Sime Darby Plantation Berhad 1. ) PENGARAH TANAH DAN GALIAN PULAU PINANG 2. ) Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan 3. ) PENANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 4. ) Kerajaan Negeri Pulau Pinang

PA-25-21-04/2021 Kand. 225 18/11/2025 14:41:26 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI PULAU PINANG DALAM NEGERI PULAU PINANG DI MALAYSIA PERMOHONAN SEMAKAN KEHAKIMAN NO.: PA-25-21-04/2021 Dalam perkara mengenai hartanah milik Pemohon yang dipegang di bawah GRN 38705 di Lot 1347; GRN 38696 di Lot 1336; GRN 38704 di Lot 1346; GRN 38698 di Lot 1338; GRN 38697 di Lot 1337; GRN 45035 di Lot 1578; GRN 38742 di Lot 1481; GRN 38706 di Lot 1349; GRN 45034 di Lot 1577; GRN 38694 di Lot 1334; GRN 38693 di Lot 1332; GRN 51907 di Lot 1333; GRN 45057 di Lot 1331; GRN 38699 di Lot 1339; GRN 38703 di Lot 1345; GRN 38711 di Lot 1369; GRN 45040 di Lot 3903 dan GRN 160819 di Lot 1377, Mukim 11, Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan, Pulau Pinang; Dan Dalam perkara pengambilan tanah yang diisytiharkan dalam Warta Kerajaan untuk “Tujuan awam iaitu Perindustrian dan Pembangunan Page 1 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Bercampur” menurut Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960; Dan Dalam perkara hak asasi ke atas harta menurut Perkara 13 Perlembagaan Persekutuan; Dan Dalam perkara semakan kehakiman menurut Aturan 53 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 23 (2) Seksyen 25 (2) dan perenggan 1 Jadual kepada Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964. Antara SIME DARBY PLANTATION BERHAD [No. Pendaftaran Syarikat: 196901000760 (9163-D)] …PEMOHON Page 2 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Dan 1. PENGARAH TANAH DAN GALIAN PULAU PINANG 2. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH SEBERANG PERAI SELATAN 3. PENANG DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 4. KERAJAAN NEGERI PULAU PINANG … RESPONDEN-RESPONDEN JUDGMENT (JURISDICTION AND SUFFICIENCY OF ORDER 53 STATEMENT) PRELUSION [1] The applicant: Sime Darby Plantation Berhad (Sime Darby) filed a judicial review application against the statutory acquisition of 18 pieces of land that it owned. Sime Darby refers to the acquisition as “the 2019 wrongful acquisition”. [2] The Third Respondent: the Penang Development Corporation (PDC) raised two preliminary points to object to Sime Darby’s judicial review application. The other Respondents supported these objections. These objections apply to 17 out of the 18 lots of land. (The objections do not apply to Lot 1377.) [3] The two preliminary objections are that— (1) as Sime Darby’s judicial review application was filed outside of the mandatory time limit to file a judicial review application, this Court has no jurisdiction to determine it; and Page 3 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (2) Sime Darby’s mandatory Order 53 Rule 3(2) statement (Order 53 Statement) is insufficient, in that it does not set out the very grounds on which Sime Darby applies for this judicial review. [4] Should either or both of these objections be accepted and render Sime Darby’s judicial review application incompetent or defective? Or, should these objections be rejected, so that the judicial review application could be heard on its merits? THE JURISDICTION ISSUE—FILING THE JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION OUT OF TIME The time limit under Order 53 Rule 3(6) [5] Order 53 Rule 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) provides that a judicial review application must be filed “within three months” from the date “when the grounds of application first arose” or “when the decision is first communicated to the applicant”. [6] The Court can extend this three-month time limit, but it must be “upon an application”, i.e. the applicant must make a formal application to extend the time limit. And by necessity, the applicant must give “a good reason” to justify an extension of the time limit. [7] Order 53 Rule 3(6) and Rule 3(7) are set out below for reference (with my emphases added)— Leave (O. 53, r. 3) 3. (1) … Page 4 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal . . (6) An application for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when the grounds of application first arose or when the decision is first communicated to the applicant. (7) The Court may, upon an application, extend the time specified in rule 3(6) if it considers that there is a good reason for doing so. The pertinent provisions of the Land Acquisition Act [8] The relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (LAA), which outline the land acquisition procedure, from the declaration of an intended acquisition to the commencement of the land acquisition proceeding, are sections 8, 9 and 10. [9] The pertinent portions of sections 8, 9 and 10 of the LAA are set out below (with my emphases added)— Section 8. Declaration that land is needed under section 3. (1) When the State Authority decides that any of the lands referred to in section 7 are needed for any of the purposes