SIA CHENG SOON V TENGKU ISMAIL BIN TENGKU IBRAHIM

1 SIA CHENG SOON & ANOR v. TENGKU ISMAIL TENGKU IBRAHIM FEDERAL COURT, PUTRAJAYA ABDUL HAMID MOHAMAD, CJ; ZAKI TUN AZMI, PCA; ARIFFIN ZAKARIA, FCJ CIVIL APPLICATION NO: 08-151-2007 (N) 15 MAY 2008 [2008] 5 CLJ 201 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Courts - Jurisdiction of Federal Court - Reference to Federal Court of issues of law pertaining to case that commenced in Sessions Court - Whether permitted - Inherent jurisdiction of court - Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP - Rules of the Federal Court 1995, r. 137 CIVIL PROCEDURE: Jurisdiction - Federal Court - Reference to Federal Court of issues of law pertaining to case that commenced in Sessions Court - Whether permitted - Inherent jurisdiction of court - Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP - Rules of the Federal Court 1995, r. 137 CIVIL PROCEDURE : Jurisdiction - Inherent jurisdiction of court - Federal Court - Reference to Federal Court of issues of law pertaining to case that commenced in Sessions Court - Whether permitted - Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP - Rules of the Federal Court 1995, r. 137 CIVIL LAW ACT: Damages - Claim for damages - Reference to Federal Court of issues of law pertaining to case that commenced in Sessions Court - Whether permitted - Inherent jurisdiction of court - Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP - Rules of the Federal Court 1995, r. 137 The first and second respondents, the parents of the deceased who died in a road accident, brought a claim for berea vement and funeral expenses under s. 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956 ('CLA') in the Se ssions Court. The case proceeded on two issues only ie, on liability and on the issue of limitation. The Sessions Court gave judgment for the respondents but the High Court subsequently allowed the applicant's appeal against that decision. The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeal, which allowed their appeal, resulting in the applicant's application for leave to appeal to this court ('first application'). Upon the respondents' preliminary objection that the first application was defective since t he suit had originated in the Sessions Court, this court dismissed the first application. The applicant then filed this application praying for leave to appeal to this court or alternatively to refer the issues hereunder set out to the Federal Court under its inherent jurisdiction as provided under r. 137 of the Rules of the F ederal Court 1995 ('RFC') on a point of law. Reliance was placed on the judgment of this court in Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP, where the applicant's application for this court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeal - even though the case commenced in the Sessions Court - was allowed. Held (dismissing the application) 2 Per Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ: (1) Jurisdiction of this court is given by law ie, the Federal Constitution ('FC') and statute. The law provides that an appeal from a decision of the Sessions Court ends at the Court of Appeal. Since there is no appeal to this court, does r. 137 of the RFC allow issues of law to be "referred" to this court? With respect, it could not be so. To allow it to be done is like accepting with the left hand what the right hand rejects. After all, even appeals to this court are only on "points of law", to use a general phrase to cover the pro visions of s. 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ('CJA') . When a matter ends in the Court of Appeal, it ends there, the whole of it. There has to be a provision in the law for this court to have jurisdiction to have such issues of law referred to it. For example, in the Industrial Relations Act 1967 , there is a provision that allows the Industrial Court to refer a question of law to the High Court for its determination - s. 33A. See also s. 16Z of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 . Going back to r. 137 of the RFC , the same reasons that were given by this court in Abdul Ghaffar Mohd Amin v. Ibrahim Yusoff & Anor in discussing whether r. 137 of the RFC permits an appeal not permitted by statute equally appli ed in this instance. There is no valid reason for a distinction to be made in respect of an appeal and a "reference". (paras 9, 10 & 11 ) (2) With regard to the case of Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock (supra) , it was misplaced to apply the CLA relating to civil law in a criminal case. The reasoning in that case was flawed and could not be resorted to in support of this application. (para 19) Bahasa Malaysia> Translation Of Headnotes Responden-responden pertama dan kedua, iaitu ibu bapa simati y ang meninggal dunia dalam satu kemalangan jalanraya, telah memfail tuntutan di Mahkamah Sesyen di bawah s. 7 Akta Undang-Undang Sivil 1956 ('CLA') kerana kehilangan dan perbelanjaan pengkebumian. Kes didengar atas dua isu, iaitu atas isu -isu liabiliti dan had masa. Mahkamah Sesyen memutuskan untuk responden -responden, namun rayuan pemoh on terhadapnya telah dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Responden -responden merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan, dan ini membangkitkan permohonan oleh pemohon di sini untuk kebenaran untuk merayu ke mahkamah ini ('permohonan pertama'). Responden-responden bagaimanapun membangkitkan bantahan awal bahawa permohonan pertama cacat disebabkan guaman berasal di Mahkamah Sesyen, dan akibatnya, mahkamah ini menolak permohonan pertama. Berikutan itu, pemohon memfail pula permohonan semasa, sekaligus memohon kebenaran untuk mera yu ke mahkamah ini, atau sebagai alternatifnya untuk merujuk isu -isu yang menyangkuti persoalan undang-undang ke mahkamah ini, berdasarkan bidangkuasa sedia ada mahkamah ini di bawah k. 137 Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Persekutuan 1995 ('RFC') . Pergantungan dibuat ke atas keputusan mahkamah ini di dalam Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP, di mana permohonan pemohon supaya mahkamah ini menggunakan bidangkuasa sedia adanya bagi menyemak keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan - walaupun kes bermula di Mahkamah Sesyen - telah dibenarkan. Diputuskan (menolak permohonan) 3 Oleh Abdul Hamid Mohamad KHN: (1) Bidangkuasa mahkamah ini diberikan oleh undang -undang, iaitu Perlembagaan Persekutuan ('FC') dan statut. Undang-undang memperuntukkan bahawa satu rayuan dari satu keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen berakhir di Mahkamah Rayuan. Oleh itu, oleh kerana tiada rayuan ke mahkamah ini dibuat, adakah k. 137 RFC membenarkan isu undang -undang "dirujuk" ke mahkamah ini? Dengan hormat, jawapannya adalah tidak. Membenarkan rujukan sedemikian s amalah seperti menerima dengan tangan kiri apa yang ditolak oleh tangan kanan. Sementelah, rayuan -rayuan ke mahkamah ini sekalipun, menggunakan ungkapan umum untuk menyerlahkan peruntukan s. 96 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 ('CJA') , hanya boleh dibuat atas "persoalan undang -undang". Apabila sesuatu perkara berakhir di Mahkamah Rayuan, i a akan keseluruhannya berakhir di situ. Jika tidak, harus ada peruntukan jelas di dalam undang -undang memberikan bidangkuasa kepada mahkamah bagi membolehkan isu-isu sedemikian dirujuk kepadanya. Sebagai contoh, di dalam Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 , terdapat peruntukan yang membenarkan Mahkamah Perusahaan merujuk persoalan undang-undang ke Mahkamah Tinggi untuk keputusan - iaitu s. 33A. Lihat juga s. 16Z Akta Pemajuan Perumahan (Kawalan dan Pelesenan) 1966 . Mengimbas kepada k. 137 RFC , alasan yang sama yang diberikan oleh mahkamah ini di dalam Abdul Ghaffar Mohd Amin v. Ibrahim Yusoff & Anor semasa mengupas sama ada k. 137 RFC mengizinkan rayuan yang tidak dibenarkan oleh statut, terpakai. Tiada alasan sah untuk membeza -bezakan satu rayuan de ngan satu "rujukan". (2) Berhubung kes Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock (supra) , adalah tidak kena pada tempatnya untuk menggunapakai CLA yang berkaitan dengan undang - undang sivil di dalam satu kes jenayah. Taakulan di dalam kes tersebut adalah cacat dan tidak boleh diambilkira bagi menyokong permohonan di sini. Case(s) referred to: Abdul Ghaffar Mohd Amin v. Ibrahim Yusoff & Anor [2008] 5 CLJ 1 FC (foll) Attorney General v. Sillem [1864] 11 ER 1200 (refd) Auto Dunia Sdn Bhd v. Wong Sai Fatt & Ors [1995] 3 CLJ 485 FC (refd) Barraaclough v. Brown [1897] AC 615 (refd) Colonial Sugar Refining Ltd v. Irving [1905] AC 369 (refd) Dato' Moham ed Hashim Shamsuddin v. The Attorney General, Hong Kong [1986] 1 CLJ 377; [1986] CLJ (Rep) 89 SC (refd) In re Harbhajan Singh Sodhi AIR (29) 1942 Nagpur 38 (refd) 4 Lee Cheng Yee v. Tiu Soon Siang & Anor [2004] 1 CLJ 1 CA (refd) Kuan Hip Peng v. Yap Yin & Anor [1964] 1 LNS 69 FC (refd) PP v. Hoo Chang Chwen [1962] 1 LNS 123 HC (refd) PP v. RK Menon & Anor [1977] 1 LNS 101 HC (refd) R v. The Lachiran ILR 28 Bom 533 (refd) R Rama Chandran v. Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 147 FC (refd) Re Soo Leot [1955] 1 LNS 127 HC (refd) Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP [2007] 1 CLJ 565 FC (not foll) Legislation referred to: Civil Law Act 1956, ss. 3(1), 7(5), 26, 27, 28, 28A Courts of Judicature Act 1964, ss. 16, 17, 50(1), 67, 87(1), 96(a), (b) Criminal Procedure Code, s. 323 Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, s. 16Z Industrial Relations Act 1967, s. 33A Penal Code, s. 409 Rules of the High Court 1980, O. 18 r. 18 Rules of the Federal Court 1995, rr. 2, 137 Subordinate Courts Rules 1980, O. 14 r. 14 Criminal Procedure Code 1898 [Ind], s. 439 Criminal Procedure Code 1973 [Ind], s. 397(2) Other source(s) referred to: GC Thornton, Legislative Drafting , 4th edn 1996, p 87 Counsel: 5 For the applicant - RJ Manecksha (V Natnavathy with him); M/s Matthew Thomas & Co For the respondents - Cyrus Dass (AC Vohrah with him); M/s Vohrah & Tan Chee Lan Reported by Suresh Nathan Case History: Court Of Appeal: [2006] 3 CLJ 556 JUDGMENT Abdul Hamid Mohamad CJ: [1] Like Application No. 08 -149-2007(P) (Abdul Ghaffar bin Mohd. Amin v. Ibrahim b. Yusoff & Anor), this application was also heard on 28 January 2008. We dismissed it. These are my grounds. [2] The first and second respondents are the parents of the deceased who died in a road accident on 11 December 1993. They brought a claim for bereavement and funeral expenses under s. 7 of the Civil Law Act 1956 (CLA 1956) in the Sessions Court at Seremban, on 6 December 1977, that is, 11 months and 23 days after the expiry of the limitation period under s. 7(5) of the Act . The case proceeded on two issues only ie, on liability and on the issue of limitation. The Sessions Court gave judgment for the respondents. The applicant appealed to the High Court. The High Court allowed the appeal. The High Court held that as the claim was under s. 7 of the CLA 1956 wherein there was a specific provision in that Act as regards limitation under s. 7(5) and as t he provision was absolute with no exception, it need not be pleaded in the statement of defence. [3] The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. The reason given by the Court of Appeal may be summarized as follows: (a) The issue of limitation must be pleaded in the statement of defence for cases under s. 7 of the CLA 1956 and s. 7(5) does not provide an absolute bar for cases filed after the expiry of limitation. (b) The Court of Appeal case of Lee Cheng Yee v. Tiu Soon Siang & Anor [2004] 1 CLJ 1 670 was per incuriam as it failed to consider O. 14 r. 14 of the Subordinate Courts Rules 1980 (SCR 1980) and O. 18 r. 18 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (RHC 1980) and therefore did not bind the court which had coordinate jurisdiction. (c) The Federal Court decision of Kuan Hip Peng v. Yap Yin & Anor [1964] 1 LNS 69 is not an authority that decided that the limitation under s. 7(5) CLA 1956 need not be pleaded in a statement of defence as in that case there was an application to strike out. 6 (d) The applicant used limitation as an 'ambush tactic' as it was only raised at submissions stage. [4] The applicants applied for leave to appeal to this court (the first application). The questions posed were: (a) Considering that Section 7(5) of the Civil Law Act, 1965 , is absolute in nature and contains no exceptions, does it therefore not follow that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1953 , will not apply in circumstances when the said Section 7(5) applies. And therefore as Section 7(5) is a statutory bar and absolute in nature, a party relying upon it need not, by the law of procedure, specifically plead it? (b) Is Section 7(5) Civil Law Act 1956 substantive law or procedural requirement that has to be pleaded? (c) Was the Court of Appeal correct in its decision that the decision of the earlier Court of Appeal in Lee Cheng Yee (suing as administrator of the estate of Chia Miew Hien) v. Tiu Soon Siang t/a Tiyo Soon Tiok & Soons Company & Anor [2004] 1 CLJ 1; [2004] 1 MLJ 670 wherein the facts in that case is on all fours with this case was per incuriam ? [5] When the first application was heard by this court, learned counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the application for leave was defective as the suit had originated in the Sessions Court. This court dismissed the ap plication. The applicants then filed this application (the second application) praying for leave to appeal to this court "or alternatively to refer the issues hereunder set out to the Federal Court under its inherent jurisdiction as provided under r. 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995 on a point of law." [6] As regards the prayer that leave to appeal be given under r. 137 of the Rules of t he Federal Court 1995 (RFC 1995) , I have covered the issue in Abdul Ghaffar bin Mohd. Amin v. Ibrahim bin Yusoff & Anor , Federal Court Application No. 08 -151-2007(N) and I need say no more. My response on the reasons given as to why the appeal should be al lowed equally apply here. [7] However, there is an alternative prayer here ie, to refer the issues to this court under r. 137 of the RFC 1995 . Reliance is placed on the judgment of this court in Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock v. PP [2007] 1 CLJ 565. [8] Before going any further I would like to state that this judgment focuses only on the issue whether issues arising from a case that commences in the Sessions Court which is not appealable to this court may be "referred" to this court for its decision. This judgment is not concerned with a review by this court of its own judgment. So, cases on review by this court of its own judgment will not be considered, neither is the issue decided here. [9] Jurisdiction of this court is given by law ie, the Constitution and statute. The law provides that an appeal from a decision of the Sessions Court ends at the Court of Appeal. There is no provision anywhere in our law (putting aside r. 137 of the time being) that allows such an appeal to this court. I have reaffirmed the position in Abdul Ghaffar bin Mohd. Amin (supra). 7 [10] Since there is no appeal to this court, does r. 137 of the RFC 1995 allow issues of law to be "referred" to this court? With respect, I do not think so. To allow it to be done is like accepting with the left hand what the right hand rejects. After all, even appeals to this court are only on "points of law", to use a general phrase to cover the provisions of s. 96 of the CJA 1964. When a matter ends in the Court of Appeal, it ends there, the whole of it. There has to be a provision in the law for this court to have jurisdiction to have such issues of law referred to it. We see, for example, in th e Industrial Relations Act 1967 a provision that allows the Industrial Court to refer a question of law to the High Court for its determination - s. 33A. See also s. 16Z Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966. [11] Going back to r. 137 of the RFC 1995 , in my judgment, the same reasons that I have given in Abdul Ghaffar bin Md. Amin (supra) in discussing whether r. 137 of t he RFC 1995 permits an appeal not permitted by statute equally apply here. There is no valid reason for a distinction to be made in respect of appeal and a "reference". [12] Regarding Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock (supra) the passages from that judgment that I have quoted in Abdul Ghaffar bin Md. Amin (supra) speak for themselves, supporting the same conclusion. [13] It is true that in Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock (supra) this court allowed the application of the applicant for this court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to review the decision of the Court of Appeal even though the case commenced in the Sessions Court. [14] With respect, I have great difficulty in following the reasoning of Augustine Paul FCJ. Having said what I have quoted in Abdul Ghaffar b in Md. Amin (supra) , the judgment went on to say: [17] The corollary is that r. 137 comes within the scope of s. 16(a) and is therefore lawful. It must be added that even if it can be argued that r. 137 does not conform with the requirements of s. 16(a) it makes no difference as r. 137 merely preserves what had been brought into force by s. 3(1)(a). [15] I have no problem with the first sentence. However, if it were otherwise, as I had said in Abdul Ghaffar bin Mohd. Amin (supra) , it would be ultra viress. 16 of the CJA . But, with respect, I am unable to agree with the view expressed in the second sentence. CLA 1956 concerns civil law, not criminal law. The title of the Act says so. The preamble also provides: An Act relating to the civil law to be administered in Malaysia. [16] By looking at the title of the chapters alone we will find the following: Part I - Preliminary Part II - General Part III - Fatal Accidents and Survival of 8 Causes of Action Part IV - Tortfeasors and Award of Interest Part V - Contributory Negligence and Common Employment Part VI - Frustrated Contracts Part VIA - Apportionment Part VII - Disposal and Devolution of Property Part VIII - Miscellaneous Under "Miscellaneous" there are sections on agreement by way of gaming or wagering to be null and void (s. 26); Infants (s. 27); No person chargeable with rent bone fide paid to holder under defective title (s. 28); Damages in respect of personal injury (s. 28A). For details please refer to the Act. [17] Those are matters covered by the Act, and they are matters of civil law. Common law of England and the rules of equity made applicable by the Act are those concerning civil law not provided by the Act or any other written law. Once it is provided by our written law, the English common law and the rules of equity are excluded. To read that the English common law exists side by side with a law provided by statute, whether originated from the principles of the English common law or not, is to blatantly disregard the very clear opening words of s. 3(1) of the CLA 1956. That cannot be right. [18] That is in respect of civil law which to a large extent, is not codified. Criminal law, even criminal jurisdiction, has no place in the CLA 1956. It is completely outside the scope of the Act. For example, can a person be charged in Mal aysia for a common law offence not codified by Malaysian law? The answer is certainly "No". [19] So, it is misplaced to apply the CLA 1956 relating to civil law in a criminal case. The reasoning in Tan Sri Eric Chia Eng Hock (supra) is flawed and that case cannot be resorted to in support of this application. [20] Of course, this is a civil matter. Eve n then, we should look closely at the opening words of s. 3(1): 3(1) Save so far a s other provision has been made or may hereafter be made