PENDAKWARAYA V. KOK WAH KUAN

1 PP v. KOK WAH KUAN FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA AHMAD FAIRUZ, CJ; ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, PCA; ALAUDDIN MOHD SHERIFF, CJ (MALAYA); RICHARD MALANJUM, CJ (SABAH & SARAWAK); ZAKI TUN AZMI, FCJ CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 05-46-2007 (W) 23 OCTOBER 2007 [2007] 6 CLJ 341 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : Federal Constitution - Separation of powers, doctrine of - Whether integral part of Constitution - Section 97(2) of Child Act 2001 - Child convict to be held at pleasure of Yang di -Pertuan Agong - Whether consigning judicial power to the Executive - Whether contravening doctrine of separation of powers - Whether unconstitutional - Federal Constitution, arts. 39, 40, 121(1) - Child Act 2001, s. 97(2) - Penal Code, s. 302 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Federal Constitution - Article 121(1), amendment to - Effect and scope - Whether article sole repository of judicial role of courts - Jurisdiction and powers of courts - Whether only as conferred by federal law - Whether courts servile agents of federal law - Federal Constitution, arts. 39 , 40, 121(1) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: Sentence - Murder - Child convict - Alternative sentence under Child Act 2001 - Child ordered to be held in custody during pleasure of Yang di -Pertuan Agong - Whether order lawful - Child Act 2001, s. 97(2) - Penal Code, s. 302 WORDS & PHRASES : "The High Courts and inferior courts shall have jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law" - Federal Constitution, art. 121(1) - Meaning and import - Whether courts reduced to servile agents of Acts of Parliament This was an appeal by the Public Prosecutor against the decision of the Court of Appeal ruling that notwithstanding that the learned High Court judge was correct in convicting the 12-year old respondent for murder under s. 302 Penal Code , he was nonetheless wrong in ordering the child convict to be detained during the pleasure of the Yang di -Pertuan Agong pursuant to s. 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 ('the Act' ). It was the view of the Court of Appea l, in so faulting the learned judge, that s. 97(2) of the Act, upon a proper rea ding of the Federal Constitution, including arts. 39 , 40 and 121(1) therein, was unconstitutional - for having consigned the Court's judicial power to determine the measure of sentence to be served by the respondent to the Executive and co ntravened the doctrine of separation of powers housed in the Constitution. The Public Prosecutor retorted otherwise, whereof the learned justices of the apex court, on account of the constitutional deliberations undertaken by the Court of Appeal, deemed it wise and proper to re -visit the relevant constitutional provisions, before pronouncing their opinion thereon and answering the question of whether the learned High Court judge was wrong in making the order aforesaid, or conversely whether the Court of Appeal was justified in releasing the respondent 2 forthwith from custody. Held (allowing appeal and restoring order of High Court) Per Abdul Hamid Mohamad PCA (delivering the judgment of the court): (1) Following the amendment to art. 121(1) of the Constitution by Act A704 , there was no longer a specific provision declaring that the "judic ial power of the Federation", as the term was understood prior to the amendment, is vested in the two High Courts. This prompted us to look at the federal law if we want to know about the jurisdiction and powers of the two High Courts. In short, to what extent such "judicial powers" are vested in the two courts would depend on what federal law provides, not on the interpretation of the term "judicial power" as prior to the amendment. This is the difference and the effect of the amendment. Thus, to say that the amendment has no effect does not make sense. (para 11) (2) In the instant appeal, even the Court of Appeal's judgment does not, indeed cannot, show which provision of the Constitution s. 97 is inconsistent with. Instead, the court held that that section violated the doctrine of the separation of powers, which, in its view, was an integral part of the Constitution. (para 13) (3) The doctrine of separation of powers is a political doctrine under which the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are kept distinct, to prevent abuse of power. However, Malaysia has its own model. Whilst our Constitution does have the features of the separation of powers, it also contains features which do not strictly comply with the doctrine. To what extent the doctrine applies, therefore, depends on the provisions of the Constitution. (paras 14 & 17) (3a) In determining the constitutionality or otherwise of a statute under our Constitution, it is the provision of the Constitution that matters, not a political theory expounded by some thinkers. The doctrine of separation of powers is not a provision of the Malaysian Constitution. Thus, a provision of the Constitution cannot be struck out on the ground that it contravenes the doctrine. Similarly, no provision of the law may be struck out as unconstitutional if it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, even though it may be inconsistent with the doctrine. (paras 17 & 18) (4) Federal law provides that the sentence of death shall not be pronounced or recorded against a person who was a child at the time of the commission of the offence. That is the limit of judicial power of the court imposed by the law. It further provides that, instead, the child shall be ordered to be detained in a prison during the pleasure of the Yang di -Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri, depending on where the offence was committed. That is the sentencing power given by federal law to the court as provided by the Constitution. (para 22) 3 Bahasa Malaysia Translation Of Headnotes Ini adalah rayuan oleh Pendakwa Raya terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan yang memutuskan bahawa walaupu n yang arif hakim betul dalam mensabitkan responden, yang berumur 12 tahun, atas kesalahan bunuh di bawah s. 302 Kanun Keseksaan , beliau khilaf apabila memerintahkan pesalah kanak -kanak tersebut ditahan menurut perkenan Yang di - Pertuan Agong di bawah s. 97(2) Akta Kanak-Kanak 2001 ('Akta'). Adalah menjadi pandangan Mahkamah Rayuan, dalam menyalahkan yang arif hakim, bahawa s. 97(2) Akta adalah tidak berperlembagaan atas pembacaan wajar Perlembagaan Persekutuan, termasuk fasal -fasal 39 , 40 dan 121(1)nya - kerana telah menyerahkan kuasa kehakiman Mahkamah untuk menentukan had hukuman yang perlu dijalani oleh responden kepada pihak Eksekutif, sekaligus menyanggahi doktrin perasingan kuasa yang termaktub di dalam Perlembagaan. Pendakwa Raya berhujah sebaliknya, dan berikutnya, yang arif hakim - hakim mahkamah tertinggi, dengan mengambilkira perbincangan -perbincangan perlembagaan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan, merasakan patut dan wajar untuk meneliti semula peruntukan-peruntukan perlembagaan berkenaan, sebelum mengambil pendirian mereka dan seterusnya menjawab persoalan sama ada yang arif hakim Mahkamah Tinggi khilaf dalam membuat perintah di atas, atau sebaliknya sama ada Mahkamah Rayuan betul apabila membebaskan responden dengan serta merta dari tahanan. Diputuskan (membenarkan rayuan dan mengekalkan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi) Oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad PMR (menyampaikan penghakiman mahkamah): (1) Berikutan pindaan kepada fasal 121(1) Perlembagaan oleh Akta A704 , tidak ada lagi peruntukan spesifik yang mengisytiharkan bahawa "kuasa kehakiman Persekutuan", sepertimana ungkap an itu difahami sebelum pindaan, adalah terletakhak kepada kedua -dua Mahkamah Tinggi. Ini memaksa kita untuk melihat kepada undang -undang persekutuan jika kita ingin tahu mengenai kuasa -kuasa dan bidangkuasa kedua -dua Mahkamah Tinggi. Apapun, setakat manak ah "kuasa kehakiman" sedemikian terletakhak kepada kedua-dua mahkamah bergantung kepada apa yang diperuntukkan oleh undang-undang persekutuan, bukannya kepada pentafsiran terma "kuasa kehakiman" seperti yang berlaku sebelum pindaan. Inilah perbezaan dan kesan pindaan tersebut. Oleh itu, adalah tidak masuk akal untuk mengatakan bahawa pindaan tidak memberi apa-apa kesan. (2) Dalam rayuan semasa, penghakiman Mahkamah Rayuan sendiri tidak, malah tidak mampu, menunjukkan dengan bahagian peruntukan Perlembagaan yang manakah s. 97 didapati tidak konsisten. Mahkamah tersebut sebaliknya memutuskan bahawa seksyen tersebut telah melanggari doktrin perasingan kuasa yang, menurut pandangannya, merupakan sebahagian dari Perlembagaan. (3) Perasingan kuasa adalah satu doktrin politik di mana cabang perundangan, eksekutif dan kehakiman kerajaan diasing kan, bagi mengelakkan salahguna kuasa. Malaysia bagaimanapun mempunyai modelnya yang tersendiri. Sementara Perlembagaan kita mengandungi beberapa ciri perasingan kuasa, ia juga mempunyai ciri -ciri yang tidak menepati secara ketat ciri -ciri doktrin 4 tersebut. Maka itu, setakat manakah doktrin ini terpakai akan bergantung kepada peruntukan-peruntukan Perlembagaan. (3a) Yang penting dalam menentukan keperlembagaan atau tidaknya sesuatu statut di bawah Perlembagaan adalah peruntukan Perlembagaan sendiri, bukannya teori politik yang dilaungkan oleh beberapa pemikir -pemikir. Doktrin perasingan kuasa bukan merupakan sebahagian dari Perlembagaan Malaysia. Oleh itu, satu peruntukan Perlembagaan tidak boleh dibatalkan atas alasan bahawa ia melanggar doktrin. Begitu jug a, mana -mana peruntukan undang-undang tidak boleh dibatalkan atas alasan tidak perlembagaan jika ia konsisten dengan Perlembagaan, walaupun ia mungkin tidak konsisten dengan doktrin. (4) Undang-undang persekutuan memperuntukkan bahawa hukuman mati tidak boleh diisytiharkan terhadap seseorang yang masih kanak -kanak semasa kesalahan dilakukan. Itu adalah had kuasa kehakiman mahkamah yang ditetapkan oleh undang -undang. Ia juga memperuntukkan bahawa kanak - kanak tersebut sebaliknya hendaklah di tahan di penjara selagi diperkenan Yang di -Pertuan Agong atau Raja Pemerintah atau Yang di -Pertua Negeri, bergantung kepada di mana kesalahan itu dilakukan. Inilah kuasa menghukum yang diberikan oleh undang -undang persekutuan kepada mahkamah seperti yang diperuntukkan oleh Perlembagaan. Case(s) referred to: Chiu Wing Wa & Ors v. Ong Beng Cheng [1994] 1 CLJ 313 SC (refd) Dato' Yap Peng v. PP [1987] 2 MLJ 31 (refd) Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan & Anor v. Nordin Salleh & Anor [1992] 2 CLJ 1125; [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 72 SC (refd) Faridah Begum v. Sultan Ahmad Shah [1996] 2 CLJ 159 (refd) Hajjah Halimatussaadiah v. Public Services Commission [1992] 1 CLJ 413; [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 467 HC (refd) Kesultanan Pahang v. Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 559 FC (refd) Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia [1975] 1 LNS 90 FC (refd) Mamat Daud & Ors v. Government of Malaysia & Anor [1988] 1 CLJ 11; [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 197 SC (refd) Ngan Tuck Seng v. Ngan Yin Groundnut Factory Sdn Bhd [1999] 3 CLJ 26 HC (refd) Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer -In-Charge Criminal Investigation, Kedah/Perlis [1975] 1 LNS 5 117 (refd) PP v. Dato' Yap Peng [1987] 1 CLJ 550; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 284 SC (refd) PP v. Jafa Daud [1981] 1 LNS 28 (refd) PP v. Sihabduin Hj Salleh & Anor [1981] CLJ 39; [1981] CLJ (Rep) 82 FC (refd) R v. Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham [1998] QB 575 (refd) R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147 FC (refd) Standard Chartered Bank and Others v. Directorate of E nforcement and Others [2005] AIR SC 2622 (refd) Teoh Eng Huat v. Kadhi Pasir Mas [1990] 2 CLJ 11; [1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 277 SC (refd) Legislation referred to: Child Act 2001, s. 97(2) Criminal Procedure Code, ss. 183, 418A Federal Constitution, arts. 4(1), 5(1), (3), 11, 32(1), 39, 40, 41, 44, 45(1), 121(1)(b), 121(1B), (2), 128(1), (2), 160(2), 162(6) Penal Code, s. 302 Prison Act 1995, ss. 44, 50, 67 Counsel: For the appellant - Tan Sri Abdul Gani Patail; Public Prosecutor/Att. General, Malaysia (Yacub Sam DPP with him) For the respondent - Karpal Singh (Ram Karpal Singh with him); M/s Karpal Singh & Co Reported by WA Sharif Case History: Court Of Appeal : [2007] 4 CLJ 454 High Court : [2007] 6 CLJ 367 6 JUDGMENT Abdul Hamid Mohamad PCA: [1] The respondent who was 12 years and 9 months old at the time of the commission of the offence was charged in the High Court for the offence of murder punishable under s. 302 of the Penal Code. He was convicted and ordered to be detained during the pleasure of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong pursuant to s. 97(2) of the Child Act 2001 (Act 611) ("the Child Act") . He appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction but set aside the sentence imposed on him and released him from custody on the sole ground that s. 97(2) of the Child Act was unconstitutional. The Public Prosecutor appealed to this court. [2] On what ground did the Court of Appeal hold s. 97(2) of the Child Act to be unconstitutional? [3] From the judgment of the Court of Appeal, it can be seen that that court had arrived at that conclusion on the following premises: (i) The doctrine of separation of powers is an integral part of the Constitution; (ii) Judicial power of the Federation vests in the courts; (iii) By s. 97(2) of the Child Act , Parliament had consigned the power to determine the mea sure of the sentence that was to be served to the Yang di - Pertuan Agong in the case of an offence committed in the Federal Territories, or to the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri, if the offence is committed in the State. (iv) By virtue of art. 39 of the Constitution , the executive authority of the Federation vests in th e Yang di -Pertuan Agong who, in accordance with art. 40 of the Constitution , must act in accordance with the advice given by the Cabinet or particular minister of the Cabinet. (v) Therefore, s. 97(2) of the Child Act contravenes the doctrine of separation of powers housed in the Constitution by consigning to the Executive the judicial power to determine the measure of the sentence to be served by the appellant. [4] Before going any further I will first reproduce the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Child Act. Article 121 of the Constitution provides: 121. (1) There shall be two High Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction and status, namely: (a) one in the States of Malaya... and; (b) one in the States of Sabah and Sarawak... and t he High Courts... shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law. (emphasis added) 7 [5]Article 4(1) of the Constitution provides: 4. (1) This Constitution is the supreme law of the Federation and any law passed after Merdeka Day which is inconsistent with this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. [6]Section 97 of the Child Act provides: 97. (1) A sent ence of death shall not be pronounced or recorded against a person convicted of an offence if it appears to the Court that at the time when the offence was committed he was a child. (2) In lieu of a sentence of death, the Court shall order a person convict ed of an offence to be detained in a prison during the pleasure of: (a) the Yang di-Pertuan Agong if the offence was committed in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur or the Federal Territory of Labuan; or (b) the Ruler or the Yang di -Pertua Negeri, if th e offence was committed in the State. (3) If the Court makes an order under subsection (2), that person shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act: (a) be liable to be detained in such prison and under such conditions as the Yang di -Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri may direct; and (b) while so detained, be deemed to be in lawful custody. (4) If a person is ordered to be detained at a prison under subsection (2), the Board of Visiting Justices for that prison: (a) shall review that person's case at least once a year; and (b) may recommend to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di -Pertua Negeri on the early release of further detention of that person, and the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri may thereupon order him to be released or further detained, as the case may be. [7] The Court of Appeal posed two questions for it to answer. They are, first, whether the doctrine of separation of powers is an integral part of the Constitution and, secon dly, whether s. 97 of the Child Act "in pith and substance violates the doctrine ." The Court, answered the two questions in the affirmative. On the first question, the court held that the amendment to art. 121 of the Constitution by Act A 704 did not have the effect of divesting the courts of the judicial power of the Federation. The court gave two reasons: 8 First, the amending Act did nothing to vest the judicial power in some arm of the Federation other than the courts. Neither did it provide for the sharing of the judicial power wit h the Executive or Parliament or both those arms of government. Second, the marginal note to art. 121 was not amended. This clearly expresses the intention of Parliament not to divest ordinary courts of judicial power of the Federation and to transfer it to or share it with either the Executive or the Legislature. [8] Let us take a close look at the provision of art. 121 of the Constitution before and after the amendment. [9] Prior to the amendment, art. 121(1) of the Constitution reads: "... the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested in the two High Courts... and the High Courts... shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law. [10] There was thus a definitive declaration that the judicial p ower of the Federation shall be vested in the two High Courts. So, if a question is asked "Was the judicial power of the Federation vested in the two High Courts?" The answer has to be "yes" because that was what the Constitution provided. Whatever the wor ds "judicial power" mean is a matter of interpretation. Having made the declaration in general terms, the provision went of to say "and the High Courts... shall have jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law." In other words, if we want to know what are the specific jurisdiction and powers of the two High Courts, we will have to look at the federal law. [11] After the amendment, there is no longer a specific provision declaring that the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested in the two High Courts. What it means is that there is no longer a declaration that "judicial power of the Federation" as the term was understood prior to the amendment vests in the two High Courts. If we want to know the jurisdiction and powers of the two High Courts we will have to look at the federal law. If we want to call those powers "judicial powers", we are perfectly entitled to. But, to what extent such "judicial powers" are vested in the two High Courts depend on what federal law provides, not on the interpretation of the term "judicial power" as prior to the amendment. That is the difference and that is the effect of the amendment. Thus, to say that the amendment has no effect does not make sense. There must be. The only question is to what extent? [12] In Public Prosecutor v. Dato' Yap Peng [1987] 1 CLJ 550; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 284 , s. 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code came into question as it was argued that it infring ed art. 121(1) and 5(1) of the Federal Constitution . Zakaria Yatim J (as he then was) held that s. 418A of the Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional as it was inconsistent with art. 121(1) of the Constitution . Appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by a majority of 3:2. That case was decided, not on the ground that it was inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. It was decided on the ground that it was inconsistent with the term "judicial power" of the court then provided by art. 121(1) of the Constitution . In other words s. 418A was inconsistent with the specific provision of the Constitution that provides "... the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested in two High Courts..." The inconsiste ncy then attracts art. 4(1) of the Constitution which declares such a law, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.