Salim bin Amat (No. K/P: 620419-01-6337) 1. Jenap binti Ahmad (No. K/P: 470529-01-5406) 2. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Mersing, Negeri Johor

Page 1 of 18 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020 (Dalam perkara asal Saman Pemula JA-24-13-09/2019) Dalam perkara mengenai Akta Harta Pusaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955 Guaman Pembahagian No. JKPTG/PK/01/05/0163/2011 Tahun 2011. Dalam hal Harta Pusaka Bunga Binti Jusoh, No. KP: 280816-01-5248 (1232173), Tarikh Mati: 25/10/2010, No. Sijil Mati: D 775013 Perintah Pembahagian (Seksyen 13) bertarikh 2 Mei 2012; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai 7/40 Bahagian Harta No. Hakmilik GM1081 Lot 470 Mukim Tenglu Daerah Mersing Negeri Johor; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai 7/40 Bahagian Harta No. Hakmilik GM258 Lot 469 Mukim Tenglu Daerah Mersing Negeri Johor; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 471 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 7, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 2012 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 18 Kaedah 19 & Aturan 92 Kaedah 4, Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 2 of 18 ANTARA SALIM BIN AMAT (No. K/P: 620419-01-6337) …PLAINTIF DAN 1. JENAP BINTI AHMAD (No. K/P: 470529-01-5406) 2. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH MERSING NEGERI JOHOR … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN FREDRICK INDRAN X.A. NICHOLAS Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Tarikh: 30 MAC 2021 MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 3 of 18 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Lampiran 29) Pendahuluan [1] Alasan Penghakiman yang berikut adalah diturunkan atas rayuan terhadap keseluruhan keputusan Mahkamah ini yang telah diberikan pada 1.3.2021; yang memutuskan bahawa Notis Permohonan bertarikh 28.12.2020 oleh Responden dalam rayuan ini (selepas daripada ini dirujuk sebagai ‘Defendan Pertama’ di dalam Alasan ini) ~ untuk membatalkan tindakan sivil ini oleh Perayu (selepas daripada ini dirujuk sebagai ‘Plaintif’) di bawah Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1) (a) dan/atau (b) dan/atau (d) Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 serta menurut bidang kuasa Mahkamah yang sedia ada (Lampiran 29): dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM1,500.00. Matriks [2] Pada kesemua masa yang material, Plaintif telah memulakan tindakan guaman secara Saman Pemula ke atas Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua, antara lainnya untuk menuntut bahawa: i. Perintah Pembahagian bertarikh 2.5.2012 dibatalkan dan diketepikan; ii. Guaman Pembahagian untuk Harta Pusaka Bunga bt Jusoh, yang meninggal pada 25.10.2010 dibatalkan dan/atau dibicarakan semula; MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 4 of 18 iii. Hakmilik 7/40 masing-masing di atas Hartanah GM 1081 Lot 470 Mukim Tenglu, Daerah Mersing dan Hartanah GM 258 Lot 469 Mukim Tenglu, Daerah Mersing didaftar kembali dan/atau didaftar perletakkan kembali kepada Bunga binti Jusoh, simati. [3] Melalui perintah bertarikh 12.2.2020, Mahkamah telah memerintahkan bahawa Saman Pemula dalam tindakan ini dan kesemua prosiding di bawahnya diteruskan sebagai writ, dan kesemua afidavit yang difailkan dianggap sebagai pliding. [4] Pihak Defendan Pertama memfailkan permohonan ini untuk membatalkan Writ Saman dan Pernyataan Tuntutan pihak Plaintif tersebut terhadap Defendan Pertama. Pendirian Pihak-Pihak Secara Ringkas [5] Adalah pendirian teguh Defendan Pertama bahawa tindakan ini oleh Plaintif mendedahkan kausa tindakan yang tidak munasabah dan suatu yang mengaibkan, remeh dan menyusahkan; mahupun adalah penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. [6] Pihak Defendan Pertama merujuk kepada kes BANDAR BUILDER Sdn Bhd & Ors [Infra] dan menghujahkan bahawa ianya adalah satu undang-undang yang mantap bahawa kaedah ini patut digunakan di dalam kes-kes yang ‘terang dan nyata’ sahaja dan prosedur terus ini hanya boleh digunakan apabila jelas bahawa sesuatu tuntutan atau jawapan adalah pada wajahnya ‘obviously unsustainable’. MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 5 of 18 [7] Tuntutan utama di dalam Saman Pemula/Writ Saman pihak Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: i. Perintah Pembahagian bertarikh 2.5.2012 dibatalkan dan diketepikan; ii. Guaman Pembahagian untuk Harta Pusaka Bunga bt Jusoh, yang meninggal pada 25.10.2010 dibatalkan dan/atau dibicarakan semula; iii. Hakmilik 7/40 masing-masing di atas Hartanah GM 1081 Lot 470 Mukim Tenglu, Daerah Mersing dan Hartanah GM 258 Lot 469 Mukim Tenglu, Daerah Mersing didaftar kembali dan/atau didaftar perletakkan kembali kepada Bunga bt Jusoh, simati. [8] Pihak Plaintif menyatakan bahawa Perintah Pembahagian tersebut adalah diperintahkan secara silap fakta dan undang-undang. [9] Akan tetapi, Nota Prosiding Perbicaraan bertarikh 2.5.2012 (rujuk Ekshibit “J-6” Afidavit Tambahan Defendan Pertama di muka surat 7) jelas memperlihatkan bahawa pihak Plaintif sendiri selaku waris bagi simati, bersama waris-waris lain telah bersetuju untuk hartanah simati tersebut didaftarkan ke atas nama Defendan Pertama. [10] Tiada sebarang bantahan diterima dan direkodkan kepada Defendan Kedua semasa perbicaraan petisyen tersebut sama ada dalam bentuk bertulis, atau secara lisan ditimbulkan oleh waris- waris simati termasuk Plantif sendiri. MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 6 of 18 [11] Pihak Plaintif mempunyai peluang yang secukupnya dan seadilnya untuk menyatakan bantahan ke atas petisyen Defendan Pertama di dalam perbicaraan tersebut namun tidak berbuat demikian. Malahan, Plaintif juga turut direkodkan bersetuju untuk hartanah simati tersebut didaftarkan ke atas nama Defendan Pertama. “Harta Ada harta 1. GM 258 (LOT 469) – 7/40 bhg 2. GM 1081 (LOT 470) – 7/40 bhg Tanah sebelah menyebelah. Ada kelapa. Tiada gadaian. Serah pada saya Saya Majid setuju letak nama Jenap. Saya Salim setuju letak nama Jenap. Waris tidak hadir 4(1) akan hantar surat setuju kemudian. Tempoh satu bulan” [12] Atas dasar persetujuan tersebut, perintah telah diberikan untuk hartanah simati tersebut didaftarkan ke atas nama Defendan Pertama. [13] Pihak Plaintiff hanya lebih kurang 7 tahun selepas itu memulakan tindakan Mahkamah di mana ia menyatakan bahawa pembahagian dan perintah tersebut telah dikeluarkan secara silap fakta dan undang-undang. MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 7 of 18 [14] Defendan Pertama menekan dengan kuat bahawa: i. Pihak Plaintif selaku waris yang hadir semasa perbicaraan tersebut; ii. Pihak Plaintif tidak mengemukakan apa-apa bantahan dalam apa jua cara terhadap permohonan pihak Defendan Pertama selaku pempetisyen; iii. Pihak Plaintif bersetuju untuk hartanah simati tersebut diletakkan di atas nama pihak Defendan Pertama; dan iv. Hanya selepas 7 tahun, baru pihak Plaintif memulakan tindakan guaman ini dan menyatakan bahawa perintah tersebut diperintahkan secara salah fakta dan undang- undang adalah suatu tindakan yang mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan yang menyebabkan tindakan guamannya tersebut adalah suatu yang jelas tidak dapat dikekalkan (obviously unsustainable). [15] Selain daripada itu pihak Plaintif sepatutnya telahpun mengambil tindakan sewajarnya sekiranya berniat untuk mengetepikan Perintah betarikh 2.5.2012 berkenaan seperti termaktub di dalam Seksyen 14 (9) dan Seksyen 29 Akta Harta Pusaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955 serta Peraturan 10 Small Estate Distribution Regulations 1955 (infra). Ini tidak dilakukan. MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 8 of 18 Undang-Undang [16] Aturan 18, Kaedah 19 (1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 memperuntukkan bahawa: “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that – (a) It disclose no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b) It is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) It may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) It is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. And may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be” [17] Merujuk kepada otoriti utama di dalam Aturan 18, Kaedah 19 (1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam BANDAR BUILDER SDN BHD v. UNITED MALAYAN BANKING CORPORATION BHD [1993] 1 MLRA 611; [1993] 3 MLJ 36; [1993] 4 CLJ 7; [1993] 2 AMR 1969, dan merujuk kepada keputusan yang diberikan oleh Mohamed Dzaiddin, HMP (pada ketika itu) yang menyatakan bahawa: “The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O 18 r 19(1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 9 of 18 is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M R in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it “obviously unsustainable” (Attorney- General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L & N W Ry Co [1892] 3 Ch 274, CA). it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O 33 r 3 (which is in pari materia with our O 33 r 2 Rules of the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable”. It is therefore well established that the power of the Court to strike out under the four grounds of O 18 r 19(1) is to be exercised when it can clearly be determined that a claim or answer is prime facie obviously unsustainable (see the Court of Appeal decision of Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd v. Commerce International Merchant Bankers Bhd [2013] 4 MLRA 478; [2013] 4 MLJ 520; [2013] 8 CLJ 329; [2013] 3 AMR 782; it is also only to be invoked sparingly (see Affin Bank Bhd v. Eye Bee Sdn Bhd [2005] 5 MLRH 200; [2005] 5 MLJ 1). MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 10 of 18 [18] Di dalam kes TIMAH RAMLAH BT DAWI And Anor v. SARAWAK MEDICAL VENTRE Sdn Bhd [2007] MLJU 507 menyatakan bahawa: “It is trite that the court is vested with extensive powers to strike out pleadings. These powers are both salutary and necessary not only to enforce the basic rules of pleadings but also to dispose of proceedings which are hopeless, baseless or without foundation in law or in equity or are otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. However, the powers are permissive, not mandatory, and they confer a discretionary jurisdiction which the court will exercise in the light of all the circumstances and facts of the case. This discretion will be exercised by applying two fundamental principles. The first principle is that the parties will not lightly ‘be driven from the seat of judgment.’ The second principle is that a dismissal of the action may be required by the very essence of justice of the case, so as to prevent the parties being harassed and put to expense by frivolous, vexatious or hopeless litigation.” [emphasis added] [19] Seksyen 14 (9) Akta Harta Pusaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955 memperuntukkan bahawa perintah oleh Pentadbir Tanah di bawah seksyen ini mempunyai efek yang sama seperti Mahkamah dan seharusnya dirayu di bawah Seksyen 29 Akta yang sama. “Any order made by a Land Administrator under this section shall have the same force and effect and shall be enforceable in the same manner as if it had been made by a court but there shall be no appeal from such an order except under section 29.” MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 11 of 18 [20] Seksyen 29 Akta Harta Pusaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955 telah dengan jelas memperuntukkan bahawa: “29. (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act and to subsection (5), any person aggrieved by any order, decision or act made or done by a Land Administrator under this Act may appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal shall lie from any such order, decision or act so far as the same is based on and in accordance with a decision of the Ruler or of any other person or body in respect of a reference under paragraph 19(1)(a) or in accordance with the opinion of the High Court in respect of a reference under paragraph 19(1)(b): … (2) The time limited for appeal and the procedure in every such appeal shall, unless otherwise provided by rules made under section 30, conform to the limited for, and the procedure in, a civil appeal from a Sessions Court with such variations as may be necessary and the same fees shall be payable.” [emphasis added] [21] Di dalam kes MAJLIS PEGUAM & Anor v. TAN SRI DATO’ MOHAMED YUSOFF MOHAMED [1997] 1 MLRA 302, Mahkamah Persekutuan menyatakan prinsip bahawa: “It is true that on general principle, where a statue regulates the exercise of a right or power, or the use of a prescribed procedure, express reference to time being made, there is a marked inclination on the part of the Court to regard the relevant provision as obligatory unless a power of extending or abridging the time is given to the Court.” MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 12 of 18 [22] Prinsip ini juga dirujuk dan digunapakai di dalam kes PANG SHYIAN JUANG v. PENTADBIR TANAH SEGAMAT & Anor [2020] MLRHU 1778, di mana Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman, Evrol Mariette Peters memutuskan bahawa: “[9] In my view, the provisions in the Small Estate Distribution Act 1955 and Small Estate Distribution Regulations 1955 should take precedence over O 3 r 5 of the Rules of Court, pursuant to the principle of generalia specialibus non derogant.” [23] Tambahan lagi, waktu yang ditetapkan untuk pihak Plaintif merayu telah lama luput. Peraturan 10 Small Estate Distribution Regulations 1955 menetapkan bahawa: “(c) The notice of Appeal shall be intituled and filed in the proceedings before the Land Administrator and shall be filed in the Land Administrator’s office within 14 days from the day on which the decision appealed against was pronounced. Sufficient copies of the notice of appeal shall be filed to provide copies for all parties affected by the appeal and in addition copies for the Court and for the Land Administrator.” [emphasis added] [24] Di dalam kes SYED OMAR BIN SYED MOHAMED v. PERBADANAN NASIONAL Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 461, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan, antara lainnya bahawa: MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 13 of 18 “The plaintiff did not appeal against the decision of the learned judge striking out the first suit. The failure to appeal meant that the plaintiff accepted the correctness of the decision to dismiss its suit. Further, the failure to appeal has itself been recognized as an abuse of process because the second suit would be construed as an attempt to circumvent the appeal procedure.” [25] Di dalam kes SERAC ASIA Sdn. Bhd. v. SEPAKAT INSURANCE BROKERS Sdn. Bhd. [2013] 6 CLJ 673, Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan seperti berikut: “Once a regularly obtained order or a judgement has been perfected, the Court is functus officio. The matter as decided vide encl. 6 was thus res judicata and could not be relitigated. It needed to be emphasized that the order made under encl. 6 was appealed and affirmed right up to the Federal Court. It could not now be revisited or reasserted under any guise in a subsequent proceeding. … The law does not allow the respondent to have a second bite of the cherry and in the manner as it did,” [26] Di dalam kes ASIA COMMERCIAL FINANCE (M) Bhd. v. KAWAL TELITI Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 3 CLJ 783, telah diputuskan: “[2] The doctrine of res judicata is not confined to causes of action or issues which the Court is actually asked to decide or has already decided. It covers also causes of action or issues of facts, which, though not already decided as a result of the same not being brought forward due to negligence, inadvertence or deliberately, are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised, MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 14 of 18 that it would be an abuse of Court process to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them …” [emphasis added] [27] Di dalam ORCHARD CIRCLE Sdn Bhd v. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH HULU LANGAT & Ors [2021] 1 MLRA 54, Mahkamah Persekutuan, dalam merujuk kepada kes ASIA COMMERCIAL FINANCE (M) Berhad v. KAWAL TELITI Sdn Bhd [1995] 1 MLRA 611 menyatakan prinsip res judicata seperti berikut: “Peh Swee Chin FCJ in Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v. Kawal Teliti Sdn. Bhd. [1995] 1 MLRA 611 in delivering the judgment of the Court explained the concept of res judicata which means that when a matter adjudge, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicature. When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata as the judgment becomes the truth between the parties. The rationale is that there should be finality in litigation and that no one should be vexed twice for the same cause or issue.” [28] Di dalam kes SEE THONG & Anor v SAW BENG CHONG [2013] 3 MLJ 235, Mahkamah Rayuan memperuntukkan dengan jelas bahawa: “The words ‘frivolous or vexatious’ generally refer to a groundless action of statement with no prospect of success, often raised to embarrass or annoy the other party to the action. In considering whether any proceedings were MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 15 of 18 vexatious or frivolous, one is entitled to and ought to look at the whole history of the matter and it is not to be determined by whether the pleading discloses a cause of action or not (see Attorney General of The Duchy of Lancaster v London & North Western Railway Co [1892] 3 Ch 274; and Re Vernazza [1959] 2 All ER 200). It was decided in the above case of Attorney General of the Duchy of Lancester that ‘frivolous or vexatious actions means cases which are obviously frivolous or vexatious or obviously unsustainable.” [emphasis added] [29] Di dalam kes BOO ARE NGOR (P) v. CHUA MEE LIANG (P) (SUED AS PUBLIC OFFICER OF KIM LENG TZE TEMPLE) [2009] 6 MLJ 145, Mahkamah Persekutuan menggunapakai dapatan Mahkamah Rayuan Singapura di dalam kes GABRIEL PETER & Partners (suing as a firm) v. WEE CHONG JIN & Ors yang menyatakan tentang prinsip “penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah” di mana: “[22] The term, ‘abuse of the process of the court’, in O. 18 r. 19 (1)(d), has given a wide interpretation by the courts. It includes considerations of the public policy and the interest of justice. This term signifies that the process of the court must be used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The court will prevent the improper use of its machinery. It will prevent the judicial process from being used a s a means of vexation and oppression in the process of litigation … if an action was not brought bona fide for the purpose of obtaining relief but for some other ulterior or collateral purpose, it might be struck out as an abuse of the process of the court.” [emphasis added] MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 16 of 18 Penilaian & Penemuan [30] Secara kesimpulan, berdasarkan ke atas matriks kes ini yang disandingkan dengan otoriti-otoriti tersebut di atas dapatlah Mahkamah ini memperlihatkan secara jelas dan nyata bahawa: i. Tindakan guaman Plaintif adalah suatu tindakan yang tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan yang munasabah; ii. Tindakan ini tidak dapat dikekalkan; iii. Tindakan ini merupakan suatu tindakan yang mengaibkan, remeh atau menyusahkan; dan iv. Perbuatan Plaintif untuk tidak merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi seperti yang diperuntukkan di dalam Seksyen 29 Akta Harta Pusaka Kecil (Pembahagian) 1955 adalah satu tindakan penyalahgunaan proses Mahkamah. Pesanan Akhir [31] Ini adalah permohonan oleh Defendan Pertama (Lamp. 29) dan Defendan Kedua (Lamp. 32), kedua-duanya merangkumi Aturan 18 Kaedah 19(1) dan Kaedah 92(4) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 17 of 18 Setelah mendengar penghujahan lisan dan membaca penghujahan bertulis dari semua pihak berkenaan melalui peguambela yang bijaksana masing-masing, serta menimbang nas undang-undang yang telah dikemukakan dan menilai keterangan dokumentari di dalam kes ini, adalah diputuskan bahawa kedua-dua permohonan tersebut dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM1,500.00 dibayar oleh Plaintif kepada setiap Defendan. -T.tangan- ................................................................... (Fredrick Indran X.A. Nicholas) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246 Page 18 of 18 KAUNSEL Bagi pihak Perayu/Plaintif: En. Hasanuddin bin Yusoff (Cik Noor Shafarin Abdullah bersamanya) Tetuan Hasanuddin Shafarin & Ghazali Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 24A, Jalan Tun Abdul Razak 30100 IPOH Perak (Ruj: HY/H/CIV/286/4/19) Bagi pihak Responden/Defendan Pertama: En. Ahmad Nur Awalludin bin Zakaria (Cik Shazwani bersamanya) Tetuan Azwad Ihsan & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara No. 5-01, Jalan Padi Emas 1/5 Uda Business Centre Bandar Baru Uda 81200 Johor Bahru (Ruj: S.1309.13] Bagi pihak Responden/Defendan Kedua: Tn. Hj. Jailani bin Abd. Rahman Peguam Kanan Persekutuan Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Johor Aras 2, Bangunan Dato’ Jaafar Muhammad Kota Iskandar 79100 Iskandar Puteri Johor (Ruj: PN/JR/FC/11/22/2020) MTJB(S2)-JA-21NCvC-10-03/2020/SA/JA/fi/r78/3246