NORAIMI BIN SHAFIE UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA

JA-25-14-04/2022 Page 1 of 22 Kand. 18 29/03/2023 09:18:50 MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM JUDICIAL REVIEW NO. JA-25-14-04/2022 In the matter of an agreement ‘Cuti Belajar’ dated 05.09.2014 between Noraimi Bin Shafie and Universiti Teknologi Malaysia And In the matter of Respondent’s Notice of Demand dated 23.9.2021 and the decision of the appeal dated 12.1.2022 And In the matter of Article 8(1)(2) and 136 of the Federal Constitution And In the matter of the application for a certiorari, mandamus and/or declaratory relief order under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Rules of Court 2012 and/or within the jurisdiction of this Court BETWEEN NORAIMI BIN SHAFIE (No. K/P: 750424-03-5251) …APPLICANT AND UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA …RESPONDENT S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 2 of 22 (HEARD TOGETHER WITH) MALAYSIA IN THE HIGH COURT IN MALAYA AT JOHOR BAHRU IN THE STATE OF JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM JUDICIAL REVIEW NO. JA-25-15-04/2022 In the matter of an agreement ‘Cuti Belajar’ dated 05.02.2010 between Noraslinda Binti Mohamed and Universiti Teknologi Malaysia And In the matter of Respondent’s Notice of Demand dated 17.3.2021 and the decision of the appeal dated 12.1.2022 And In the matter of Article 8(1)(2) and 136 of the Federal Constitution And In the matter of the application for a certiorari, mandamus and/or declaratory relief order under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, Rules of Court 2012 and/or within the jurisdiction of this Court BETWEEN NORASLINDA BINTI MOHAMED ISMAIL (No. K/P: 710314-71-5268) …APPLICANT S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 3 of 22 AND UNIVERSITI TEKNOLOGI MALAYSIA …RESPONDENT GROUNDS OF DECISION [1] These were two applications for judicial review under O.53 Rules of Court 2012 to quash the decision by Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM) to enforce the terms of the study leave contract (perjanjian cuti belajar) entered between the applicants and UTM. After hearing submissions by counsel for the applicants and the preliminary objection by the senior federal counsel on behalf of the Attorney General, I dismissed the applications for leave to commence judicial review. My reasons now follow. [2] For case no JA-25-14-04/2022, the relevant facts as gleaned from the learned SFC’s submission are: “Fakta 3. Tarikh-tarikh penting kes ini, diringkaskan seperti di jadual 1 di bawah seperti dinyatakan di dalam Afidavit Sokongan Pemohon. Jadual I TARIKH PERKARA 30/6/2014 Surat Tawaran Kemasukan ke Program Pengajian Siswazah Sesi Akademik 20142015 (SEM. 1). S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 4 of 22 18/8/2014 Kelulusan Cuti Belajar Dalam Negara bergaji penuh dan Biasiswa SLAB. 5/9/2014 Pemohon tandatangan Perjanjian Cuti Belajar (PCB). 7/9/2014 Permulaan cuti belajar Pemohon. 18/10/2016 Pekeliling Pindaan Bentuk Pendaftaran Pengajian Pasca Siswazah kepada Sepenuh Masa dan berkuatkuasa mulai Semester I Sesi 2016/2017. 6/9/2017 Lapor Diri selepas Cuti Belajar dengan status Belum Selesai dan Tesis Belum Dihantar. 2/4/2019 Surat maklumkan Permohonan Tanggung Pengajian bagi Semester II sesi 2018/2019 diluluskan. 4/2/2019 Tarikh kuatkuasa Taraf Pemohon sebagai Pelajar Berdaftar pada Semester II sesi 2018/2019 ditangguhkan. 7/9/2020 Tarikh akhir Pemohon cuti belajar selepas penangguhan pada Semester II sesi 2018/2019 dibenarkan. 11/3/2021 Pemohon menyerah tesis. 7/5/2021 Pemohon menghadiri peperiksaan lisan (viva-voce) secara atas talian (Cisco Webex). 23/9/2021 Notis Tuntutan Ganti Rugi Pecah Kontrak Cuti Belajar UTM. 20/10/2021 Surat Rayuan Pemohon untuk Pelepasan Tuntutan Ganti Rugi Pecah Kontrak. 30/12/2021 Surat makluman bahawa Pemohon dianugerahkan Doktor Falsafah berkuatkuasa dari 17/11/2021. 12/1/2022 Keputusan Rayuan untuk Pelepasan Tuntutan Ganti Rugi Pecah Kontrak. 12/4/2022 Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman difailkan. 25/4/2022 Notis Peringatan. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 5 of 22 [3] Similarly for case no JA-25-15-04/2022, the relevant facts distilled from the learned SFC’s submission are: “Fakta 3. Tarikh-tarikh penting kes ini, diringkaskan seperti di Jadual 1 di bawah seperti dinyatakan di dalam Afidavit Sokongan Pemohon. Jadual 1 TARIKH PERKARA 12/10/2010 Kelulusan Cuti Belajar Dalam Negara bergaji penuh dan Biasiswa SLAI/UTM dari 9/12/2009 hingga 8/12/2012 (3 Tahun). 5/2/2010 Pemohon tandatangan Perjanjian Perjanjian Cuti Belajar (PCB). 17/12/2012 Lanjutan Tempoh Cuti Belajar diluluskan. Asal – 9/12/2009 hingga 8/12/2012 (3 tahun). Lanjutan Pertama – 9/12/2012 hingga 8/6/2013 (6 bulan). 