NG THAI WONG FAH DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD

CB-24NCvC-82-08/2022 Kand. 16 19/06/2023 16:50:05 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: CB-24NCVC-82-08/2022 Dalam perkara Perjanjian Pembangunan (Development Agreement) bertarikh 18.12.2012 di antara Ng Thai (No. K/P: 550510- 06-5063) dan Wong Fah Development Sdn Bhd. (No. Syarikat: 443574-T) Dan Dalam perkara Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan (Supplementary Development Agreement) bertarikh 31.05.2019 di antara Ng Thai (No. K/P: 550510- 06-5063) dan Wong Fah Development Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 443574-T) Dan Dalam Perkara Hartanah- Hartanah yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik (HS(D) 20253 PT 20913 (kemudian dirujuk sebagai “hakmilik-hakmilik tersebut”) Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 11 Specific Relief Act 1950 1 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 18 Specific Relief Act 1950 Dan Aturan 7 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA NG THAI (NO. K/P: 550510-06-5063) … PLAINTIF DAN WONG FAH DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 443574-T) … DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Latar Belakang [1] Tindakan ini adalah berpunca daripada Perjanjian Pembangunan bertarikh 18.07.2012 di antara Plaintif dan Defendan. Plaintif dan Defendan juga telah menandatangani Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan pada 31.05.2019. 2 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [2] Penelitian kepada Affidavit Sokongan, Affidavit Jawapan dan Affidavit Balasan serta hujahan-hujahan yang dikemukakan oleh kedua- dua pihak, Mahkamah mendapati terdapat beberapa isu iaitu: (a) Isu awalan adakah saman pemula ini wajar dijadikan writ di bawah Aturan 28 Kaedah 8 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah (KKM) 2012; (b) Adakah terdapat kegagalan memenuhi terma-terma perjanjian disebabkan kelewatan; (c) Adakah wajar diberikan pelaksanaan spesifik; dan (d) Adakah ketidakbolehpelaksanaan terma-terma kontrak disebabkan oleh force majeure. [3] Berdasarkan kepada surat daripada peguam Defendan bertarikh 30.08.2021 telah dimaklumkan kepada Plaintif bahawa Sijil Penyiapan dan Pematuhan (CCC) telah dikeluarkan oleh pihak yang berkaitan. Surat tersebut juga telah menyatakan bahawa 13 salinan asal dokumen hakmiliik bersama-sama dengan cukai hartanah dikemukakan. Apa yang menarik dalam surat itu juga turut disertakan dengan surat pengecualian yang dikeluarkan oleh Kementerian Perumahan dan Kerajaan Tempatan selaras dengan Akta Langkah-langkah Sementara Bagi Mengurangkan Kesan Penyakit Koronavirus 2019 (Covid19) 2020 (Akta Covid-19). 3 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [4] Plaintif telah memberikan respon kepada surat tersebut melalui surat yang diemelkan kepada peguam Defendan dan menyatakan antara lain mereka hanya mengetahui Sijil Penyiapan dan Pematuhan (CCC) tersebut pada 30.08.2021 sedangkan ia dikeluarkan pada 28.05.2021. Plaintif juga memohon gantirugi terhadap unit rumah dan pejabat kedai tersebut yang telah lewat diserahmilik kepada Plaintif. Plaintif juga mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah menamatkan perjanjian kerjasama tersebut secara sebelah pihak. Plaintif memohon supaya Defendan membayar jumlah gantirugi yang dipersetujui berdasarkan kepada Klausa 7 dan 9 Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan. [5] Defendan telah mengeluarkan surat bertarikh 07.09.2021 kepada Plaintif yang telah memberikan milikan kosong kepada Plaintif unit rumah dan pejabat kedai yang terlibat. [6] Penelitian affidavit-affidavit adalah jelas menunjukkan bahawa berlaku kelewatan penyerahan milikan kosong kepada Plaintif oleh Defendan. Namun begitu, Defendan menyatakan kelewatan tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan dan ianya dikecualikan dan mereka diberikan perlepasan di bawah Akta Covid-19. Oleh itu, Defendan tidak perlu membayar gantirugi yang diperuntukkan di bawah perjanjian tersebut. Dalam konteks ini, wajar merujuk seksyen 7 Akta Covid-19 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “Ketidakupayaan mana-mana pihak atau pihak-pihak untuk melaksanakan apa-apa obligasi kontraktual yang timbul daripada mana- mana kategori kontrak yang dinyatakan dalam Jadual kepada Bahagian 4 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ini yang disebabkan oleh langkah-langkah yang ditetapkan, dibuat atau diambil di bawah Akta Pencegahan dan Pengawalan Penyakit Berjangkit 1988 [Akta 342] untuk mengawal atau mencegah merebaknya COVID-19 tidak membolehkan pihak atau pihak-pihak lain untuk menjalankan haknya atau hak mereka di bawah kontrak. 1. Kontrak kerja pembinaan atau kontrak perundingan pembinaan dan apa-apa kontrak lain yang berhubungan dengan pembekalan bahan, kelengkapan atau pekerja pembinaan yang berkaitan dengan suatu kontrak pembinaan. 2. Bon pelaksanaan atau yang setara yang diberikan menurut suatu kontrak pembinaan atau kontrak pembekalan. 3. Kontrak perkhidmatan professional. 4. Pajakan atau sewaan harta tak alih bukan kediaman. 5. Kontrak acara bagi penyediaan mana-mana tempat, penginapan, kemudahan, pengangkutan, hiburan, katering atau barangan atau perkhidmatan lain termasuklah, bagi mana-mana mesyuarat perniagaan, perjalanan insentif, persidangan, pameran, acara jualan, konsert, pertunjukan, perkahwinan, parti atau perhimpunan sosial lain atau acara sukan, bagi peserta, orang yang hadir, tetamu, penaung atau penonton bagi perhimpunan atau acara itu. 6. Kontrak oleh pengusahaan pelancongan sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah Akta Industri Pelancongan 1992 [Akta 482] dan kontrak bagi penggalakan pelancongan di Malaysia. 5 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 7. Kontrak yang berhubungan dengan ziarah keagamaan. 8. Perjanjian sewa beli sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah Akta Sewa Beli 1967 [Akta 212] atau kontrak pajakan, yang telah dimasuki oleh perusahaan mikro, golongan B40 atau M40 seperti yang dinyatakan dalam pangkalan data Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri Malaysia, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan, bagi kenderaan yang berikut: (a) kenderaan motokar seperti yang dikelaskan di bawah seksyen 5 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 [Akta 333]; (b) kenderaan barangan atau perkhidmatan awam- (i) berhubung dengan Semenanjung Malaysia, mempunyai erti yang diberikan kepadanya dalam Akta Pengangkutan Awam Darat 2010 [Akta 715]; atau (ii) berhubung dengan Sabah, Sarawak dan Wilayah Persekutuan Labuan, mempunyai erti yang diberikan kepadanya dalam Akta Lembaga Pelesenan Kenderaan Perdagangan 1987 [Akta 334]; atau (c) kenderaan pelancongan- (i) berhubung dengan Semenanjung Malaysia, mempunyai erti yang diberikan kepadanya dalam Akta Pengangkutan Awam Darat 2010 [Akta 715]; atau 6 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (ii) berhubung dengan Sabah, Sarawak dan Wilayah Persekutuan Labuan, mempunyai erti yang diberikan kepadanya dalam Akta Pelesenan Kenderaan Pelancongan 1999 [Akta 594] [8. Dimasukkan. PU(A) 385/2020: Perintah 2] 9. Kontrak jualan kredit di bawah Akta Perlindungan Pengguna 1999 [Akta 599].” Analisa Isu Awalan [7] Aturan 5 KKM 2012 telah memperihalkan cara memulakan satu prosiding sivil. Aturan 5 kaedah 3 KKM 2012 menyatakan prosiding yang hendak dimulakan dengan saman pemula seperti berikut: “3. Prosiding yang hendak dimulakan melalui saman pemula (A. 5 k. 3) Prosiding yang suatu permohonan akan dibuat kepada Mahkamah atau seorang Hakim itu di bawah mana-mana undang-undang bertulis hendaklah dimulakan melalui saman pemula.” [8] Aturan 5 kaedah 4 KKM 2012 pula menyatakan tindakan yang boleh dimulakan melalui writ atau saman pemula, iaitu: 7 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “4. Prosiding yang boleh dimulakan melalui writ atau saman pemula (A. 5 k. 4) (1) Prosiding- (a) yang di dalamnya persoalan tunggal atau persoalan pokok yang menjadi isu adalah atau mungkin menjadi salah satu pentafsiran mana-mana undang-undang bertulis atau apa apa surat cara yang dibuat di bawah mana-mana undang-undang bertulis, atau apa-apa surat ikatan, wasiat, kontrak atau dokumen lain, atau apa-apa persoalan undang-undang yang lain; atau (b) yang di dalamnya tidak mungkin ada apa-apa pertikaian fakta yang substansial, adalah sesuai untuk dimulakan melalui saman pemula melainkan jika plaintif berniat dalam prosiding itu untuk memohon penghakiman di bawah Aturan 14 atau Aturan 81 atau untuk apa-apa sebab lain yang mengambil kira prosiding itu lebih sesuai dimulakan melalui writ.” [9] Dalam kes ini Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan melalui saman pemula. Apabila sesuatu tindakan itu dimulakan dengan saman pemula, ia akan melibatkan pemfailan affidavit-affidavit oleh pihak- pihak. Mahkamah akan memutuskan kes tersebut berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan oleh pihak-pihak. Oleh itu wajar mahkamah meneliti apakah tindakan yang bersesuaian untuk dimulakan dengan saman pemula seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam kes In re Giles Real and Personal Advance Company v Michell [1890] 43 Ch.D 391. Di dalam kes tersebut tindakan adalah berkaitan dengan keutamaan gadaian (priority of mortgage) dan berkaitan dengan 8 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal undang-undang amanah serta melibatkan Rules oleh Supreme Court, 1883 Order LV. R. 3. Cotton L.J menyatakan seperti berikut: “The Defendants who claim are trustees but their claim to the mortgage is not as trustees, but as mortgagees under a contract between them and one of their cestuis que trust, independently of their position as trustees. There may be a question as to the validity of their mortgage having regard to their position as trustees, but the question of priority does not arise in the administration of the trust. The Judge decided either that he had no jurisdiction to decide the question of priority of the mortgages upon an originating summons, or, that if he had, it was not proper to decide it in an action commenced in that manner. I agree with him. In my opinion the Court has no jurisdiction to decide such a question on an originating summons; but I decidedly hold that, if it has jurisdiction, it is not proper to decide it upon an originating summons. Under the rules the Court has jurisdiction only to decide certain special matters on an originating summons, and the question whether the Court has jurisdiction in this case depends upon whether the rules give it power to decide the questions at issue here. I cannot find in Order IV., rule 3, anything justifying such a point as this being determined upon an originating summons.” [10] Kes ini telah dirujuk oleh Mahkamah Tinggi dalam kes Abdulmajid v Haji Abdulrazak [1971] 2 MLJ 228. Di dalam kes tersebut ia melibatkan penentuan keesahan amanah yang telah dibuat. Ia memerlukan keterangan saksi-saksi. Oleh itu tidak sesuai ia dikemukakan melalui saman pemula. YA Hakim Chang Min Tat menyatakan seperti berikut: 9 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “But so far as the law is concerned, the valid constitution of a trust is a matter to be determined on facts to be found by a trial court so that it occurs to me that even on the strength of the submission of learned counsel for the plaintiff and his admission, there is a dispute as to facts and that necessarily calls for evidence to be taken.” As for the adjournment into open court, counsel for the plaintiff relies on O.54 r.9 and on a passage at page 1494 of the 1960 Annual Practice in the notes to O.59 r.3 under the heading "dispute as to facts" but it is clear even on his reading that in an originating summons supported by affidavits, such evidence is limited to the cross-examination of deponents on their affidavits.” [11] Dalam kes Foong Seong v Chan San Choon [1947] 13 MLJ 85, tindakan adalah berkaitan dengan penentuan keesahan amanah yang telah dibuat oleh simati untuk Plaintif. Dalam kes tersebut Bostock Hill menyatakan seperti berikut: “Moreover the question at issue is a question of fact and not of law and will have to be determined in Open Court and is not suitable for determination by the procedure of an Originating Summons.” [12] Dalam kes Ponniah v Chinniah [1961] 1 MLJ 66 YAA Thomson CJ menyatakan bahawa kes tersebut adalah melibatkan fakta seperti berikut: “I would observe in limine that the respondent was asking for the discharge of a charge of land which is the equivalent under our land laws of a reconveyance of mortgaged property and it was therefore open 10 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal to him to proceed by way of Originating Summons under Order LV rule 5A. His solicitor, however, must have been well aware that there was a dispute as to the facts of the case and in the circumstances the proceedings should have been commenced by Writ (see White Book, 1959, p. 1503).” [13] Adalah didapati bahawa di dalam kes tersebut keterangan yang perlu dikemukakan ialah wang telah dibayar oleh pihak Responden mengikut perjanjian asal yang dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua belah pihak. Namun demikian mahkamah berpendapat bahawa adalah sukar untuk membuktikannya melalui affidavit di dalam kes tersebut. Mahkamah memerintahkan supaya perbicaraan semula dibuat dalam kes tersebut. [14] Berdasarkan kepada duluan kehakiman tersebut adalah jelas bahawa prosiding perdengaran melalui saman pemula adalah bagi kes- kes yang tidak melibatkan pertikaian fakta sehingga memerlukan kepada pengemukaan saksi-saksi yang perlu hadir memberi keterangan lisan di mahkamah. Dalam erti kata lain mahkamah tidak dapat menentusahkan keterangan-keterangan dengan hanya berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan. Namun demikian fakta yang dipertikaikan dalam satu prosiding itu hendaklah sesuatu yang relevan dengan perkara yang dipertikaikan atau yang sedang dikemukakan kepada mahkamah. Ini bermakna pertikaian fakta semata-mata tidak secara automatik akan menyebabkan prosiding tersebut tidak boleh diteruskan melalui saman pemula. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Hakim Raja Azlan Shah di dalam kes Pesurohjaya Ibu Kota Kuala Lumpur v Public Trustee & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 30. Di dalam kes tersebut satu tindakan melalui saman pemula bagi 11 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal mendapatkan gantirugi sebanyak $338,378.45 bagi pengusiran setinggan oleh Pemohon dan ia berkaitan dengan Essential (Clearance of Squatters) Regulations 1969. Hakim Raja Azlan Shah ketika menyentuh berkenaan dengan prosedur di dalam kes itu menegaskan seperti berikut: “I now come to the question of procedure. The respondents contend that the action should have proceeded by way of writ and not originating summons because disputed questions of fact and law are involved. When a question of fact is at issue action is to be by way of writ and not by originating summons. This is because the facts have to be established by examination and cross-examination of witnesses. In the present case the disputed question of fact would be as to the number of squatter families removed from the said land. The question now is whether the number of squatter families is a relevant question rendering it necessary to be established by examination of witnesses in court. The determination of number of squatter families would be crucial under the unamended 1969 Regulations because the mode of computing compensation under regulation 7(a)(v) is by squatter families. But with the amendment the method of computing is by way of area.” [15] Adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa sesuatu prosiding sivil boleh dimulakan dengan saman pemula sekiranya ia tidak mempunyai isu berkenaan dengan pembuktian fakta-fakta berdasarkan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi. Sekiranya berdasarkan kepada affidavit- affidavit yang difailkan dan fakta-fakta yang ada adalah jelas dan nyata maka keputusan boleh dibuat berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit dan dokumen-dokumen yang dikemukakan di mahkamah. Apa yang menarik ialah di bawah Aturan 7 KKM 2012 yang memperihalkan 12 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal peruntukan am kepada saman pemula terutamanya di Aturan 7 kaedah 3 KKM 2012 telah menggariskan perkara-perkara yang perlu dimasukkan di dalam saman pemula. Ia menunjukkan bahawa isu-isu yang dibangkitkan di dalam satu saman pemula ialah sesuatu yang tepat melalui relif atau remedi yang dituntut dalam satu prosiding berikut. Aturan 7 kaedah 3 KKM 2012 menyatakan seperti berikut: “3. Kandungan saman pemula (A. 7 k. 3) (1) Tiap-tiap saman pemula hendaklah memasukkan suatu pernyataan persoalan yang ke atasnya plaintif meminta penentuan atau arahan Mahkamah atau, mengikut mana-mana yang berkenaan, suatu pernyataan tepat mengenai relief atau remedi yang dituntut dalam prosiding yang dimulakan melalui saman pemula dengan butir-butir yang cukup untuk mengenal pasti kausa atau kausa-kausa tindakan yang berkenaan dengannya yang plaintif menuntut relief atau remedi itu. (2) Aturan 6, kaedah 2, kecuali subperenggan (1)(a) dan (b) hendaklah terpakai berhubung dengan suatu saman pemula sebagaimana ia terpakai berhubung dengan suatu writ.” [16] Berdasarkan kepada perkembangan undang-undang berkaitan prosiding sivil telah berlaku perubahan yang ketara berkenaan kepentingan format permulaan suatu tindakan di mahkamah. Jika pada masa dahulu pematuhan kepada format di dalam satu prosiding adalah penting malahan mahkamah di dalam keadaan tertentu boleh membatalkan sesuatu tindakan semata-mata disebabkan kesilapan format untuk memfailkan satu prosiding di mahkamah. Ia berkaitan 13 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dengan sejarah berkenaan format tindakan di mahkamah di United Kingdom. Ia juga berkenaan dengan format yang perlu dibuat di dalam prosiding melalui common plea dan court equity di England. Oleh yang demikian format-format yang berkenaan telah disediakan dan menjadi ikutan kepada Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah yang berkaitan dengan prosiding sivil. Ini misalnya dinyatakan di dalam artikel bertajuk The Renaissance of English Legal History oleh D.J. Ibbetson di dalam Cambridge Law Journal [2021] 91 di halaman 103 seperti berikut: “Secondly, the increased use of actions on the case, in which the plaintiff's case was spelled out in some detail, made it possible to raise more sharply focused objections to the way in which actions had been framed. This was especially the case with the post-verdict motion in arrest of judgment after a verdict had been given for the plaintiff. It was through such motions, for example, that the detailed contours of the doctrine of consideration in assumpsit were mapped. Thirdly, there was a move from oral tentative pleading, the characteristic of the medieval Common law, to the enrolment of paper pleadings, with no pre-verdict judicial involvement; no doubt this was facilitated by the falling cost of paper, though the details of the shifts which occurred are very hard to track. It was this, more than anything, which opened the way for the massive rise in post-verdict motions: if the pleadings had been settled without judicial involvement, it was only after the trial at nisi prius that legal argument about the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claim or the defendant's pleaded defence could be raised.” [17] Walau bagaimanapun selepas daripada pengenalan Civil Procedure Rules 1998 di United Kingdom telah diperakukan bahawa tindakan-tindakan akan dibuat melalui borang-borang tertentu yang 14 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal dikeluarkan oleh mahkamah atas permintaan pihak-pihak. Ini dinyatakan di dalam Bahagian 7 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 seperti berikut: “How to start proceedings 7.2—(1) Proceedings are started when the court issues a claim form at the request of the claimant. (2) A claim form is issued on the date entered on the form by the court. (A person who seeks a remedy from the court before proceedings are started or in relation to proceedings which are taking place, or will take place, in another jurisdiction must make an application under Part 23) (Part 16 sets out what the claim form must include)” [18] Di dalam Civil Procedure Volume 1 The White Book Service 2006 Thomson Sweet & Maxwell telah memberikan ulasan berkenaan dengan Bahagian 7 Civil Procedure 1998 seperti berikut: “Effect of rule This rule is at the heart of the CPR reforms. It introduces the “claim form” – a single form of originating process for all claims in the High Court and country court. (The concept is diluted somewhat by Pt 8 – Alternative Procedure for Claims which is akin to the originating summons/originating application procedure and is for use only in appropriate cases as provided by r.8.1) 15 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The plethora of originating process previously available in the High Court (writ, originating summons, originating motion and petition) and in the country court (summons, originating application, petition and notice of appeal) are all abolished and replaced by the “claim form”. [19] Dalam erti kata lain mahkamah tidak lagi begitu ketat untuk membatalkan sesuatu tindakan saman semata-mata kerana kesilapan format yang dikemukakan di mahkamah. [20] Dalam konteks Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah 2012, Aturan 28 kaedah 8 KKM 2012 telah memberi jalan keluar untuk suatu prosiding yang dikemukakan di bawah saman pemula untuk ditukarkan kepada satu tindakan writ. Aturan 28 kaedah 8 KKM 2012 menyatakan seperti berikut: “8. Penerusan prosiding seolah-olah kausa atau perkara dimulakan melalui writ (A. 28 k. 8) (1) Jika, dalam hal suatu kausa atau perkara yang dimulakan melalui saman pemula, ternyata kepada Mahkamah pada mana-mana peringkat prosiding bahawa prosiding itu patut kerana apa-apa sebab diteruskan seolah-olah kausa atau perkara itu telah dimulakan melalui writ, ia boleh memerintahkan untuk prosiding itu diteruskan seolah-olah kausa atau perkara itu telah dimulakan sedemikian dan boleh, khususnya, memerintahkan bahawa pliding hendaklah diserahkan atau bahawa mana-mana afidavit hendaklah dijadikan sebagai pliding, dengan atau tanpa kebebasan kepada mana-mana pihak untuk 16 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal menambah kepadanya atau untuk memohon bagi mendapatkan butir- butir mengenainya. (2) Jika Mahkamah memutuskan untuk membuat suatu perintah yang disebut dalam kaedah (1), Aturan 34 hendaklah terpakai dengan ubah suaian yang perlu. (3) Kaedah ini terpakai walaupun kausa atau perkara dalam persoalan tidak dapat dimulakan melalui writ. (4) Apa-apa sebutan dalam Kaedah-Kaedah ini dalam suatu tindakan yang dimulakan melalui writ hendaklah, melainkan jika konteksnya menghendaki selainnya, ditafsirkan sebagai termasuk suatu sebutan kepada suatu kausa atau perkara prosiding yang diperintahkan di bawah kaedah ini untuk diteruskan seolah-olah kausa atau perkara itu telah dimulakan sedemikian.” [21] Ia memberikan kepada mahkamah di dalam suatu tindakan yang dimulakan dengan saman pemula untuk dikendalikan seperti seolah- olah tindakan itu dimulakan dengan writ. Ini adalah bagi membolehkan sesuatu prosiding yang telah dimulakan dengan saman pemula didapati oleh mahkamah terdapat isu-isu yang timbul dan memerlukan penyiasatan lanjut dan pengesahan fakta-fakta bercanggah yang hanya boleh dirungkaikan melalui keterangan saksi-saksi. Ia bagi memastikan pihak-pihak tidak akan dihalang daripada mengemukakan keterangan di mahkamah untuk penelitian mahkamah untuk satu keputusan yang adil. Dalam erti kata lain pemfailan suatu tindakan yang bermula dengan saman pemula bukannya batu penghalang untuk penelitian keterangan saksi-saksi seperti satu tindakan writ saman. 17 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [22] Oleh yang demikian keadaan yang berlaku di dalam kes Employees Provident Fund Board v Goh Tiong [1958] 1 MLJ 54 tidak akan berulang. Di dalam kes tersebut satu saman pemula telah difailkan oleh Plaintif seperti berikut: "Whether or not the lighter workers (Taikongs and boatmen referred to in the Plaintiffs' Affidavit) are 'employees' as defined in section 2 of the Employees Provident Fund Ordinance, 1951." [23] Hakim Hepworth di akhir kes tersebut memutuskan seperti berikut: “On perusing O. 51 I think it is clear that that Order deals with applications in chambers and summonses in chambers. These summonses in chambers may or may not be Originating Summonses. These summonses may be summonses in a matter which has been commenced by writ. This being so no inference can be drawn from rule 14(1)(j) of O. 51 that the subject matter of this application can be started by Originating Summons. As there is nothing in O. 52 which provides for the issue of an Originating Summons in the circumstances of this case, and as there is no statutory provision applicable, there is no jurisdiction at all in this case, and where there is no jurisdiction jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the parties. I therefore make no order on the Summons.” [24] Oleh itu sekiranya mahkamah mendapati semasa prosiding saman pemula adalah sewajarnya saksi-saksi dikemukakan atau terdapat fakta-fakta yang memerlukan penyiasatan lanjut maka Aturan 18 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 28 kaedah 8 KKM 2012 ini membolehkan mahkamah menukarkan prosiding tersebut kepada suatu tindakan writ. Ia adalah semata-mata bagi membolehkan sebarang ketidakpatuhan format pengemukaan kes ke mahkamah dan tidak akan menyebabkan kes tersebut boleh dibatalkan. [25] Persoalan yang timbul dalam kes ini ialah adakah saman pemula ini wajar ditukarkan kepada writ. Ini adalah disebabkan Defendan berhujah bahawa isu-su yang timbul dalam kes ini memerlukan kepada keterangan saksi-saksi bagi membolehkan Mahkamah ini menentukan isu dalam kes ini. Sebaliknya peguam Plaintif menyatakan bahawa kes ini dapat diselesaikan dengan hanya berdasarkan affidavit-affidavit yang dikemukakan kedua-dua pihak. [26] Dalam kes ini apa yang jelas ialah tuntutan ini berkaitan dengan dakwaan Plaintif bahawa Defendan telahpun melanggari terma-terma Perjanjian Pembangunan dan Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan. Ia adalah disebabkan Defendan dikatakan gagal menyiapkan pembinaan bangunan-bangunan yang sepatutnya diserahkan milikan kosong kepada Plaintif seperti yang telah dipersetujui di dalan perjanjian- perjanjian tersebut. Ini bermakna Mahkamah perlu meneliti dokumen- dokumen berkaitan dengan perjanjian tersebut yang telah dieksibitkan di dalam affidavit-affidavit Plaintif dan Defendan. Begitu juga Mahkamah perlu meneliti surat-surat perhubungan di antara pihak Plaintif dan Defendan berkaitan dengan perjanjian tersebut. Ia dapat dilihat kesemuanya di dalam affidavit-affidavit yang dikemukakan. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat ia bukanlah suatu kes yang memerlukan 19 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal kepada pendengaran keterangan saksi-saksi sehingga saman pemula ini perlu ditukarkan kepada writ. [27] Mahkamah ini berpendapat kes ini adalah berkaitan dengan penelitian kepada terma-terma perjanjian kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan. Mahkamah perlu melihat sama ada terdapat apa-apa pemecahan terma kontrak tersebut sehingga mewajarkan pihak Plaintif diberikan gantirugi atau perintah-perintah lain yang dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak. Hal ini boleh diteliti melalui dokumen kontrak itu sendiri dan keterangan affidavit-affidavit yang dikemukakan. Ia tidak memerlukan kepada pengemukaan keterangan saksi-saksi secara lisan sehingga menyebabkan saman pemula ini perlu ditukarkan kepada writ. Ia hanyalah merlibatkan penelitikan kepada dokumen dan memadai dengan fakta-fakta yang dideposkan di dalam affidavit-affidavit yang difailkan. [28] Dalam kes ini fakta yang jelas adalah berkenaan sama ada terdapatnya pemecahan kontrak dan ketidakupayaan Defendan untuk menyempurnakan terma-terma di dalam perjanjian tersebut adalah ekoran daripada Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan yang disebabkan oleh wabak Covid-19 serta sama ada Defendan tergolong di dalam pengecualian di bawah seksyen 7 Akta Covid-19. Ini semua boleh diputuskan berdasarkan kepada dokumen-dokumen yang dinyatakan dalam eksibit serta fakta-fakta yang dideposkan di dalam affidavit- affidavit pihak-pihak. Mahkamah berpendapat ia tidak perlu dikemukakan keterangan melalui saksi-saksi di dalam perbicaraan. Adalah memadai untuk Mahkamah ini memutuskan berdasarkan 20 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal kepada affidavit-affidavit dan eksibit-eksibit yang difailkan di Mahkamah. [29] Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat isu awalan yang ditimbulkan bahawa tindakan ini perlu ditukarkan kepada writ seperti di bawah Aturan 28 kaedah 8 KKM 2012 adalah ditolak. Adakah Terdapat Pemecahan Kontrak Oleh Pihak Defendan [30] Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah cuba untuk menamatkan perjanjian ini secara unilateral, secara sebelah pihak. Ia berdasarkan surat yang dikemukakan oleh peguam Defendan yang telah ditafsirkan oleh Plaintif sebagai tindakan membatalkan perjanjian tersebut. Penelitian kepada Perjanjian Pembangunan dan Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan, tiada sebarang peruntukan khusus berkenaan dengan penamatan kontrak tersebut. Namun keterangan yang tidak dapat dinafikan ialah berlaku kelewatan di dalam pembangunan pejabat kedai tersebut sepertimana yang telah dipersetujui. Apa yang lebih menarik ialah terdapatnya perjanjian yang khusus memperuntukan bahawa kegagalan Defendan menyerah milikan kosong pejabat-pejabat kedai tersebut memberi hak kepada Plaintif untuk mengemukakan permohonan pelaksanaan spesifik atau gantirugi. [31] Pada masa yang sama Defendan menyatakan bahawa ketidakupayaan untuk menyerahkan pemilikan kosong pejabat kedai tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan dan 21 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal menyatakan bahawa seksyen 7 Akta Covid-19 terpakai. Hakikat yang tidak dapat dinafikan ialah berlaku kelewatan dalam penyerahan milikan kosong pejabat kedai tersebut. Apa yang menarik di dalam perjanjian- perjanjian tersebut telah dipersetujui apakah kesan daripada kelewatan tersebut dan diperuntukkan remedi yang khusus di dalam perjanjian tersebut. [32] Ini bermakna sekiranya mana-mana pihak terutamanya Defendan yang gagal mematuhi terma-terma tersebut serta klausa-klausa dalam perjanjian itu telahpun memperuntukkan remedi yang berkaitan. Mahkamah berpendapat melainkan pihak Defendan dapat menunjukkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa kegagalan untuk mematuhi terma-terma tersebut adalah disebabkan oleh perkara yang tidak dapat dielakkan oleh Defendan sendiri seperti force majeure mungkin Mahkamah boleh mempertimbangkannya. [33] Adalah menjadi prinsip undang-undang yang jelas bahawa semasa mentafsirkan terma-terma kontrak Mahkamah tidak wajar memasukkan terma-terma baharu, sebaliknya haruslah secara ketat melihat terma-terma yang telah dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak. Mahkamah ini dipanduarah oleh garis panduan yang menarik yang dinyatakan berkenaan dengan untuk mentafsirkan sesuatu kontrak seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v Hopkin & Sons (a firm) and others; Alford v West Bromwich Building Society and others; Armitage v West Bromwich 22 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Building Society and others [1998] 1 All ER 98 di mana Lord Hoffmann menyatakan seperti berikut: “My Lords, I will say at once that I prefer the approach of the learned judge. But I think I should preface my explanation of my reasons with some general remarks about the principles by which contractual documents are nowadays construed. I do not think that the fundamental change which has overtaken this branch of the law, particularly as a result of the speeches of Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 3 All ER 237 at 240–242, [1971] 1 WLR 1381 at 1384–1386 and Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen, Hansen-Tangen v Sanko Steamship Co [1976] 3 All ER 570, [1976] 1 WLR 989, is always sufficiently appreciated. The result has been, subject to one important exception, to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the old intellectual baggage of 'legal' interpretation has been discarded. The principles may be summarised as follows. (1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract. (2) The background was famously referred to by Lord Wilberforce as the 'matrix of fact', but this phrase is, if anything, an understated description of what the background may include. Subject to the requirement that it should have been reasonably available to the parties and to the exception to be mentioned next, it includes absolutely anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable man. 23 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (3) The law excludes from the admissible background the previous negotiations of the parties and their declarations of subjective intent. They are admissible only in an action for rectification. The law makes this distinction for reasons of practical policy and, in this respect only, legal interpretation differs from the way we would interpret utterances in ordinary life. The boundaries of this exception are in some respects unclear. But this is not the occasion on which to explore them. (4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean. The background may not merely enable the reasonable man to choose between the possible meanings of words which are ambiguous but even (as occasionally happens in ordinary life) to conclude that the parties must, for whatever reason, have used the wrong words or syntax (see Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] 3 All ER 352, [1997] 2 WLR 945. (5) The 'rule' that words should be given their 'natural and ordinary meaning' reflects the commonsense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. On the other hand, if one would nevertheless conclude from the background that something must have gone wrong with the language, the law does not require judges to attribute to the parties an intention which they plainly could not have had. Lord Diplock made this point more vigorously when he said in Antaios Cia Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB, The Antaios [1984] 3 All ER 229 at 233, [1985] AC 191 at 201: 24 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal '… if detailed semantic and syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead to a conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to yield to business common sense.' ” [34] Ia turut dinyakan oleh Majlis Privy dalam kes Attorney General of Belize and others v Belize Telecom Ltd and another, [2009] 1 WLR 1988 seperti berikut: “19 The proposition that the implication of a term is an exercise in the construction of the instrument as a whole is not only a matter of logic (since a court has no power to alter what the instrument means) but also well supported by authority. In Trollope & Colls Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601, 609 Lord Pearson, with whom Lord Guest and Lord Diplock agreed, said: “the court does not make a contract for the parties. The court will not even improve the contract which the parties have made for themselves, however desirable the improvement might be. The court’s function is to interpret and apply the contract which the parties have made for themselves. If the express terms are perfectly clear and free from ambiguity, there is no choice to be made between different possible meanings: the clear terms must be applied even if the court thinks some other terms would have been more suitable. An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract: it is not enough for the court to find that such a term would have been adopted by the parties as reasonable men if it had been suggested to them: it must have 25 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal been a term that went without saying, a term necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, a term which, though tacit, formed part of the contract which the parties made for themselves.” 20 More recently, in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Hyman [2002] 1 AC 408, 459, Lord Steyn said: “If a term is to be implied, it could only be a term implied from the language of [the instrument] read in its commercial setting.” 21 It follows that in every case in which it is said that some provision ought to be implied in an instrument, the question for the court is whether such a provision would spell out in express words what the instrument, read against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean. It will be noticed from Lord Pearson’s speech that this question can be reformulated in various ways which a court may find helpful in providing an answer—the implied term must “go without saying”, it must be “necessary to give business efficacy to the contract” and so on—but these are not in the Board’s opinion to be treated as different or additional tests. There is only one question: is that what the instrument, read as a whole against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?” [35] Ia turut ditegaskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Sumbangan Aneka Sdn Bhd v. KNK Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [2021] 7 CLJ 694 seperti berikut: “[39] To summarise, what we have decided above basically is to give effect to what the parties themselves have agreed in their agreements as to the particular event that gives rise to the right to terminate and the consequences following such termination. In this regard it is pertinent to 26 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal reproduce what was held by the House of Lords in Trollope & Colls Ltd v. North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 1 WLR 601 which was quoted by this court in SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 CLJ 177; [2016] 1 MLJ 464: The court does not make a contract for the parties. The court will not even improve the terms which the parties have made for themselves, however desirable the improvement might be. The court's function is to interpret and apply the contract which the parties have made for themselves. If the express terms are perfectly clear and free from ambiguity, there is no choice to be made between different possible meanings: the clear terms must be applied even if the court thinks some other terms would have been suitable. An unexpressed term can be implied if and only if courts finds that the parties must have intended that term to form part of their contract. (emphasis added)” Ia juga telah ditegaskan sebelum ini dalam kes SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1 MLJ 464. [36] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah perlu melihat kepada terma-terma yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Pembangunan bertarikh 18.07.2012 dan Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan bertarikh 31.05.2019. Perjanjian Pembangunan bertarikh 18.07.2012 telah menyatakan bahawa pemilik tanah iaitu Plaintif dalam kes ini telah bersetuju dengan Defendan untuk memajukan tanah di GM 34774 Lot No. 32230 Mukim Mentakab, Temerloh, Negeri Pahang yang meliputi keluasan tanah sebanyak 3.625 hektar. Defendan telah bersetuju membayar balasan sebanyak RM30,000.00 yang dibayar oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. Defendan 27 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal juga bersetuju untuk membuat pembayaran pendahuluan sebanyak RM300,000.00. [37] Di Fasal 2 Perjanjian Pembangunan tersebut telah diperihalkan kelayakan hak Plaintif dan Defendan terhadap projek pembangunan tersebut iaitu Plaintif akan memperolehi 27 % daripada bangunan- bangunan yang dibina, sementara Defendan akan memperolehi 73 % daripada keseluruhan bangunan tersebut. [38] Di Fasal 3.12 Perjanjian Pembangunan tersebut juga dinyatakan bahawa penyerahan hakmilik kosong hendaklah disiapkan oleh Defendan dan menyerahkan milikan kosong kepada Defendan dalam tempoh 60 bulan daripada tarikh Perjanjian Pembangunan tersebut. Sekiranya gagal, Plaintif hendaklah memberikan tempoh perlanjutan masa selama 12 bulan kepada Defendan dan Defendan bersetuju untuk membayar gantirugi yang dikira pada kadar 50 % dengan nilai sewaan RM500.00 sebulan bagi setiap unit bangunan Plaintif. [39] Defendan juga bersetuju bahawa beliau bertanggungjawab terhadap segala cukai tanah dan juga apa-apa tunggakan bayaran kepada pihak berkuasa. [40] Apa yang menarik di dalam Fasal 3.11 (d) Perjanjian tersebut dinyatakan bahawa sekiranya terdapat kelewatan ekoran daripada force majeure atau keadaan-keadaan yang diperincikan di bawah Fasal 3.11 (d) iaitu (1) hingga (8) pemilik atau Plaintif hendaklah memberikan 28 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal lanjutan masa selama 18 bulan. Fasal 3.11 (d) (1) hingga (8) Perjanjian Pembangunan dinyatakan seperti berikut: “(d) diligently proceed with and complete the Owner’s Buildings or cause the same to be diligently proceed with and completed so that the same shall be completed within twenty four (24) months from the date of commencement of works on the said Land PROVIDED ALWAYS that if construction and development of the said Owner’s Buildings or any part thereof shall be delayed by : (1) force majeure; (2) … (3) … (4) … (5) … (6) … (7) … (8) … The Owner shall grant the Developer an extension of 18 months.” [41] Seterusnya di dalam Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan bertarikh 31.05.2019 telah dirujuk Perjanjian Pembangunan bertarikh 18.07.2012 dan menyatakan bahawa tujuan perjanjian ini dibuat adalah seperti berikut: “The owner and the Developer are desirous of entering into this Supplementary Development Agreement for the purpose of setting out certain terms for the sake of clarity and certainty and for the purpose of facilitating the development of the Said Land.” 29 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [42] Di dalam Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan tersebut juga terdapat Fasal 7 yang menyatakan bahawa Defendan bersetuju untuk membayar kepada Plaintif sebanyak RM95,000.00 di atas kelewatan penyerahan milikan kepada Plaintif sebanyak 13 unit rumah dan 7 unit pejabat kedai yang dikira pada kadar RM250.00 seunit bermula daripada 18.07.2012 hingga 18.02.2019. [43] Penelitian kepada perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut menunjukkan bahawa tiada peruntukan khusus berkenaan dengan tatacara penamatan kontrak tersebut. Malahan terdapat juga peruntukan di bawah Fasal 8.4 Perjanjian Pembangunan yang memperuntukkan bahawa sekiranya terdapat apa-apa isu berkenaan dengan kelulusan daripada pihak berkuasa pihak Plaintif berhak untuk menamatkan perjanjian tersebut. Ini menunjukkan bahawa penamatan kontrak ini akan hanya berlaku sekiranya Defendan dalam tempoh 3 tahun dengan pelanjutan masa 6 bulan gagal mendapatkan apa-apa kelulusan maka pihak Plaintif boleh menamatkan perjanjian tersebut. Namun demikian tiada peruntukan penamatan yang boleh dibuat oleh Defendan atau dibuat bersama oleh Plaintif dan Defendan berdasarkan kepada terma- terma perjanjian tersebut. [44] Selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga mendapati dalam Perjanjian Pembangunan terdapat peruntukan di Fasal 11 yang menyatakan bahawa sekiranya terdapat apa-apa perlanggaran terma-terma yang dipersetujui maka satu permohonan pelaksanaan spesifik boleh dibuat. Fasal 11.2 menyatakan bahawa sekiranya Plaintif melakukan apa-apa 30 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pemecahan terma-terma kontrak, maka Defendan berhak untuk melakukan atau membuat permohonan kepada Mahkamah untuk satu perintah pelaksanaan spesifik ataupun gantirugi. [45] Penilaian kepada terma-terma perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut menunjukkan bahawa sekiranya terdapat apa-apa pemecahan terma- terma perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut pihak Plaintif mempunyai hak untuk memohon pelaksanaan spesifik, begitu juga pihak Defendan. Pihak Plaintif boleh menamatkan perjanjian tersebut sekiranya dalam tempoh 3 tahun ditambah dengan 6 bulan Defendan gagal mendapatkan kelulusan daripada pihak berkuasa. Pada masa yang sama terdapat juga terma-terma yang menyatakan bahawa tatacara pengiraan gantirugi yang perlu dilakukan oleh pihak Defendan kepada Plaintif. [46] Penelitian kepada dokumen-dokumen Perjanjian tersebut jelas menunjukkan bahawa telah dipersetujui tatacara pelaksanaan terma- terma kontrak tersebut dan remedi yang boleh diperolehi oleh pihak- pihak sekiranya terdapat pemecahan terma-terma kontrak. Oleh itu ia memerlukan Mahkamah meneliti terma-terma kontrak tersebut dan menentukan remedi yang boleh diperolehi oleh pihak yang terkesan daripada pemecahan kontrak tersebut seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam Perjanjian tersebut. [47] Walau bagaimanapun dalam kes ini Mahkamah juga perlu mengambil perhatian bahawa ketidakmampuan Defendan untuk mematuhi terma-terma Perjanjian tersebut juga dikatakan berpunca daripada Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan. Mahkamah perlu meneliti 31 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal sama ada adakah ia termasuk di dalam force majeure ataupun dilindungi di bawah Akta Langkah-langkah Sementara Bagi Mengurangkan Kesan Penyakit Koronavirus 2019 (Covid19) 2020 sehingga membolehkan Defendan terlindung daripada sebarang tindakan penguatkuasaan remedi di atas pemecahan terma kontrak tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan fakta yang tidak dinafikan telah berlaku kelewatan dalam penyiapan projek tersebut seperti yang dipersetujui dalam Perjanjian. [48] Peguam Defendan dalam Affidavit Jawapannya menyatakan bahawa di perenggan 16 Affidavit Wong Kam Fah bahawa Sijil Penyiapan dan Pematuhan (CCC) bertarikh 28.05.2021 telah disempurnakan kepada Plaintif pada 01.09.2021 melalui surat Defendan bertarikh 30.08.2021. Kelewatan berlaku disebabkan oleh Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan dan Defendan bersandarkan kepada Klausa 3.11(d) perenggan 4 dan perenggan 18. Defendan juga merujuk kepada surat Plaintif bertarikh 07.09.2021 iaitu di eksibit “D” yang telah dinyatakan oleh Defendan sebagai terdapat tindakan penamatan kontrak secara sebelah pihak. Ini dinyatakan di perenggan 11 surat tersebut dan ekoran daripada itu pihak Plaintif telah memohon supaya tuntutan gantirugi seperti yang terdapat dalam Klausa 7 dan 9 Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan tersebut dibenarkan. [49] Sebaliknya pihak Plaintif di dalam Affidavit Sokongannya menyatakan bahawa Defendan telah gagal untuk menyelesaikan pembinaan rumah yang telah dipersetujui dalam tempoh masa yang terdapat dalam Perjanjian tersebut. Plaintif bergantung kepada terma- 32 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal terma Perjanjian dan kegagalan untuk melakukan tanggungjawab yang telah dipersetujui di antara Plaintif dan Defendan. [50] Penelitian kepada hujahan pihak Defendan menunjukkan bahawa Defendan menyatakan bahawa Defendan boleh bergantung kepada seksyen 7 Akta Covid-19 di bawah force majeure atas kegagalan menyiapkan projek perumahan dan pejabat kedai tersebut. Rujukan dibuat kepada kluasa 18.4 Perjanjian Pembangunan bertarikh 18.07.2012. Ini adalah disebabkan adalah mustahil dalam tempoh masa 7 hingga 8 bulan antara Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan dan Pandemik Covid-19 untuk Defendan membina dan menyiapkan unit- unit rumah dan pejabat kedai tersebut. [51] Sementara itu pihak Plaintif dalam Hujahan Tambahan Plaintif pula menyatakan bahawa Perjanjian Pembangunan dan Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan tersebut tidak terlibat dengan Akta Covid-19 disebabkan perjanjian di antara mereka bukanlah perjanjian ‘construction contract’. [52] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa sekiranya sesuatu kontrak tidak dapat dilaksanakan ekoran daripada perkara-perkara yang timbul di luar kawalan kedua-dua pihak atau mustahil untuk melaksanakan terma-terma kontrak tersebut. Ini dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 57 Akta Kontrak memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “57 Agreement to do impossible act (1) An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. 33 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful (2) A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known to be impossible or unlawful (3) Where one person has promised to do something which he knew, or, with reasonable diligence, might have known, and which the promisee did not know, to be impossible or unlawful, the promisor must make compensation to the promisee for any loss which the promisee sustains through the non-performance of the promise. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A agrees with B to discover treasure by magic. The agreement is void. (b) A and B contract to marry each other. Before the time fixed for the marriage, A goes mad. The contract becomes void. (c) A contracts to marry B, being already married to C, and being forbidden by the law to which he is subject to practice polygamy. A must make compensation to B for the loss caused to her by the non- performance of his promise. (d) A contracts to take in cargo for B at a foreign port. A's Government afterwards declares war against the country in which the port is situated. The contract becomes void when war is declared. (e) A contracts to act at a theatre for six months in consideration of a sum paid in advance by B. On several occasions A is too ill to act. The contract to act on those occasions becomes void.” [53] Ia acapkali dikenali sebagai doktrin kekecewaan kontrak (doctrine of frustration of contract). Adalah wajar pada hemat Mahkamah untuk ditelusuri prinsip kekecewaan kontrak bagi memahami pemakaiannya 34 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal di dalam kes ini. Kekecewaan kontrak merujuk kepada keadaan di mana sesuatu kontrak itu adalah mustahil untuk dilaksanakan sama ada secara undang-undang atau fizikal. Sekiranya dapat dibuktikan dapat melepaskan tanggungjawab pihak yang terlibat dalam kontrak tersebut. Ini telah dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Pacific Forest Industries Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lin Wen-Chih & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 293 menyatakan kekecewaan kontrak seperti berikut: “[22] A contract does not become frustrated merely because it becomes difficult to perform. If a party has no money to pay his debt, it cannot be considered impossible to perform as it is not frustration. Neither can he plead frustration because the terms of the contract make it difficult to interpret. If it cannot be performed or becomes unlawful to perform, then the party who is to perform his part of the bargain can plead frustration. The doctrine of frustration is only a special case to discharge a contract by an impossibility of performance after the contract was entered into (see Joseph Constantine Steamship Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp Ltd [1942] AC 154 (HL)). A contract is frustrated when subsequent to its formation, a change of circumstances renders the contract legally or physically impossible to be performed (see Visu Sinnadurai, Law of Contract in Malaysia and Singapore: Cases and Commentary (2nd Ed, 1987) at p 519).” [54] Dalam kes Kin Nam Development Sdn Bhd v Khau Daw Yau [1984] 1 MLJ 256 dinyatakan seperti berikut: “The doctrine of frustration which operates to terminate a contract is of recent origin. (see Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B & S 826; 122 ER 309). It occurs in a situation where due to a change of circumstances a 35 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal contract is rendered legally and physically impossible of performance. The doctrine is an exception to the general rule as to an absolute contract in that a person who specifically undertakes an absolute obligation cannot afterwards claim to be absolved from liability by the fact that his failure to perform the obligation is due to the occurrence of an event over which he has no control. The doctrine does not apply just because the promisor's obligation has become, because of change of circumstances, more onerous than what he has contracted for. The basis of the doctrine is, as stated by Lord Radcliffe in Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham UDC [1956] AC 696 729 to be "not hardship or inconvenience or material loss", but "such a change in the significance of the obligation that the thing undertaken would, if performed, be a different thing from that contracted for". In Jackson v Union Marine Insurance Co Ltd (1874) LR 10 CP 125 the charterers were held justified to throw up their contracts with the ship-owners when the chartered ship was, due to damages, unable to load the agreed cargo as the loading of cargo after the ship had been repaired would have been "a new adventure" or "a new agreement". Bramwell B., held that the parties were discharged by the ship's inability. In the present appeal there can be no doubt that it would be a heavy financial burden on the appellant to build the houses contracted for and to complete the contracts with its purchasers because costs have since spiralled. But this point is not a relevant factor for calling the doctrine of frustration into play. To invoke the doctrine the appellant must show that the completion of every one of these contracts is in substance a different obligation from what it had previously agreed to, i.e. a new agreement altogether. In our view the substance remains the same. Each of these contracts was and still is for the sale of house which the appellant has agreed to build. The special condition which enjoins the appellant to reserve 30% of the houses (in practical terms 10 houses) to be built for 36 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal the Pahang State Development Corporation may well result in the impossibility of the appellant to determine with fairness who amongst its purchasers are to be deprived of their contracts and who to have their contracts performed, especially when the Pahang State Government gives no indication, nor guidance as to how the appellant should go about in complying with the special condition. To choose certain particular purchasers as those who should lose out even at random may be arbitrary and cause an injustice on them, unless they all agree. But despite this difficulty or impossibility the special condition does in no way change the substance of the appellant's agreement with its purchasers. It can still perform 70% of the contracts, although it may not be able to do justice when choosing which contracts it should perform.” [55] Selain daripada itu seseorang itu boleh dilepaskan daripada tanggungjawab kontraktual setelah berlaku kekecewaan kontrak berdasarkan satu prinsip yang dikenali sebagai force majeure yang pada amalannya terdapat klausa force majeure di dalam satu perjanjian. Di dalam Chitty of Contracts Volume 1 General Principles London Sweet & Maxwell 1999 menyatakan seperti berikut di halaman 722: “force majeure clause” is normally used to describe a contractual term by which one (or both) of the parties is excused from performance of the contract, in whole or un part, or is entitled to suspend performance or to claim an extension of time for performance, upon the happening of a specified event or events beyond his control. Such clauses may assume a variety of forms, and a term “the usual force majeure clauses to apply” has been held void for uncertainty.” 37 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [56] Walau bagaimanapun terdapat penjelasan yang menarik berkenaan dengan perbezaan di antara force majeure dan doktrin kekecewaan. Dalam kes RDC Concrete Pte Ltd V Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd And Another Appeal [2007] 4 SLR 413 dinyatakan seperti berikut: “[56] Conceptually, it is true that a force majeure clause operates differently from the doctrine of frustration. Whereas a force majeure clause is an agreement as to how outstanding obligations should be resolved upon the onset of a foreseeable event, the doctrine of frustration concerns the treatment of contractual obligations from the onset of an unforeseeable event: see the decision of this court in Glahe International Expo AG v ACS Computer Pte Ltd [1999] 2 SLR 620 (“Glahe”) at [26]. The prevalent practice of incorporating force majeure clauses into commercial contracts today stems largely from the blunt nature of the doctrine of frustration as a tool to allocate loss. It has often been said that the juridical basis for the doctrine of frustration is unclear, the doctrine is difficult to invoke and the consequences of its operation are drastic, in the sense that the contract is automatically brought to an end. Parties therefore often include force majeure clauses in their contracts to avoid the uncertainty and hardship that might otherwise result from relying on the common law doctrine of frustration. Uncertainty and inconvenience are avoided by incorporating a well- drafted clause that clearly defines the events or circumstances that constitute force majeure. Hardship is also minimised in so far as a force majeure clause can be crafted to provide a more nuanced response to events of force majeure. For example, it may be provided that, in circumstances constituting force majeure, an extension of time may be granted to the party in default, there may be cancellation of the contract at the option of one party, or the defaulting party’s duty to perform the 38 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal contract will be suspended. The contract is thus not automatically brought to an end. [57] Despite this conceptual distinction, we are of the view that the principles relating to the doctrine of frustration are, in the vast majority of cases, still relevant to the construction and interpretation of force majeure clauses. In this regard, it is important to note that, by their very nature and function, force majeure clauses would – in the ordinary course of events – be triggered only where there was a radical external event that supervened and that was not due to the fault of either of the contracting parties. It will be immediately noticed that this is also a prerequisite to the invocation of the doctrine of frustration. However, this, admittedly, is not invariably the case. There might, for instance, be force majeure clauses, the language of which falls short of meeting the criteria required with respect to the doctrine of frustration at common law (this is clearly envisaged, for example, by Prof Treitel in the passage quoted in [55] above and see also Frustration and Force Majeure ( [55] supra) at para 12-017). We should think, however, that this would not be common, especially if one accepts the basic premise that the doctrine of frustration centres (in large part at least) on the absence of reasonable control on the part of the contracting parties. As S Rajendran J observed in the Singapore High Court decision of Magenta Resources (S) Pte Ltd v China Resources (S) Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR 62 at 78, [60] (“Magenta Resources”) (affirmed in China Resources (S) Pte Ltd v Magenta Resources (S) Pte Ltd [1997] 1 SLR 707, but without apparent consideration of this particular point): What is referred to as force majeure in our law (as opposed to French law from which that term originates) is really no more than a convenient way of referring to contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over 39 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal which the parties have little or no control, that might impede or obstruct the performance of the contract. There can therefore be no general rule as to what constitutes a situation of force majeure. Whether such a (force majeure) situation arises, and, where it does arise, the rights and obligations that follow, would all depend on what the parties, in their contract, have provided for. [emphasis added] [58] Everything depends, in the final analysis, on the precise language and actual facts of the case at hand (as pointed out both in the quotation above as well as at [54] above). In the present appeal, for example, the force majeure clauses in the Contract (reproduced at [9] above) refer to causes that are “beyond the supplier’s control”. Depending on the precise facts before the court, the cause or event in question could be beyond the supplier’s (here, the Defendant’s) control and, yet, not beyond the other party’s control (here, the Plaintiff). [59] In this regard, it should be emphasised that the doctrine of frustration can be successfully invoked only if the alleged frustrating event is an external one that is, ex hypothesi, beyond the control of both contracting parties (also bearing in mind the important complementary principle that there can be no self-induced frustration). In the oft-cited words of Lord Radcliffe in the House of Lords decision of Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 at 729: [Frustration occurs whenever the law recognizes that without the default of either party - a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circumstances in which performance is called for would render it a thingradically different from that which was undertaken by the contract. [emphasis added] 40 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Similarly, in the construction of a force majeure clause (similar to those found in the present case), the courts will apply “the presumption that the expression force majeure is likely to be restricted to supervening events which arise without the fault of either party and for which neither of them has undertaken responsibility” [emphasis added]: see the English High Court decision of The Kriti Rex [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171 at 196, per Moore-Bick J (as he then was). [60] However, whatever the precise content of a force majeure clause (which, coupled with the precise facts of the case, would determine, in turn, the precise relationship between that clause and the doctrine of frustration), it is important to emphasise that where a force majeure clause excludes the doctrine of frustration, the principal effect and difference between the two is with respect to the nature of the relief. The relief available under a force majeure clause will, of course, be determined by the specific content of that clause itself. In a situation where the doctrine of frustration is sought to be excluded, the clause concerned would expressly stipulate that the contract is not to be discharged despite the fact that the situation would otherwise be one that would have frustrated the contract. [61] The force majeure clauses in the Contract in the present appeal are a paradigm illustration. Whilst they are triggered or catalysed only if the relevant event is “beyond the supplier’s control” and, to that extent, appear to embody some of the common law principles relating to the frustration of a contract, the crucial difference lies, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, in the nature of the relief that will be granted. If these clauses apply, the Contract “shall be suspended or limited until such circumstance ceases” [emphasis added]. In contrast, where a contract is frustrated under the common law, it is automatically 41 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal discharged by operation of law and the precise relief would be determined by the provisions of the Frustrated Contracts Act (Cap 115, 1985 Rev Ed) (“the Act”) instead (and see generally Andrew Stewart & J W Carter, “Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The Case for a Reappraisal” [1992] CLJ 66). It should also be noted that s 3(3) of the Act itself clearly stipulates thus with respect to its very limited applicability in the context of force majeure clauses (this provision was in fact referred to in the Singapore High Court decision of Chan Buck Kia v Naga Shipping & Trading Co Ltd [1963] MLJ 159 at 160): Where any contract to which this Act applies contains any provision which, upon the true construction of the contract, is intended to have effect in the event of circumstances arising which operate, or would but for that provision operate, to frustrate the contract, or is intended to have effect whether such circumstances arise or not, the court shall give effect to that provision and shall only give effect to section 2 to such extent, if any, as appears to the court to be consistent with that provision. [62] On the other hand, where the force majeure clause concerned does not exclude the doctrine of frustration, then, if the supervening event is indeed a frustrating event that, ex hypothesi, lies beyond the boundaries of that clause, the legal consequences as described above (ie, which flow from an application of the common law doctrine of frustration and which entail an application of the relevant provisions of the Act) would follow instead. It is important, however, to note that there is no need to canvass the issue of relief in the present appeal as the only issue before us is whether or not the force majeure clauses in the Contract apply to the facts at hand. Indeed, no attempt was, in any event, made to argue that the doctrine of frustration applied to the present case. 42 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [63] As we have already seen, it is clear that a force majeure clause can seek to exclude the doctrine of frustration. It is important, in this regard, to reiterate the basic proposition that contracting parties are, of course, free to exclude the doctrine and, as emphasised above, the court must give full effect to such an agreement on the basis that these parties are at liberty to allocate the possible risks between them in any manner they see fit. Nevertheless, it is clear that in order to actually exclude the doctrine of frustration, the clause concerned must be clear and unambiguous. It should be noted, however, that the case law suggests that courts will construe force majeure clauses strictly: see, for example, the oft-cited House of Lords decisions of Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr and Company, Limited [1918] AC 119 (“Metropolitan Water Board”) and Bank Line, Limited v Arthur Capel and Company [1919] AC 435. In other words, what often appears, at first blush at least, to be an express provision covering the event concerned is often interpreted by the courts as not intended by the contracting parties to cover so drastic an event as a frustrating event; hence, the doctrine of frustration would continue, with the attendant consequences or relief briefly outlined in the paragraphs above. Indeed, it has been observed as follows (see Ewan McKendrick, Force Majeure and Frustration of Contract (Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd, 2nd Ed, 1995) at p 36): It is, therefore, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to draft a force majeure clause which shuts out the doctrine of frustration completely, because even the widest of clauses may be held not to cover a particular catastrophic event [such as in Metropolitan Water Board] … 43 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [64] Another general principle to note is that a party who relies on the force majeure clause must show not only that it has brought itself within the clause concerned (a separate and extremely important point in itself: see below at [65]) but also that it has taken all reasonable steps to avoid its operation, or mitigate its results: see the English Court of Appeal decision of Channel Island Ferries Ltd v Sealink UK Ltd [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 323 (“Channel Island Ferries”) at 327. This principle is not only commonsensical but is also consistent with (and may even be a corollary of) the very nature and function of a force majeure clause which we have in fact elaborated upon above (at [53]). To briefly recapitulate, such a clause presupposes that events falling within its scope and ambit are beyond the control of the contracting parties and that language to this effect will invariably be utilised in the clause itself. Thus, in the English High Court decision of Continental Grain Export Corporation v STM Grain Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 460 (“Continental Grain Export”), Robert Goff J (as he then was) said (at 473) that a seller who invoked a “prohibition of export” clause (where the rubric of “impossibility” was utilised) had to prove that: (a) no goods of the contract description were available to him to fulfil his contract; and (b) he could not, following notice of the event, obtain any such goods “by the exercise of any means reasonably open to him”. This was approved (in relation to a similar clause) by the English Court of Appeal inAndre & Cie SA v Tradax Export SA [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 254 at 258. [65] Finally, it should also be noted that a party who relies on a force majeure clause has the burden of bringing himself squarely within that clause: see Channel Island Ferries( at 327); Magenta Resources ([57]; supra at 86, [98]); and Chitty on Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 29th Ed, 2004) vol 1 at para 14-140.” 44 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Pandemik Covid-19 Dan Prinsip Undang-Undang Kontrak [57] Pandemik Covid-19 telah mencabar kebijaksanaan penggubal undang-undang bagi memperkenalkan undang-undang dalam usaha menangani kesan Pandemik Covid-19 tersebut kepada kehidupan. Misalnya di dalam kegiatan ekonomi yang melibatkan kontrak di antara pihak-pihak di dalam suatu urus niaga. Di Malaysia Rang Undang- undang Langkah-langkah Sementara Bagi mengurangkan Kesan Penyakit Koronavirus 2019 (Covid-19) 2020 telah dibentangkan pada 25.08.2020. Menteri Di Jabatan Perdana Menteri (Parlimen dan Undang-undang) Dato’ Takiyuddin bin Hassan menyatakan seperti berikut: “ Rang undang-undang ini memberikan suatu pelepasan sementara ataupun temporary relief daripada tanggungjawab perjanjian contractual obligation, dengan izin atau pematuhan kepada perundangan tertentu bagi satu tempoh yang ditetapkan demi kelangsungan hidup rakyat. Persoalan sama ada rang undang-undang ini dengan izin too little too late ataupun better late than never adalah tidak berbangkit kerana isu yang dihadapi kesan daripada wabak COVID-19 bukan sahaja diambil tindakan oleh kerajaan melalui pakej rangsangan ekonomi malah telah diselesaikan dengan menggunakan perundangan sedia ada termasuk melalui pindaan kepada perundangan subsidiari seperti perintah dan peraturan ataupun diselesaikan secara pentadbiran oleh kementerian, jabatan dan agensi kerajaan. Sehingga kini, saya ingin menjelaskan bahawa sebanyak 58 peraturan dan perintah telah disediakan atau dipinda bagi menangani kesan akibat COVID-19 ini. Daripada jumlah 58 peraturan ini sebanyak 45 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 24 peraturan dan perintah adalah yang berkaitan dengan kegiatan dan aktiviti ekonomi sahaja.” [58] Ketika menyentuh Fasal 7 Bahagian 2 Rang Undang-undang tersebut telah menyatakan seperti berikut: “ Fasal 7 Bahagian II bertujuan untuk memperuntukkan bahawa ketidakupayaan mana-mana pihak untuk melaksanakan obligasi contractual berbangkit daripada mana-mana kategori kontrak yang dinyatakan di dalam Jadual. Tidak membolehkan pihak lain menjalankan haknya di bawah kontrak itu. Kategori kontrak yang disenaraikan dalam Jadual dikenal pasti sebagai kategori yang paling terkesan akibat COVID-19. Dalam hubungan ini, jika diperhatikan kontrak yang berkaitan perkhidmatan perlu (essential services) tidak dimasukkan di dalam Jadual seperti kontrak bekalan makanan, perkhidmatan perbankan dan kewangan, elektrik dan tenaga serta penjagaan kesihatan dan perubatan. Ini memandangkan kerajaan telah memastikan perkhidmatan tersebut perlu berjalan walaupun Perintah Kawalan Pergerakan sedang berlangsung. Walau bagaimanapun, Menteri diperuntukkan kuasa untuk meminda Jadual kepada bahagian ini sekiranya terdapat keperluan untuk menambah kategori kontrak yang mempunyai kaitan ataupun yang mempunyai isu berkaitan COVID-19 yang perlu ditangani.” [59] Malahan di beberapa negara Pandemik Covid-19 ini telah menyebabkan tafsiran berkenaan dengan kontrak juga telah diberikan nafas baharu bagi membolehkan undang-undang dapat menangani isu- isu yang berbangkit ekoran daripada Pandemik Covid-19. Ini dapat dilihat dalam artikel bertajuk The Contract Clause: Reawakened In 46 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The Aged Of Covid-19, Havard Law Review 2023 Vol. 136:2130 seperti berikut: “Even so, the Contract Clause and its broad language remain a topic of litigation today, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Litigants protesting against eviction moratoria and other rent assistance, recall ordinances, and even vaccine mandates have looked to the Contract Clause for relief. Few have succeeded, but those recent triumphs may augur a reevaluation of the Contract Clause. If even COVID-19 failed to justify state governments’ exersice of police power, the clause may furnish even more successful challenges in a postpandemic world.” [60] Persoalan seterusnya yang mahkamah perlu teliti ialah sama ada prinsip kekecewaan kontrak dan force majeure mempunyai kaitan dengan Akta Covid-19. Ini adalah disebabkan jika diteliti kepada Akta itu sendiri dan penjelasan di dalam Penyata Rasmi Parlimen ia merupakan langkah sementara sehingga selesainya Pandemik Covid- 19. Adakah ia membawa maksud segala tanggungan kontrak di antara Plaintif dan Defendan akan terlerai ekoran daripada penggunaan seksyen 7 di bawah Akta Covid-19 tersebut. Dalam hal ini mahkamah berpendapat bahawa perhubungan kontraktual antara Plaintif dan Defendan tidak semestinya secara automatik akan terlerai. Ini adalah disebabkan Plaintif dan Defendan telahpun memasuki Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan yang mengesahkan bahawa Defendan akan menyelesaikan pembinaan dalam tempoh yang telah dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak. Dalam konteks ini adalah wajar sekiranya mahkamah merujuk kepada artikel bertajuk Covid-19 and Force Majeure Clause 47 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal in Commercial Contracts in Malaysia [2021] 3 MLJ ccxvi oleh Dr. Ahmad Masum, Dr. Hjh Hanan Hj Awang Abdul Aziz dan Dr. Hjh Mas Nooraini Hj Mohiddin yang menjelaskan seperti berikut: “The paper submits that invoking force majeure clause is one of the ways by which contracting parties to an agreement may relieve themselves from performing their obligations at the Page ccxxxiii time of the Covid-19 pandemic. On the other hand, parties to a contract which does not contain a force majeure clause or where the force majeure clause does not cover events such as the Covid-19 pandemic, may rely on the doctrine of frustration by invoking s 57(2) of the Contracts Act 1950. Thus, if there is no express force majeure clause in the contract, the contracting parties may examine if there are any other contractual provisions that have a similar effect ie, the doctrine of frustration.” [61] Bagi membolehkan force majeure digunakan, perlu ditunjukkan kepada mahkamah bahawa usaha-usaha yang berkaitan telah dilakukan bagi membolehkan terma-terma dalam perjanjian tersebut dapat dilaksanakan namun ia masih tidak dapat dilaksanakan ekoran daripada berlakunya keadaan di luar kawalan pihak-pihak. Mahkamah berpendapat adalah tidak memadai dengan hanya mengemukakan surat daripada pihak berkuasa yang menyatakan bahawa kontrak Plaintif dan Defendan adalah termasuk di bawah Akta Covid-19 tanpa sebarang keterangan yang menunjukkan bagaimana usaha yang telah dijalankan oleh pihak Defendan bagi membolehkan terma-terma kontrak perjanjian itu dilaksanakan walaupun terdapat Pandemik Covid- 19. Ia sewajarnya dinyatakan di dalam affidavit Defendan. Namun mahkamah berpendapat tiada keterangan yang mencukupi bagi 48 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah mengambil tindakan yang munasabah bagi melaksanakan terma-terma perjanjian tersebut. [62] Mahkamah juga merujuk pandangan dalam artikel Covid-19 and Force Majeure Clause in Commercial Contracts in Malaysia (supra) tersebut seperti berikut: “Looking at this third element, perhaps it is vital to make reference to a situation where a party anticipates falling into difficulty with meeting his obligations. For example, a highly likely scenario with Covid-19 would be the inability to perform a contract due to having to self-isolate an office or a team due to the outbreak of Covid-19 at the workplace. In other words, a case of staff shortages due to self-isolation in accordance with government guidelines or issues with the supply of materials may hinder the performance of the contract in question. Under many force majeure clauses, this would likely have the necessary impact and causal link to qualify as a force majeure event, subject to the party affected having taken all reasonable measures. Thus, it would still be crucial to explore whether alternatives such as sources of labour or materials are reasonably available even at a higher cost, unless it would involve breaching existing contracts.” [63] Berdasarkan kepada affidavit-affidavit yang dikemukakan adalah satu fakta yang tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa terdapat kegagalan pihak Defendan untuk menyerahkan milikan kosong dalam tempoh yang dipersetujui. Persoalannya ialah adakah kegagalan tersebut adalah disebabkan keadaan yang tidak dapat dielakkan ekoran daripada Pandemik Covid-19 sehingga menyebabkan prinsip kekecewaan kontrak dan klausa force majeure terpakai. Dalam kes ini 49 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Mahkamah berpendapat Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan di antara Plaintif dan Defendan adalah persetujuan yang menunjukkan bahawa pihak Plaintif telah sudi untuk melanjutkan tempoh yang telah ditetapkan dalam Perjanjian Pembangunan pertama dan Defendan juga bersetuju untuk menyiapkan bangunan tersebut seperti yang dinyatakan dalam Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan. Mahkamah juga berpendapat tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa pihak Defendan telah dapat menunjukkan bahawa adalah mustahil untuk melaksanakan dan menyiapkan pembinaan unit-unit tersebut seperti yang dipersetujui dalam tempoh yang telah dilanjutkan oleh Plaintif. Oleh itu Mahkamah berpendapat prinsip kekecewaan kontrak dan klausa force majeure tidak dapat digunakan dalam kes ini. [64] Sementara itu Mahkamah juga berpendapat bahawa terma-terma perjanjian tersebut telah jelas dan nyata menunjukkan remedi yang oleh diperolehi sekiranya terdapat pemecahan terma kontrak. Ia telah dilakukan oleh Defendan setelah tidak dapat membina bangunan tersebut dalam tempoh yang telah dipersetujui. Malahan Plaintif dan Defendan telah bersetuju berkenaan dengan remedi yang boleh diperolehi oleh pihak yang memecahkan kontrak tersebut. Mahkamah berpendapat force majeure dan kekecewaan kontrak tidak terpakai dalam kes ini. Remedi [65] Penelitian kepada penyataan tuntutan dan juga kedua-dua perjanjian tersebut terdapat peruntukan yang menyatakan bahawa 50 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal pelaksanaan spesifik boleh diberikan oleh Mahkamah. Walau bagaimanapun berdasarkan kepada fakta dan keterangan dalam kes ini adalah tidak adil untuk Defendan diminta untuk melaksanakan dan menyelesaikan pembinaan bangunan yang dipersetujui dalam perjanjian tersebut. Ini adalah disebabkan Defendan tidak dapat menunjukkan kemampuan untuk menyelesaikan pembinaan tersebut. Perintah untuk melaksanakan pembinaan tersebut mungkin akan menyebabkan Defendan tidak dapat melaksanakannya dan mendedahkan Defendan dengan tindakan oleh pihak Plaintif. Oleh itu Mahkamah merujuk kepada seksyen 18 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 yang menyatakan seperti berikut: “18 Power to award compensation in certain cases (1) Any person suing for the specific performance of a contract may also ask for compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution for, its performance. (2) If in any such suit the court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him compensation accordingly. ILLUSTRATION A contracts to sell a hundred gantangs of rice to B. B brings a suit to compel A to perform the contract or to pay compensation. The court is of opinion that A has made a valid contract and has broken it, without excuse, to the injury of B, but that specific performance is not the proper remedy. It shall award to B such compensation as it deems just. 51 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (3) If in any such suit the court decides that specific performance ought to be granted, but that it is not sufficient to satisfy the justice of the case, and that some compensation for breach of the contract should also be made to the plaintiff, it shall award him such compensation accordingly. ILLUSTRATION A contracts with B to sell him a house for RM1,000, the price to be paid and the possession given on the 1 January. A fails to perform his part of the contract, and B brings his suit for specific performance and compensation, which is decided in his favour. The decree may besides ordering specific performance, award to B compensation for any loss which he has sustained by A's refusal. (4) Compensation awarded under this section may be assessed in such a manner as the court may direct. (5) The circumstance that the contract has become incapable of specific performance shall not preclude the court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this section. ILLUSTRATIONS (a) A, a purchaser, sues B, his vendor, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a patent. Before the hearing of the suit the patent expires. The court may award A compensation for the non-performance of the contract, and may, if necessary, amend the plaint for that purpose. (b) A sues for the specific performance of a resolution passed by the directors of a public company, under which he was entitled to have a certain number of shares allotted to him, and for compensation for the non-performance of the resolution. All the shares had been allotted before the institution of the suit. The court may, under this section, award A compensation for the non-performance.” [66] Dalam kes Bukit Melita Sdn Bhd v. Revolusi Rancak Sdn Bhd [2020] 2 CLJ 199 pemakaian seksyen 18 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950 ini telah dinyatakan seperti berikut: 52 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal “[25] As regards the application of s. 18 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 ("the SRA 1950") it was contended that the court granting the order has the power to award damages if it was of the opinion that merely granting the specific performance was inadequate as to constitute a remedy to the plaintiff's claim. We had occasion to peruse through the authorities cited to us on this issue, and with respect, we were in agreement with learned counsel for the first defendant that the exercise of that power, as stipulated under s. 18(3) of the SRA 1950, must be predicated upon the fact that there must be a specific prayer asking for damages in addition to the prayer for specific performance. In the regard, we would refer to the decision of this bench in the case of NZ New Image Sdn Bhd v. Loh Yok Liang [2016] 9 CLJ 474 ("NZ New Image ") where it was held that: [33] Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 does not give the appellant freedom to act as they wish for it clearly stipulates, and we say that learned counsel did not seem to realise, that a person "may also ask for compensation" for the breach of contract which means therefore that the appellant must necessarily pray for the compensation in the statement of claim if it is intended that the appellant wishes to also seek for damages. In fact, illustrations provided in s. 18(2), (3) and (5) plainly show that the plaintiffs sue for specific performance and for compensation, which was not the case here. Reference in this connection is made to O. 81 r. 1(1)(a) of the Rules of Court 2012 which clearly envisages a situation where an action for specific performance may be begun with or without an alternative claim for damages (Insofex Sdn Bhd v. Labasama Group (M) Sdn Bhd (No. 2) [2000] 6 CLJ 97). Accordingly, where a person wishes to claim for damages, he would have to do so by way of an alternative claim for damages. Or he can otherwise sue for specific performance only. In the present appeal, the essence of the appellant's claim in the circumstances of the case was for specific 53 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal performance only. They did not seek the alternative remedy of damages in lieu of specific performance. [67] Mahkamah mendapati gantirugi yang dipohon oleh Plaintif telah dinyatakan dalam penyataan tuntutan dan juga di dalam kedua-dua perjanjian tersebut. Oleh itu Mahkamah memutuskan seperti berikut: (i) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif wang sejumlah RM987,890.00 sebagai gantirugi sebagai ganti (in lieu of) Perintah Pelaksanaan Spesifik beserta dengan bayaran RM6,300.00 sebulan dikira daripada 01.09.2021 hingga tarikh perintah gantirugi diberikan dan dibayar dalam tempoh empat belas (14) hari dari tarikh perintah; (ii) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif gantirugi sebanyak RM58,500.00 sebagai Agreed Liquidated Damages dikira daripada bulan April 2020 hingga September 2021 di bawah Klausa 7(b) Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan bertarikh 31.05.2019 untuk kelewatan milikan kosong 13 unit rumah kepada Plaintif; (iii) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif gantirugi sebanyak RM107,000.00 sebagai Agreed Liquidated Damages dikira dari April 2020 hingga bulan Ogos 2021 di bawah Klausa 9 Perjanjian Pembangunan Tambahan bertarikh 31.05.2019 untuk kelewatan pembinaan pejabat kedai; 54 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (iv) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif sejumlah wang RM45,600.00 yang merupakan Cukai Tanah tertunggak sehingga tahun 2021 dan berterusan pada kadar RM9,000.00 setahun sehingga tarikh perintah; (v) Defendan membayar kepada Plaintif wang sejumlah RM22,475.40 yang merupakan Cukai Pintu yang tertunggak sehingga tahun 2021 dan berterusan pada kadar RM5,310.00 setahun sehingga tarikh perintah; dan (vi) Kos peguamcara anak guam diberikan RM15,000.00 tertakluk kepada fi alokator. [68] Sementara itu berkenaan dengan tuntutan balas pula Mahkamah berpendapat tiada keterangan yang dapat menyokong tuntutan balas tersebut dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan bagi mewajarkan ianya dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini. Oleh itu tuntutan balas adalah ditolak. Bertarikh: 19hb. Jun 2023 (ROSLAN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR 55 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Plaintif M. Ramachelvam dan Nurul Syuhada Abdullah Tetuan Rama-Rozi & Associates No. 33, Tingkat 1 Jalan Datuk Bahaman 3 28000 Temerloh Pahang Darul Makmur Bagi Pihak Defendan Richard Bong dan Ivan Bong Tetuan Bong & Co No. 24, Tingkat 1, Bangunan Lee Jalan Tengku Bakar 28000 Temerloh Pahang Darul Makmur 56 S/N 1pehTOU85Ua3x8sCs2fd4w **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal