify the authenticity and truth of the contents. [34] In the present case, neither PW1 nor PW2 was the maker of the invoices and delivery orders. PW1 is a director of the Plaintiff company, whilst PW2 is the financial manager. Neither witness was employed by or had any direct connection with the suppliers who allegedly issued these documents. The Plaintiff's failure to call representatives from P&U Cycle or Tick Hing Jaya Trading to verify the documents is fatal to its case. [35] Second, the Defendant has adduced compelling expert evidence that the signatures on the invoices and delivery orders are forged or fabricated. The Defendant called DW4, Ms. Linthini A/P Gannetion, a qualified handwriting expert, who conducted a thorough forensic examination of the signatures appearing on the documents. [36] DW4's expert report reveals that out of 89 questioned signatures, 78 were found to exhibit strikingly similar form and design. These signatures were classified into 25 distinct categories based on unique combinations of signature features. Most significantly, signatures on documents 21 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal purportedly issued by P&U Cycle fell into the exact same categories as signatures on documents purportedly issued by Tick Hing Jaya Trading. This is impossible if the documents had truly been signed by independent representatives of two separate companies. [37] DW4's expert opinion is unequivocal that the signature patterns strongly indicate intentional disguise and deliberate attempts to imitate original signatures. The Plaintiff did not challenge this expert evidence, did not cross-examine DW4 effectively on her findings, and did not adduce any counter- expert evidence to rebut DW4's conclusions. [38] The unchallenged expert evidence is entitled to significant weight. Where expert evidence is adduced on a technical matter and remains unchallenged, the court is entitled to rely on it. The Plaintiff's failure to rebut the expert evidence renders its case inherently weak. [39] Third, the Defendant has identified several glaring abnormalities in the invoices that further undermine their authenticity. Some invoices bear GST registration numbers despite being dated in 2011. GST was only implemented in Malaysia on 1.4.2015. It is therefore impossible for invoices issued in 2011 to bear GST registration numbers. The only reasonable inference is that these invoices were fabricated and deliberately backdated. 22 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [40] Additionally, the Defendant's investigations revealed that Tick Hing Jaya Trading's business registration expired on 20.5.2008. Despite this, the Plaintiff's claim relies on invoices and delivery orders purportedly issued by Tick Hing Jaya Trading in 2011 and 2012. This glaring inconsistency strongly suggests that these documents are not genuine. [41] Fourth, the Plaintiff has failed to call material witnesses who could have corroborated its case. PW2 testified that a colleague, Miss Ang, was responsible for communicating with the suppliers and handling the verification of documents. However, Miss Ang was not called as a witness. The Plaintiff also failed to call any representatives from P&U Cycle or Tick Hing Jaya Trading to verify the invoices and delivery orders. [42] Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. In OCBC Bank (Malaysia) Bhd v Prolink Marketing Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2023] MLJU 454, the Court of Appeal held that the failure to call a key or material witness to give evidence strongly suggests that the party did not want the witness to be subjected to cross-examination, and that this warrants the drawing of an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950. 23 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [43] In the present case, the Plaintiff has offered no reasonable explanation for its failure to call Miss Ang or representatives from the suppliers. I draw an adverse inference against the Plaintiff that if these witnesses had been called, their evidence would have been unfavourable to the Plaintiff's case. [44] I now turn to address the Plaintiff's argument that the Defendant cannot “approbate and reprobate” by accepting the documents for investigation purposes but then challenging their authenticity. I reject this argument for the following reasons. [45] First, the principle against approbation and reprobation does not apply in the circumstances of this case. The principle prevents a party from taking inconsistent positions to gain an advantage. However, the Defendant has not taken inconsistent positions. The Defendant's adjusters and investigators received the documents from the Plaintiff and examined them precisely to determine their authenticity and the legitimacy of the claim. It was through this examination and investigation that the abnormalities, discrepancies, and evidence of fabrication were discovered. [46] The Defendant did not “accept” the documents as genuine. Rather, the Defendant examined them and, upon investigation, concluded that they were fabricated. This is not inconsistency; this is the proper discharge of an insurer's duty 24 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal to investigate a claim. To accept the Plaintiff's argument would be to say that an insurer, merely by receiving and examining documents submitted in support of a claim, is forever precluded from challenging their authenticity based on the findings of its investigation. Such a proposition is untenable and would render the investigative process meaningless. [47] Second, the purpose of the investigation was precisely to verify the authenticity of the documents and the validity of the claim. The adjusters and forensic investigators did not accept the documents as genuine; they examined them critically. It was through this critical examination that the evidence of forgery, fabrication, and fraud came to light. The Defendant is entitled, indeed obligated, to rely on the findings of its investigation. [48] Third, an insurer has both a right and a duty to investigate claims thoroughly before making payment. The fact that documents are submitted by an insured does not mean they must be accepted at face value. The insurer is entitled to conduct investigations and to verify the authenticity of documents submitted in support of a claim. To hold otherwise would undermine the insurer's ability to protect itself against fraudulent claims and would be contrary to the fundamental principles governing contracts of insurance. 25 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [49] Fourth, the evidence adduced by the Defendant demonstrates conclusively that the documents are fabricated. The expert handwriting evidence, the presence of GST registration numbers on invoices dated before GST implementation, and the issuance of invoices by a company whose registration had expired are all objective indicators of fabrication. These findings arose from the investigation process. The Defendant would be failing in its duty if it did not act upon these findings. [50] Accordingly, I reject the Plaintiff's argument based on approbation and reprobation. The Defendant has acted entirely properly and consistently in receiving the documents, investigating them, discovering evidence of fabrication, and subsequently rejecting the claim based on those findings. Credibility of the Plaintiff's Witnesses [51] The Plaintiff relies primarily on the testimony of PW1 and PW2. The Defendant submits that minimal to no weight should be attached to the testimony of these witnesses due to numerous inconsistencies, contradictions, and evasive responses. [52] The Defendant argues that PW1 gave inconsistent testimony on several material issues, including who held the keys to the premises, how he was notified of the fire, whether flammable 26 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal materials were stored at the premises, and the security features at the premises. [53] Having reviewed the notes of evidence and the witness statements, I find that the testimony of both PW1 and PW2 is riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions that fatally undermine their credibility. [54] With respect to PW1, his testimony regarding who held the keys to the premises is contradictory. In his witness statement, PW1 stated that he was the person who held the keys to the premises. However, during cross-examination, he gave evasive answers and appeared to suggest that other employees also had access to keys. The issue of who held the keys is material because the forensic evidence establishes that there was no forced entry to the premises before the fire, suggesting that the person who set the fire had access to keys. [55] PW1's testimony regarding how he was notified of the fire is also problematic. According to PW1, he was informed of the fire at 7.30 a.m. on 10.11.2017 by his friend, Mr. Neah Kok Boom, who had received a missed call at 4.00 a.m. from a security guard. This account is convoluted and lacks corroboration. Mr. Neah was not called as a witness to verify this account, nor was the security guard identified or called to testify. 27 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [56] Furthermore, PW1's testimony regarding the storage of flammable materials at the premises is contradictory. In his witness statement, he stated that no petrol, kerosene, or any flammable liquids were stored at the premises. However, the forensic investigation revealed the presence of kerosene and petrol residues at multiple locations within the premises. When confronted with this evidence during cross- examination, PW1 gave evasive and unconvincing responses. [57] With respect to PW2, her testimony is equally problematic. PW2 initially denied having any knowledge of the suppliers, P&U Cycle and Tick Hing Jaya Trading. However, when shown the invoices and delivery orders, she admitted that P&U Cycle was the Plaintiff's supplier. This sudden reversal, only after being confronted with documentary evidence, suggests an attempt to withhold information. [58] PW2 also gave materially inconsistent testimony regarding who handled communications with the suppliers. In her witness statement, she stated that she personally forwarded the invoices and delivery orders to the suppliers for verification. However, during cross-examination, she testified that it was Miss Ang, a colleague, who handled all communications with the suppliers. This unexplained discrepancy fundamentally undermines the credibility of PW2's testimony. 28 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [59] Additionally, PW2 initially testified that she was acquainted with the director of Tick Hing Jaya Trading. However, when asked to name this individual, she claimed she could not remember. This selective memory is highly suspicious and suggests evasiveness. [60] The cumulative effect of these inconsistencies and contradictions is that I find the testimony of both PW1 and PW2 to be unreliable. Where a witness gives inconsistent testimony on material issues, the court is entitled to reject that testimony in its entirety. In Tay Mary v Capitol Prosper Sdn Bhd [2024] MLJU 3232, I observed that given a witness's inconsistent statements and the irreconcilable discrepancies in testimony, such evidence is completely lacking in credibility. Material inconsistencies in a witness's testimony fundamentally undermine that witness's credibility. [61] In the present case, the testimony of the Plaintiff's witnesses is so riddled with inconsistencies that I find it unsafe to rely on their evidence to establish the Plaintiff's case. Whether the Fire was Deliberately Set [62] The Plaintiff submits that if the fire was incendiary in nature, it was caused by an unknown third party and not by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. The Plaintiff points to a previous burglary incident at the premises in 2014 as evidence that third parties had access to the property. 29 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [63] The Defendant submits that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. The Defendant relies on forensic evidence establishing that the fire was incendiary in nature, that all possible accidental causes have been ruled out, and that the manner in which the fire was set indicates premeditated planning by someone familiar with the layout of the premises. [64] Having carefully considered the evidence, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. [65] The forensic evidence is overwhelming. The Defendant called DW2, Mr. Anand Ghnavello, a forensic expert from Forensic Services (M) Sdn. Bhd., who conducted a detailed investigation of the fire scene. DW2's investigation revealed the following key findings. [66] First, the fire was classified as an incendiary fire by the Fire and Rescue Department. The Fire Investigation Report prepared by the Fire and Rescue Department concluded that the cause of ignition was an open flame, likely from a match or lighter, applied to flammable materials such as petrol. The report explicitly stated that the fire was deliberately set. [67] Second, forensic testing detected the presence of kerosene residues at multiple locations within the premises, including in plastic containers and on the remaining stock. The presence 30 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal of accelerants such as kerosene strongly indicates that the fire was deliberately set to ensure rapid and widespread destruction. [68] Third, newspapers and cardboard were strategically placed throughout the premises to facilitate the spread of fire. The strategic placement of these combustible materials is inconsistent with normal business operations and indicates premeditated planning. [69] Fourth, there were multiple points of origin for the fire that had no direct connection to each other. This indicates that the fire was deliberately set at multiple locations to ensure maximum damage and to prevent the fire from being easily extinguished. [70] Fifth, all possible accidental causes of the fire have been ruled out. DW2 conducted a thorough investigation and concluded that the fire could not have been caused by electrical faults, spontaneous combustion, or any other accidental cause. The only reasonable conclusion is that the fire was deliberately set. [71] The Plaintiff did not challenge this forensic evidence effectively. The Plaintiff did not call any expert witness to rebut DW2's findings. The Plaintiff did not produce any independent forensic report to contradict the conclusions of the Fire and Rescue Department or Forensic Services (M) 31 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Sdn. Bhd. The Plaintiff's failure to challenge this compelling forensic evidence is telling. [72] The Plaintiff's suggestion that the fire was caused by an unknown third party is speculative and unsupported by evidence. The physical evidence establishes that when the fire brigade arrived at the premises, all entrances to the premises were intact. There was no sign of forced entry. The main gate was locked with a padlock, and all doors and windows were secure. [73] This indicates that the person who set the fire had access to the premises, likely through possession of keys. PW1 testified that he was the sole key holder to the premises. If a third party had gained access to the premises, there would be evidence of forced entry. The absence of any such evidence strongly suggests that the fire was set by someone with legitimate access to the premises, namely the Plaintiff or its representatives. [74] The Plaintiff argues that DW1 (Mr. Ruhaizal), the fire commander (Ketua Bomba), could not confirm during his testimony whether the premises were intact when the fire department arrived. The Plaintiff submits that this undermines the Defendant's case that the premises were secured and that there was no forced entry. 32 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [75] I reject this argument. The fact that DW1 could not personally confirm whether the premises were intact does not mean that the premises were breached by intruders. DW1's inability to provide a definitive answer during testimony merely reflects that he did not personally make detailed observations about the state of all doors and windows when he arrived, as his primary concern was firefighting operations, not forensic investigation. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. [76] More importantly, the court has before it compelling positive evidence from multiple sources establishing that the premises were secured when the fire broke out. First, the Defendant's forensic expert DW2 interviewed Mr. Prakash, an auxiliary fireman from Juru who was among the first responders to arrive at the scene. According to Mr. Prakash's account, when the auxiliary fire team arrived at approximately 3:30 a.m., they found that “the main sliding gate and side gate were locked.” The auxiliary firemen could not gain access through the front entrance and were forced to cut through the steel cladding of the adjacent Hup Leong Plastic Sdn. Bhd. factory to enter the premises. Subsequently, when the fire brigade from Perda Fire Station arrived, they too found the main gate locked and had to cut the padlock to gain entry. [77] DW2 testified that this evidence clearly demonstrated that “the premises Yang Arif was secure at the time of the fire, when the fire occurred the premises were secured because 33 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal no one could actually get access into it, the auxiliary Bomba who first arrived could not go in.” This finding is further corroborated by the physical evidence that both the auxiliary firemen and the regular fire brigade had to breach security barriers, cutting through cladding and cutting padlocks, to gain access for firefighting purposes. These breaches did not exist prior to the firefighting efforts and were created solely to facilitate emergency access. [78] The Defendant's expert DW2 confirmed during cross- examination that he had interviewed the first responders and considered the issue of access and possible intruders in his report. While the Plaintiff's counsel attempted to suggest that DW2 could not confirm whether the access doors to the building itself were locked, this line of questioning conflates the perimeter security with internal access. The critical point is that the entire premises, the compound perimeter, was secured, as evidenced by the locked gates that prevented the fire brigade from entering. [79] Furthermore, even the Defendant's expert DW2 acknowledged during cross-examination that only the Fire Department (Bomba) could definitively confirm whether the premises were intact when the fire occurred. However, this acknowledgment cuts both ways. The evidence from the first responders, as documented by DW2's investigation and interviews with Mr. Prakash and other firefighters, clearly establishes that the premises were secured. The Plaintiff has 34 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal not adduced any evidence from Bomba or any other source to contradict this finding. The Plaintiff cannot rely on the absence of DW1's detailed testimony about every door and window while ignoring the positive evidence from other Bomba personnel that the premises were locked and secured. [80] The burden of proof rests on the Plaintiff to establish its case on a balance of probabilities. Having failed to adduce any credible evidence of forced entry or breach by a third party, and in the face of clear evidence that the premises were locked and secured when the first responders arrived, the Plaintiff cannot now rely on DW1's inability to recall specific details as a basis for suggesting that an unknown third party may have gained entry. Such speculation is insufficient to discharge the Plaintiff's burden of proof. [81] The Plaintiff's reference to a previous burglary incident in 2014 does not assist its case. The burglary incident occurred three years before the fire, and there is no evidence linking that incident to the fire in 2017. Moreover, the manner in which the fire was set, involving the strategic placement of newspapers and cardboard, the use of accelerants, and multiple points of origin, indicates premeditated planning by someone familiar with the layout of the premises. This is inconsistent with the actions of a random intruder. 35 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [82] I also note that the Plaintiff's pleaded position on the cause of the fire has been inconsistent. In its Amended Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff made no allegation that the fire was caused by a third party. In its Reply to the Defence, the Plaintiff expressly denied that the fire was deliberate. However, in PW1's witness statement, the Plaintiff appears to adopt the position that the fire was deliberate but caused by a third party. This inconsistency is impermissible. [83] It is trite law that parties are bound by their pleadings. In Iftikar Ahmed Khan (as the executor of the estate for Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan, deceased) v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd [2018] 2 MLJ 292, the Federal Court held that parties are not allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded, and that a decision based on an issue not raised in the pleadings is liable to be set aside. [84] In the present case, the Plaintiff cannot be permitted to advance, through witness evidence, a theory that was never pleaded. The Plaintiff's attempt to shift its position from an accidental fire to a deliberate fire caused by a third party is procedurally impermissible and should be disregarded. [85] Taking all of the evidence together, I find that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance for the purpose of making a fraudulent insurance claim. 36 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Whether the Plaintiff Suffered Any Actual Financial Loss [86] The Plaintiff claims damages in the sum of RM5,796,206.40, representing the alleged value of motorcycles and spare parts destroyed in the fire. [87] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that it suffered any actual financial loss. The Defendant points to the Plaintiff's own admission that it never paid for the scooters and spare parts claimed to have been destroyed in the fire. [88] I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that it suffered any actual pecuniary loss. [89] It is a fundamental principle of insurance law that an insured must demonstrate an actual financial loss arising from the destruction or damage of the insured property. This principle stems from the indemnity nature of insurance contracts. An insured is only entitled to be restored to the same financial position it was in immediately before the loss and not to profit from the insurance. [90] In ALW Car Workshop Sdn. Bhd. v AXA Affin General Insurance Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 561, the Federal Court held that the principle of indemnity is fundamental to insurance contracts. The court stated that the insured must prove actual loss suffered and cannot profit from insurance claims. 37 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [91] In the present case, the evidence establishes that the Plaintiff never paid for the scooters and spare parts. In a letter dated 15.11.2017 from the Adjuster to the Plaintiff, the Adjuster requested documentary proof of payment for the scooters and spare parts. In the Plaintiff's reply letter dated 12.3.2018, the Plaintiff unequivocally admitted that it had not made any payment whatsoever for the purchase of the scooters and spare parts. [92] During the trial, PW2 was cross-examined on this issue and confirmed that no payment had been made by the Plaintiff for the scooters and spare parts. This admission is fatal to the Plaintiff's claim. [93] If the Plaintiff never paid for the goods, then the Plaintiff has suffered no actual financial loss from their destruction. The Plaintiff cannot claim to have lost something for which it never paid. To allow such a claim would be to permit the Plaintiff to profit from the insurance, which is contrary to the fundamental principle of indemnity. [94] The Plaintiff's attempt to claim RM5,796,206.40 for goods for which it never paid amounts to a grossly exaggerated and fraudulent claim. By knowingly advancing a claim with full awareness that no actual pecuniary loss had been suffered, the Plaintiff has wilfully submitted an exaggerated, false, and fraudulent claim in order to deceive the Defendant and to obtain an insurance payout to which it is not lawfully entitled. 38 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The Plaintiff's Alternative Claim Based on the Adjuster's Assessment [95] In the alternative, the Plaintiff submits that even if its claim of RM5,796,206.40 is wholly disputed, it is at least entitled to the sum of RM2,145,776.75. The Plaintiff argues that this figure was recommended by the Adjuster, DW5 (Mr. Thomas Tan Chiap Yeong), in the Adjuster's Report after conducting investigation and assessment of the fire-damaged premises and the invoices submitted. The Plaintiff contends that this constitutes a clear admission by the Defendant's representative which this court ought to take into consideration. [96] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any payment whatsoever, including the alternative sum of RM2,145,776.75. The Defendant argues that the Adjuster's report was prepared as part of the investigation process and represented a preliminary assessment of what might be payable if the Defendant decided to accept the claim. The Defendant contends that once fraud was discovered, the entire claim was properly repudiated and no payment is due. [97] I reject the Plaintiff's alternative claim for the following reasons. 39 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [98] First, the Adjuster's report and the figure of RM2,145,776.75 were based on the same fraudulent invoices and delivery orders that have been found to be forged and fabricated. The Adjuster conducted his assessment based on the documents submitted by the Plaintiff. At the time of preparing the report, the Adjuster had not yet concluded his full investigation, including the forensic handwriting examination and the detailed forensic investigation into the cause of the fire. The figure in the Adjuster's report was provisional and conditional upon the claim being accepted. [99] Second, DW5's testimony makes it clear that the Adjuster's report was merely a suggestion of what might be paid if the insurer decided to accept the claim. During cross- examination, DW5 explicitly confirmed that the report outlined “the basis of assessment that we've adopted at the writing of the adjustment” and that these were “assessment as suggested”. The use of the word “suggested” is significant. The Adjuster was not making a binding determination or admission. He was providing a preliminary assessment based on the documents available to him at that stage of the investigation. DW5 did not make any admission that would bind the Defendant. His preliminary assessment was not a binding determination. The decision whether to accept or reject a claim ultimately rests with the insurer, not with the adjuster. 40 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [100] Third, the completion of the investigation revealed fraud, forgery, and fabrication. Once fraud was discovered, the entire basis for the Adjuster's preliminary assessment fell away. An adjuster's preliminary assessment cannot bind an insurer when it is subsequently discovered that the claim is fraudulent. To hold otherwise would be to say that an insurer is bound by a preliminary assessment even after discovering that the claim is based on forged documents and deliberate arson. Such a proposition is legally untenable. [101] Fourth, where a claim is tainted by fraud, the entire claim fails. This principle is well established in insurance law. In ALW Car Workshop, the Federal Court held that a fraudulent claim disentitles the insured to any indemnity under the Fire Policy, and that where an insured makes a fraudulent claim, the insurer is entitled to repudiate the entire claim and the insured loses all benefits under the Fire Policy. In the present case, the Plaintiff's claim is not merely exaggerated; it is fundamentally fraudulent. The Plaintiff deliberately set the fire or caused it to be set, submitted forged invoices and delivery orders, claimed for goods it never paid for, and gave false testimony to this court. The fraudulent nature of the claim taints the entire claim, including any alternative or reduced amount that the Plaintiff now seeks to claim. [102] Fifth, Condition 15 of the Fire Policy expressly provides that if the claim is fraudulent, or if fraudulent means or devices are 41 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal used to obtain any benefit under the policy, “all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited”. It reads: “If the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the Insured or any one acting on his behalf to obtain any benefit under this Policy; or, if the loss or damage be occasioned by the wilful act, or with the connivance of the Insured: or, if the claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced within three (3) months after such rejection, or (in the case of an Arbitration taking place in pursuance of Condition 22 of this Policy) within three (3) months after the Arbitrator or Arbitrators or Umpire shall have made their award, all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited.” [103] The use of the words “all benefit” makes clear that the forfeiture is total, not partial. The Plaintiff cannot salvage a portion of its fraudulent claim by pointing to a preliminary assessment prepared by the Adjuster based on fabricated documents. To permit such an approach would undermine the policy's clear terms and would encourage insureds to make fraudulent claims in the knowledge that, even if discovered, they might still recover a reduced amount. [104] Sixth, the Plaintiff's argument fails to address the fundamental finding that the Plaintiff suffered no actual pecuniary loss. As I have found above, the Plaintiff never paid for the goods claimed. The Plaintiff therefore has no 42 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal insurable interest in those goods and suffered no financial loss from their destruction. This finding applies regardless of what figure the Adjuster may have suggested in his preliminary report. The principle of indemnity requires proof of actual loss. The Plaintiff has failed to prove any actual loss whatsoever. The fact that the Adjuster may have assessed a lower figure based on the fabricated documents does not create an entitlement to that sum. The fundamental issue is not the quantum of the claim but whether the Plaintiff has any legitimate claim at all. [105] Seventh, the Plaintiff's argument also fails to address the finding that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. Condition 15 of the Fire Policy expressly provides that if “the loss or damage be occasioned by the wilful act, or with the connivance of the Insured”, all benefit under the Fire Policy shall be forfeited. Having found that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance, the Plaintiff is disentitled to any payment under the Fire Policy. [106] Eighth, the Plaintiff cannot rely on the Adjuster's report whilst simultaneously challenging the Defendant's right to investigate and to reject the claim based on the findings of that very investigation. The Plaintiff's position is internally inconsistent. The Plaintiff effectively argues that the Defendant must accept the favourable parts of the investigation (the preliminary assessment figure) but cannot 43 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal rely on the unfavourable parts (the findings of fraud, forgery, and arson). This is an impermissible attempt to cherry-pick from the investigation process. [107] For all of these reasons, I reject the Plaintiff's alternative claim for RM2,145,776.75. The Plaintiff is not entitled to any sum whatsoever under the Fire Policy. The entire claim is fraudulent and is dismissed in its entirety. Whether the Plaintiff Acted in Bad Faith and Breached the Duty of Utmost Good Faith [108] The Plaintiff denies that it acted in bad faith or breached the duty of utmost good faith. [109] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff has failed to make full and frank disclosure when submitting its claim and has acted in bad faith in breach of the principle of uberrimae fidei (utmost good faith). [110] I find that the Plaintiff has acted in bad faith and has breached the duty of utmost good faith. [111] It is settled law that a contract of insurance is one where the parties are under a duty to exercise the utmost good faith in matters relating to the contract. In ALW Car Workshop, the Federal Court held that where a party to a contract of 44 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal insurance acts mala fide, the innocent party is entitled in law to be discharged from the obligations under the contract. [112] In the present case, the Plaintiff's conduct demonstrates a clear and deliberate intention to deceive the Defendant. The Plaintiff submitted invoices and delivery orders that are forged or fabricated. The Plaintiff claimed damages for goods for which it never paid. The Plaintiff gave inconsistent and contradictory testimony in an attempt to mislead the court. [113] The cumulative effect of the Plaintiff's conduct is that it has failed to act in good faith. The Plaintiff has made a grossly exaggerated claim which is fraudulent in nature. On the facts and surrounding circumstances of the present case, the Plaintiff's entire claim is liable to be defeated as there has been a failure to act in good faith. [114] Section 17 of the Contracts Act 1950 defines fraud to include any act committed with intent to deceive another party, including the suggestion of a fact that is not true, the active concealment of a fact, a promise made without any intention of performing it, and any other act fitted to deceive. [115] The Plaintiff's conduct falls squarely within the definition of fraud. The submission of forged invoices, the claim for goods never paid for, and the giving of false testimony are all acts fitted to deceive the Defendant and to induce the Defendant 45 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal to make an insurance payout to which the Plaintiff is not entitled. Whether All Benefits Under the Fire Policy Shall Be Forfeited as the Action Was Brought More Than Three Months After Rejection [116] The Plaintiff submits that the three-month time limitation clause in Condition 15 is void and unenforceable. The Plaintiff relies on Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950, which provides: “Every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent.” [117] The Plaintiff argues that the three-month limitation period is inconsistent with the statutory limitation period of six years prescribed under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 for actions founded on contract. The Plaintiff submits that contractual clauses which purport to impose shorter time limits than the statutory limitation period are void by virtue of Section 29. Section 29 reads: “Every agreement by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by the usual legal proceedings in the 46 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent.” [118] The Plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court decision in New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Federal Motor Trading [1992] 1 MLJ 185, where a 12-month time limitation clause in an insurance policy was held to be void under Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950. The court in that case held that such a clause clearly limits the time within which a party can enforce rights under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 and is therefore void. [119] The Plaintiff further relies on the Federal Court decision in CIMB Bank Bhd v Anthony Lawrence Bourke & Anor [2018] MLJU 1864, where the court held that exclusion clauses which oust or curtail a party's right to enforce contractual rights through the courts are subject to Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 and are void if inconsistent with it. [120] The Plaintiff also submits that confining an insured to a three- month period would be unreasonably short, particularly where the insurer has failed to provide detailed reasons for rejection. The Plaintiff argues that it required time to ascertain the grounds of rejection and to seek legal advice before commencing proceedings. 47 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [121] The Defendant initially pleaded that all benefits under the Fire Policy should be forfeited because the action was commenced approximately four years and eight months after the rejection letter dated 22.2.2019, well beyond the three- month time limit stipulated in Condition 15. [122] However, in its written submissions, the Defendant acknowledges that parties cannot absolutely restrict a party from enforcing their rights through legal proceedings or limit the time within which those rights can be enforced, as per Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950. The Defendant expressly concedes that the three-month limitation clause may be void under Section 29. [123] Notwithstanding this concession, the Defendant submits that the Plaintiff's claim should still be dismissed on the basis of laches - an equitable principle which bars a claim where a plaintiff delays taking action to the detriment of the defendant. The Defendant relies on the case of Lim Quee Lin & Anor v Ng Jit Thye & Ors [2022] MLJU 2758. [124] The Defendant submits that there was inordinate delay by the Plaintiff in commencing the suit. The Plaintiff was fully aware of the repudiation as evidenced by its letter dated 6.7.2020, in which it expressly stated its intention to commence legal action if the Defendant failed to pay within seven days. Despite this clear notice, no action was taken by the Plaintiff for more than three years. The Plaintiff ultimately filed its 48 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal action on 7.11.2023, just three days before the six-year statutory limitation period would have expired. [125] Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties and the relevant authorities, I find that the three-month time limitation clause in Condition 15 is void and unenforceable by virtue of Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950. Accordingly, I find in favour of the Plaintiff on this issue. [126] Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 is clear and unambiguous. It renders void any agreement which restricts a party absolutely from enforcing rights through legal proceedings, or which limits the time within which such rights may be enforced. The purpose of this provision is to prevent parties from contracting out of the statutory limitation periods prescribed by the Limitation Act 1953. [127] The three-month time limitation clause in Condition 15 clearly falls within the prohibition of Section 29. It purports to limit the time within which the Plaintiff can enforce its rights under the insurance contract to a period of three months which is far shorter than the six-year limitation period prescribed under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 for actions founded on contract. [128] The law on this point is well-established. In New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd v Federal Motor Trading [supra], the Supreme Court considered a materially identical provision. In 49 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal that case, an insurance policy contained a condition stating that “in no case whatever shall the company be liable for any loss or damage after the expiration of twelve months from the happening of the loss or damage unless the claim is the subject of pending action or arbitration.” The court held that this condition was void under Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 (then Section 28 of the Contract Enactment) as it clearly limited the time within which the insured could enforce its rights under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953. [129] More recently, in CIMB Bank Bhd v Anthony Lawrence Bourke & Anor [supra], the Federal Court affirmed that exclusion clauses which oust or curtail a party's right to enforce contractual rights through the courts are subject to Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 and are void if inconsistent with it. Although that case concerned a different type of limitation clause, the principle is equally applicable to time limitation clauses in insurance contracts. [130] I note that the Defendant has expressly conceded this point in its written submissions. The Defendant acknowledges that Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950 prevents parties from limiting the time within which rights can be enforced through legal proceedings. This concession is properly made and accords with the established law. 50 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [131] Accordingly, I find that the three-month time limitation clause in Condition 15 is void and unenforceable. The Plaintiff was entitled to commence this action at any time within the six- year statutory limitation period prescribed under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953. The Plaintiff commenced this action on 7.11.2023, which was within the six-year period running from either the date of the fire (10.11.2017) or the date of the repudiation (22.2.2019), whichever is applicable. The Plaintiff's action is therefore not time-barred. [132] I turn now to consider the Defendant's alternative submission that the Plaintiff's claim should be barred by the equitable principle of laches. [133] Laches is an equitable doctrine which may bar a claim where a plaintiff, despite having knowledge of their rights, delays taking action to the detriment of the defendant. The doctrine is based on the principle that “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.” However, laches is a discretionary remedy and is not applied mechanically. [134] In the present case, I am not persuaded that the doctrine of laches should be applied to bar the Plaintiff's claim. My reasons are as follows. [135] First, the Plaintiff commenced this action well within the statutory limitation period. The law prescribes a six-year limitation period for actions founded on contract. The Plaintiff 51 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal commenced its action within this period. Equity does not generally intervene to impose a shorter time bar where a statutory limitation period has been prescribed by Parliament and has not expired. [136] Second, there is no evidence that the Defendant has suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. The Defendant conducted its investigation and reached its decision to repudiate the claim within a reasonable time after the fire. All the evidence relevant to the Defendant's defences was gathered during that investigation. The Defendant has not identified any material evidence that has been lost or become unavailable due to the delay. [137] Third, the fact that the Plaintiff delayed in commencing proceedings does not, in itself, demonstrate that the Plaintiff was “sleeping on its rights.” The Plaintiff may have had various reasons for the delay, including attempts at negotiation, financial constraints, or the time required to obtain legal advice and funding for litigation. The mere lapse of time, without more, does not constitute laches. [138] Fourth, and most importantly, the question of whether the Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed is not dependent on issues of delay. The claim must be dismissed for the substantive reasons set out elsewhere in this judgment, namely, that the claim is fraudulent, that the Plaintiff has breached fundamental terms and conditions of the Fire 52 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Policy, and that the Plaintiff has failed to prove any actual financial loss. These substantive grounds are sufficient to dispose of the claim, and it is unnecessary to invoke the equitable doctrine of laches. [139] Accordingly, I decline to apply the doctrine of laches to ar the Plaintiff's claim. However, as I will explain below, this finding makes no difference to the outcome of the case, as the claim fails on multiple independent substantive grounds. Whether the Defendant Rightfully Repudiated the Claim [140] The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant wrongfully repudiated the claim. [141] The Defendant submits that it has rightfully repudiated the claim pursuant to Condition 15 of the Fire Policy and due to breaches of other policy conditions. [142] I find that the Defendant has rightfully repudiated the claim. [143] Condition 15 of the Fire Policy provides that if the claim is in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration is made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the insured to obtain any benefit under the policy, or if the loss or damage is occasioned by the wilful act or with the connivance of the insured, all benefit under the policy shall be forfeited. 53 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [144] In the present case, all of the conditions for repudiation under Condition 15 have been satisfied. The claim is fraudulent in nature. False declarations have been made in support of the claim, specifically the submission of forged invoices and delivery orders. Fraudulent means have been used by the Plaintiff to obtain a benefit under the Fire Policy. The loss and damage were occasioned by the wilful act of the Plaintiff or with its connivance, as the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or its representatives. [145] It is trite law that before a claim is payable under an insurance policy, the terms and conditions therein must be complied with. In Veheng Global Traders Sdn. Bhd. v AmGeneral Insurance Bhd [2019] 4 MLJ 581, the Federal Court held that where there is a breach of warranties and conditions of an insurance policy, the insurer is entitled to avoid liability, as strict compliance with warranties and conditions is a condition precedent to the insured's right to claim and the insurer's obligation to pay. [146] In the present case, the Fire Policy expressly states that due observance and fulfilment of the terms, conditions, and endorsements of the policy, in so far as they relate to anything to be done or complied with by the insured, shall be a condition precedent to any liability of the company to make any payment under the Fire Policy. 54 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [147] The Plaintiff has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Fire Policy. The Plaintiff has breached Condition 15 by submitting a fraudulent claim. The Plaintiff has breached the duty of utmost good faith. The Plaintiff has breached the duty of full and frank disclosure under Condition 12 of the Fire Policy which reads as follows: “On the happening of any loss or damage the Insured shall forthwith give notice thereof to the Company and shall within fifteen (15) days after the loss or damage, or such further time as the Company may in writing allow in that behalf, deliver to the Company: (a) A claim in writing for the loss and damage containing as particular an account as may be reasonably practicable of all the several articles or items of property damaged or destroyed, and of the amount of the loss or damage thereto respectively, having regard to their value at the time of the loss or damage, not including profit of any kind. (b) Particulars of all other Insurances, if any. The Insured shall also at all times at his own expense produce, procure and give to the Company all such further particulars, plans, specifications, books, vouchers, invoices, duplicates, or copies thereof, documents, proofs and information with respect to the claim and the origin and cause of the fire and the circumstances under which the loss or damage occurred, and any matter touching the liability or the amount of the liability of the Company as 55 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal may be reasonably required by or on behalf of the Company together with a declaration on oath or in other legal form of the truth of the claim and of any matters connected therewith. No claim under this Policy shall be payable unless the terms of this Condition have been complied with.” [148] Accordingly, the Defendant is entitled to repudiate liability and to discharge itself from any legal obligations to satisfy the Plaintiff's claim. Standard of Proof for Fraud Allegations [149] The Plaintiff submits that fraud must be proved to a standard beyond reasonable doubt, or at least to a higher standard than the ordinary civil standard of balance of probabilities. [150] The Defendant submits that fraud in civil cases need only be proved on the balance of probabilities, relying on the decision of the Federal Court in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v Damai Setia Sdn. Bhd. [2015] 6 MLJ 1. [151] The law on this issue is now settled. In Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn. Bhd. v Damai Setia Sdn. Bhd., the Federal Court authoritatively held that the standard of proof for fraud in civil cases is the balance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt. The Federal Court expressly overruled earlier 56 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal authorities that had suggested a higher standard of proof for fraud allegations. [152] This principle has been consistently applied in subsequent Federal Court decisions. In ALW Car Workshop, the Federal Court applied the balance of probabilities standard to fraud allegations in an insurance case. [153] I am bound by the decisions of the Federal Court. Accordingly, I hold that the standard of proof for fraud in the present case is the balance of probabilities. [154] In any event, even if a higher standard were applicable, I am satisfied that the Defendant has discharged that burden. The evidence of fraud in this case is overwhelming and compelling. The forensic evidence, the expert handwriting evidence, the documentary abnormalities, the Plaintiff's own admissions, and the inconsistent testimony of the Plaintiff's witnesses all point inexorably to the conclusion that the Plaintiff's claim is fraudulent. Motive for Fraud [155] The Defendant submits that the Plaintiff had a clear motive to cause the fire and to make a fraudulent claim, as the Plaintiff was in dire financial straits and there was virtually no market demand for the scooters and spare parts. 57 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [156] The Plaintiff submits that there is no evidence of financial difficulties or lack of market demand. [157] I find that the evidence supports the Defendant's submission that the Plaintiff had a motive for fraud. [158] The Defendant adduced evidence that the Plaintiff was facing financial difficulties at the time of the fire. The Plaintiff had significant unpaid bank charges and other financial obligations. The Plaintiff's financial statements, to the extent they were available, showed a company struggling to meet its financial commitments. [159] Furthermore, the evidence establishes that the MZ Moskito scooters had virtually no market demand. The scooters were an outdated model with limited appeal. The Plaintiff had been unable to sell the stock, which had been sitting in the warehouse for years. The destruction of this unsaleable stock by fire, followed by a claim for the full alleged value, provided the Plaintiff with a financial lifeline. [160] Whilst motive alone is not sufficient to prove fraud, the presence of a clear and compelling motive strengthens the inference of fraud when considered together with the other evidence in this case. 58 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ADDRESSING THE ISSUES TO BE TRIED [161] The parties agreed on thirteen issues to be tried, as set out in the document entitled “Isu-Isu Untuk Dibicarakan” filed on 26.3.2024. I shall address each of these issues in turn. Issue 1: Whether the Plaintiff's claim amounting to RM 5,796,206.40 is the amount of damages the Plaintiff is entitled to claim following the fire that occurred in accordance with the insurance policy entered into by the Plaintiff with the Defendant. [162] For the reasons set out above, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove that it is entitled to recover damages in the sum of RM5,796,206.40 or any sum whatsoever. The Plaintiff has failed to prove that it suffered any actual financial loss. The Plaintiff has failed to substantiate its claim with credible evidence. The invoices and delivery orders submitted in support of the claim are forged or fabricated. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's claim does not constitute recoverable damages. Issue 2: Whether the cause of fire at the risk premises on 10.11.2017 was incendiary fire and/or deliberately set fire and/or arson. [163] For the reasons set out above, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the fire was incendiary in nature and was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. The 59 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal forensic evidence overwhelmingly establishes that the fire was not accidental but was deliberately started using accelerants and strategic placement of combustible materials. All possible accidental causes have been ruled out. Issue 3: Whether there are irregularities and/or malpractices and/or discrepancies in the Plaintiff's claim. [164] I find that there were numerous and material irregularities, discrepancies, and contradictions in the Plaintiff's claim. These include the forged or fabricated invoices and delivery orders, the presence of GST registration numbers on invoices dated before the implementation of GST, invoices purportedly issued by a company whose business registration had expired, the Plaintiff's admission that it never paid for the goods claimed, and the inconsistent and contradictory testimony of the Plaintiff's witnesses. Issue 4: Whether the Plaintiff's claim is false and/or exaggerated and/or involves fraud. [165] For the reasons set out above, I find that the Plaintiff's claim was false, grossly exaggerated, and fraudulent. The Plaintiff submitted forged invoices, claimed for goods it never paid for, deliberately set the fire or caused it to be set, and gave false testimony in an attempt to deceive the Defendant and this court. 60 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Issue 5: Whether the Plaintiff's claim is inconsistent with the documents provided, the information provided, and the Adjuster's investigation. [166] I find that the Plaintiff's claim was materially inconsistent with the documents provided, the information disclosed, and the findings of the Adjuster's investigation. The invoices and delivery orders submitted by the Plaintiff were found to be fabricated. The Plaintiff's representations regarding payment for the goods were contradicted by its own admissions. The Plaintiff's explanation for the cause of the fire was inconsistent with the forensic findings. Issue 6: Whether the Plaintiff's Claim was Made Mala Fide (in Bad Faith) [167] For the reasons set out above, I find that the Plaintiff's claim was made mala fide. The Plaintiff acted in bad faith by deliberately setting the fire or causing it to be set, submitting forged documents, making false representations, and attempting to deceive the Defendant in order to obtain an insurance payout to which it was not entitled. Issue 7: Whether the Plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure when submitting the said claims. [168] I find that the Plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure when submitting its claim. The Plaintiff concealed the true 61 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal origin of the fire, misrepresented the authenticity of the invoices and delivery orders, failed to disclose that it had never paid for the goods claimed, and provided false and misleading information to the Adjuster and to this court. Issue 8: Whether the Plaintiff breached the terms and conditions of the Fire Policy. [169] I find that the Plaintiff breached numerous terms and conditions of the Fire Policy, including Condition 15 (prohibition against fraudulent claims), Condition 12 (duty of full and frank disclosure), Condition 1 (duty of utmost good faith), and the general condition relating to the duty of disclosure. Issue 9: Whether the Plaintiff breached the perils /clauses / warranties/ memorandum of the Fire Policy. [170] The Defendant also pleaded that the Plaintiff breached the Fire Extinguishing Appliances Warranty (FEA Warranty) by failing to maintain functional fire extinguishers, hydraulic hose reels, and internal hydrants at the premises. Whilst the Defendant adduced some evidence on this issue, I find it unnecessary to make a definitive finding on this breach, as the claim fails on other grounds. 62 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Issue 10: Whether all benefits under the Fire Policy can be forfeited because this action, brought on 7.11.2023, has exceeded 3 months after the repudiation of the Plaintiff's claim on 22.2.2019. [171] For the reasons set out in the analysis above regarding contractual time limitation clauses, I find that the three-month time limitation clause in Condition 15 is void and unenforceable by virtue of Section 29 of the Contracts Act 1950. The statutory limitation period of six years under Section 6(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1953 applies. The Plaintiff commenced this action on 7.11.2023, which was within the statutory limitation period. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's action is not time-barred, and I find in favour of the Plaintiff on this issue. [172] I have also considered and rejected the Defendant's alternative submission based on the equitable doctrine of laches. The Plaintiff commenced this action within the statutory limitation period, the Defendant has not demonstrated any material prejudice arising from the delay, and equity does not generally intervene to impose a shorter time bar where the statutory period has not expired. [173] However, this finding in favour of the Plaintiff on Issue 10 does not alter the outcome of this case. The Plaintiff's claim must be dismissed in its entirety on the multiple independent substantive grounds established in Issues 1 to 9, including: 63 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the fraudulent nature of the claim; the deliberate setting of the fire by the Plaintiff or with its connivance; the submission of forged or fabricated documents; the failure to prove any actual financial loss; and breaches of fundamental policy conditions including the duties of utmost good faith and full and frank disclosure. Each of these grounds is independently sufficient to warrant dismissal of the entire claim. Issue 11: Whether the Defendant is entitled to deny liability on the basis of a breach of the terms and conditions of the Fire Policy. [174] For the reasons set out above, I find that the Defendant is entitled to repudiate liability on the basis of the Plaintiff's breaches of the terms and conditions of the Fire Policy. The Plaintiff's breaches of Condition 15, Condition 12, Condition 1, and the duty of utmost good faith are fundamental breaches that entitle the Defendant to avoid all liability under the policy. Issue 12: Whether the Defendant is entitled to deny liability on the basis of a breach of the perils/ clauses/ warranties/ memorandum of the Fire Policy if such allegations exist and need to be proved. [175] As stated above, the Defendant is entitled to repudiate liability on multiple grounds. Whilst I have made findings regarding breaches of policy conditions, I find it unnecessary 64 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal to make a definitive finding on the alleged breach of the FEA Warranty, as the claim fails on other grounds. Issue 13: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to obtain any relief sought. [176] For all of the reasons set out in this judgment, I find that the Plaintiff is not entitled to any of the relief sought. The Plaintiff's claim is dismissed in its entirety. CONCLUSION AND ORDER [177] In conclusion, I find that the Plaintiff has failed to prove its case on a balance of probabilities. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that the Plaintiff's claim is fraudulent, grossly exaggerated, and made in bad faith. [178] The forensic evidence establishes that the fire was deliberately set by the Plaintiff or with its connivance. The expert handwriting evidence establishes that the invoices and delivery orders submitted in support of the claim are forged or fabricated. The Plaintiff's own admissions establish that it never paid for the goods claimed and therefore suffered no actual financial loss. The testimony of the Plaintiff's witnesses is riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions that fatally undermine their credibility. 65 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [179] The Plaintiff has breached fundamental terms and conditions of the Fire Policy, including the prohibition against fraudulent claims, the duty of utmost good faith, and the duty of full and frank disclosure. The Plaintiff has also failed to comply with the time limit for commencing an action after rejection of the claim. [180] The Defendant has rightfully repudiated the claim pursuant to Condition 15 of the Fire Policy and is entitled to be discharged from all liability under the Fire Policy. [181] It is settled law that a contract of insurance is based upon good faith, and if the utmost good faith is not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party. Where a party to a contract of insurance acts mala fide, the innocent party is entitled in law to be discharged from the obligations under the contract. [182] In the present case, the Plaintiff has made a grossly exaggerated claim which is fraudulent in nature to defraud the Defendant. On the facts and surrounding circumstances of the present case, the Plaintiff's entire claim is liable to be defeated as there has been a failure to act in good faith. [183] The circumstantial evidence, when taken together with the other factual matrix of the case in its totality, is so compelling as to arrive at the irresistible conclusion that the Plaintiff's claim is fraudulent and ought to be dismissed. 66 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [184] For all of the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's claim is dismissed in its entirety and the Plaintiff shall pay costs to the Defendant. [185] The court orders the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant costs of RM80,000 subject to the allocatur. 19 February 2026 ATAN MUSTAFFA YUSSOF AHMAD Judge Kuala Lumpur High Court (Commercial Division) Counsel: For the Plaintiff: Mohd Iskandar Ismail and Muhamad Faris Fazly with Mohamad Nasrom Rashid and Iman Roslan (Messrs Basharuddin Iskandar) For the Defendant: Emily Chong Pei Yen, Sheldon Moi Xuen Loong, Thayakugan Rajendram and Lau Zhi Ying (Messrs Othman Hashim & Co) 67 S/N 8imKK9z1NUGG9vAdXjgzHw **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal