Mohd Johari bin Abdul Raoff 1. Khor Ben Jin 2. Dato' Kua Khai Shyuan 3. Zaidi bin Mat Isa @ Hashim 4. Hoo Wai Keong 5. Muhammad Faliq bin Mohod Redzuan 6. Ong Tee Kein 7. Yap Kim Choy 8. Tan Kok Hui 9. Chai Jian Yao 10.Tajul Khalil bin Moha

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR (COMMERCIAL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS No: WA-24NCC-595-11/2019 BETWEEN MOHD JOHARI BIN ABDUL RAOFF [Identity Card No.: 720426-10-10-5711 ] ……….. PLAINTIFF AND 1. KHOR BEN JIN [Identity Card No.: 750807-14-5265] 2. DATO’ KUA KHAI SHYUAN [Identity Card No.: 840225-01-5871] 3. ZAIDI BIN MAT ISA @ HASHIM [Identity Card No.: 691030-02-5125] 4. HOO WAI KEONG [Identity Card No.: 760321-01-6719] 5. MUHAMMAD FALIQ BIN MOHD REDZUAN [Identity Card No.: 860519-14-5063] 6. ONG TEE KEIN [Identity Card No.: 570101-10-7187 ] 7. YAP KIM CHOY 8. TAN KOK HUI 9. CHAI JIAN YAO 10. TAJUL KHALIL BIN MOHAMAD 11. METRONIC GLOBAL BERHAD [Company No.: 63068-V] ……….DEFENDANTS 2 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [1] At the outset of the hearing on 18.8.20, the respective counsel for all Defendants have graciously confirmed that they will not make an issue of the late filing and service of the amended OS now known as enc. 47. In this regard, all cause papers and submissions referring to the OS as enc. 1 will by agreement be taken to mean enc. 47 instead. [2] The 1st to 6th Defendants’ application in enc. 33 to strike out the Originating Summons is grounded on Order 18 r 19(1) (a), (b) or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“2012 Rules “) and/or under the inherent powers of the Court. [3] The 1st to 6th Defendants asserted that: (a) the Plaintiff became a shareholder on 1.11.2019, (b) he was not a shareholder when: (i) the allotment and issuance of shares pursuant to the Employees Share Options Scheme on 13.6.2019 and 19.6.2019 took place; (ii) the allotment and issuance of shares under the Private placement took place on 15.10 .19; (c) the Plaintiff had full knowledge as the transactions were announced; his counsel informed the court during CM on 8.11.2019 that he acquired the shares of D11 to commence proceedings; 3 (d) Lee Kim Yew (“LKY”)’s counterclaim in the Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit no BA-22NCC-134-10/2019 is premised on the same facts as the present proceedings; and (e) the Plaintiff ought to commence a derivative action under s346 of the CA 2016 if there is misconduct and/or mismanagement. [4] The 7th to 9th Defendants’ application in enc. 35 to strike out the Originating Summons is grounded on Order 18 r 19(1) (a), (b), (c) and/or (d) of the 2012 Rules, and/or under the inherent powers of the Court contending that the Plaintiff: (i) Only owns tens of Thousands of shares in D11; (ii) Was not shareholder prior 16.10.19; (iii) Only acquired the shares after the Bursa announcements and has full knowledge; (iv) Is a proxy of LKY, he acquired shares to institute the action for LKY who is a substantial shareholder of D11; and (v) LKY’s CC makes similar allegations [5] The 10th Defendant’s application in enc. 37 to strike out the Originating Summons is predicated on Order 18 r 19(1) (a) of the 2012 Rules and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court contending that 4 the OS do not disclose a reasonable cause of action and the Plaintiff has no locus standi. [6] The 11th Defendant’s application in enc. 38 to strike out the Originating Summons is grounded on Order 18 r 19(1) (a), (b) and/or, (d) of the 2012 Rules contending that: (i) the Plaintiff relied on info from LKY; and (ii) the Plaintiff is LKY’s proxy [7] For convenience, Order 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“2012 Rules “) is produced: 19. Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O. 18 r. 19) (1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that- (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be. 5 [8] In dealing with the applications before me, it is usefuI to be reminded of trite principles: (i) a pleading can only be struck out in a plain and obvious case, or where the pleading is obviously unsustainable - the Supreme Court’s judgment in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, at p 43 where it said: The principles upon which the court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 are well settled. If is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule … and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it 'obviously unsustainable' … (ii) Order 18 rule 19(2) 2012 Rules provides that in considering a striking out application under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) 2012 Rules, the court cannot consider affidavit evidence. The test to be applied is whether on the face of the statement of claim, the court is prepared to conclude that the cause of action is obviously unsustainable - see : the Federal Court‘s decision in New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226; (iii) In Pengiran Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff & Anor v Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd (Formerly known as Lipkland (Sabah) Sdn Bhd) & Ors [1969] 1 MLJ 309 , Siti Norma JCA ( as her ladyship then was) explained the approach when 6 dealing with an application under O 18 r 19(1) of the Rules of the High Court 1980: The discretionary power to dismiss an action summarily under O 18 r 19 and under the inherent jurisdiction of the court is a drastic power which should only be exercised in plain and obvious cases, as the effect of the exercise of such a power is to shut out the plaintiff altogether from pursuing his claim. (See Tractors (M) Bhd v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1.) Whether a case is plain or obvious does not depend upon the length of time it takes to argue the case, but that when the case is argued on the affidavit evidence available, it becomes plain and obvious that the case has no chance of success. (See Mckay & Anor v Essex Area Health Authority & Anor [1982] 2 QB 1166; [1982] 2 All ER 771; [1982] 2 WLR 890.) When a question of law becomes an issue, this in itself will not prevent the court from granting the application, for as long as the court is satisfied that the issue of law is unarguable and unsustainable, it may proceed to determine that question. (See Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400) Likewise, where the affidavit evidence discloses a dispute of facts, such facts must be analysed and if they are found to be inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or inherently improbable in themselves, the court is entitled to reject those facts and proceed upon the undisputed contemporaneous documentary evidence. Does the OS disclose a reasonable cause of action? [9] A reasonable cause of action means simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy 7 against another person: per Diplock LJ in Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 222 at 242. This definition was followed in Lim Kean v Choo Koon [1970] 1 MLJ 158; Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32; Saw Gaik Beow v Cheong Yew Weng & Ors [1989] 3 MLJ 301; Newacres Sdn. Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474; Credit Corp (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409 and Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11 [10] Having scrutinised the statement of claim filed by the Plaintiff, I am of the view that the OS assuming the factual allegations are true, clearly discloses various causes of action as follows: (i) that the allotment and issuance of shares pertaining to the Employees Share Options Scheme and the allotment and issuance of shares under the Private placement were wrongful and void; (ii) that the 1st to 6th Defendants have acted in breach of fiduciary duties; (iii) oppression of shareholders; (iv) account for losses suffered by the 11th D; and (v) damages sought against the Defendants except the 11th Defendant . [11] I also bear in mind as held by the Supreme Court case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking 8 Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, at 44, the mere fact that a pleaded case is weak and is not likely to succeed, is not a ground to strike out the case. [12] This Court also notes that the Plaintiff has a pending application in Enc. 3 for discovery which is to be dealt with after enc. 33,35. 37 and 38 are disposed off. The Courts have on numerous occasions also held that Order 18 rule 19(1) 2012 Rules confers a discretion on the court to allow a plaintiff to amend the SOC (instead of striking out the suit). I refer only to 2 of such authorities: (i) Mahadev Shankar JCA s decision in the Court of Appeal in Muniandy s/o Subrayan & Ors v Chairman & Board Members of Koperasi Menara Maju Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 557, at 560 and 561; and (ii) the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in the Court of Appeal case of Shahidan Shafie v Atlan Holding Bhd & Anor & Other Appeals [2005] 3 CLJ 793, at 803. [13] Even assuming that the OS in this case does not disclose any reasonable cause of action, this court need not necessarily strike out the OS but may exercise its discretion to allow the Plaintiff to amend the OS depending on the fate of the Plaintiff’s application for discovery. [14] In deciding the 4 Applications, this court further assumes that what is stated in the OS SOC is true – Tuan Haji Ishak bin Ismail v Leong Hup Holdings Bhd & other appeals [1996] 1 MLJ 661, at 679. 9 [15] To even get a foot on a cause of action, the Plaintiff has to have locus standi. If found lacking in standing to bring an action, the action falls in liminine at the threshold stage and there will be no necessity to delve into the merits of the case. [16] Whilst I accept that the Rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 welded in iron that shareholders have no locus standi to bring an action to remedy a wrong done to the company except by means of a derivative action, but with due respect to the Defendants’ arguments, I find that the statutory remedy of an oppression action in the circumstances as provided under section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 is by itself an abrogation of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle . [17] On this point of the Plaintiff seeking interalia the various relief including declaratory ones, I would like to refer to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Dato Raja Ideris bin Raja Ahmad & Ors v Teng Chang Khim (Chairman of the select Committee on Competence, Accountability and Transparency and the Chairman of the Committee of Rights and Privileges State Legislative Assembly of Selangor) & Ors [2012] 5 MLJ 490, at 498 and 499 500, delivered by Low Hop Bing JCA as follows: [25] The question raised in the aforesaid submissions may be formulated as follows: Upon a true construction of s 41 of the [SRA] and O 15 r 16, where the OS prays for a declaratory judgment in the form of declarations, is it proper to strike out the OS on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action? 10 [28] A declaratory judgment merely states the rights or legal position of the parties as they stand without altering them in any way: see Gan Hwa Kian & Anor v Shencourt Sdn Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 554. A declaration can be used to ascertain and determine the legal rights of parties or to determine a point of law : Brett Andrew Macnamara v Kam Lee Kuan [2008] 2 MLJ 450 at p 459 per Balia Yusof J (now JCA). By virtue of s 41 and O 15 r 16, the court’s jurisdiction to make a declaratory order is unlimited, subject only to its own discretion. The court has power to grant a declaration irrespective of whether an application has a cause of action or not and even if a cause of action does not exist at the time of the filing of an application: see eg Tan Beng Sooi v Penolong Kanan Pendaftar (United Merchant Finance Bhd, intervener) [1995] 2 MLJ 421; BSN Commercial Bank (M) Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Mersing [1997] 5 MLJ 288; and Cekal Berjasa Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2006] 4 MLJ 284 at p 294, per Abdul Malik Ishak J (now JCA). [29] The jurisdiction to make a declaration under the rule is not confined to cases in which the plaintiff has a complete and subsisting cause of action: Guaranty Trust Co of New York v Hannay [1915] 2 KB 536 (CA) (Eng); Dewan Singh v M Thynappa Ltd & Yeo Teck Chiang [1939] MLJ 278; Haji Hussin bin Haji Ali & Ors v Datuk Haji Mohamed bin Yaacob & Ors and connected cases [1983] 2 MLJ 227 (FC); Karpal Singh v Sultan of Selangor [1988] 1 MLJ 64; and Tengku Mariam binte Tengku Sri Wa Raja & Anor v Commissioner for Religious Affairs, Terengganu & Ors [1969] 1 MLJ 110. Our answer to the question set out in para [25] is in the negative. CONCLUSION [30] Based on the foregoing grounds, we allow this appeal, set aside the striking out order of the High Court and substitute it with an order that the OS be reinstated and remitted to the High Court and, with the utmost respect, to be heard and disposed of on merits before another judge. (emphasis added) 11 [18] Based on the above case alone and the fact that the Plaintiff is a member of the 11th Defendant prior institution of these proceedings, in my judgment, the Plaintiff has locus standi to file the OS for the various declaratory relief but whether he is entitled to them, I am not at this stage of the striking out proceedings prepared to make any finding of facts and will desist from expressing any views in respect of the strength or weakness of his claim. Suffice to say nonetheless, the ends of justice will not be achieved if the court’s doors are slammed in the Plaintiff’s face at this stage. I am not prepared to rule at this stage that the Plaintiff’s claim is bound to fail. [19] Consequently, I find that the Defendants’ application predicated on Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) 2012 Rules cannot succeed. The OS is not so hopeless, baseless or without any foundation in law. [20] It has not escaped my attention that if the Plaintiff’s complaints are true, there is also the statutory force of the Listing Requirements to reckon with. In the Court of Appeal case of Tan Sri Dato’ Hj Lamin bin Hj Mohd Yunus v Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 182, Low Hop Bing JCA had this to say at paras 23 and 24: At the outset, we must stress that the LR has statutory force in the form of rules containing obligations and requiring compliance by participating organisations pursuant to the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007. The director’s duties are set out generally in the LR , and in para 2.04(2) specifically ie ‘A listed issuer, its directors must comply with these requirement for so long as the listed issuer shall remain on the official list. 12 [21] The Defendants’ counsel have also argued that when the Plaintiff became a shareholder, he would already have been aware of the allotment and issuance of shares pursuant to the Employees Share Options Scheme that took place on 13.6.2019 and 19.6.2019 as well as the allotment and issuance of shares under the Private placement which took place on 15.10 .19. As such, he is deemed to have acquiesced to the transactions and it does not lie in his mouth to now complain. I do not agree with this argument as statutory requirements cannot be waived. [22] In Chase Perdana Bhd v Md Afendi bin Hamdan [2009] 6 MLJ 783, the Federal Court speaking through Zaki Azmi CJ said at para 18: i. The law on this is quite established. Once it is enacted by legislation that parties are required to comply with any provision, parties must comply with such provision. It is not for any person to waive legislative requirements by an agreement unless the legislation allows it to be done. Legislation enacts laws which in its opinion are for the benefit of the public. It is not for courts, or anybody for that matter, to say that it need not be followed. [23] 5 years later, in Tan Chee Hoe & Sdn Bhd v Code Focus Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 301, the Federal Court in a judgment delivered by Ramly Ali FCJ also had this to say: [33] To knowingly and consciously waive the mandatory statutory requirement of s 132C of the Companies Act 1965 is unlawful. The court of law will not entertain such unlawful act by allowing claim base on the void agreement. The same principle was adopted by Coulson J in K/S Lincoln v CB Richard Ellis Hotel Ltd [2009] EWHC 2344 where it 13 was held that ‘it seems clear that the underlying principle or policy is one of deterrence; that the courts will not encourage illegal acts by allowing claim based upon them’. [36] Based on the above considerations, it is clear that the SPA in question was not merely voidable at the option of the plaintiff as found by the Court of Appeal but invalid and void. The plaintiff cannot make any claim based on the terms of the said void agreement. The SPA, although lawful on its face according to its own terms, was unlawful as it was to be performed in a manner which the law or statute prohibits, (see Yango Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd (1978) 139 CLR 410). The plaintiff had knowingly participated in the contravention of the statutory requirement under s 132C; and therefore not entitled to the protection under the exception in sub-s (3). [24] It must be appreciated that in order to see whether the Plaintiff has a cause of action, it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case – Bandar Builder. I am also made aware that the parties have agreed that the Defendants keep in abeyance their affidavits in reply to the OS pending the fate of these striking out applications and as such, has obviated the need of this court to conducting a trial by affidavits at this interlocutory stage which this court will not do ,as it is wrong in any case. [25] I find that the following issues are triable in this case: a) whether the allotment and issuance of shares pursuant to the Employees Share Options Scheme and the Private placement were made properly; 14 b) whether there was dishonest assistance by D7, D8 and D9 to the directors in the allotment and issuance of shares pursuant to the Employees Share Options Scheme; c) whether the Plaintiff is a proxy of LKY by dint of fact that: (i) LKY’s counterclaim in the Shah Alam High Court Civil Suit no BA-22NCC-134-10/2019 is premised on the same facts as the present proceedings; (ii) he relied on information from LKY; and (iii) both plaintiff and LKY are represented by the same solicitors; d) and if the answer to c), is in the affirmative , what bearing it has on the claim herein; e) whether the Plaintiff ought to have commenced a derivative action under s346 of the CA 2016 if there is misconduct and/or mismanagement? [26] The issues identified by this court warrants a mature and careful consideration. [27] It has not escaped my attention that on top of the prayers for various declarations, the OS among others also seek for damages against all Defendants. 15 [28] If in fact LKY’s counterclaim in the Shah Alam High Court is based on the same facts as the proceedings herein, both proceedings can be consolidated. It must also not be forgotten that the court in deciding an application under Order 18 rule 19(1) 2012 Rules, also has power to stay this action - a power which for present purposes is both premature and presumptuous to be considered. [29] On paragraph 25 (e) above, the Defendants could have adopted the procedure set out in O 33 r 2 of the 2012 rules after both parties have agreed to indisputable facts involved in the case rather than take the draconian step of striking out. [30] The summary procedure to strike out as stated earlier, is only appropriate to cases which are plain and obvious so that any judge can say at once that the claim as it stands is insufficient, even if proved, to entitle the Plaintiff to what he asks – see Hubbuck & Sons v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd [1899] 1 QB 86 at pg 91. [31] This court is only able to exercise its discretion judicially to grant any appropriate relief at the conclusion of hearing of enc. 47 and not at this stage of striking out. [32] Pioneer Haven Sdn Bhd v Ho Hup Construction Co Bhd [2012] 3 MLJ 616, and Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 6 MLJ 237 among the cases cited by the Defendants were decided after a trial in the High Court. 16 Is the OS scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or constitute an abuse of the process of the court? [33] 'Scandalous' in the context of O 18 r 19(1)(b), is taken to mean wholly unnecessary and irrelevant and not just unpleasant allegations: see eg Boey Oi Leng (Trading as Indah Reka Construction and Trading) v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 AMR 4807 (HC). [34] 'Frivolous' or 'vexatious' means that the pleadings are obviously unsustainable: see eg. Mohamed Nazri, Boey Ai Leng v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 and Datuk Ir Che Amran Mohd Yusoff v Yayasan Melaka & Ors [2003] MLJU 7. Technointan Holding Sdn Bhd v. Tetuan Tan Kim & Teh Hong Jet [2007] 1 MLJ 163; an action raised with no prospect of success to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. [35] In the case of Malayan Banking Berhad v Gan Kong Yam [1972] 1 MLJ 32 Raja Azlan Shah J (as HRH then was) had made the following observation: No precise legal definition can be found as yet, as to the meaning of 'no reasonable defence' or 'frivolous or vexatious' or 'tending to delay the fair trial or the action', but as can be observed a pleading will not be struck out under this rule 'unless it is not only demurrable but something worse than demurrable', that is, such that no legitimate amendment can save it from being demurrable: per Chitty J, in Republic of Peru v Peruvian Guano Co. 17 [36] As for the meaning of 'an abuse of the process of the court' reference is made to the case of Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v. Wee Chang Jin [1998] 1 SLR 374 at p. 384:- The term 'abuse of the process of the Court', in Order 18 rule 19(1) (d), has been given a wide interpretation by the Courts. It includes considerations of public policy and the interests of justice. This term signifies that the process of the Court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The Court will prevent the improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used as a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation. The categories of conduct rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process are not closed and will depend on all relevant circumstances of the case. A type of conduct which has been judicially acknowledged as an abuse of process is the bringing of an action for a collateral purpose... if an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the Court. 31. Gopal Sri Ram JCA ( as he then was) in the case of Malaysia Building Society Bhd v. Tan Sri General Ungku Nazaruddin Ungku Mohamed [1998] 2 CLJ 340, at 352 said this in regard to the doctrine of abuse of process ): Every person who is aggrieved by some wrong he considers done him is at liberty to invoke the process of the court. Equally may a litigant invoke the process to enforce some claim which he perceives he has against another. When however, the process of the court is invoked, not for the genuine purpose of obtaining the relief claimed, but for a collateral purpose, for example, to oppress the defendant, it becomes an abuse of process. Where the court's process is abused, the proceedings complained of may be stayed, or if it is too late to grant a stay, the party injured may bring an action based on the tort of collateral abuse of process. 18 [37] The Supreme Court in Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors v British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16 pronounced that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its process (SC). [38] I have borne at the forefront of my mind that the inherent power to dismiss an action summarily without permitting the Plaintiff to proceed to trial is a drastic power and it should be exercised with the utmost caution - CC Ng & Brothers Sdn Bhd v Government of State of Pahang [1985] 1 MLJ 347. Seah FJ in delivering the judgment of the court said (at p 350): In our judgment, this is not a proper time to consider these rival submissions when the inherent jurisdiction of the court is invoked to strike out a writ and/or a statement of claim on the ground that it was an abuse of the process of the court. The inherent power to dismiss an action summarily without permitting the plaintiff to proceed to trial is a drastic power. It should be exercised with the utmost caution (per Lord Diplock in Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Tio Chee Hing [1975] 2 MLJ 1. In Lawrance v Norreys (1890) 15 App Cas 210 at p 219 Lord Herschell said words to the same effect that 'It cannot be doubted that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action which is an abuse of the process of the court. It is a jurisdiction which ought to be very sparingly exercised and only in very exceptional cases. I do not think its exercise would be justified merely because the story told in the pleadings was highly improbable, and one which it was difficult to believe could be proved'. [39] Having found that the OS does disclose a reasonable cause of action and that there are triable issues, it is my view then that it cannot be said that the OS in all the circumstances of the case is scandalous, 19 frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court within the meaning of Order 18 rule 19(1)(b) (c) and (d) of the 2012 Rules, and/or under the court’s inherent jurisdiction. [40] I am unable to agree with the Defendants’ counsel that there is an abuse of court process as the OS is not so hopeless as to be a plain and obvious case to strike out at this interlocutory stage. [41] In the interest of justice, I find that the complaints of the Plaintiff are eminently unsuitable to be disposed of summarily; they ought to be investigated fully by the court when all the evidence is in, and the matter is fully ventilated at the hearing of the substantive application in enc. 47. [42] For the reasons given above, I exercise my discretion to dismiss all 4 Applications with costs of RM2,500 each subject to allocator. [43] I thank all learned counsel for their efforts in the research and detailed submission which had assisted the court greatly. Dated this 7th day of September 2020 - sgd - Liza Chan Sow Keng Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur 20 COUNSEL For the Plaintiff : Mak Lin Kum, (Mhd Izzul Faris and Tan Xu Qi (Sandra with him)) (Messrs Syed Ibrahim & Co) For the 1st to 6th Defendants : Alex Tan (Messrs Wong Kian Kheong) For the 7th to 9th Defendants : Chong Loong Men (Messrs Lim Chong Phang & Amy) For the 10th Defendant 1 : Terrence Lee Rohul (Messrs Terrence & Randy) For the 11th Defendant : Chan Kheng Hoe( Aaron Aiman with him) (Messrs Kheng Hoe) 21 CASES REFERRED: Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36 New Straits Times (Malaysia) Bhd v Kumpulan Kertas Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [1985] 1 MLJ 226 Pengiran Othman Shah bin Pengiran Mohd Yusoff & Anor v Karambunai Resorts Sdn Bhd (Formerly known as Lipkland (Sabah) Sdn Bhd) & Ors [1969] 1 MLJ 3 Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 222 Lim Kean v Choo Koon [1970] 1 MLJ 158 Nasri v Mesah [1971] 1 MLJ 32 Saw Gaik Beow v Cheong Yew Weng & Ors [1989] 3 MLJ 30 Newacres Sdn. Bhd v Sri Alam Sdn Bhd [1991] 3 MLJ 474 Credit Corp (M) Bhd v Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 MLJ 409 Indah Desa Saujana Corp Sdn Bhd & Ors v James Foong Cheng Yuen, Judge, High Court Malaya & Anor [2008] 2 MLJ 11 Muniandy s/o Subrayan & Ors v Chairman & Board Members of Koperasi Menara Maju Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 557 Shahidan Shafie v Atlan Holding Bhd & Anor & Other Appeals [2005] 3 CLJ 793 Tuan Haji Ishak bin Ismail v Leong Hup Holdings Bhd & other appeals [1996] 1 MLJ 661 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 Dato Raja Ideris bin Raja Ahmad & Ors v Teng Chang Khim (Chairman of the select Committee on Competence, Accountability and 22 Transparency and the Chairman of the Committee of Rights and Privileges State Legislative Assembly of Selangor) & Ors [2012] 5 MLJ 490 Tan Sri Dato’ Hj Lamin bin Hj Mohd Yunus v Bursa Malaysia Securities Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 182 Chase Perdana Bhd v Md Afendi bin Hamdan [2009] 6 MLJ 783 Tan Chee Hoe & Sdn Bhd v Code Focus Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 MLJ 301 Hubbuck & Sons v Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark Ltd [1899] 1 QB 86 Pioneer Haven Sdn Bhd v Ho Hup Construction Co Bhd [2012] 3 MLJ 616 Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd v UEM Genisys Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 6 MLJ 237 Boey Oi Leng (Trading as Indah Reka Construction and Trading) v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2001] 4 AMR 4807 Mohamed Nazri, Boey Ai Leng v Trans Resources Corporation Sdn Bhd [2002] 1 CLJ 405 Datuk Ir Che Amran Mohd Yusoff v Yayasan Melaka & Ors [2003] MLJU 7 Technointan Holding Sdn Bhd v. Tetuan Tan Kim & Teh Hong Jet [2007] 1 MLJ 163 Malayan Banking Berhad v Gan Kong Yam [1972] 1 MLJ 32 Gabriel Peter & Partners (suing as a firm) v. Wee Chang Jin [1998] 1 SLR 374 Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Haji Tachik & Ors v British-American Life & General Insurance Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 16 CC Ng & Brothers Sdn Bhd v Government of State of Pahang [1985] 1 MLJ 347 23 LEGISLATION/STATUTE Section 346 of the Companies Act 2016 Rules of Court 2012 Order 18 r 19(1) (a), (b) (c) (d) Order 18 r 19(1) Order 33 r 2