11/9/2013 Lanjutan Kali Kedua diluluskan. 9/6/2013 hingga 8/9/2013 (3 bulan). 9/9/2013 Lapor diri di Fakulti Sains dengan status Belum Selesai dan Tesis Belum Dihantar. 30/9/2013 Tukar mod pengajian dari sepenuh masa kepada separuh masa mulai Semester I sesi 2013/2014. 7 semester telah digunakan. Baki adalah 7 semester lagi dan semester terakhir adalah pada semester I sesi 2016/2017. 18/10/2016 Pekeliling Pindaan Bentuk Pendaftaran Pengajian Pasca Siswazah kepada Sepenuh Masa dan berkuatkuasa mulai Semester I Sesi 2016/2017. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 6 of 22 29/1/2018 Pemohon serah tesis. 23/7/2018 Peperiksaan Lisan (viva-voce). 21/3/2019 Surat makluman bahawa Pemohon diaugerahkan Doktor Falsafah (Matematik) berkuat kuasa dari 14/1/2019. 31/3/2019 Surat makluman Pemohon lulus PhD dalam Matematik berkuatkuasa 14/1/2019. 13/8/2020 UTM maklum Pemohon belum selesai pengajian dan telah tamat iaitu tempoh 6 tahun dari tarikh diluluskan Cuti Belajar bagi Pengajian Doktor Falsafah. 17/8/2020 Notis Penamatan Cuti Belajar. 17/3/2021 Notis Tuntutan Ganti Rugi Pecah Kontrak Cuti Belajar UTM. 31/3/2021 Rayuan Tuntutan Ganti Rugi. 12/1/2022 Rayuan diluluskan dengan pengurangan. 12/4/2022 Permohonan Semakan Kehakiman difailkan. The applicants must have an arguable case [4] In the case of WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v. Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 CLJ 478, the Federal Court stated: “[12] For purposes of its application, the appellant had alluded to the statutory route of O. 53 of the Rules. Under this order two stages are anticipated, with the leave stage being the first, to be followed closely by the substantive hearing after successfully obtaining leave at the High Court. At the leave stage, on a quick perusal of the material available, if the court thinks that subsequently at the substantive hearing stage an arguable case may be disclosed, and the relief sought may be granted, leave should be granted (IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617). In Malaysia, the Federal S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 7 of 22 Court in Mohd Nordin Johan v. The Attorney-General, Malaysia [1983] 1 CLJ 130; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 271 when allowing the appeal, opined that 'the point taken was not frivolous to merit refusal of leave in limine and justified argument on a substantive motion for certiorari '. Without the need to go into depth of the abundant authorities, suffice if we state that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant outcome. A rider must be attached to the application though ie, unless the matter for judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged.” [5] See also the cases of Mohd Nordin Johan v. The Attorney- General, Malaysia [1983] 1 CLJ 130, FC and Dr. Amir Hussein Bin Baharuddin v. Universiti Sains Malaysia [1989] 3 MLJ 298; [1989] 1 LNS 76 HC. [6] The learned SFC submitted that the applicants failed to show an arguable case which would entitle them to be given leave. She submitted as follows: “6. Kami menghujahkan bahawa pada tahap ini, pihak Pemohon tidak dapat membuktikan bahawa wujudnya arguable case untuk membolehkan ianya disemak oleh mahkamah ini. Bagi tujuan bantahan ini, kami akan memecahkan alasan-alasan kepada no-arguable case tersebut kepada perkara-perkara berikut iaitu: i. misconceived application – not amenable for Judicial Review 1. Subject matter yang dipohon adalah bukan public law related; dan S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 8 of 22 2. Keputusan Responden adalah suatu keputusan public body yang sedang melaksanakan kuatkuasa kontrak antara pihak-pihak – bukan public law ii. procedural non-compliance 1. pre mature dan kesilapan mode of commencement of proceeding dalam memulakan tindakan ini; dan 2. permohonan ini adalah abuse of courts’ process.” [7] With respect to the learned counsel for the applicants, I agree with the submission of the learned SFC. The Law [8] Application for judicial review (O. 53, r. 1) “1. (1) This Order shall govern all applications seeking the relief specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and for the purposes therein specified. (2) This Order is subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII of Part 2 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 [Act 137].” Applications (O. 53, r. 2) “2. (1) An application for any of the reliefs specified in paragraph 1 of the Schedule to the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (other than an application for an order of habeas corpus) shall be in Form 109. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 9 of 22 (2) An application for judicial review may seek any of the reliefs, including a prayer for a declaration, either jointly or in the alternative in the same application if it relates to or is connected with the same subject matter. (3) Upon the hearing of an application for judicial review, the Court shall not be confined to the relief claimed by the applicant but may dismiss the application or make any orders, including an order of injunction or monetary compensation: Provided that the power to grant an injunction shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of section 29 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 [Act 359] and section 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950. (4) Any person who is adversely affected by the decision of any public authority shall be entitled to make the application.” [9] In the case of Subramanyah AJ Karuppiah v. Bank Negara Malaysia [2011] 2 CLJ 178; the Court of Appeal held: “[30] In the present case, it is not in dispute that the appellant was employed by BNM under a contract of employment vide a letter of appointment dated 26 January 1981 and was subjected to the terms and conditions contained therein and as further imposed by BNM from time to time. Paragraph 2(f) of the said letter of appointment specifically states "kakitangan-kakitangan sentiasa dikehendaki patuh kepada syarat- syarat kerja yang ditentukan oleh Bank Negara Malaysia". The said S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 10 of 22 contract does not make any specific reference to the applicability of the General Orders (Cap D). [31] BNM is a statutory body or a body corporate established under s. 3 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 (Revised in 1994). The officers and employees of BNM are appointed by BNM, under s. 15 of the same Act. They hold office for such period, receive such salaries and allowances, and are subject to such other terms and conditions of service as may be determined by the Board of BNM. [32] Clearly the appellant does not fall within the categories of public officer or employees as set out in art. 132 of the Federal Constitution, and therefore is not eligible for the protection and benefits under the General Orders.” [10] The learned SFC submitted that in applying the principles of the above case to the facts of our case, the following should be borne in mind: “a. Antara ciri utama bagi membolehkan Aturan 53 dan Semakan Kehakiman dibuat kepada mana-mana keputusan Pihak Berkuasa Awam ialah, keputusan tersebut hendaklah berkait dengan Public Law. b. Kontrak Perjanjian Cuti Belajar (kemudian ini dirujuk sebagai PCB) bertarikh 5/2/2010 yang dimasuki antara pihak-pihak adalah perkara yang melibatkan antara individu (private) dan tidak boleh dikategorikan sebagai public law. c. Cuma bezanya dalam kes ini, kontrak PCB tersebut dimasuki oleh individu/Pemohon dengan Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. Walau apapun ertinya, ianya tetap di antara individu dan private law (Akta Kontrak), dan bukannya melibatkan public law. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 11 of 22 d. Responden mempunyai hak, kebebasan dan kuasa (rights, privileges and powers) di bawah Kontrak yang ditandatangani bertarikh 5/2/2010 dan di bawah Akta Kontrak untuk menguatkuasakan terma Perjanjian akibat perlanggaran kontrak PCB tersebut.” [11] In the case of Ahmad Jefri Bin Mohd Jahri @ Md Johari v, Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 145; [2010] 5 CLJ 865; the Federal Court said: “[16] One may ask what is the purpose of these conditions? The basic objective is to protect those entrusted with the enforcement of public duties 'against groundless, unmeritorious or tardy harassment that were accorded to statutory tribunals or decision making public authorities by O 53, and which might have resulted in the summary, and would in any event have resulted in the speedy disposition of the application, is among the matters fit to be taken into consideration by the judge in deciding whether to exercise his discretion by refusing to grant a declaration …' as described in the celebrated case of O'Reilly v Mackman [1982] 3 All ER 1124 at p 1133. Further, there is also the need to reduce the delay in resolving such application in the interest of good administration. As Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v Mackman reiterated, 'The public interest in good administration requires that public authorities and third parties should not be kept in suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority has reached in purported exercise of decision making powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary in fairness to the person affected by the decision'. ………. [20] The ratio of this case is: if the claim for infringement is based solely on substantive principles of public law then relief must be by way of an application for judicial review under O 53 of the RHC. If it was commenced by writ or by originating summons then this would be considered an abuse of the court's process and should be struck out S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 12 of 22 under O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC. But if the matter is under private law though concerning a public authority, O 53 of the RHC is not a suitable. But the distinction and the boundaries between public law and private law are difficult to ascertain in practice though in principle it is clear. Further, what would happen if a matter is a mixture of public law and private law? In our instant appeal, there is also the argument that O 15 r 16 of the RHC to be read with s 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1967, which allows a claimant seeking declaratory relief to commence his claim by writ or originating summons. ……….. [61] We observed that a challenge on the use of appropriate procedure is very much fact based. Thus, it is necessary for a judge when deciding on such matter to first ascertain whether there is a public law element in the dispute. If the claim for infringement is based solely on substantive principles of public law then the appropriate process should be by way of O 53 of the RHC. If it is a mixture of public and private law then the court must ascertain which of the two is more predominant. If it has substantial public law element then the procedure under O 53 of the RHC must be adopted. Otherwise it may be set aside on ground that it abuses the court's process. But if the matter is under private law though concerning a public authority, the mode to commence such action under O 53 of the RHC is not suitable. Aside from this, there could be other circumstances like the kind in YAB Dato' Dr Zambry. Much depends on the facts of the case. But generally the court should be circumspect in allowing a matter which should be by way of O 53 of the RHC to proceed in another form. To say that it is opened to any applicant seeking judicial review to elect any mode he prefers, as implied in Kuching Waterfront, would, in our considered opinion, be rendering O 53 of the RHC redundant. This is certainly not the intention of the drafters of this rule who had a purpose in mind. When the purpose of this rule is in the interest of good administration then this rule must be adhered to except in the limited and exceptional circumstances discussed.” S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 13 of 22 [12] The Malaysian Civil Procedure (White Book) 2018 edition states: “Judicial review—Judicial review provides a means by which judicial control of administrative actions is exercised (Ahmad Jefri bin Mohd Jahri @ Md Johari v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 145; [2010] 5 CLJ 865, FC). Generally, judicial review refers to the process of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court over proceedings and decisions of inferior courts, tribunals and other bodies or persons who carry out quasi-judicial functions or who are charged with the performance of public acts and duties. What is meant by judicial review in Malaysia is (1) review of the decision of the executive and/or an inferior tribunal, etc; (2) review of legislation; (3) review of constitutional amendment; and (4) review of a policy decision (see Teh Guat Hong v Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional [2015] 3 AMR 35; [2015] MLJU 213; and Pathmanathan a/l Krishnan (also known as Muhammad Riduan bin Abdullah) v Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho and other appeals [2016] 3 AMR 35; [2016] 4 MLJ 455; [2016] 1 CLJ 911). Relief under Order 53—The rule enables an applicant to seek any combination of remedies, including mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, declaration, injunction and monetary compensation. The court may grant any relief and is not confined to the relief claimed by the applicant (Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 AMR 1900; [2002] 2 MLJ 413). See further, Abdul Aziz bin Mohamed Ginan & 108 Ors v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur [2007] 4 AMR 388; [2007] 3 MLJ 12; [2008] 1 CLJ 464, HC. Broadly, if the proceedings are directed to challenging a decision of a public law nature, and are not for the enforcement of private rights, an application for judicial review is the only permissible course; the court will not permit an action for a declaration to be used as a means of circumventing the procedural restrictions on the availability of judicial review, in particular the rule that S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 14 of 22 leave to apply for judicial review must be obtained and the time limit of three months (see O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237; [1982] 3 All ER 1124, HL). Hence, such proceedings if brought by way of private action without resorting to Order 53 is an abuse of process of the court: Bencon Development Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang & Ors [1999] 2 AMR 1440; [1999] 2 MLJ 385; Yahya bin Kassim v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 3 MLJJ 749, CA; O’Reilly v Mackman (above); Subramaniam Vythilingam v The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suhakam) & 5 Ors [2003] 3 AMR 213; [2003] 6 CLJ 175; Heywood v Hull Prison Board of Visitors & Anor [1980] 3 All ER 594. The Court of Appeal in Permodalan Negeri Selangor (PNSB) & Anor v Citrasama Projek Sdn Bhd & Anor [2017] AMEJ 0082; [2017] MLJU 25 dismissed the appellant’s appeal on the basis that the claim for infringement concerned private law relief rather than public law relief. The Court of Appeal, following Ahmad Jefri Mohd Jahri v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 5 CLJ 865, held that if the claim for infringement is based solely on substantive principles of public law then relief must be by way of an application for judicial review under Order 53. However, if the matter is within the realm of private law, though concerning a public authority, Order 53 is not suitable. Public authority—Judicial review will lie against any person or body of person charged with any public duty: Chin Shui Lan v Director of Lands & Surveys [1995] 4 CLJ 358. This public duty must be susceptible to judicial review: Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd v Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224, quoting from Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935; [1985] AC 374, HL. The “public authority” is the body/person having the final say in connection with the determination of the issue in question: Fan Yew Teng v Government of Malaysia [1976] 2 MLJ 262 at 266–267. A body whose role is merely to recommend while, with or without the recommendation, the power to decide lies elsewhere, should not have been made a party at all (Bencon Development Sdn Bhd v S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 15 of 22 Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang & Ors [1999] 2 AMR 1440; [1999] 2 MLJ 385). The court will look at the structure, nature, powers, duties and functions of the body in issue to look for existence of a “public element”: OSK & Partners Sdn Bhd v Tengku Noone Aziz & Anor [1983] 1 MLJ 179, SC; Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Tekali Prospecting Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 AMR 3082; [2002] 2 MLJ 707; R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p Datafin [1987] QB 815 at 838. Private entities such as a limited company duly incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act 1965 (Act 125) or the Companies Act 2016 (Act 777) and its agents including special administrators appointed under the provisions of the Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad Act 1998 (Act 587) are not public authorities within the scope of Order 53 r 2(4): Wong Koon Seng v Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd & Ors [2002] AMEJ 0231; [2002] 1 MLJ 98. Essentially in determining whether a party in a judicial review application is a public body, the following test enunciated by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as His Lordship was then) is instructive: see Tekali Prospecting Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd & Anor [2001] AMEJ 0135; [2002] 1 MLJ 113: “So what answer us to be given to the question: does judicial review lie against the appellant? In our view, the answer lies in two words. It depends.” If the activity of the appellant in the private law sphere is called into question, eg the wrongful allotment or issuance of shares, the alleged wrongful removal of a director and the like, then, plainly judicial review will not lie. On the other hand, if the activity complained of falls within the public law environment, then of course judicial review will be available. The above passage was endorsed by the Federal Court in the recent case of WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 296, which also went on to approve the following passage from Ahmad S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 16 of 22 Jefri bin Mohd Jahri @ Md Johari v Pengarah Kebudayaan & Kesenian Johor & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 145, FC: “. . . It is widely accepted that not every decision made by an authoritative body is suitable for judicial review. To qualify there must be sufficient public law element in the decision made. 3.—(1) An application under this Order shall not be made unless leave therefore has been granted in accordance with this rule. (2) An application for leave must be made ex parte to a Judge in Chambers and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on. (3) The applicant must give notice of the application for leave not later than three days before the hearing date to the Attorney General’s Chambers and must at the same time lodge in those Chambers copies of the statement and affidavits. (4) The Judge may, in granting leave, impose such terms as to costs and as to the giving of security as he thinks fit. (5) The grant of leave under this rule shall not, unless the Judge so directs, operate as a stay of the proceedings in question. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 17 of 22 (6) An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant. (7) The Court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 3(6) if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so. (8) An application to extend time must be served on all respondents and shall be heard inter partes.” The leave stage—The application for leave must be made in the prescribed form, Form 109. The purpose of the leave requirement is to protect the public administration against false, frivolous or tardy challenges to official action. This policy has something in common with the policy of requiring leave to appeal, namely to act as a filter against frivolous or unmeritorious proceedings (Kemper Reinsurance Co v Minister of Finance & Ors [2000] 1 AC 1 at 14, PC; O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] 2 AC 237 at 280; [1982] 3 All ER 1124, HL). Therefore, to obtain leave an applicant has to demonstrate that his application is not frivolous or vexatious: Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v A- G, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68; Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia v Malayan Commercial Banks Association [1990] 3 MLJ 228 at 229; Lam Kong Co Ltd v Thong Guan Co Pte Ltd [2000] 3 AMR 3304; [2000] 4 MLJ 1 at 18; [2000] 3 CLJ 769, FC; YAM Tunku Dato’ Seri Nadzaruddin Ibni Tuanku Ja’afar v Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur & Anor [2003] 1 AMR 352; [2003] 5 MLJ 128; George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319; Marcel Jude Joseph v Minister of Education, Ministry of Education, Malaysia [2012] 2 AMR 599; [2012] 4 MLJ 555; Ta Wu Realty Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri & Anor [2008] 5 AMR 458; [2008] 6 CLJ 235. The S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 18 of 22 applicant has to show that there is an arguable case for granting the relief claimed: MAS Golden Boutique Sdn Bhd v Md Zain Abu [1999] AMEJ 0266; [1999] 3 CLJ 610. The High Court should not go into the merits of the case at leave stage: Tang Kwor Ham & 2 Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & 5 Ors (unreported; Civil Appeal No M–02– 644–03). See also Inland Revenue Commissioners v National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617 at 643; [1981] 2 All ER 93 at 106, HL. The approach of the Court of Appeal in Tang Kwor Ham v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd [2006] 4 AMR 89 to a leave application was disapproved by the Federal Court in Wong Kin Hoong v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar [2013] 4 AMR 211. At the leave stage an applicant must act uberrimae fidei and make full and frank disclosure; otherwise the court may revoke the leave. See Viking Askim Sdn Bhd v National Union of Employees in Companies Manufacturing Rubber Products & Anor [1991] 2 MLJ 115 and the cases therein cited. The principles concerning disclosure in ex parte applications for injunctions are applicable in leave applications under Order 53: Co-operative Central Bank Ltd (in receivership) v Rashid Cruz bin Abdullah & Ors [2004] 2 AMR 104; [2004] 1 MLJ 626 at 633. Where the High Court refuses leave and the Court of Appeal reverses, it has jurisdiction to hear the matter on its substantive merits: Mohamed Nordin bin Johan v A-G, Malaysia [1983] 1 MLJ 68; J P Berthelsen v Director General of Immigration, Malaysia & Ors [1987] 1 MLJ 134. But this jurisdiction will only be exercised in appropriate cases: Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan Peguam Malaysia & Anor [2002] 2 AMR 1900; [2002] 2 MLJ 413. The question of leave was revisited recently by the Federal Court in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 296, where it was reiterated that leave may be granted if the leave application is not thought of as frivolous, and if leave is granted, an arguable case S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 19 of 22 in favour of granting the relief sought at the substantive hearing may be the resultant objective. The Federal Court added that “A rider must be attached to the application though i.e. unless the matter of judicial review is amenable to judicial review absolutely no success may be envisaged”. The threshold at the leave stage is extremely low. As such, affidavit evidence as to why leave should be refused must be given by the Attorney General or other party who seeks to oppose the application. In the absence of such an affidavit it is not open to the court to hear oral objections and refuse leave. See Teh Guat Hong v Perbadanan Tabung Pendidikan Tinggi Nasional [2015] 3 AMR 35, CA. Ex parte hearing—Leave is applied for ex parte under r 3(1). However, while the respondent has no right of appearance, the court may invite the putative respondent(s) to seek their view on specific legal issues or to assist in coming to a decision whether to grant leave: Kanawagi a/l Seprumaniam v Dato’ Abdul Hamid bin Mohamad [2004] 5 MLJ 495; Bandar Utama Development Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia & Anor [1998] 1 MLJ 224. Where a party does not have a right to intervene but the court takes the view that the importance of the questions involved in the proceedings, the intervention as amicus curiae is permissible. There is an overriding discretion given to the court, in the absence of intervener application for the court by its own motion to hear persons who desire to be heard: Jerry WA Dusing @ Jerry W Patel & Anor v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2016] 6 AMR 47; [2017] 1 MLJ 216. The Attorney-General has a discretion whether to appear at the hearing for leave and if the Attorney-General appears, the court is bound to hear the Attorney-General but it must noted that the role of the Attorney General at the leave stage is a limited one: Kanawagi a/l Seprumaniam v Dato’ Abdul Hamid bin Mohamad (above); George John v Goh Eng Wah Bros Filem Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 1 MLJ 319 at 320. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 20 of 22 The Attorney-General has locus standi and a special right to appeal in the public interest against leave granted: Peguam Negara Malaysia v Nurul Izzah Anwar & Ors [2017] 5 CLJ 595. Statutory statement—Under Order 53 r 3(2), the application for leave must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought (Dr A Dutt v Assunta Hospital [1981] 1 MLJ 304). Grounds omitted in the statement cannot be relied upon at the hearing by the applicant, or at the appellate stage. The principle that a party is bound by his own pleadings applies: V Paul Raj Chelladurai v Jabatan Telekom (M) Bhd & 2 Ors [2000] 2 AMR 2435; [2000] 3 MLJ 652, CA. There is however power in a judge to grant leave to amend the statement pursuant to r 7.” [13] Ergo, in conclusion it can be summarised as stated by the learned SFC in her submission: “a. keputusan Responden adalah berdasarkan kepada kontrak antara pihak-pihak; b. keputusan tersebut TIDAK boleh ditakrifkan sebagai Keputusan yang melibatkan public law; c. Kausa tindakan yang tepat ialah terarah kepada pemecahan kontrak antara pihak-pihak (private law); d. Keputusan responden adalah tidak boleh disemak melalui Semakan Kehakiman; e. Pemohon telah tersilap dalam memulakan tindakan ini dengan menggunakan Permohonan di bawah Aturan 53 KKM 2012; dan S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 21 of 22 f. Tindakan Pemohon memfailkan permohonan Semakan Kehakiman di bawah Aturan 53 KKM 2012 ini merupakan satu tindakan penyalahgunaan proses dan kuasa Mahkamah, remeh dan menyusahkan.” [14] Therefore based on what has been adumbrated above, I dismissed the applications for leave made by the applicants as this was not a public law matter, on the contrary it was a private law issue id est a contractual dispute between the applicants and the respondent. [15] Cadit quaestio. Dated 28th March 2023 -Signed- ………………….………. (ASLAM B ZAINUDDIN) Judge High Court in Malaya Johor Bahru Note: This judgment is subject to correction of typographical errors, grammatical mistakes and editorial formatting, if any. S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Page 22 of 22 COUNSEL For the Applicants: Fadhil Ihsan (Syahmi Nawawi with him) Messrs Azwad Ihsan & Co Advocates & Solicitors No. 05-01 Jln Padi Emas 1/5 UDA Business Centre, Bandar Baru Uda 81200 Johor Bahru For the Respondent: Zahilah binti Mohammad Yusoff, SFC (Unit Guaman) Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Johor Aras 2, Bangunan Dato’ Jaafar Muhammad Kota Iskandar 79100 Iskandar Puteri S/N UukR9CsXeEGL/URSCw87BA **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal