ROSNAH BINTI MT ARIFF (IBU KANDUNG KEPADA SIMATI, MUHAMAD ROHAIZAD BIN ALIAS) 1. ) SENTIASA HEBAT SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 6329559-D) 2. ) RUSLI BIN SALLEH (No. K/P : 670221-07-5069)

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI GEORGETOWN DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG NOMBOR RAYUAN: PA-12B-19-10/2022 ANTARA ROSNAH BINTI MT ARIFF (IBU KANDUNG KEPADA SIMATI, MUHAMAD ROHAIZAD BIN ALIAS) ...Perayu DAN 4. SENTIASA HEBAT SDN BHD (No. Syarikat: 6329559-D) 2. RUSLI BIN SALLEH (No. K/P : 670221-07-5069) ...Responden-Responden PENGHAKIMAN Pengenalan [1] Ini merupakan kes kemalangan maut yang melibatkan Penunggang motosikal yang mempunyai pendaftaran nombor PMR 5752 (Simati) dengan motorlori Defendan yang mempunyai pendaftaran nombor DY 3075 di KM 135.6 Lebuhraya Utara Selatan pada 16.07.2019. [2] Ibu Simati (Plaintif telah memfailkan tuntutan terhadap Defendan - Defendan untuk gantirugi knas dan kehilangan tanggungan (Loss of Dependency) di bawah seksyen 7 dan 8 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 akibat dari kemalangan tersebut. [3] _Mahkamah Sesyen telah menolak kes Plaintif dan memutuskan Plaintif adalah 100% cuai. Selepas mendengar rayuan, Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan rayuan Plaintif dan pembahagian liabiliti atas 50%- 50% terhadap Simati dengan Defendan dan membenarkan kuantum atas kehilangan tanggungan. Perayu (Defendan-Defendan) yang tidak berpuashati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini telah memfailkan permohonan bagi kebenaran untuk merayu terhadap keputusan bertarikh 28 Mac 2023 tersebut. Pihak-Pihak dirujuk sebagaimana mereka di Mahkamah Sesyen. Latarbelakang Perbicaraan Di Mahkamah Sesyen [4] Terdapat empat [4] saksi bagi kes Perayu/Simati Plaintif iaitu (i) | Inspektor Farizal Akmar bin Omar, Pegawai Penyiasat (SPI), (ii) © Nurakmar binti Alias, Kakak Simati Plaintif (SP2), (iii) Rosnah binti Mt Ariff bu Simati Plaintif (SP3), dan (iv) Kenneth Anak Jimmy Kana Majikan Simati Plaintif (SP4). [5] Saksi bagi Kes Defendan Kedua adalah - Rusli bin Salleh, Defendan Kedua sendiri (SDI). [6] Semasa perbicaraan, berikut adalah keterangan daripada saksi-saksi Plaintif; “Mengikut SP2, pada hari kejadian, apabila beliau berada di Permatang Nibong Bukit Mertajam, telah dapat tahu daripada anggota polis melalui telefon mengatakan adiknya bernama Muhamad Rohaizad bin Alias (Simati Plaintif) telah terlibat dalam kemalangan jalan raya di KM 135.6 Lebuhraya Utara Selatan (U) semasa menunggang motorsikal No. PMR 5752 dengan motorlori No. DY 3075 dan meninggal dunia di tempat kejadian. Berdasarkan perenggan 5 Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif (m/s 68 Rekod Rayuan Bahagian B&C (Jilid 2), kemalangan berlaku apabila Responden/ Defendan Kedua yang memandu motorlori No. DY 3075 telah bergesel dengan motorsikal Simati Plaintif.” [7] Berikut pula adalah ringkasan keterangan versi Defendan- Defendan: “Defendan sedang memandu motorlori No. DY 3075 dari Prai menuju ke Sungai Dua, Butterworth. Apabila Defendan sampai di KM 135.6 Lebuhraya Utara Selatan (U), beliau memandu di lorong kiri, tiba-tiba beliau dengar bunyi yang kuat dari arah belakang sebelah kiri motorlori. Beliau berhenti turun dan dapati motorsikal No. PMR 5752 telah melanggar motorlori Defendan di bahagian tepi sebelah kiri’. [8] Tiada keterangan daripada saksi bebas di tempat kejadian dan Mahkamah bergantung kepada keterangan senyap seperti gambar kejadian, rajah kasar dan laporan polis. Analisa dan dapatan Mahkamah Liabiliti Pihak-Pihak [9] Ini merupakan rayuan selepas perbicaraan penuh oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (“HMS’) yang berpeluang melihat dan mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi dihadapan beliau. Mahkamah ini hanya akan campurtangan dan mengenepikan keputusan HMS sekiraya terdapat kekhilafan yang nyata. [10] Prinsip ini dinyatakan dalam kes Ong Cheng Wah & Anor v Supramaniam a/| Arjunan [2001] MLJU 291; [2001] 4 CLJ 202 di muka surat 203 seperti yang berikut: “The dissenting view in Wong Thin Yit v Mohamad Ali held that an appellate court is in good position as the trial judge to draw its own conclusion from the primary undisputed facts. It should not be assumed that the trial judge must necessarily be right just because he had seen and heard the 4 witnesses. Even where the trial judge had been impressed by the demeanour of certain witnesses, the appellate court still has an obligation to scrutinise the evidence. The sessions judge had fundamentally misdirected himself and that warranted appellate intervention despite the trite view that findings of fact by the trial court should not generally be disturbed.” {11] Dalam kes Lee Hock Lai v Yeoh Wah Pein [1999] 5 MLJ 172, misalnya, mahkamah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: “It is a basic principle of law that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact by a lower court. But it is also the principle that an appellate court should reverse a finding of fact by the lower court if such finding is clearly against the weight of evidence.” (linat Siti Aishah Bt. Ibrahim v Goh Cheng Hwai [1982] 2 MLJ 124) [12] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Kesemua alasan yang dikemukakan oleh HMS dalam menolak tuntutan Plaintif. Berikut adalah antara sebab utama HMS dalam menolak tuntutan Plaintiff iaitu: “Isu utama yang perlu diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini adakah Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan bahawa defendan telah cuai sehingga menyebabkan kemalangan dan memindahkan “onus of proof’ kepada defendan? Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi untuk liabiliti Mahkamah membuat dapatan fakta berikut : a) Mahkamah ini telah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi dan berpendapat adalah tidak dipertikaikan arah pergerakan si mati dan Defendan. b) Hasil siasatan oleh Pegawai Penyiasat (SP1) berkenaan kesan kerosakan pada motorsikal si mati dan motolori Defendan, ianya adalah gagal menunjukan bagaimana kemalangan berlaku dan gagal menyokong butir-butir kecuaian Defendan. Cc) Versi Plaintif iaitu motolori yang di pandu oleh Defendan telah mengubah laluan dan bergesel dengan Plaintif gaga! dibuktikan. Tiada sebarang keterangan atau saksi yang mengesahkan versi tersebut. d) Tiada sebarang keterangan dari Plaintif bagaimana kemalangan ini berlaku. e) Laporan Puspakom /Gambar kerosakan kenderaan yang dikemukakan di Mahkamah gagal menunjukan sebarang inference bagaimana kemalangan itu berlaku.” [13] Dalam Alasan Penghakiman, HMS tidak menyatakan sama ada pertimbangan yang sewajarnya diberikan kepada keterangan SP1 tetapi hanya menyatakan SP1 gagal menunjukkan bagaimana kemalangan ini berlaku. Ini adalah dapatan fakta yang salah kerana adalah jelas berdasarkan keterangan SP1 dapat disimpulkan bahawa terdapatnya pergeseran antara motosikal simati dengan bahagian tepi motorlori Defendan. Ini dapat dilihat melalui keterangan SP1 bahawa tiada terdapat kerosakan di bahagian hadapan motorsikal tersebut. Sekiraya terdapat perlanggaran di bahagian hadapan sudah tentu kerosakan akan berlaku di bahagian hadapan dan akan terdapat kerosakan yang teruk. [14] Ini adalah bertentangan dengan keterangan Defendan bahawa Simati telah melanggar motolori Defendan di bahagian belakang kiri dan keterangan Defendan terdengar bunyi yang kuat, sekiranya benar sudah tentu akan ada kerosakan di bahagian hadapan motosikal. Berdasarkan gambar motosikal dan keterangan SP1 langsung tiada kerosakan yang teruk atau hentaman di bahagian hadapan motosikal. Tambahan pula laporan PUSPAKOM juga mengesahkan tiada perlanggaran di bahagian belakang motorlori. [15] Keterangan Defendan ini adalah bercanggah dengan laporan polis beliau yang mengatakan bahawa “motosikal melanggar bahagian tepi kiri motorlori” Laporan polis merupakan maklumat yang penting kerana ia merupakan maklumat terawal di mana kejadian baru berlaku dan masih dapat diingati. Sebaliknya keterangan di mahkamah pula telah melampaui masa. Fakta percanggahan yang material ini langsung tidak diambilkira oleh HMS. Sekiranya fakta ini diambilkira maka adalah jelas bahawa perlanggaran atau pergeseran itu berlaku “di bahagain tepi kiri” dan ini adalah selari dengan keterangan SP1 dan juga gambar kerosakan motosikal Simati. Keterangan Defendan Kedua ini boleh dianggap keterangan yang lemah dan wajar ditolak kerana ia adalah bercanggah dengan pembelaan Defendan-Defendan. Di dalam pembelaan Defendan- Defendan juga menyatakan bahawa Simati telah melanggar bahagian belakang motorlori beliau. Pembelaan ini juga bercanggah dengan laporan polis sedangkan pembelaan ini dibuat kemudian. [16] Adalah jelas bahawa keterangan oleh Defendan Kedua di mahkamah adalah cubaan untuk menyesuaikan dengan pembelan tersebut. Harus diingatkan bahawa pliding bukanlah keterangan tetapi cuma penyataan yang memerlukan keterangan diberikan untuk menyokongnya. [17] Dalam kes Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579, diputuskan seperti berikut: “Am asked by the defence to rely on its pleadings and to dismiss this case. The Defendant must realize that pleadings is not evidence. It is a bare averment of a party's case. The party has to adduce evidence in the absence of evidence being led in court; similarly, evidence cannot be let outside the pleadings. Pleadings and evidence become the heart and soul of a case. They complement each other”. [18] Seterusnya timbul persoalan utama, sekiraya tiada kesan perlanggaran di bahagian hadapan, di manakah pergeseran ini berlaku. Di sini, keterangan Defendan Kedua juga tidak dapat membantu kerana beliau mengakui tidak nampak langsung motosikal Simati. Mahkamah ini meneliti keterangan SP1 yang gagal dipertimbangkan oleh HMS iaitu dalam keterangan SP1 menyatakan bahawa kemungkinan pergeseran berlaku di bahagian tepi dengan melihat kepada kerosakan di bahagian kanan_ motorsikal. Dalam keterangan beliau_ telah merumuskan bahawa kemalangan ini berlaku akibat pergeseran di bahagian tepi motorlori. Keterangan ini adalah konsisten dengan kerosakan motosikal Simati. Harus diingat, ini melibatkan kenderaan yang besar iaitu motorlori (treler) dengan motorsikal. [19] Tiada sebarang kerosakan di hadapan motosikal Simati dan juga adalah jelas tiada bukti menunjukkan perlanggaran dari arah belakang oleh Simati berdasarkan kerosakan motosikal di bahagian sisi kanan (papan huruf nombor plat patah, pemijak kaki sebelah kanan bengkok dan cermin sisi kanan tertanggal). [20] Mahkamah mendapati bahawa laporan polis Defendan Kedua tidak diulas oleh HMS sama ada ianya bercanggah dengan keterangan dan pliding pembelaan Defendan-Defendan dan sama ada keterangan Defendan Kedua ini diterima di mahkamah sedangkan_terdapat percanggahan yang ketara. Keterangan dalam laporan polis wajar diterima berbanding dengan keterangan lisan di mahkamah. Dalam kes Dharam Singh Dhillon v Ibrahim Bin Shaaban &Anor [1995] 4 CLJ 207, Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa di dalam kes melibatkan versi bercanggah, lain-lain keterangan harus dipertimbangkan: “when the oral evidence from evidence adduced from the witnesses opposed each other, it is necessary to seek assistance from the sketch plan of the scene of accident to ascertain the positions of the vehicles involved in the accident in relation to the road, photographs of the portions of the vehicle damaged and all the mute evidence to determine which version of the manner in which the accident occurred is inherently probable or improbable...” [21] Dalam kes Mohamad Shahrul Azman bin Ishak v Malaysia Airlines Systems Bhd [2010] 2 CLJ 1, diputuskan bahawa: “The trial court should have preferred the evidence of the plaintiff as it was consistent with her police report whereas the first defendant's versions were totally at variance and inconsistent with his police report. The trial court failed to consider adequately the clear contradiction between the police report as opposed to the first defendant's testimony in court. Had the trial court considered the police report of the first defendant in its correct perspective and read it against the evidence of the plaintiff as a whole, an unmistakable conclusion would be arrived at in the road accident was due to the negligence of the first defendant wholly” [22] Bagi isu cuai sumbangan daripada Simati, dalam kes sebegini, di mana tiada keterangan daripada Simati, kes seperti Fu Yik Teck lwn Chai Sou Lan dan satu lagi [2017] 8 MLJ 773 menjadi panduan di mana kemalangan berlaku hanyalah berdasarkan kepada keterangan oleh Defendan Kedua sahaja kerana penunggang motosikal telah meninggal dunia di tempat kejadian, tidak bermakna bahawa keterangan oleh 9 Defendan Kedua_ tidak boleh dinilai bagi memutuskan sama ada terdapatnya cuai sumbangan oleh Simati. [23] Dalam kes Nadarajan Muiandy v. Ayob Jauhari [2001] 4 CLJ 718, diputuskan bahawa: “‘I1] Since the defendant did not adduce evidence and as the onus of proof of negligence on the part of the defendant rested with the plaintiff, the court was left to decide the issue of liability based on the plaintiff's evidence. In the circumstances, the court had no doubt of the defendant's negligence. However, that did not mean that the defendant had to give evidence before the court could find the plaintiff contributory negligent. His contribution, if any, could be ascertained from his own evidence. (p 720 d-e)” [24] Dalam kes Lai Yew Seong v. Chan Kim Sang Lai Yew Seong v. Chan Kim Sang [1987] CLJ Rep 151 diputuskan bahawa: “negligence as used in the expression "contributory negligence" does not mean breach of duty. It means the failure of a person to use reasonable care for his own safety or with regard to his own property so that he becomes the author of his own wrong. The test of contributory negligence is based entirely on the conduct of the plaintiff in the particular case. Having considered the plaintiff's evidence, the court was of the view that the plaintiff was to a large extent guilty of contributory negligence. (pp 720 f & 721 b) [25] Dalam kes ini Mahkamah mendapati HMS tidak menilai keterangan Defendan Kedua sama ada terdapat kecuaian di pihaknya walaupun terlalu banyak pencanggahan keterangan Defendan Kedua dengan laporan polis dan juga keterangan senyap yang lain, terutama bahagian kerosakan pada motosikal. Juga fakta bahawa kenderaan Defendan 10 Kedua adalah besar berbanding dengan motosikal Simati yang mana Defendan Kedua dengan jelas mengakui tidak nampak kehadiran motosikal Simati. [26] Dalam kes Miskinah Binte Jaya & Ors v Mohamed Bin Salleh & Anor [1984] | MLJ 187, diputuskan: “lack of knowledge of any accident must imply a finding that he was driving without due care and attention; and had not been keeping a proper look- out. On this count alone, some negligence must be laid at his door.” [27] Dalam kes Ng Aik Kian & Anor v Sia Loh Sia [1997] 2 CLJ Supp 218, apabila wujud keraguan mengenai bagaimana sesuatu kemalangan jalan raya berlaku disebabkan versi bertentangan pihak-pihak, maka apa yang wajar dilakukan oleh mahkamah menurut Abdul Malik Ishak H (pada waktu itu) sewaktu memberi keputusannya dalam kes Ng Aik Kian ini, ialah: “To resolve these doubts, | am reminded of the decision of Wan Suleiman FJ in the case of Mohamed Bin Abdullah V. Chah Hea Seng [1980] 1 LNS 48 at p. 283 right hand column at G where his Lordship said: We are of the view that the principles enunciated in Baker v. Market Harborough Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd. [1953] 1 WLR 1472 followed by our Court of Appeal in Ong Yam Chong & Anor. v. Chan Wah [1962] MLJ 184 that where there is a collision between two vehicles travelling in opposite directions then in the absence of special circumstances there is a prima facie presumption that both drivers are negligent and the onus falls on each of them to show that the other driver rather than himself was negligent, is applicable in this instance.” 11 [28] Selanjutnya, dalam kes PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] 28 MLJ 257, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa selagi mana keterangan seseorang saksi itu adalah tidak mustahil, maka keterangannya hendaklah diterima oleh Mahkamah. Thomson C.J. (pada ketika itu) dalam penghakimannya telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “When a Police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his evidence must in the first instance be accepted. If he says he saw a cow jumping over the moon his evidence is, of course, not to be accepted, but if he says he saw a cow wandering along one of the main streets of Kuala Lumpur (the sort of thing we all see every day of our lives) there is not the slightest justification for refusing to believe him. Of course, if his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or is shaken by cross-examination then it becomes the business of the Magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent probability the evidence of any witness, whether a Police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted.”. [29] Atas Imbangan Kebarangkalian berdasarkan keterangan yang ada, Plaintif dan Defendan bertanggungan cuai secara bersama di dalam kemalangan ini iaitu pada kadar liabiliti sebanyak 50%-50%. Jumlah ganti rugi (kuantum) [30] Mahkamah dalam menilai gantirugi, telah berpandukan kepada kes- kes yang telah diputuskan terdahulu. Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kepada kes-kes berikut: 12 (i) (ii) (iii) Mariam bt Mansor v. JD Peter [1975] 1 MLRH 27; [1975] 1 MLJ 279: “in considering what compensation the court shall award, it is impossible to arrive at an accurate figure, however, all the court can do is to award her a sum which would compensate her for pain and suffering she had undergone and will, in all probability, continue to undergo. | feel that the sum awarded should be a fair sum to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries suffered, but it should not be too excessive to constitute an injustice to the defendant. It is trite law that any claim for special damages must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved as opposed to general damages which is subject to assessment (See Sam Wun Hoong v. Kader Ibramshah [1980] 1 MLRA 712; [1981] 1 MLJ 295 at 297, FC). In Yeap Cheng Hock v. KajimaTaisei Joint Venture [1971] 1 MLRH 257; [1973] 1 MLJ 230 at 236 Syed Agil Barakbah, J. held: “The general principle is that the plaintiff must be prepared to prove his special damages unless it has been agreed. It is not enough for him to write down the particulars and leave them for the court to decide. It is for him to prove them.”. Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 1 MLRA 154; [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300 “it must be borne in mind that damages for personal injuries are not punitive and still less a reward. They are simply compensation that will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act, so far as money can compensate.” Yeap Cheng Hock v. KajimaTaisei Joint Venture [1971] 1 MLRH 257; [1973] 1 MLJ 230 at 236: 13 “The general principle is that the plaintiff must be prepared to prove his special damages unless it has been agreed. It is not enough for him to write down the particulars and leave them for the court to decide. It is for him to prove them.”. (iv) Dalam kes S.T.U. v. The Comptroller of Income Tax [1962] 28 MLJ 220, Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan bahawa keterangan lisan adalah mencukupi untuk membuktikan sesuatu fakta dalam ketiadaan keterangan dokumentari bagi menyokong fakta tersebut. Dalam penghakiman Tan Ah Tah J (pada ketika itu), beliau telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “In this case certain explanations given by the appellant to the officers of the Income Tax Department were rejected on the ground that there was no documentary evidence to support them. No doubt documentary evidence can in many cases be very cogent and convincing. The lack of it however, should not invariably be a reason for rejecting an explanation. Not every transaction is accompanied or supported by documentary evidence. Much depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, but if the person who is giving the explanation appears to be worthy of credit, does not reveal any inconsistency and there is nothing improbable in the explanation, it can, in my view, be accepted.”. [31] Bagi membuat keputusan sama ada untuk mengenepikan keputusan HMS, mahkamah in merujuk kepada panduan dalam kes Tan Kuan Yau lwn Suhindrimani [1985] 2 MLJ 22 Mahkamah Persekutuan di muka surat 23 memutuskan seperti berikut: “The principle that could guide this court in determining whether it should interfere with the quantum of damages is crystal clear. What is also clear is that much depends on the circumstances of each case, in particular the 14 amount of the award. In a particular case therefore, it is for the appeal court to consider whether in the light of the circumstances of that case there is an erroneous estimate of the amount of the damage in that, either there was an omission on the part of the Judge to consider some relevant materials, or he had admitted for purposes of assessment some _ irrelevant considerations. If the court is satisfied or convinced that the Judge has acted upon wrong principles of law then it is justified in reversing; indeed, it is its duty to reverse the finding of the trial Judge.” [32] Dalam kes Nordin Haji Abdul Wahab Ilwn Mohd Salleh bin Hassan [1986) 2 MLJ 294 Mahkamah Agung di muka surat 296 memutuskan bahawa: “We also aware of the special difficulty in an appeal against quantum. The finding that a trial Judge has erred in the direction of being too generous would not by itself constitute a matter to be appealed from and the appellate court is always slow to reverse the trial Judge's decision on assessment of damages unless there are strong grounds for interference. See Pang Ah Chee v. Chong Kwee Sang.” [33] Mahkamah ini juga telah merujuk kepada kes Kanan Subramaniam & Satu Lagi Lwn Aman Syah Abadzyuid [2002] 6 CLJ 34 di muka surat 50 yang mengikut kes Tay Tong Chew & Anor Lwn Abdul Rahman #j. Ahmad [1984] 2 CLJ 227), di mana Mahkamah dalam kes tersebut memutuskan:- “Mahkamah ingin berkata bahawa sebarang award yang dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah bagi kecederaan plaintif memang tidak boleh membawa kaki yang asal kepada plaintif sebelum kecederaan yang dialami di kemalangan tetapi Mahkamah harus berkonsisten (there must be some consistency and certainty) atau satu ceiling di atas award supaya award itu tidak melampaui (exorbitant) dan dipastikan bukan mengikut kesukaan seseorang peguam 15 atau kesukaan seseorang hakim Mahkamah Sesyen ataupun seorang Majistret kepada sesuatu individual tetapi harus mengikut ‘trend of awards' kepada sesuatu kecederaan yang sama kalau tidak keseluruhan Industri Insuran akan jatuh (collapse) dan akibat itu, ini mungkin akan membawa kelemahan kepada ekonomi atau tidak sihat kepada ekonomi Negara kita” [34] Mahkamah Sesyen memutuskan bahawa, jumlah sebanyak RM500 sebulan sebagai jumlah minimum yang wajar dan munasabah dibenarkan bagi kehilangan tanggungan walaupun Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan tuntutan tersebut. Tiada alasan dikemukakan kenapa HMS memutuskan jumlah tersebut adalah jumlah minimum yang munasabah. [35] Namun Mahkamah ini mendapati berdasarkan keterangan, prinsip tolakan sebanyak 1/3 daripada tuntutan oleh Plaintif berdasarkan prinsip perundangan sedia ada wajar diambil kira. Dalam kes Topaiwah v. Salleh [1968] 1 LNS 61, juga dinyatakan seperti berikut: “So far as this Court is concerned we should, to paraphrase Greer LJ in Flint v. Levell [1935] 1 KB 354, 360 be disinclined to reverse the finding of a trial Judge as to the amount of damages merely because we think that if we had tried the case in the first instance we would have given a lesser sum. To justify reversing him, we should be convinced that he acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. The assessments which the Courts have made over the years form some guide to the kind of figure which is proper and which the appellate Court will follow in the light of the special facts of each particular case.” [36] Mahkamah ini juga telah merujuk kepada kes Wong Li Fatt William (An Infant) V. Haidawati Bt Bolhen & Anor [1994] 1 LNS 196; [1994] 2 16 MLJ 497, Yang Arif Hakim Richard Malanjum, (pada ketika itu) menyatakan, "In considering the issue of quantum of damages, | bear in mind that an award must be fair which means that must be a proper compensation for the injury suffered and the loss sustained. " [37] Dalam kes ini terdapat keterangan bahawa Simati bekerja sebagai jurutera dan mempunyai pendapatan sebanyak RM2700.00 sebulan. Apa yang tidak dapat dibuktikan adalah bahawa jumlah sebanyak RM1200.00 telah diberikan kepada Plaintif kerana tiada sebarang dokumen. Namum keterangan bahawa terdapatnya sumbangan kepada Plaintif tidak dicabar dengan keterangan lain oleh Defendan-Defendan. Dalam keadaan ini tolakan sebanyak 1/3 adalah wajar dibuat dan bukannya jumlah nominal. [38] Dalam kes Sodah bt Haji Saad (sebagai Isteri dan Waris kepada Haji Abdullah bin Ahmad, Simati) v Saleh bin Bakar & Anor [2009] MLJU 61, Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan bahawa : “In Lim Ah Chi v Tan Ah Mui [1969] 1 MLJ 215, a self-employed "pow" seller died in a motor accident caused by the negligence of the defendant in that case. There was paucity of credible evidence of the deceased's earnings. Nevertheless, the court used its own understanding of conditions prevailing in Singapore in regard to a one-man business of the kind in question to arrive at a reasonable figure. Again, in Chan Peng Fook v Kan Pak Lee [1974] 2 MLJ 197, the factum of employment as a carpenter was proved although the quantum of the wage earned was not. Yet, that did not prevent Hashim Yeop A Sani J (as he then was) from making an assessment based on his view of what an average carpenter would have earned. Lastly, in Abdul Rahman bin Abdul Karim v Abdul Wahab bin Abdul Hamid [1996] 4 MLJ 623, there was evidence that the plaintiff there was a self-employed log 17 broker and later the driver of an unlicensed private car. His salary slips were not adduced in evidence. Yet, Abdul Malik Ishak J was able to make an assessment. These cases illustrate the rule at common law that difficulty in assessing damages is no bar to the court making a reasonable award based, if necessary, on its own experience. After all judges is not cloistered in an ivory tower. They are but ordinary members of society, armed with the knowledge of life's experiences. Hence, they are entitled to utilise matters of common knowledge and notoriety to make an assessment of damages in case of this sort.” (penekanan ditambah) [39] Jumlah yang dibenarkan dengan mengambilkira tolakan 1/3 daripada jumlah pendapatan Simati adalah munasabah selaras dengan nas-nas perundangan sedia ada. Sebagai panduan Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Muhamad Bin Hashim v Teok Teik Chai & Anor [1996] 4 MLJ 7, Mahkamah memutuskan bahawa: “The amount of actual support received, the direct benefit to a ‘dependent’, and the amount of damages are of course matters pre-eminently for a trial court to decide, and per Thompson CJ in Nam Thiam Siew v Chuang Wai Lan [1959] MLJ 126 'a matter of assessment and not a matter of pure calculation’. The trial court provisionally assessed the years' purchase as eight at RM250 per month. Considering the deceased was 21 years old and single, and was drawing a salary of at least RM565 per month, the court found the trial court's provisional assessment of RM250 per month on a multiplier of eight years as the loss of support was reasonable, any difference between the trial court's provisional assessment and this court's assessment was also negligible and did not warrant any interference.” [40] Dalam kes Chang Chong Foo & ANOR. v. Shivanathan Perumal [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 27, diputuskan bahawa: 18 “In fatal accident cases in respect of a dependency claim, the deceased's own expenses have to be deducted: See Amar Singh v. Chin Kiew [1960] 1 LNS 5 CA. This was the position at common law. It made sense because the deceased before his death could not have contributed the whole of his earnings towards the maintenance of his wife and children and that at least some part of his earnings must have been devoted to his own maintenance. This principle is now reflected in s. 7(3)({iv)(c) which came into force on 1 October 1984 and states: In assessing the loss of earnings in respect of any period after the death of a person where such earnings provide for or contribute to the damages under this section the Court shall: take into account any diminution of any such amount as aforesaid by such sums as is proved or admitted to be the living expenses of the person deceased at the time of his death. It will be seen that the same language is used in both s. 7(3)(iv)(c) and s. 28A(2)(c)(iii). It follows that the legislature intended that the same principle be applied in both cases, that is to say, in respect of a dependency claim for loss of earnings arising out of a fatal accident and in respect of a claim for loss of future earnings for personal injury. We are accordingly of the view that the term ‘living expenses' in s. 7 and s. 28A bear the same meaning. In Harris v. Empress Motors Ltd. and Cole v. Crown Poultry Packers Ltd. [1983] 3 All ER 561, the Court of Appeal held that: (i) the ingredients that go to make up ‘living expenses’ are the same whether the deceased was young or old, single or married, or with or without dependants; (ii) the sum to be deducted as living expenses is the proportion of the deceased's net earnings that he would have spent exclusively on himself to maintain himself at the standard of life appropriate to his situation; (iii) any sums that he would have expended exclusively to maintain or benefit others will not form part of his living expenses and will not be deductible from his net earnings. 19 In White v. London Transport Executive [1982] 1 All ER 410, Webster J said at p. 418: .. in the cost of maintaining himself | include the cost of his housing, heating, food, clothing, necessary travelling and insurances and things of that kind... Where no details are given as to the deceased's living expenses, the Court of Appeal in P R Panickar V. Chwee May Kwong & Anor. [1957] 1 LNS 52 made an arbitrary deduction of RM50 p.m. as the deceased's living expenses out of monthly earnings of RM250.” [41] Dalam kes Pang Ah Chee V. Chong Kwee Sang [1985] CLJ REP 236; [1985] 1 MLJ 153, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan: "The finding that a trial judge has erred in the discretion of being too generous would not be itself constitute a matter to be appealed from and the appellate court is always slow to reverse the trial judge's decision on assessment of damages unless there are strong grounds for interference." (penekanan ditambah) Kesimpulan [42] Atas imbangan kebarangkalian, Plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan kes terhadap Defendan-Defendan, namun Mahkamah juga mendapati terdapat cuai sumbangan oleh Simati dalam kes ini. Rayuan Plaintif (Perayu) dibenarkan dan perintah HMS diketepikan dengan perintah- perintah berikut: 20 (3) (4) Bertarikh : 2 Mei 2023 Pegquamcara kepada Perayu : Liabiliti dipertanggungjawabkan 50% kepada Perayu dan 50% kepada Responden; Untuk quantum diatas kehilangan tanggungan dibenarkan untuk jumlah RM900.00 x 12 bulan x 16 tahun dan 50% # daripada jumlah_ tersebut sebanyak RM86,400.00. dan Kos Rayuan ini RM 3000.00 dibayar oleh Responden kepada Perayu tertakluk kepada alokator. Lain-lain perintah HMS adalah kekal. == AZIZAN MD. ARSHAD Persuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi (8) Pulau Pinang Eda Nurul Hanani Binti Md Daud Tetuan Sudesh Narinder And Partners 73A, Jalan Maharaja, Pusat Bandar Parit Buntar, 34200 Parit Buntar, Perak 21 Pequamcara kepada Responden: M.Thanushini A/P Moorthy Tetuan Kumar & Co. No. 84, Bishop Street, 10200 Penang, Penang Kes-kes yang dirujuk: 1. Ong Cheng Wah & Anor v Supramaniam a/l Arjunan [2001] MLJU 291; [2001] 4 CLJ 202 2. Lee Hock Lai v Yeoh Wah Pein [1999] 5 MLJ 172 3. Siti Aishah Bt. Ibrahim v Goh Cheng Hwai [1982] 2 MLJ 124 4. Ng Ben Thong & Ors v Krishnan a/l Arumugam [1998] 5 MLJ 579 5. Dharam Singh Dhillon v Ibrahim Bin Shaaban &Anor [1995] 4 CLJ 207 6. Mohamad Shahrul Azman bin Ishak v Malaysia Airlines Systems Bhd [2010] 2 CLJ 1 7. Fu Yik Teck lwn Chai Sou Lan dan satu lIagi [2017] 8 MLJ 773 8. Nadarajan Muiandy v. Ayob Jauhari [2001] 4 CLJ 718 9. Lai Yew Seong v. Chan Kim Sang Lai Yew Seong v. Chan Kim Sang [1987] CLJ Rep 151 10. Miskinah Binte Jaya & Ors v Mohamed Bin Salleh & Anor [1984] | MLJ 187 11. Ng Aik Kian & Anor v Sia Loh Sia [1997] 2 CLJ Supp 218 12. PP v. Mohamed Ali [1962] 28 MLJ 257 22 13. Mariam bt Mansor v. JD Peter [1975] 1 MLRH 27; [1975] 1 MLJ 279 14. Ong Ah Long v. Dr S Underwood [1983] 1 MLRA 154; [1983] 2 MLJ 324; [1983] CLJ (Rep) 300 15. Yeap Cheng Hock v. KajimaTaisei Joint Venture [1971] 1 MLRH 257; [1973] 1 MLJ 230 at 236 16. S.T.U. v. The Comptroller of Income Tax [1962] 28 MLJ 220 17. Tan Kuan Yau lwn Suhindrimani [1985] 2 MLJ 22 18. Nordin Haji Abdul Wahab Iwn Mohd Salleh bin Hassan [1986] 2 MLJ 294 19. Kanan Subramaniam & Satu Lagi Lwn Aman Syah Abadzyuid [2002] 6 CLJ 34 20. Tay Tong Chew & Anor Lwn Abdul Rahman Hj. Ahmad [1984] 2 CLJ 227) 21. Topaiwah v. Salleh [1968] 1 LNS 61 22. Wong Li Fatt William (An Infant) V. Haidawati Bt Bolhen & Anor [1994] 1 LNS 196; [1994] 2 MLJ 497 23.Sodah bt Haji Saad (sebagai Isteri dan Waris kepada Haji Abdullah bin Ahmad, Simati) v Saleh bin Bakar & Anor [2009] MLJU 61 24. Muhamad Bin Hashim v Teok Teik Chai & Anor [1996] 4 MLJ 7 25. Chang Chong Foo & ANOR. v. Shivanathan Perumal [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 27 26. Pang Ah Chee V. Chong Kwee Sang [1985] CLJ REP 236; [1985] 1 MLJ 153 23