referred to in section 3, a declaration in Form D shall be published in the Gazette. (2) A copy of the list of lands referred to in paragraph 7(1)(b), amended, if necessary, in accordance with the decision of the State Authority, shall be included as a schedule to the declaration in Form D. (3) A declaration in Form D shall be conclusive evidence that all the scheduled land referred to therein is needed for the purpose specified therein… Page 5 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Section 9. Land to be marked out and notice entered on register, etc. (1) Upon the publication pursuant to section 8 of the declaration in Form D that any land is needed for the purpose specified in such Form, then— (a) … (b) the Land Administrator or other registering authority shall make a note of the intended acquisition in the manner specified in subsection (2). (2) The note of the intended acquisition required by paragraph (1)(b) shall be made— (a) where the scheduled land is held by registered title— (i) on the register document of title; and… Section 10. Land Administrator to commence proceedings. (1) The Land Administrator shall, having completed the action required by section 9, commence proceedings for the acquisition of the land by giving public notice in Form E in the manner prescribed by section 52, and by fixing the date of an inquiry for the hearing of claims to compensation for all interests in such land. (2) … (3) A copy of the schedule to the declaration in Form D gazetted under subsection 8(2) shall be appended to every notice in Form E. Binding principles from case law [10] These are the principles that I gleaned from case law authorities that I am to apply in deciding these two objections. They not only instruct me. They bind me. Page 6 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [11] One—the applicant (here: Sime Darby) must strictly comply with the provisions under Order 53 Rule 3(6) of the ROC, particularly the requirement to file the judicial review application within the time limit (here: three months) from either—(i) the date when the reason or cause for the application first arose, or (ii) the date when the applicant was first informed of the decision. To put it simply, it is mandatory to file the judicial review application within the three months. There must be strict compliance. There can be no exceptions. Unless the applicant applies for, and obtains, an extension of the time limit—Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor [2016] 1 MLJ 544 (FC); [2015] 2 AMR 89; [2015] 3 CLJ 861; [2015] 1 MLRA 255; at paragraph [121]. [12] Two—when the time limit to file the judicial review application is not complied with, the Court need not delve into the merits of the application— Kijal Resort (supra), at paragraph [125]. [13] Three—when the time limit to file the judicial review application is not adhered to, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the application. Whether or not the judicial review application has merits is irrelevant—(1) Kijal Resort (supra), at paragraph [124]; (2) Wong Kin Hoong & Anor v Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 MLJ 161 (FC); [2013] 4 AMR 211; [2013] 4 CLJ 193; [2013] 3 MLRA 525, at paragraph [30]; (3) Ravindran P. Muthukrishnan v. Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168 (FC); [1984] 1 CLJ 232; [1984] 1 MLRA 231, at the penultimate paragraph. Page 7 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [14] Four—when the time limit to file a judicial review application is breached, the application is “not competently brought”. If the judicial application is incompetent, the Court has no jurisdiction to preside over the application and no power to hear and determine it—(1) Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 2 MLJ 1 (FC); [2020] 2 AMR 517; [2020] 3 CLJ 153; [2020] 1 MLRA 683; at paragraph [105]; (2) Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Yayasan Buah Pinggang Kebangsaan Malaysia [2024] 4 MLJ 288 (CA); [2024] 4 AMR 585; [2024] 6 CLJ 413; [2024] 4 MLRA 676; at paragraphs [7] to [11]. [15] Five—it is trite that the time limit to file a judicial review application in a land acquisition exercise begins from the date the Notice of Enquiry in Form E (under section 10 of the LAA), attaching the Form D Schedule, is served. This is the date that the decision sought to be reviewed is deemed “first communicated to the applicant” (per the words of Order 53 Rule 3(6))—(1) Kijal Resort (supra), at paragraph [105]; (2) Tunku Yaacob Holdings Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kedah & Ors [2016] 1 MLJ 200 (FC); [2015] 5 AMR 577; [2015] 3 CLJ 1017; [2015] 1 MLRA 355; at paragraph [68]. The pertinent facts [16] These are the pertinent and material facts that surround the two objections raised— (1) 25.4.2019—The State Authority issued its decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands. The State Authority published Form A (under section 4 of the LAA) in the Gazette. (2) 4.7.2019—The section 8 notice (Form D) was issued and published in the Gazette. Page 8 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal (3) 3.10.2019—The Land Administrator issued the section 10 notice (Form E), with the schedule in Form D appended to it. (4A) 7.10.2019—The date Sime Darby received the Form E (with reference to the posting of Form E on Sime Darby’s premises); or (4B) 18.10.2019—The alternative date Sime Darby received the Form E (with reference to the acknowledgement of receipt on the advice of receipt (AR) card). (5) 15.11.2019—The land acquisition enquiry was held. Sime Darby participated in the enquiry. (6) 4.6.2020—The enquiry continued. Sime Darby participated. (7) 6.10.2020—The enquiry continued further. Sime Darby participated. (8) 16.10.2020—The Land Administrator made a written award in Form G. (9) 22.2.2021—Sime Darby wrote a letter of complaint to the Chief Minister of Penang (which was received on 5.3.2021). (10) 24.4.2021—Sime Darby filed this judicial review application, more than 18 months after the service of the Form E. With the three-month time limit to file a judicial review application, Sime Darby was approximately 15 months out of time. There was no application for an extension of time [17] I reiterate that Order 53 Rule 6(7) provides that the Court may, on an application, extend the prescribed three-month time limit to file a judicial review application, if the Court considers that there is a good reason for doing so. Page 9 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [18] But Sime Darby did not avail itself of this provision. Sime Darby did not make an application for an extension. Thus, there is no issue regarding whether an extension of time should be granted to Sime Darby to file the judicial review application. There was no application for an extension of time. [19] If this Court were to exercise its discretion ex propio motu (on its own volition or initiative) to give an extension of time to excuse Sime Darby’s breach of the time limit to file its judicial review application, it would cause extreme prejudice and serious injustice to the Respondents. The consequences of being out of time [20] Sime Darby’s judicial review application was filed 15 months out of time. That is inordinately (excessively) out of time, rendering the application not only defective, but incompetent. And when the judicial review application is incompetent, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine it. [21] I am guided and indeed bound by the mandatory words used in statute law and the principles propounded in case law. Sime Darby’s judicial review application should accordingly be dismissed in limine (right at the beginning)—Kijal Resort (supra), at paragraphs [124], [125]. Page 10 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal THE INSUFFICIENCY OF SIME DARBY’S ORDER 53 STATEMENT The Order 53 Statement requirements [22] Order 53 Rule 3(1) of the ROC provides that a judicial review application can only be made if leave of the court is granted to file the application. [23] Then Order 53 Rule 3(2) provides that the application for leave must be supported by the Order 53 Statement, which sets out “the name and description of the applicant”, “the reliefs sought”, and “the grounds on which it is sought”, i.e. the grounds for the judicial review. The application must also be supported by affidavits verifying, i.e. proving, “the facts relied on” to support the grounds for the judicial review. [24] Order 53 Rule 3(1) and Rule 3(2) are set out below for reference (with my emphases added)— Leave (O. 53, r. 3) 3. (1) An application under this Order shall not be made unless leave therefor has been granted in accordance with this rule. (2) An application for leave must be made ex parte to a Judge in Chambers and must be supported by a statement setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it is sought, and by affidavits verifying the facts relied on. Binding principles from case law [25] These are the binding principles concerning the Order 53 Statement that I have to apply when considering the two objections. Page 11 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [26] One—the Order 53 Statement in a judicial review proceeding is the equivalent of pleadings in a writ proceeding. It is the equipollent of pleadings. Just as parties in a writ action are bound by their pleadings, the applicant is bound by, and confined to, the averments in its Order 53 Statement—(1) Leftenan Kolonel Hafiz bin Haji Sulaiman & Ors v Zulkefli bin Mohamed [2023] 5 MLJ 548 (CA); [2023] 7 AMR 1; [2023] 8 CLJ 700; [2023] 6 MLRA 551; at paragraph [37]; (2) V Paul Raj Chelladurai v Jabatan Telekom (M) Bhd & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 652 (CA) at MLJ page 656, at paragraphs G, H; [2000] 2 AMR 2435; [2000] 4 CLJ 882; [2000] 1 MLRA 726; (3) Ong See Teong & Anor v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2008] 5 MLJ 717 (HC); [2008] 3 AMR 299; [2008] 8 CLJ 831; [2007] 4 MLRH 421; at paragraph [23]. [27] Two—to support its judicial review application, the applicant can only rely on the facts and grounds stated in its Order 53 Statement. The applicant cannot rely on the grounds stated in its affidavit(s) in support, or the grounds contained in its written submissions, which are not stated in its Order 53 Statement—(1) V Paul Raj (supra), at MLJ page 656, at paragraphs C, G, H; (2) Ong See Teong (supra), at paragraphs [20], [22]. [28] Three—to warrant a judicial review on its merits, the applicant is required to set out its grounds for review “clearly” in its Order 53 Statement, with “sufficient details and comprehensive particulars of the facts and matters” relied on. The applicant cannot merely set out general grounds for judicial review in its Order 53 Statement without the necessary particulars of the facts and grounds relied on—Sunway University College v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [2019] 3 MLJ 749 (CA); [2019] 3 AMR 68; [2019] 7 CLJ 55; [2019] MLRAU 80; at paragraphs [33], [34]. Page 12 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal The consequences of not pleading the ground relied on for judicial review [29] If Sime Darby’s grounds for this judicial review are not stated in its Order 53 Statement—even if the grounds are averred to in its affidavits in support of the judicial review application—the omission is fatal to its application. Sime Darby is not permitted to stray outside of, and rely on, the facts and grounds not stated in its Order 53 Statement. Sime Darby is not permitted to rely on additional grounds which are only averred to in its affidavits. Sime Darby is not permitted to enhance its case by relying on the facts and grounds beyond what is stated in its Order 53 Statement. [30] Sime Darby cannot sustain a judicial review application if it states merely general grounds without sufficient particulars to justify a review on its merits. Sime Darby cannot sustain a judicial review application on the grounds stated only in its affidavits, but not in its Order 53 Statement. [31] This Court cannot consider reviewing the decision sought to be reviewed on the facts and grounds not stated and not particularised in the applicant’s Order 53 Statement. ADDRESSING SIME DARBY’S ARGUMENTS [32] I now address Sime Darby’s pertinent arguments against the Respondent’s objections, and render my findings on them. [33] Firstly, Sime Darby argues that Order 53 Rule 3(6) of the ROC provides for two alternative triggers to compute the start of the three- month time limit, and hence two alternative cut-off dates to file this judicial Page 13 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal review application. The first alternative is the date when the grounds of the application first arose. The second alternative is the date when the decision sought to be reviewed was first communicated to the applicant. [34] The Respondents’ position is that in land acquisition judicial reviews, it is the second alternative that is applicable. The time limit begins on the service or receipt of the Form E. Either of those dates is the date that the decision sought to be reviewed was first communicated to the applicant: Sime Darby. That date was in October 2019. The evidence discloses that the date was either 7.10.2019 (when the Form E was posted at Sime Darby’s premises) or 18.10.2019 (when the Form E was acknowledged as received). [35] Sime Darby, however, argues that in this land acquisition judicial review, it is the first alternative that is applicable—the time limit starts when the grounds of the application first arose. [36] Sime Darby asserts that it wrote to the Chief Minister of Penang by its letter dated 22.2.2021, asking the Chief Minister to consider withdrawing the 2019 wrongful acquisition. I note that this letter was written in February 2021, which is 18 months from when the Form E was served on, or received by, Sime Darby (in October 2019). The Chief Minister did not respond. [37] Sime Darby submits that the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond (or omission to respond), is the decision that it seeks to judicially review. Page 14 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [38] Sime Darby argues that the process of judicial review is available to any person who is adversely affected by the exercise of public duty or function, which can include a non-decision, such as the Chief Minister’s silence in this case. So, Sime Darby relies on the first alternative to compute the start of the time limit to file a judicial review application. Sime Darby argues that the start-date for this judicial review application is the date that the grounds of the judicial review application first arose, which was when the Chief Minister did not respond to its 22.2.2021 letter. Sime Darby filed this judicial review application on 24.4.2021, well within the mandatory three months. My findings [39] In this land acquisition judicial review, Sime Darby is challenging the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond, to Sime Darby’s 22.2.2021 letter of complaint. Sime Darby submits that that was when the grounds for the judicial review application first arose—the first alternative for the computation of the time limit to file for judicial review. [40] With respect, I find this argument untenable. Firstly, from Sime Darby’s Order 53 Statement, it is clear that it is seeking to challenge the State Authority’s decision to acquire its lands. Sime Darby is not seeking to challenge the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond, to Sime Darby’s 22.2.2021 letter of complaint. [41] The decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands took the form of the Form E, which is the notice served on, and received by, Sime Darby— notifying it about the list of lands that were to be compulsorily acquired. It Page 15 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal is rather unpersuasive for Sime Darby to say that the decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands was related to the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond to a letter of complaint sent to the Chief Minister a year and a half after the decision to acquire the lands. [42] Secondly, case law authority instructs and binds me that in a land acquisition judicial review, the date to compute the mandatory time limit under Order 53 Rule 3(6) is the date the Form E was served or received— Tunku Yaacob Holdings (supra); at paragraph [68]. [43] I should not depart from this principle. [44] Thirdly, Sime Darby endeavours to persuade me that the principle in Tunku Yaakob (supra) only applies to the second alternative of Order 53 Rule 3(6), i.e. the date the decision was first communicated to Sime Darby (in October 2019). Sime Darby argues that for this judicial review application, this Court must apply the first alternative of Order 53 Rule 3(6), i.e. the date the grounds for the application first arose—when the Chief Minister was silent on Sime Darby’s letter of complaint (in February 2021). [45] This is not cogent. I already said that case law authority binds me with the principle that in a land acquisition judicial review, the time limit to file the application starts from the date the Form E was served. If Sime Darby can trigger the time limit by writing to the Chief Minister, to ask him to do something, or to ask him to respond to a complaint—then there Page 16 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal would be, in my view, a real risk of undesirable disorder and uncertainty in our statutory land acquisition scheme. [46] There can easily exist circumstances such as the one facing this judicial review application—the Form E is issued and served; the land enquiry is held; but at some later material time, the applicant writes a letter to the Chief Minister, or to the relevant authorities, like the Respondents here—and the applicant would be able to re-set the clock for the computation of the time limit for the applicant to file a judicial review application. [47] Fourthly, section 3 of the LAA provides that it is the State Authority that statutorily acquires land. It is the State Authority that has the power to acquire land for the three purposes stated in section 3. [48] Section 3(1) of the LAA is set out below for reference (with my emphasis added)— Section 3. Acquisition of land. (1) The State Authority may acquire any land which is needed— (a) for any public purpose; (b) by any person or corporation for any purpose which in the opinion of the State Authority is beneficial to the economic development of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the public generally or any class of the public; or (c) for the purpose of mining or for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial or recreational purposes or any combination of such purposes. Page 17 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [49] Section 2 (the interpretation section of the LAA) defines the State Authority as the Ruler or the Yang di-Pertua Negeri of the State. [50] It was propounded in case law authority that the Penang State Government is distinct from the State Authority. Similarly, the Penang Chief Minister is different from the State Authority. I concur with this finding in Palmington Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan, Pulau Pinang [2024] 5 MLRH 186 (HC); [2024] MLJU 1033; [2024] AMEJ 1034; [2024] CLJU 1007; at paragraphs [30], [34], [40]. [51] I also agree with counsel for the First, Second and Fourth Respondents that the Penang Chief Minister has no function, and hence no power, in the legislative scheme of the LAA. [52] In its Order 53 Statement, Sime Darby challenges the State Authority’s decision to acquire its lands. But in its affidavits to support this judicial review application, Sime Darby challenges the Chief Minister’s decision not to respond, or omission to respond, to its 22.2.2021 letter of complaint. This challenge to the Chief Minister’s decision or omission is misplaced, as the Chief Minister did not make the decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands. The State Authority, which made the decision to acquire Sime Darby’s lands, is not bound or affected by the decisions of the Chief Minister. [53] There is no merit to Sime Darby’s challenge to the Chief Minister’s decision or omission, in the context of this land acquisition judicial review. The challenge is misconceived. Page 18 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [54] Fifthly, Sime Darby’s grounds for this judicial review application are general grounds, without the detailed particulars of the facts relied on. This makes Sime Darby’s Order 53 Statement—its pleadings in this judicial review application—deficient (insufficient). [55] But Sime Darby’s detailed grounds for judicial review are contained in its affidavit in support of the application. The PDC’s (Third Respondent’s) counsel pointed out that there are approximately 30 particularised grounds for its judicial review application. But these specific grounds and the particulars of these grounds are not in its Order 53 Statement. Hence, the judicial review application cannot be considered on its merits on these unpleaded grounds. CONCLUSION [56] Bound by the principle of stare decisis (to stand by and not disturb what is already decided), I am compelled to find that Sime Darby’s judicial review application has failed to comply with the time limited for its filing, thus making it a jurisdiction issue. I am also accordingly compelled to find that Sime Darby’s judicial review application in relation to the subject 17 lots (excluding Lot 1377) is incompetent. And this Court does not have the jurisdiction to determine the application. [57] As such, and for the reasons given, I dismiss Enclosure 13—the Notice of the judicial review application—in relation to the relevant 17 lots, with costs of RM20K to be paid by Sime Darby to the PDC, and RM20K to be paid by Sime Darby to the First, Second and Fourth Respondents by 24.3.2025. Costs are subject to the allocatur. Page 19 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal [58] Sime Darby may still proceed with this judicial review application for Lot 1377. [59] I make this Order— (1) this judicial review application per Enclosure 1 as prayed for in prayers 1(a) to 1(u) pertaining to the 17 Lots [to be particularised in this Order] be dismissed with costs of RM20K to be paid by the Applicant to the Third Respondent, which costs are subject to the allocatur, and costs of RM20K to be paid by the Applicant to the First, Second and Fourth Respondents, which costs are not subject to the allocatur, all by 24.3.2025; (2) the ad interim stay, granted in paragraph 2 of the Order dated 2.6.2021 (Enclosure 15) pertaining to the 17 lots stated in paragraph 1 of this Order, be set aside. Dated: 18 November 2025 KENNETH ST JAMES Judge Penang High Court Page 20 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal Counsel/Solicitors: For the Applicant : Rosli Dahlan, Elani Mazlan and Amiratu Amiraj Messrs. Rosli Dahlan Saravana Partnership (Kuala Lumpur) For the First, Second and : Naizatul Zima and Charanjit Singh Fourth Respondents Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Pulau Pinang (Georgetown) For the Third : Dato’ Sithambaram and Reubankumar Respondent Messrs. Sitham & Associates (Penang) Legislation referred to: 1. Sections 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10 of the Land Acquisition Act 1960. 2. Order 53 Rules 3(1), 3(2), 3(6), 3(7) of the Rules of Court 2012. Cases referred to: 1. Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kemaman & Anor [2016] 1 MLJ 544 (FC); [2015] 2 AMR 89; [2015] 3 CLJ 861; [2015] 1 MLRA 255. 2. Wong Kin Hoong & Anor v. Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar & Anor [2013] 4 MLJ 161 (FC); [2013] 4 AMR 211; [2013] 4 CLJ 193; [2013] 3 MLRA 525. 3. Ravindran P. Muthukrishnan v. Malaysian Examinations Council [1984] 1 MLJ 168 (FC); [1984] 1 CLJ 232; [1984] 1 MLRA 231. Page 21 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal 4. Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v Majlis Perubatan Malaysia & Anor [2020] 2 MLJ 1 (FC); [2020] 2 AMR 517; [2020] 3 CLJ 153; [2020] 1 MLRA 683. 5. Ketua Pengarah Hasil Dalam Negeri v Yayasan Buah Pinggang Kebangsaan Malaysia [2024] 4 MLJ 288 (CA); [2024] 4 AMR 585; [2024] 6 CLJ 413; [2024] 4 MLRA 676. 6. Tunku Yaacob Holdings Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Kedah & Ors [2016] 1 MLJ 200 (FC); [2015] 5 AMR 577; [2015] 3 CLJ 1017; [2015] 1 MLRA 355. 7. Leftenan Kolonel Hafiz bin Haji Sulaiman & Ors v Zulkefli bin Mohamed [2023] 5 MLJ 548 (CA); [2023] 7 AMR 1; [2023] 8 CLJ 700; [2023] 6 MLRA 551. 8. V Paul Raj Chelladurai v Jabatan Telekom (M) Bhd & Ors [2000] 3 MLJ 652 (CA); [2000] 2 AMR 2435; [2000] 4 CLJ 882; [2000] 1 MLRA 726. 9. Ong See Teong & Anor v Tenaga Nasional Bhd [2008] 5 MLJ 717 (HC); [2008] 3 AMR 299; [2008] 8 CLJ 831; [2007] 4 MLRH 421. 10. Sunway University College v Mahkamah Perusahaan Malaysia & Anor [2019] 3 MLJ 749 (CA); [2019] 3 AMR 68; [2019] 7 CLJ 55; [2019] MLRAU 80. 11. Palmington Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Selatan, Pulau Pinang [2024] 5 MLRH 186 (HC); [2024] MLJU 1033; [2024] AMEJ 1034; [2024] CLJU 1007. Page 22 of 22 S/N SNZiyqjE20OQKJR53Cocig **Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal