NURAZLINA BINTI ABD KADIR 1. ) FAUZIAH BINTI MOHD YUSOF @ MAT YUSOF 2. ) XXXX 3. ) SIM YOKE FONG

CB-12B-2-01/2024 Kand. 14 04/02/2025 16:29:40 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI TEMERLOH DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO. CB-12B-2-01/2024 ANTARA NURAZLINA BINTI ABD KADIR (NO. K/P: 820913-03-5464) … PERAYU DAN 1. FAUZIAH BINTI MOHD YUSOF @ MAT YUSOF (NO. K/P: 700107-06-5208) 2. NAJMI FAIQ BIN MOHD NOOR (NO. K/P: 071128-14-0095) [Seorang yang belum dewasa menuntut Melalui ibu dan wakil litigasinya FAUZIAH BINTI MOHD YUSOF @ MAT YUSOF] 3. SIM YOKE FONG … RESPONDEN- (NO. K/P: 810617-14-5002) RESPONDEN 1 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Di Temerloh Dalam Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur, Malaysia Guaman Sivil No. CB-A53KJ-75-04/2022 ANTARA 1. FAUZIAH BINTI MOHD YUSOF @ MAT YUSOF (NO. K/P: 700107-06-5208) … PLAINTIF PERTAMA 2. NAJMI FAIQ BIN MOHD NOOR … PLAINTIF KEDUA (NO. K/P: 071128-14-0095) [Seorang yang belum dewasa menuntut Melalui ibu dan wakil litigasinya FAUZIAH BINTI MOHD YUSOF @ MAT YUSOF] 3. SIM YOKE FONG (NO. K/P: 810617-14-5002) … PLAINTIF KETIGA DAN NURAZLINA BINTI ABD KADIR (NO. K/P: 820913-03-5464) … DEFENDAN] 2 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah rayuan terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkaitan dengan tuntutan gantirugi ekoran daripada kemalangan jalan raya. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memutuskan 100 % liabiliti kepada Responden. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga mengawardkan kuantum gantirugi dalam kes ini. [2] Apa yang menarik dalam kes ini ialah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam alasan penghakiman beliau mengesahkan bahawa pihak Defendan telah membuat keputusan untuk tidak memberikan keterangan dalam kes ini. Ini telah dinyatakan di muka surat 5 Rekod Rayuan iaitu di perenggan [15] alasan penghakiman seperti yang berikut: “[15] Sepanjang perbicaraan kes ini, Defendan tidak pernah menghadirkan diri untuk memberi keterangan di Mahkamah mengenai kemalangan ini. Mahkamah merujuk kes Jaafar Shaari & Siti Jama Hashim v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693: “Once a defendant in civil proceedings elects not to call evidence, then all the evidence led by the Plaintiff must be assumed to be true”. 3 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Satu “adverse inference” boleh diambil terhadap Defendan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana gagal untuk memberi keterangan.” [3] Berdasarkan kepada alasan penghakiman Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa Defendan adalah bertanggungjawab cuai 100 %. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah menggunapakai seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 terhadap Defendan di atas kegagalan Defendan mengemukakan saksi dalam kes ini. [4] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti kepada nota keterangan untuk melihat apakah sebenarnya yang berlaku dalam kes ini sehingga menyebabkan pihak Defendan telah membuat keputusan tidak mengemukakan keterangan. Apabila kes ini telah berada di akhir kes pihak Plaintif, di mana dalam kes tersebut hakim bicara telah mengemukakan persoalan seperti yang berikut: JUDGE Ya, sebab saya perlu jelas berkenaan persetujuan itu. Saya tidak mahu ada perkara berbangkit seperti saksi ini tidak dipanggil dan sebagainya sedangkan pihak telah menutup kes. Saya tak nak berbangkit begitu lah. Jadi, setakat mana ianya dihujahkan? Kalau begitu, saya serah kepada persetujuan pihak-pihak, ya. 4 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [5] Seterusnya Mahkamah juga meneliti nota keterangan berkaitan dengan keputusan Defendan untuk tidak mengemukakan keterangan tersebut yang terdapat di halaman 42 KM 5 seperti yang berikut: PP Plaintif tutup kes, Tuan. JUDGE Ya. Sebelum itu, Mahkamah ingin clarify lah daripada peguam Plaintif terutamanya, boleh jealskan maksud ianya diterima subject kepada submission ini? Ada apa-apa skop supaya tak berbangkit apa-apa isu lah, sebab memandangkan saksi ini tidak akan dipanggil? PP Tuan, dokumen ini kita terima sebagai eksibit, Tuan. [6] Seterusnya di halaman 44 KM 5 dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: JUDGE Defendan tidak akan memanggil saksi ke? PD Tuan, kita tidak dapat menghubungi saksi tersebut dan kita bersedia untuk menutupkan kes ini. [7] Akhirnya Mahkamah memerintahkan seperti yang berikut di akhir kes: JUDGE Ok, dengan ini, Mahkamah mengarahkan untuk pihak- pihak berhujah dengan menyediakan hujahan bertulis serentak. Tarikh pemfailan, satu bulan daripada 5 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal sekarang, 4 September. Jurubahasa, check 4 September. Ok, 4 September untuk hujahan serentak. Kemudian, reply pada 18 September. Ok, reply. Kemudian, untuk keputusan pada 3 Oktober. Ok, 3 Oktober, secara e-review. Ok, 4 September untuk hujahan serentak. 18 September untuk hujahan balas. 3 Oktober, keputusan secara e-review. Sekiranya ada apa-apa hujahan tambahan daripada mana-mana pihak, dikehendaki memfailkan satu minggu sebelum 3 Oktober. [8] Penelitian kepada nota keterangan itu menunjukkan bahawa pihak Defendan telah memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah bahawa dia tidak akan memanggil saksi-saksi disebabkan saksi-saksi tersebut tidak dapat dikesan. Walau bagaimanapun pihak-pihak Plaintif dan Defendan bersetuju untuk mengemukakan hujahan berkenaan dengan kuantum berdasarkan kepada laporan-laporan yang telah dikemukakan di Mahkamah. [9] Setelah mendapat pengesahan daripada kedua-dua pihak, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah memutuskan bahawa keterangan Plaintif adalah diterima dan dianggap sebagai benar. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen juga menggunakan inferens yang bertentangan (adverse inference) di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 kerana Defendan telah gagal memberikan keterangan. Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah bersandarkan kepada kes Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (supra). 6 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Analisa [10] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan bahawa di dalam sesuatu perbicaraan Mahkamah tidak wajar mengganggu dapatan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara. Ini adalah disebabkan hakim bicara mempunyai peluang untuk melihat saksi-saksi ketika mereka memberi keterangan dan membuat penilaian yang sewajarnya kepada keterangan- keterangan yang telah diberikan tersebut. Namun demikian, jika didapati terdapat apa-apa kesilapan dalam penilaian keterangan- keterangan, maka Mahkamah boleh mengganggu dapatan hakim bicara tersebut. [11] Pendekatan yang perlu diambil perhatian oleh Mahkamah berkenaan dengan penilaian keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Gann Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin & Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309 yang dikatakan sebagai penilaian keterangan yang tidak mencukupi (insufficient judicial appreciation of the evidence) yang mana dinyatakan: “In our view, the Court of Appeal in citing these cases had clearly borne in mind the central feature of appellate intervention ie, to determine whether or not the trial court had arrived at its decision or finding correctly on the basis of the relevant law and/or the established evidence. In so doing, the Court of Appeal was perfectly entitled to examine the process of evaluation of the evidence by the trial court. Clearly, the phrase "insufficient judicial 7 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal appreciation of evidence" merely related to such a process. This is reflected in the Court of Appeal's restatement that a judge who was required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. The Court of Appeal further reiterated the principle central to appellate intervention ie, that a decision arrived at by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the evidence might be set aside on appeal. This is consistent with the established plainly wrong test. [12] Isu berkenaan dengan kesilapan yang ketara (plainly wrong) dan ujian yang perlu digunakan dinyatakan dalam kes Henderson v Foxworth Investment Ltd and another [2014] 1 WLR 2600 seperti yang berikut: 66 These dicta are couched in different language, but they are to the same general effect, and assist in understanding what Lord Macmillan is likely to have intended when he said that the trial judge might be shown “otherwise to have gone plainly wrong”. Consistently with the approach adopted by Lord Thankerton in particular, the phrase can be understood as signifying that the decision of the trial judge cannot reasonably be explained or justified. 67 It follows that, in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as (without attempting an exhaustive account) a material 8 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal error of law, or the making of a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence, or a demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence, or a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence, an appellate court will interfere with the findings of fact made by a trial judge only if it is satisfied that his decision cannot reasonably be explained or justified. 68 This approach is consistent, as I have explained, with the Scottish authorities, and also with more recent authority in this court and in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council: see, for example, In re B (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Threshold Criteria) [2013] 1 WLR 1911, paras 52–53, per Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury PSC. A similar approach has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada (see HL v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 401, paras 55–56) and by the United States Supreme Court: see Anderson v Bessemer (1985) 470 US 564, 573–574.” [13] Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menjelaskan perkara ini ketika menerima pakai prinsip kesilapan yang ketara (plainly wrong). Misalnya dalam kes Director of Forest Sarawak & Ors v Nicholas Mujah Ason & Ors [2020] 2 CLJ 1 dan Ng Hoo Kui v Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng, Administrator of the Estates of Tan Ewe Kwang, Deceased & Ors [2020] 10 CLJ 1 yang menerangkan bahawa Mahkamah perlu melihat sama ada penilaian yang diberikan oleh hakim bicara itu adalah sesuatu yang boleh dikategorikan sebagai kesilapan yang ketata (plainly wrong) sehingga menyebabkan campur tangan oleh Mahkamah yang 9 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal mendengar rayuan. Dalam kes Ng Hoo Kui (supra) tersebut dinyatakan seperti yang berikut: [54] Premised on Thomas v. Thomas (supra) and Henderson (supra) Lord Reed qualified that the "plainly wrong" test only comes into play in the absence of the following: (i) material error of law; (ii) critical factual finding which had no basis in evidence; (iii) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and (iv) demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. [14] Mahkamah Rayuan juga telah menyatakan berkenaan dengan prinsip tersebut dalam kes Kerajaan Malaysia v PDS Training Camp Sdn Bhd and another appeal [2024] 6 MLJ 196 seperti yang berikut: [17] However, it is plain that our function here is merely that of review based on the record of appeal. In Perembun (M) Sdn Bhd v Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 149; [2012] CLJU 1416 (CA), Abdul Wahab Patail JCA held as follows with emphasis added by us: [4] Both parties began their submissions with the clear understanding that an appellate court will be slow to interfere with the findings of facts and judicial appreciation of the facts in the trial judge. They cited this court in Sivalingam a/l Periasamy v Periasamy & Anor [1995] 3 MLJ 395; [1996] 4 CLJ 545 (CA). This general principle was 10 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal adopted by this court in Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97; [2003] 2 CLJ 19 and other cases. It is clear it is a general principle and that there are exceptions when appellate intervention is necessary to ensure justice is done. In the cases regularly cited, the terms ‘intervene’ and ‘interfere’ are used interchangeably. A more precise use of terminology would remove much unnecessary confusion and argument. It is more precise to say that an appellate court will intervene to correct an injustice when it is shown to have occurred in the trial court, but it would be an interference otherwise. ... [7] There is almost no limit to the range within which cases in court may vary. At one end there are cases that involve solely questions of law, and no facts are disputed. On the other there are cases that involve no law but all the facts are disputed. Within these cases there may be cases with disputed facts that involve solely interpretation and inferences leading to a conclusion on a finding on the disputed fact, and there may be other cases with disputed facts that involve solely oral evidence and the finding depends entirely upon an assessment of the credibility of witnesses who testified and were tested before the trial judge. [8] Hence, the proper approach is that if: (a) it is shown that the judgment cannot be explained or justified by the special 11 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal advantage enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses testify and being tested before him; and (b) an injustice is demonstrated to have been occasioned by any error by the trial judge, for example: (a) the judgment is based upon a wrong premise of fact or of law; (b) there was insufficient judicial appreciation by the trial judge of the evidence of circumstances placed before him; (c) the trial judge has completely overlooked the inherent probabilities of the case; (d) that the course or events affirmed by the trial judge could not have occurred; (e) the trial judge had made an unwarranted deduction based on faulty judicial reasoning from admitted or established facts; or (f) the trial judge had so fundamentally misdirected himself that one may safely say that no reasonable court which had properly directed itself and asked the correct questions would have arrived at the same conclusion; an appellate court will intervene to rectify that error so that injustice is not occasioned. [18] Moreover, in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v Wendy Tan Lee Peng (administratrix for the estate of Tan Ewe Kwang, deceased) & 12 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Ors [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 10 CLJ 1 (FC), Zaleha Yusof FCJ held as follows with emphasis also added by us: [71] From the aforesaid authorities, there appears to be a difference in approach taken and applied by the UK Supreme Court and the approach taken by the Malaysian courts. Whilst Lord Reed in Henderson separated the four non-exhaustive identifiable errors of a trial judge from the plainly wrong test: (a) a material error of law; (b) a critical finding of fact which has no basis in the evidence; (c) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and (d) a demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence; (all of which justifies appellate intervention of a trial judge’s decision), this court in Gan Yook Chin effectively included them under what amount to the trial judge as being ‘plainly wrong’. [72] The phrase ‘lack of judicial appreciation of evidence’ used in Gan Yook Chin could very well encompass three out of four errors of a trial judge (other than the ‘material error of law’) said to be identifiable by Lord Reed in Henderson, namely: (a) critical factual finding which has no basis in evidence; 13 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (b) demonstrable misunderstanding of relevant evidence; and (c) demonstrable failure to consider relevant evidence. [73] Given that the issue at present is about identifying situations where the findings of fact by a trial court justify appellate intervention, the other identifiable error of ‘material error of law’ listed by Lord Reed in Henderson can occur when a trial judge erroneously apply legal principles (eg rules of evidence) in the course of making a finding of fact, thus resulting in a lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. For example, when a trial judge erroneously placed a burden of proof on a party, that will lead the judge to misdirect himself when he attempts to interpret the factual matrix before him. The commission of material error of law by the trial judge in arriving at his conclusions (eg, the requirement of proof of intention in constructive trust as opposed to express trust), also justifies an appellate court reversing such conclusions. [74] Thus, whilst there is a slight difference in approach of appellate intervention, both the UK Supreme Court and our Federal Court effectively shares a common thread where it has been held that appellate intervention is justified where there is lack of judicial appreciation of evidence. 14 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [75] The Court of Appeal in Singapore applies the plainly wrong test which is similar to our Federal Court, as illustrated in Damu Jadhao v Paras Nath Singh [1965] 2 MLJ 151; [1965] CLJU 30; [1965] 1 LNS 30, when it held: The principles under which an appellate court acts when an appellant seeks to displace the conclusion arrived at by a trial judge on questions of fact have been very recently restated by the Privy Council in the case of Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] 1 MLJ 87; [1964] CLJU 202; [1964] 1 LNS 202 at 153 need only refer to a passage of the judgment of Lord Guest when dealing with the matter, where he states: Before the Court of Appeal in Singapore was entitled to reject the trial judge’s estimate of the credibility of the appellant and Goh Leh they would have to be satisfied that the trial judge’s view was plainly wrong and that any advantage which he enjoyed by having seen and heard the witnesses was not sufficient to explain his conclusion. This case seems to me to be completely dependent on the trial judge’s estimate of the credibility of the appellant and his witnesses and nothing that counsel for the appellant has put forward in his 15 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal arguments before me has persuaded me that the trial judge’s view of the credibility of the witnesses before him was in any way plainly wrong. [76] What is pertinent is that, the ‘plainly wrong’ test is not intended to be used by an appellate court as a mean to substitute its own decision for that of the trial court on the facts. [77] It is to be observed that this court in Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra had referred to McGraddie and Henderson and has adopted the Henderson approach of the ‘plainly wrong’ test in determining whether the trial court’s findings of fact is reversible upon appeal: Recently in Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd and Another [2014] 1 WLR 2600, the United Kingdom Supreme Court held that in the absence of some other identifiable error, such as a material error of law or the making of a critical factual finding which had not interfered with the factual finding which had no basis in the evidence, an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was ‘plainly wrong’ in the sense that it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached, and that if the 16 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal appellate court was not satisfied that the decision came within that category it was irrelevant that, with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge. [78] Hence following this court’s ruling in Tengku Dato’ Ibrahim Petra Tengku Indra Petra an appellate court should not interfere with the factual findings of a trial judge unless it was satisfied that the decision of the trial judge was ‘plainly wrong’ where in arriving at the decision it could not reasonably be explained or justified and so was one which no reasonable judge could have reached. If the decision did not fall within any of the aforesaid category, it is irrelevant, even if the appellate court thinks that with whatever degree of certainty, it considered that it would have reached a different conclusion from the trial judge. [79] The outcome of the present appeal would therefore turn upon whether the findings of the learned trial judge were reasonably made. ... [148] Given the aforesaid, we form the view that rather than adopting a rigid set of rules to demarcate the boundaries of appellate intervention insofar as findings of fact are concerned, the ‘plainly wrong’ test as espoused in decisions of this court should be retained as a flexible guide for appellate courts. As long as the trial judge’s conclusion can 17 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal be supported on a rational basis in view of the material evidence, the fact that the appellate court feels like it might have decided differently is irrelevant. In other words, a finding of fact that would not be repugnant to common sense ought not to be disturbed. The trial judge should be accorded a margin of appreciation when his treatment of the evidence is examined by the appellate courts. [15] Tatacara susunan ucapan dalam sesuatu prosiding sivil telah dinyatakan di bawah A 5 k 4 KKM 2012 yang boleh diringkaskan seperti berikut: (a) Plaintif hendaklah memulakan sesuatu kes dengan membuka kesnya. Ia dilakukan melalui keterangan saksi- saksi di Mahkamah. (b) Defendan setelah Plaintif selesai mengemukakan keterangan dan menutup kesnya Defendan akan mengemukakan keterangan melalui saksi-saksinya. [16] Ini telah dinyatakan dengan jelas di bawah A 35 k 4 KKM 2012 seperti berikut: 4. Susunan ucapan (A. 35 k. 4) (1) Hakim yang di hadapannya suatu tindakan dibicarakan boleh memberi arahan tentang pihak yang akan memulakan dan 18 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal susunan ucapan pada perbicaraan, dan, tertakluk kepada apa- apa arahan yang sedemikian, pihak yang akan memulakan dan susunan ucapan itu hendaklah sebagaimana yang diperuntukkan oleh kaedah ini. (2) Tertakluk kepada perenggan (6), plaintif hendaklah memulakan dengan membuka kesnya. (3) Sekiranya defendan memilih untuk tidak mengemukakan keterangan, maka, sama ada atau tidak defendan telah mengemukakan dokumen semasa berlangsungnya pemeriksaan balas ke atas seorang saksi bagi pihak plaintif atau selainnya, plaintif boleh, selepas keterangan bagi pihaknya telah diberikan, membuat ucapan kedua untuk menutup kesnya dan defendan hendaklah kemudiannya pula menyatakan kesnya. [17] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati bahawa pihak Defendan tidak menyatakan bahawa dia tidak mempunyai kes untuk dijawab sehingga menyebabkan hakim boleh mengarahkan hujahan dikemukakan berkenaan perkara tersebut. Apa yang ada dalam kes ini ialah pihak Defendan tidak dapat memanggil saksi-saksi Defendan setelah Plaintif mengakhiri kesnya. Fakta ini adalah sama seperti yang berlaku di dalam kes Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (supra). Ini dapat dilihat seperti berikut: “In the instant case, there was no intention expressed about making a submission of no case to answer, therefore there was 19 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal no need for the trial court to put the defence to such election. Any such perceived intention was in fact very clearly contradicted by the defence referring to O 28 r 16(3) aforesaid applicable to a normal order of speeches in the sessions court. The defendants had however chosen to close the case at the end of the plaintiffs’ case; they were entitled to do so though they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having any adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call any such evidence should the circumstances appropriately call for such an adverse inference or for the presumption of avoiding unfavourable evidence by the defence to be invoked against the defendants.” [18] Apa yang menarik dalam kes Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (supra) Mahkamah Persekutuan telah memberikan garis panduan yang mendalam berkenaan dengan ucapan di dalam suatu prosiding sivil dan kesan kepada kegagalan mematuhi aturan tersebut. Adalah didapati dalam kes tersebut aturan yang dirujuk adalah A 28 k 16 Kaedah Mahkamah Rendah 1980 yang pari materia dengan A 35 k 4 KKM 2012. YA Hakim Peh Swee Chin menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “Order 28 r 16(1), (2) and (3) regulate the order of speeches when an action comes up for hearing in the ordinary way in the absence of any contrary or other directions from the court and provide that where the defence elects not to adduce evidence, a plaintiff may make his closing speech. These rules do not deal with the matter 20 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal of making a submission of no case to answer by a defendant at the close of a plaintiff's case. It will be noticed that in the instant case, the defence counsel did not say that he wished to make a submission of no case to answer, for if the defence had wished to make it, then the trial court would be under an obligation to put to the election of the defence counsel that he would not call any evidence because the same court would not rule on such submission of no case to answer in the absence of such declared election. Otherwise, the court would make its ruling or decision only after hearing the entire evidence (and submission) of the defence if any. See the case of Simirah v Chua Hock Lee & Anor [1963] MLJ 239 (CA). The reason for such obligation by the trial court is that no judge should be asked for his conclusion or opinion on the evidence until such evidence is concluded. Thus, should a defendant make a submission of no case to answer without being asked by the trial court to make such an election, and if the trial court then makes its ruling or decision on such submission, the defendant would still be entitled to call evidence as if he had not made such a submission: see Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 (CA). Thus, should the trial court deliver its decision on such submission without performing such obligation and should the case go to an appellate court, which is unable to agree with such ruling or decision of the trial court, the appellate court would be without the benefit of whole of evidence of the case which the defendant would have 21 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal been entitled to adduce and, to use the words of Devlin JA in Young v Rank [1950] All ER 166 at p 169 (CA), ‘the appellate court would be prevented from exercising its power of re-hearing’, leaving the appellate court with no alternative but to order a retrial.” [19] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan di dalam kes Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (supra) terdapat frasa yang digunakan oleh YA Hakim Gopal Sri Ram seperti berikut: “For, once a defendant in civil proceedings elects not to call evidence, then all the evidence led by the plaintiff must be assumed to be true.” [20] Namun demikian frasa tersebut dinyatakan sedemikian setelah Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut menganalisa keterangan- keterangan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah. Ini dapat dilihat seperti yang berikut: “At the trial, the only witness called by the appellants upon the question of fault was the investigating officer who, inter alia, explained the sketch plan of the scene of the accident, which he had prepared. At the close of the appellant's case, counsel for the respondents informed the court that the first respondent was not available to give evidence because he was out of the country. He then made a statement to the effect that he was closing his case. 22 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The record provided to this court does not reflect that the learned sessions judge, who has much experience in such matters, formally put counsel to his election that he would stand on his submissions. This is unfortunate because the procedure adopted does not appear to meet the requirements of adjectival law. The first respondent being away from the country and therefore being unable to testify was a fact. It had, in the absence of an agreement between counsel, to be established like any other fact by calling evidence. Once established, certain consequences would ensue in respect of the admissibility of the statements by him to the police officer who reduced them into writing in the form of a police report. It was only after evidence was led tending to prove the first appellant's absence as a fact, or an agreement as to that fact having been secured from his opponent, that counsel would have been entitled to inform the court that he was not calling any evidence. Once he had done this, it was incumbent for the learned sessions judge to have put counsel to his election, namely, that if he did not call evidence, he would stand or fall on his submissions. The rule of procedure, which requires these steps to be followed, is not a mere formality but one of essential justice. For, once a defendant in civil proceedings elects not to call evidence, then all the evidence led by the plaintiff must be assumed to be true.” [21] Oleh yang demikian Mahkamah ini berpendapat adalah tidak tepat untuk menyatakan bahawa disebabkan Defendan tidak 23 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal memanggil saksi-saksi maka suatu inferens yang bertentangan boleh digunakan secara automatik tanpa menganalisa keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif. Apa yang terdapat dalam kes ini ialah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah tidak menyatakan dalam alasan penghakimannya mengenai penganalisan keterangan Plaintif secara terperinci dan secara terus disebabkan ketiadaan keterangan daripada Defendan maka seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 telah digunakan terhadap Defendan. Malahan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpendapat keterangan Plaintif adalah dianggap sebagai benar. [22] Dalam hal ini Mahkamah wajar merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Persekutuan berkenaan dengan pemakaian seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950. Ini dinyatakan dalam kes Syarikat Kemajuan Timbermine Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Kelantan Darul Naim [2015] 2 CLJ 1037 seperti yang berikut: “[58] Learned counsel for the plaintiff also argued that the failure to adduce evidence and call any witnesses would, in his words, 'attract all the usual debilitative factors including the drawing of adverse inferences'. The statutory basis for the drawing of an adverse inference is s. 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 which provides that the court may presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would if produced be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Adverse inference under that provision can be drawn if there is a withholding or suppression of evidence and not merely on account of failure to obtain evidence (see Low Kian Boon & Anor v. PP [2010] 5 CLJ 489; [2010] 4 MLJ 425 24 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal and Munusamy Vengadasalam v. PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 221; [1987] 1 MLJ 492). We do not detect any oblique motive on the part of the defendant in not producing any witnesses. In any event, such an inference would have been inappropriate in the context of the present case. The termination of the agreements took place around 30 years before the filing of the action. We have said earlier, as a commercial case, this was a document-heavy dispute where the pertinent evidence was reduced to writing. It would not be appropriate to draw the inference where there has been no deliberate withholding or suppression of evidence as all the relevant documents were in the plaintiff's possession. Besides, as rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the defendant, as the question of adverse inference was not raised by either party during the trial, the learned High Court Judge and the Court of Appeal did not make any finding of adverse inference. It is misplaced for the plaintiff to introduce the argument of an adverse inference being drawn at this late stage. Moreover, as regards to the non-calling of any witnesses by the defendant, the ratio in the case of Thong Foo Ching & Ors v. Shigenori Ono [1998] 4 CLJ 674; [1998] 4 MLJ 585 at p. 601 will be applicable in the present case. In that case, Siti Norma JCA (as Her Ladyship then was) in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal held that it would not be appropriate to draw an adverse inference where a defendant elects not to call any evidence unless the plaintiff has proven its case on a balance of probability. We adopt the principle of law as stated by the Court of Appeal in Thong Foo Ching & Ors v. Shigenori Ono (supra).” 25 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [23] Ini bermakna Mahkamah bicara pada hemat Mahkamah ini tidak boleh sewenang-wenangnya menggunakan seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 semata-mata disebabkan pihak-pihak iaitu Defendan dalam kes ini semata-mata disebabkan Defendan tidak dapat mengemukakan saksi. Mahkamah perlu meneliti adakah saksi-saksi tersebut tidak dipanggil memberi keterangan bagi maksud menyembunyikan keterangan atau menghalang keterangan tersebut daripada dikemukakan seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes Munusamy Vengadasalam v PP [1987] 1 CLJ 250. [24] Penelitian kepada nota keterangan mendapati bahawa tiada keterangan yang mencadangkan Defendan cuba menyembunyikan Defendan atau menghalang daripada Defendan serta saksi-saksi lain daripada mengemukakan keterangan. Oleh yang demikian pada hemat Mahkamah adalah tidak wajar di dalam kes berdasarkan keterangan yang dikemukakan untuk Mahkamah menggunakan anggapan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 kepada pihak Defendan semata-mata disebabkan Defendan tidak memanggil saksi. [25] Anggapan adalah suatu yang dilahirkan di bawah undang-undang bertulis. Ia membawa maksud apabila satu fakta asas dibuktikan inferens berkenaan dengan satu fakta boleh dilakukan berdasarkan kepada fakta asas tersebut. Dalam erti kata lain sebelum sesuatu anggapan itu boleh digunakan fakta asas itu perlu dibuktikan terlebih dahulu. Ini dinyatakan di dalam Sarkar Law of Evidence In India, 26 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Ceylon, Malaysia & Singapore, Malaysia Edition, Volume 1, LexisNexis, 2016 seperti yang berikut: “Though presumptions function on the ground that certain underlying facts must be settled prior to the presumptions being raised, two situations where presumptions may apply minus proof of basic facts are the presumption of innocence and the presumption of sanity.” Ia juga telah dinyatakan dengan menarik oleh Mahkamah dalam kes PP v Chia Leong Foo [2000] 4 CLJ 649. [26] Pada masa yang sama seksyen 114 Akta Keterangan 1950 adalah anggapan terhadap satu fakta. Dalam konteks seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 kegagalan pihak mengemukakan saksi penting boleh menyebabkan Mahkamah membuat inferens bahawa pihak tersebut tidak ingin mengemukakan keterangan penting tersebut kerana ia akan memudaratkan kes pihak tersebut. Sebagai contoh pemakaiannya dapat dilihat dalam kes Malaysian Bar v Dato’ Kanagalingam a/l Veluppillai [2004] 4 MLJ 153 seperti yang berikut: “[17] When the respondent requested from the DB for the names of the members of the DB who sat and decided to institute the Investigating Tribunal, the DB refused to entertain his request by saying that it was not in a position to disclose the same. Surely such a reply would arouse strong suspicion as to why the DB refused to disclose the names as requested by the respondent. 27 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Yet in the case of Ngeow Yin Ngee v Majlis Peguam Malaysia [2004] 5 CLJ 467 at the request of the appellant the DB had in fact furnished the appellant (lawyer) with the names of the DB members who sat in the DB meeting after the DB had made the order against the appellant. Why then could the DB have not provided the same in the instant appeal when requested by the respondent? Therefore, we think the High Court was not in error when it invoked s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the appellant under the circumstances, thus raising the presumption that the President of the Bar Council or his alternate was present at the said meeting.” [27] Mahkamah ini juga mendapati bahawa sekiranya Mahkamah bicara ingin membuat apa-apa inferens yang menentang (adverse inference) mahkamah bicara hendaklah mengambil langkah-langkah seperti yang dinyatakan dalam kes British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] AC 877 yang diterima pakai dalam kes Takako Sakao (f) v Ng Pek Yuen (f) & Anor [2009] 6 MLJ 751 seperti yang berikut: “[5] The second consequence is that the court ought to have drawn an adverse inference against the first respondent on the amount of the appellant’s contribution to the purchase price as well as the existence and the terms of the mutual understanding or agreement that she had with the first respondent. Where, as here, the first respondent being a party to the action provides no reasons as to why she did not care to give evidence the court will 28 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal normally draw an adverse inference. See Guthrie Sdn Bhd v Trans-Malaysian Leasing Corp Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 33. See also Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (suing as Administrators of the Estate of Shofiah bte Ahmad, deceased) v Tan Lip Eng & Anor [1997] 3 MLJ 693 where Peh Swee Chin FCJ said: ‘The respondents had chosen to close the case at the end of the appellants’ case. Although they were entitled to do so, they would be in peril of not having the evidence of their most important witness and of having an adverse inference drawn against them for failing to call such evidence should the circumstances demand it.’ There are two other authorities that are of assistance on the point. In Wisniewski v Central Manchester Health Authority [1998] PIQR 324, Brooke LJ when delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal quoted from a number of authorities including the following passage from the speech of Lord Diplock in Herrington v British Railways Board [1972] AC 877: The appellants, who are a public corporation, elected to call no witnesses, thus depriving the court of any positive evidence as to whether the condition of the fence and the adjacent terrain had been noticed by any particular servant of theirs or as to what he or any other of their servants either thought or did about it. This is a legitimate tactical move under our adversarial system of litigation. But a defendant who adopts it cannot complain if the court draws from the facts which have been disclosed all reasonable inferences as to 29 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal what are the facts which the defendant has chosen to withhold. Brooke LJ then went on to say this: From this line of authority I derive the following principles in the context of the present case: (1) In certain circumstances a court may be entitled to draw adverse inferences from the absence or silence of a witness who might be expected to have material evidence to give on an issue in an action. (2) If a court is willing to draw such inferences, they may go to strengthen the evidence adduced on that issue by the other party or to weaken the evidence, if any, adduced by the party who might reasonably have been expected to call the witness. (3) There must, however, have been some evidence, however weak, adduced by the former on the matter in question before the court is entitled to draw the desired inference: in other words, there must be a case to answer on that issue. (4) If the reason for the witness’s absence or silence satisfies the court, then no such adverse inference may be drawn. If, on the other hand, there is some credible explanation given, even if it is not wholly satisfactory, the potentially detrimental effect of 30 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal his/her absence or silence may be reduced or nullified. The other case is Crawford v Financial Institutions Services Ltd (Jamaica) [2005] UKPC 40, where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe when delivering the advice of the Privy Council said: It is well settled that in civil proceedings the court may draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to give or call evidence as to matters within the knowledge of himself or his employees. Sarkar on Evidence (16th Ed) at p 1837 states: It is the bounden duty of a party personally knowing the whole circumstances to give evidence and to submit to cross- examination. Non-appearance as a witness would be the strongest possible circumstance to discredit the truth of his case Gurbakhsh v Gurdial AIR 1927 PC 230. [6] In the present instance, there is no doubt that the first respondent had intimate knowledge of the material facts relevant to the dispute and that she was privy to the several steps through which the transaction had proceeded. Based on the authorities already cited, it is patently clear that the trial judge in the present case ought to have held that the failure of the first respondent to give evidence apart from discrediting her case strengthened the 31 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal appellant’s case on those vital points that lay at the axis of the dispute between the parties. This, the trial judge clearly omitted to do. Instead, he treated the first respondent’s failure to appear and give evidence as a matter of no apparent consequence. His non- direction upon such a crucial point as this certainly amounts to a misdirection which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. To conclude the first issue, it is our judgment that there was no judicial appreciation of the appellant’s evidence. A reasonable tribunal correctly directing itself on the facts and the relevant law would have held that the appellant had indeed contributed RM194,610 towards the purchase price of the building; that there was a mutual understanding between the appellant and the first respondent that they shall be beneficial co owners of the property in question in equal shares; and that the first respondent had acted in breach of that understanding.” [28] Oleh itu jika diteliti kepada kes Jaafar bin Shaari & Anor (supra) sekali lagi dapat dilihat istilah yang digunakan ialah inferens bertentangan (adverse inference) secara umum dan tidak secara khusus merujuk kepada seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950. Ini pada hemat Mahkamah disebabkan bagi menggunakan seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 hendaklah ditunjukkan bahawa saksi yang tidak dipanggil itu adalah saksi penting, kehadiran saksi tersebut disembunyikan dan keterangan saksi tersebut tidak ingin dikemukakan yang mana sekiranya ia dikemukakan keterangan itu akan memudaratkan pihak tersebut. 32 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [29] Selain daripada itu Mahkamah juga meneliti nota keterangan dalam kes ini dan mendapati tiada sebarang petanda bahawa pihak Defendan ingin menyatakan bahawa Defendan tiada kes untuk menjawab kes Plaintif. Sebaliknya Plaintif, Defendan dan Mahkamah telah diberi maklum bahawa Defendan tidak akan memanggil saksi. Pada masa itu tiada sebarang bantahan yang diutarakan oleh peguam Plaintif untuk menggunapakai anggapan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950. Oleh itu pada hemat Mahkamah adalah tidak wajar hakim bicara menggunakan anggapan di bawah seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 seperti yang dinyatakan dalam alasan penghakiman hakim bicara. Dalam hal ini Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Idris bin Hassan v Lembaga Pertubuhan Peladang Perlis & Anor [2007] 6 MLJ 147 apabila Mahkamah Rayuan berpendapat bahawa sekiranya terdapat persetujuan pihak-pihak untuk salah satu pihak tidak mengemukakan keterangan lisan maka seksyen 114 (g) Akta Keterangan 1950 tidak boleh dibangkitkan seperti yang berikut: “[10] However before addressing this issue it is necessary to dispose of one other related matter. It was stated as one of the grounds of appeal that the learned trial judge had erred in law in not drawing an adverse inference against the defendants for the failure on their part to call for a witness to give evidence to counter the suggestion that extraneous matters had indeed been taken into account as evidenced through the documentary evidence in the form of the 24 February 1998 letter. This is indeed a 180 degrees turnaround stance taken by learned counsel for the plaintiff since it was agreed by the parties to dispense with the oral 33 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal evidence of parties. The plaintiff is therefore estopped from invoking the provisions of s 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 and to invoke that section now is misplaced. It is also unacceptable that since the parties have agreed that the trial court is to determine the case on the basis of the agreed bundle of documents it is therefore also to be understood that the plaintiff's burden of proof in law is dispensed with and the onus by implication shifted to the defendants.” [30] Mahkamah ini berpendapat di dalam kes ini Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah khilaf apabila memutuskan bahawa kegagalan pihak Defendan mengemukakan keterangan telah menyebabkan seksyen 114 (g) Akta keterangan 1950 terpakai terhadap Defendan. Mahkamah ini mendapati tiada sebarang penganalisaan kepada keterangan pihak Plaintif bagi menunjukkan sama ada keterangan-keterangan tersebut mencukupi untuk melunaskan tanggungjawab beban pembuktian pihak Plaintif terhadap Defendan seperti yang dikehendaki di bawah seksyen 101 Akta Keterangan 1950. Pada masa yang sama juga tiada keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah menyembunyikan keterangan saksi atau menghalang keterangan saksi daripada dikemukakan di Mahkamah. [31] Adalah didapati semasa penghujahan pihak-pihak dalam kes rayuan ini mereka lebih menumpukan kepada isu kuantum. Ia seolah- olah menunjukkan bahawa tidak timbul isu berkenaan dengan liabiliti yang telah diputuskan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen. Pada masa yang sama juga tiada sebarang permohonan dibuat untuk meminda 34 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal notis rayuan yang telah difailkan bagi menyatakan bahawa isu yang dirayu hanyalah berkaitan dengan kuantum sahaja. Ini bermakna apa yang dinyatakan dalam notis rayuan tersebut adalah masih terpakai bagi tujuan rayuan ini. [32] Mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan adalah bertanggungjawab untuk memastikan bahawa perbicaraan yang dijalankan di mahkamah rendah adalah dilakukan mengikut kehendak undang-undang. Penerimaan keterangan dibuat mengikut kehendak Akta Keterangan 1950 dan prinsip undang-undang keterangan. Persetujuan pihak-pihak untuk tidak membangkitkan isu tertentu di dalam suatu perbicaraan oleh mahkamah rendah tidak menghalang mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan untuk meneliti dan memutuskan bahawa perbicaraan tersebut adalah tidak teratur mengikut undang-undang. Ini ditambah pula sekiranya perbicaraan tersebut atau dapatan yang dibuat oleh hakim bicara itu adalah jelas kesilapan yang ketara (plainly wrong). Jika Mahkamah ini mengkesampingkan isu perbicaraan yang tidak teratur di bawah undang-undang semata-mata disebabkan ia tidak ditimbulkan oleh pihak-pihak Mahkamah ini berpendapat ia adalah satu kegagalan dalam menjalankan amanah sebagai mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan daripada mahkamah rendah. [33] Adalah tidak dapat dinafikan dalam perbicaraan yang melibatkan tuntutan gantirugi berkaitan kemalangan jalan raya, ia hendaklah dilakukan dalam tempoh yang munasabah. Ia dapat dilihat melalui beberapa pekeliling berkenaan dengan tuntutan kes kemalangan jalan raya seperti Arahan Amalan Bilangan 2 Tahun 2013, Proses Mediasi 35 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Bagi Kes-Kes Kemalangan Jalan Raya Di Mahkamah Majistret Dan Di Mahkamah Sesyen bertarikh 30.01.2013. Malahan sebelum itu terdapat Arahan Amalan Nombor 1/1981 yang memberikan arahan di bawah A. 25 Kaedah Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980. Malahan di bawah A. 34 k 10 KKM 2012 berkenaan arahan automatik dalam tindakan kecederaan diri telah memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 10. Arahan automatik dalam tindakan kecederaan diri (A. 34 k. 10) (1) Apabila pliding dalam mana-mana tindakan yang kepadanya kaedah ini terpakai disifatkan tertutup, arahan yang berikut hendaklah berkuat kuasa secara automatik: (a) maka terdapat penzahiran dokumen dalam empat belas hari mengikut Aturan 24 dan pemeriksaan dalam tujuh hari selepas itu, kecuali jika liabiliti diakui, penzahiran hendaklah terhad kepada penzahiran apa-apa dokumen oleh plaintif yang berhubungan dengan ganti rugi; (b) (i) tertakluk kepada perenggan (2), jika plaintif berniat untuk bersandar kepada keterangan pakar dalam perbicaraan, dia hendaklah, dalam tiga bulan dari penutupan pliding, menzahirkan isi keterangan itu kepada pihak yang satu lagi dalam bentuk laporan bertulis yang hendaklah dipersetujui, sekiranya boleh, dan selepasnya, sekiranya tidak dipersetujui, defendan hendaklah dalam tiga bulan dari tarikh penerimaan laporan 36 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal bertulis itu, merujukkan plaintif kepada seorang pakar dan menzahirkan isi keterangan kepada pihak yang satu lagi dalam bentuk laporan bertulis, sekiranya perlu; (ii) tertakluk kepada (b)(i) di atas, dalam keadaan defendan tidak bersetuju dengan laporan daripada pakar plaintif, dia hendaklah dalam satu bulan dari tarikh penerimaan laporan pakar plaintif, memaklumkan peguam plaintif niat defendan untuk merujukkan plaintif suatu laporan bertulis selanjutnya. (c) jika mana-mana pihak bercadang untuk memanggil mana- mana saksi dalam perbicaraan bagi maksud membuktikan apa- apa gambar, lakaran pelan, atau model atau keadaan suatu kenderaan atau penyenggaraan atau pengendalian lampu isyarat atau apa-apa keterangan lain, dia hendaklah, dalam tiga bulan daripada penutupan pliding, menzahirkan keterangan itu kepada pihak yang satu lagi; (d) gambar, lakaran pelan, model dan kandungan mana-mana laporan kemalangan polis bolehlah dipersetujui, sekiranya boleh; (e) tindakan itu hendaklah ditetapkan dalam enam bulan melalui suatu notis dalam Borang 60; (f) Mahkamah hendaklah dimaklumkan, tentang penetapan itu, berkenaan dengan anggaran tempoh perbicaraan; dan 37 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (g) pihak yang menetapkan tindakan itu hendaklah memperakui bahawa peruntukan kaedah ini telah dipatuhi. (2) Jika subperenggan (1)(b) terpakai bagi lebih daripada satu pihak, laporan itu hendaklah dizahirkan dengan pertukaran bersaling dalam masa yang diarahkan oleh Mahkamah. (3) Tiada apa pun dalam perenggan (1) boleh menghalang mana- mana pihak kepada suatu tindakan yang kepadanya kaedah ini terpakai daripada memohon kepada Mahkamah untuk arahan atau perintah lanjut atau yang berlainan yang, dalam hal keadaan itu, bersesuaian. (4) Bagi maksud kaedah ini, dokumen yang berhubungan dengan ganti rugi khas termasuk dokumen yang berhubungan dengan apa-apa kecederaan industri, kecacatan industri atau hak faedah penyakit, dan jika tuntutan dibuat di bawah Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956, termasuk dokumen yang berhubungan dengan apa- apa tuntutan bagi pergantungan kepada si mati. (5) Kaedah ini hendaklah terpakai bagi mana-mana tindakan bagi kecederaan peribadi kecuali- (a) apa-apa tindakan admiralti; dan 38 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (b) apa-apa tindakan yang pliding itu mengandungi pengataan tindakan cuai atau peninggalan dalam perjalanan rawatan perubatan atau pergigian. (6) Kaedah ini tidaklah terpakai bagi tindakan yang mana-mana pihak telah memohon penghakiman di bawah Aturan 14. [34] Semua ini, pada hemat Mahkamah menunjukkan kepentingan untuk mengendalikan perbicaraan melibatkan tuntutan jalan raya dilakukan dengan tempoh yang munasabah. Namun ia tidak mewajarkan sebarang perbicaraan dilakukan tanpa mematuhi Kaedah- kaedah Mahkamah 2012 dan undang-undang. Keghairahan untuk menyelesaikan satu tuntutan gantirugi kemalangan jalan raya tidak boleh mengorbankan prinsip perbicaraan adil mengikut lunas undang- undang. Pada hemat Mahkamah ia adalah penting untuk dipatuhi oleh para pengamal undang-undang, pihak-pihak dan juga Mahkamah. Jika ini tidak dilakukan ia akan menyebabkan dapatan dan keputusan yang dibuat di akhir satu perbicaraan itu adalah sesuatu yang tidak teratur. [35] Akhirnya, dalam kes ini Mahkamah berpendapat keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan dengan liabiliti adalah merupakan satu kesilapan ketara yang memerlukan campur tangan Mahkamah ini. Setelah menimbangkan keadaan kes ini dan menjunjung tinggi prinsip keadilan di dalam satu perbicaraan sivil, Mahkamah berpendapat adalah wajar untuk Mahkamah ini mengembalikan kes ini ke Mahkamah Sesyen untuk pihak Defendan mengemukakan keterangan yang sewajarnya. 39 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [36] Oleh itu Mahkamah memerintahkan seperti yang berikut: (a) Rayuan Perayu adalah dibenarkan; (b) Perintah Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen diketepikan dan kes dikembalikan ke Mahkahah Sesyen Temerloh untuk Defendan memberi keterangan agar keputusan dapat dibuat Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berkenaan liabiliti dan kuantum; dan (c) Tiada perintah berkenaan dengan kos. Bertarikh: 04 hb. Februari 2025 (ROSLAN BIN MAT NOR) HAKIM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA TEMERLOH, PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR 40 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal PIHAK-PIHAK: Bagi Pihak Perayu Lim Qi Si dan Sufiah Yusoff Tetuan Zaid Ibrahim Suflan T H Liew & Partners Bukit Damansara, Kuala Lumpur Bagi Pihak Responden Ahmad Fadzli bin Ahmad Munir Tetuan Ravi Moorthi, Noriza, Mala & Partners Kuantan, Pahang Darul Makmur 41 S/N XZwPUx5s6EGp95f1477jkQ **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal