1. ) TAN ENG HONG HOLDINGS SDN BHD 2. ) TAN ENG HONG PAPER & STATIONERY SDN BHD 3. ) PEACE CENTRE SDN BHD 4. ) TAN SENG CHOO 5. ) TAN SENG KIAT 6. ) TAN SENG KOW 7. ) TAN KIN SENG 1. ) TAN KEEN KEONG @ TAN KEAN KEONG 2. ) TAN KEEN KEONG @ T

NQoap Oh No = SNOaAP & DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI GEORGETOWN NOMBOR GUAMAN: PA-22NCvC-74-04/2021 ANTARA TAN ENG HONG HOLDINGS SDN BHD TAN ENG HONG PAPER & STATIONERY SDN BHD PEACE CENTRE SDN BHD TAN SENG CHOO TAN SENG KIAT TAN SENG KOW TAN KIN SENG ..Plaintif-Plaintif DAN . TAN KEEN KEONG @ TAN KEAN KEONG TAN KEEN KEONG @ TAN KEAN KEONG (SEBAGAI WASI KEPADA HARTA PUSAKA OOI AH GIN, SIMATI) TAN CHOO LEONG YAP PENG YAT WONG HOONG SAM TETUAN PRESGRAVE & MATTHEWS KARIN LIM Al CHING SUPPIAH A/L ARUMUGAM ...Defendan-Defendan JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURE 26) Introduction [1] This is an application [Enclosure 26] by the Plaintiffs to prevent, discharge, and disqualify Messrs Armiy Rais and their Advocates and Solicitors from representing the 3rd (“Choo Leong”) and 4th Defendants (“Peng Yat’) in this action. For ease of reference, the parties shall be referred herein as follows: (i) | The 1st Plaintiff, Tan Eng Hong Holdings Sdn Bhd, shall be referred to as “TEH Holdings”; (ii) |The 2nd Plaintiff, Tan Eng Hong Paper & Stationery Sdn Bhd, shall be referred to as “TEH Paper’: (iii) The 3rd Plaintiff, Peace Centre Sdn Bhd, shall be referred to as “Peace Centre’: (iv) The 4th Plaintiff, Tan Seng Choo, shall be referred to as “Seng Choo”: (v) The 5th Plaintiff, Tan Seng Kiat, shall be referred to as “Seng Kiat”; (vi) The 6th Plaintiff, Tan Seng Kow, shall be referred to as “Seng (vii) (viii) (ix) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) Kow”: The 7th Plaintiff, Tan Kin Seng, shall be referred to as “Kin Seng’; The 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant shall collectively be referred to as “Kean Keong’; The 3rd Defendant, Tan Choo Leong, shall be referred to as “Choo Leong’; The 4th Defendant, Yap Peng Yat, shall be referred to as “Peng Yat’; The 5th Defendant, Wong Hoong Sam, shall be referred to as “Hoong Sam”; The 6th Defendant, Messrs Presgrave & Matthews, shall be referred to as “P&M”; The 7th Defendant, Karin Lim Ai Ching, shall be referred to as “Karin Lim’; The 8th Defendant, Suppiah a/l Arumugam, shall be referred to as “Suppiah”. (see Plaintiff's’ submission dated 5", January 2022) [2] In this case, the Plaintiffs’ application is premised on rules 3, 4, 5 and 28 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978. Hereinafter all rules referred to refer to the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012. This application in Enclosure 26 is for orders, inter alia, Messrs Armiy Rais and their Advocates and Solicitors from representing the 3rd and 4th Defendants in this action. The law [3] According to the general law, all litigants have a right to be defended by legal counsel of their own choice. There is an exception where the counsel is unwilling or unable to represent the litigant. The court also has a power to withdraw or stop legal counsel from acting for litigant in certain cases. This inherent jurisdiction of the court to ensure that all the cases or trials are conducted in the proper way in order to achieve justice and fairness to all parties. [4] |InKAYLA BEVERLY HILLS (M) SDN BHD & ANOR V. QUANTUM FAR EAST LTD & ORS; (UMA DEVI D/O R BALAKRISHNAN THIRD PARTY) [2003] 6 MLJ 703, Justice Zulkefli J held that the Court has the 4 inherent jurisdiction to hear an application to disqualify a solicitor from acting for a particular party in the interest of justice. Justice Zulkefli J also referred to the Canadian case of Martin v. Gray 77 DLR (4th) 249 and quoted the part of the judgment of Sopinka J as follows: “| conclude, as well, that to permit the plaintiffs law firm to continue to act in this case would be perceived by the public as placing the defendant in an unfair position when this action goes to trial. The sina qua non of the justice system is that there be an unqualified perception of its fairness in the eyes of the general public. In order to sustain that salutary precept, it is essential that the integrity and absolute independence of the courts and its [sic] officers be maintained in such a way as to assure a discerning public that the principle of equality before the law is not in danger of being comprised [sic]. The door must remain firmly shut against any possibility of comprising [sic] that principal [sic]. To allow the plaintiffs law firm to continue to act in this case would open that door, albeit ever so slightly, to the possibility of compromising the impartial administration of justice — something which a court is duty bound to prevent.” (See: PP V. VENGADASALAM [1990] 1 MLJ 507; [1988] 2 MLRH 333; BORNEO HELICOPTERS S/B V. SABAHAIR AVIATION S/B [2010] MLJU 1633; AND RS MUTHIAH V. PEMBINAAN FIBA SDN BHD [2004] 4 MLJ 78) [5] If the court finds that the counsel has a personal interest or is required to be a witness of a material and disputed question of fact in the case, the court can exercise its power to supervise the admiration of the justice to evade any embarrassment to the parties. (See: Wong Sin Chong v. Bhagwan Singh [1993] 3 MLJ 679 (SC); Lee Kam Sun v. Ho Sau Lin & Anor [1999] 4 MLJ 509; Soo Teck Lee & Ors v. Lim Geok Kim [2021] 7 MLJ 595; Quah Poh Keat & Ors v. Ranjit Singh a/l Taram Singh [2009] 4 MLJ 293 (CA); Tanjong Marina Management Sdn Bhd v. Penang Port Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 120 and Sykt Pengangkutan Sakti Sdn Bhd v. Tan Joo Khing T/A Bengkel Sen Tak [1997] 5 MLJ 705 Background facts Grounds in support of the application [Enclosure 26] [6] The action herein was commenced after the dismissal of three Winding-up Petitions purportedly filed by Kean Keong, namely: - (1) Winding-up Petition No. 28-67-2009 — TEH Holdings, (2) Winding-up Petition No, 28-68-2009 - TEH Paper; and (3) Winding-up Petition No. 28-69-2009 - Peace Centre. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “these companies”) [7] In all the abovenamed Petitions, Seng Choo was named the 2"¢. Respondent; Seng Kiat as the 3. Respondent; Seng Kow as the 4". Respondent; Kin Seng as the 5". Respondent. They were named Respondents because, at material times, they are/were directors of the abovenamed three (3) companies (hereinafter collectively referred to as “these Respondents”). Choo Leong (director of TEH Holdings) and Choo Keng (director of TEH Paper, Peace Centre and THE Holdings’ Subsidiary, PKM) were not named the Respondents even though they were directors. (see Plaintiff's’ submission dated 5th. January 2022-Enclosure 57) [8] Plaintiffs state that Peng Yat, and the 4"". Family had appointed and paid the solicitors and counsels for Kean Keong as pleaded and named in paragraphs 32.2.2, 32.2.4 until 32.2.7 of the Statements of Claim (SOC): (i) Paragraph 32.2.2 of the SOC pleaded that: - “32.2.2 Choo Leong, Peng Yat, and/or the 4th Family continued to fund the appeals and even secured the services of Dato’ Seri Gopal Sri Ram, one of the best counsel in the country to lead the team of counsel purportedly for Kean Keong, in their attempts to challenge the finding of facts by His Lordship S. Nantha Balan on the ground that his Lordship did not hear or see “the man who was the target of criticism.” (ii) Paragraph 32.2.4 of the SOC pleaded that: - “32.2.4 At the Court of Appeal, counsel appearing for Kean Keong was Dato Seri Gopal Sri Ram, Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Ong Swee Long, Eric Lai, Yong Yit Jee, Yeoh Soo Chuin, and David Yii Hee Keat, from 3 different law firms at the least.” (iii) Paragraph 32.2.5 of the SOC pleaded that: - “32.2.5 Counsel appearing for Kean Keong for the applications for leave to appeal to the Federal Court on 9/1/2017 was Dato Seri Gopal Sri Ram, Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Ong Swee Long, Yong Yit Jee, and David Yii Hee Keat, from three (3) different law firms at the least.” (iv) Paragraph 32.2.6 of the SOC pleaded that:- “32.2.6 Whereas, at the hearing of the appeal proper before the Federal Court stage, counsel appearing for Kean Keong was Dato Seri Gopal Sri Ram, Marcus Lee, Karluis Quek, Karin Lim, A. Suppiah, Ong Swee Long, and Ong Kang Nyong, from three (3) different law firms at the least.” (v) Paragraph 32.2.7 of the SOC pleaded that: - “32.2.7 The Plaintiffs aver that with Kean Keong’s impecuniosity evidenced by desperation for money, borrowings from money- lenders and loan sharks, and many outstanding debts, he would not be in a position to afford counsel from at least three (3) different law firms to represent him in both the Court of Appeal and the Federal Court.” [9] Plaintiffs submit that paragraphs 32.2.2 until 32.2.7 of SOC are material and disputed questions of facts that required not only Ong Swee Long, Ong Kang Nyong, or other solicitors from Messrs Armiy Rais but all named solicitors and counsels in paragraphs 32.2 — 32.5 of SOC therein as witness(es) in this action. [10] In order to decide whether Ong Swee Long, Ong Kang Nyong or other solicitors from Messrs Armiy Rais would be in a situation of conflict of interest and cause embarrassment in representing Third and Fourth Defendants, it is necessary for this court to examine and consider the pleadings and the nature of the claims. The issues of facts arising from the allegations made by the Plaintiffs in their affidavits should also be considered. [11] The plaintiffs allege that, to let Messrs Armiy Rais and its solicitors continue to represent Choo Leong and Peng Yat in this action would be a conflict of interest, embarrassment, and breach of the rules under the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978.The allegations are as follows: (i) | Messrs Armiy Rais face difficulty in maintaining independence, position, and role. They have previously acted for Kean Keong in the resultant appeals as the Appellant proxy/front of Choo Leong and Peng Yat; 10 (ii) (iii) Messrs Armiy Rais ought not to act for Choo Leong and Peng Yat right from the start in this action as their solicitors were named and had explicitly been mentioned in the SOC to be appointed by Choo Leong and Peng Yat for Kean Keong; Messrs Armiy Rais ought to know that their solicitors would be material witness(es) in this action (after discovery proceedings and will be subpoenaed) in respect of the issues, among others, whether Kean Keong was the proxy appellant, their appointment as solicitors for Kean Keong in the resultant appeals, the funding of their legal fees, and who gave instructions to them; Even though the notice is given by way of their names being mentioned in the SOC, oral reminder of conflict and objections were given during the telephone conversation between Plaintiff's solicitors and the solicitors of Messrs Armiy Rais and in writing during the case management via e-review and letter of Messrs SC Tan dated 5/8/2021 Messrs Armiy Rais and its solicitors did not pay any due regard to the same and were nonchalant about it; 14, (v) (vi) (vii) Plaintiffs respectfully submit that until and unless this Honourable Court makes an order, Messrs Armiy Rais and its solicitors will continue to act for Choo Leong and Peng Yat; Choo Leong and Peng Yat have been demonstrated to be mala fide in using the petitions to exert pressure to achieve an improper end. In doing so, they had accordingly interfered with the administration of justice when they were perpetrating a blatant abuse of process of Court with the help of their solicitors. Likewise, even in this action, Choo Leong and Peng Yat are still in the drivers’ seat with the support of their solicitors, making Kean Keong their proxy who had to bow to the dictation of Tan Choo Leong and/or Yap Peng Yat. It had been clearly shown in the above and the contemporaneous chronology of events, especially the appointment of Messrs Ramli Yusuff & Co and Messrs Armiy Rais ; and Since Messrs Armiy Rais (and Messrs Ramli Yusuff & Co) had been implicated indirectly, it will be tough for them to maintain their professional independence and act in a manner compatible with the best interests of the administration of justice. 12 [12] The 3%. and 5". Defendant in reply, states that Messrs Armiy Rais represented The First Defendant before the Appellate Court in the Winding Up Proceedings and they were not opposing parties in that proceedings. Therefore, based on those facts, there is no “solicitor and client relationship” and “no issue on breach of confidentiality” on the part of Messrs Armiy Rais as it has never acted for Plaintiffs. [13] The relevant provisions of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 relied by the petitioner to disqualify Ong Swee Long, Ong Kang Nyong or other solicitors and his legal firm. Rules 3, 4, 5 and 35 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 and O 92 r 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 provide as follows: Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 3. Advocate and solicitor not to accept brief if embarrassed (a) An advocate and solicitor shall not accept a brief if he is or would be embarrassed. (b) An embarrassment arises — 13 (i) | where the advocate and solicitor finds he is in possession of confidential information as a result of having previously advised another person in regard to the same matter; (ii) | where there is some personal relationship between him and a party or a witness in the proceedings. No advocate and solicitor to accept brief if professional conduct likely to be impugned. No advocate and solicitor shall accept a brief in a case where he knows or has reason to believe that his own professional conduct is likely to be impugned. No advocate and solicitor to accept brief if difficult to maintain professional independence (a) No advocate and solicitor shall accept a brief if such acceptance renders or would render it difficult for him to maintain his professional independence or is incompatible with the best interest of the administration of justice. 14 (i) | An advocate and solicitor who has at any time advised or drawn pleadings or acted for a party in connection with the institution or prosecution or defence of any suit, appeal of other proceedings shall not act, appear or plead for the opposite party in that suit, appeal or other proceedings. (ii) An advocate and solicitor shall not act unless the consent of the first party for whom the advocate and solicitor acted is obtained in writing and the advocate and solicitor is not embarrassed by so acting. 28. Advocate and solicitor not to appear in a case where he is a witness. (a) An advocate and solicitor shall not appear in Court or in Chambers in any case in which he has reason to believe that he will be a witness in respect of a material and disputed question of fact, and if while appearing in a case it becomes apparent that he will be such a witness, he shall not continue to appear if he can retire without jeopardising his client’s interests. 15 35. Advocate and solicitor not to abuse confidence reposed in him by client (a) An advocate and solicitor shall refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by the client. (b) An advocate and solicitor shall preserve his client’s confidence and this duty outlasts his employment. ROC 2012 Order 92 Miscellaneous A. Inherent powers of the Court (O 92 r 4) For the removal of doubt it is hereby declared that nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the Court to make any order as may be necessary to prevent injustice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. Plaintiffs’ grounds for disqualification [14] The grounds are as follows: 16 (i) | Conflict of interest (difficulty in maintaining independence, position, and role) [15] The plaintiffs alleges that Mr Ong Swee Long, Ong Kang Nyong and Messrs Armiy Rais had acted for the First Defendant in the winding up, therefore there is conflict of interest . The plaintiffs submit that: “Messrs Armiy Rais face difficulty in maintaining independence, position, and role. They have previously acted for Kean Keong in the resultant appeals as the Appellant proxy/front of Choo Leong and Peng Yat.” [16] The 3. and 4"". Defendants state that in those proceeding, they did not contest in that appeal of winding up petition. There was no relationship as a solicitor and client between them as it involved 1%. Defendant. Therefore, no issue of conflict of interest and confidentiality of information to be exposed. The most important fact is that Messrs Armiy Rais never acted for the Plaintiff in any matters relate to this suit. [17] In the case of DATO’ AZIZAN ABDUL RAHMAN & ORS V. PINERAINS SDN BHD [2021] 8 CLJ 849 held that: ty “To conclude on this note, we reiterate that the legal principles in Jefri Bolkiah (supra) would apply to the issue of disqualification of counsel. These principles are as follows: (i) there must first be established a former solicitor-client or some fiduciary relationship between NN, WWW and the respondent; (ii) the respondent must prove that NN and WWW are in possession of the confidential information which is relevant to the present appeal. The respondent must place before the court full particulars of the relevant confidential information that was allegedly disclosed to NN and WWW; and (ii) a strong case must be made out by the respondent to disqualify NN and WWW from acting as counsel for the appellants. [18] Based on the affidavit filed by Plaintiffs, no documents or proof to support that the Counsels from Messrs Armiy Rais are holding any confidential information from the 1%. Defendant or Plaintiffs. 18 In their affidavit the Plaintiff allegation of conflict of interest is only based on assumptions when they stated that: “this letter gives credence and fortified Plaintiff's contention that both the Amended Defences for Kean Keong and the Amended Defence for Choo Leong andPeng Yat were authored and/or drafted by the same person, the solicitors from Messrs Armiy Rais. It also confirmed the conspiracy between Kean Keong, Choo Leong and Peng Yat (with the assistance of the said firms) to cover up the existence of puppet and master situation in this action. This is a deception practised on this Honourable Court.” Looking at the above contentious by the Plaintiffs, this court finds that the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how the evidence of these matters could be of any relevant concerning the proof of the allegation of facts for the Plaintiff's cause of action and the Defendant's defence. [19] The principles in MIRZA MOHAMED TARIQ BEG MIRZA HH BEG V. MARGARET LOW SAW LUI & ORS [2009] 4 MLJ 671, where the court held as follows: 19 “First, for the principle of confidentiality to apply warranting a court to intervene, there must first be established a relationship of solicitor and client or some other fiduciary relationship. The facts of Hardless v. Hardless AIR 1932 Allahabad 536 provide a good example as to how the principle is to be applied. The court dismissed the application and held as follows: ... In order to prevent counsel appearing for the other party, he must have a definite retainer with a fee paid or he must have had such confidential information from one of the parties as would make it improper for him to appear for the other party... Second, it depends on the facts of each case whether confidential information was conveyed. In order to bar a solicitor or other fiduciary from acting, the applicant must place before the court full particulars of the relevant confidential information that was allegedly disclosed to the solicitor or fiduciary. Mere general or vague allegations are insufficient. As was stated in State v. Lalit Mohan Nanda AIR 1961 Orissa 1: ... the onus of proving that confidential information was conveyed lies heavily upon the applicant.” 20 [20] On the first issue, this courts finds that, on the evidence produced, Plaintiffs failed to prove the relationship between them. A relationship of solicitor and client had not arisen between the Plaintiff and Messrs Armiy Rais. Federal Court in GURBACHAN SINGH BHAGWAN SINGH & ORS V. VELLASAMY PENNUSAMY AND OTHER APPEALS [2015] 1 CLJ 719 in the following passages: [35] It is trite law that in an action against a solicitor by his or her erstwhile client the threshold issue is whether a solicitor-client relationship exists between the plaintiffclient and the defendant- solicitor. In the absence of such relationship the defendant- solicitor in his professional capacity owes no duty to the plaintiff- client. [36] A solicitor-client relationship may arise either: (a) by an express agreement between a solicitor and a client; or (b) where there is express assertion by a solicitor to act for the client; or (c) it may be implied. 21 [37] Where it is to be implied it is for the purported client in an action against a solicitor to prove the existence of a solicitor-client relationship between them. Proof of such relationship requires an objective consideration of all the facts and circumstances in order to come to a reasonable conclusion: (a) that the purported client has sought for advice or assistance from the solicitor; (b) that the assistance sought for was within the professional competence of the solicitor; (c) that the solicitor expressly or impliedly agreed to provide such assistance or reasonably should know that the purported client would reasonably rely on him to provide the assistance; and (d) that it was reasonable for the purported client to believe that the solicitor was representing him. [38] It is therefore a matter of evidence to determine whether a solicitor-client relationship exists. Hence, it is essential to consider such evidence adduced including the words and 22 conduct of the parties towards each other. It is also to be noted that fee arrangement or payment is not determinative of the existence of a solicitor-client relationship. There was indeed no previous relationship in any circumstances during the appeal stage between them to conclude that the counsel or the firms were in possession of confidential information. [21] Besides that, in the case of YONG & CO V WEE HOOD TECK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [1984] 2 MLJ 39; [1984] 1 CLJ REP 251, in which the Federal Court in delivering its judgment has stated as follows: [3] The appellants had acted in favour of the developers, whose instructions directly conflicted with those of the respondents and had failed in their duty towards the respondents. They were a solicitor for two different clients whose interests were directly in conflict and had acted at their own peril. The onus of showing that the conflicting interests did not prevent them from doing their duty to both clients rested firmly on the appellants. 23 [22] The Plaintiffs relied on YEE CHANG & CO LTD -V- NV KONINKLIJKE PAKETVAART, MAATSCHAPPIJ (1958) 1 LNS 97, to support that a solicitor owes a duty to the Court to conduct litigation with due propriety and to assist in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice and, if, therefore, a solicitor becomes aware in the course of proceedings that his client is obstructing the interests of justice, it is his duty to advise his client as to the conduct which he ought to follow and if the client still persists in his wrong conduct, he should decline to act for him further. This was not the case where the Defendants or their counsels are obstructing the interest of justice and there is no proof or evidence before this court based on the affidavits filed by the Plaintiffs. Potential and material witness [23] The Plaintiffs submit that: (i) Messrs Armiy Rais ought not to act for Choo Leong and Peng Yat right from the start in this action as their solicitors were named and had explicitly been mentioned in the SOC to be appointed by Choo Leong, Peng Yat for Kean Keong. 24 (ii) Messrs Armiy Rais ought to know that their solicitors would be material witness(es) in this action (after discovery proceedings and will be subpoenaed) in respect of the issues, among others, whether Kean Keong was the proxy [24] The Defendants submit that all of them are Defendants in this suit and their counsel only acting for First Defendant in the Winding Up Petition which they did not dispute. So, there was no disputes of facts to call them as a witness. [25] The Plaintiffs are relying on the case of SYARIKAT PENGANGKUTAN SAKTI SDN BHD V. TAN JOO KHING T/A BENGKEL SEN TAK [1997] 5 MLJ 705. In that case, the advocate and solicitor did involve actively. After had been appointed by the Plaintiff he tried to persuade the Defendant to surrender moto van belongs to Plaintiff. That fact become an issue and question to be tried. Therefore, the court held that the advocates and solicitors became a potential witness. 25 [26] In the case OF PERAK HANJOONG SIMEN SDN BHD V PERINDUSTRIAN TENAGA MIX SDN BHD [2008] 8 MLJ 567, there was a material disputes on the settlement agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant prepared by the advocate and solicitor acting for the plaintiff. The court held that in the circumstances the advocate and solicitor was a potential witness in the suit brought by the plaintiff against the defendant and was disqualified from acting for the Defendant. Rule 28(a) of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 prohibited counsel to act in a case where he would be a potential witness of material dispute of facts. [27] In the cases relied by the petitioner it is clear that the advocates and solicitors were witnesses to resolve dispute of facts that had arisen by their actions or statements. In my view the issue of appeal in winding up case is not a fact in issue in the case. Based on the facts of the case, even if the issue is relevant, for whatever reason during the trial, the proper witnesses would be the Plaintiff and Defendant, not the 3% and 4! Defendants’ solicitors who were represented them during the appeal stage in winding up proceedings and not in the original suits. 26 [28] In the case of NG SIEW LAN V JOHN LEE TSUN VUI & ANOR [2017] 2 MLJ 167; [2017] 2 CLJ 245, the Federal Court in delivering its judgment has stated as follows: [61] The learned authors of Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18th Ed) have this to say on such conflicts of interest at paras 8-92: Conflicts of interest. A lawyer owes a duty to his client not to act for another in a situation where there would be a potential conflict of interest. If such a situation arises, he must decline to act for one or the other. Such a conflict will invariably arise where one firm of solicitors represents the two parties on opposite sides in litigation. In other situations, or where a firm of solicitors has previously acted for one party and now wishes to act for another whose interests are opposed, there will be a breach of duty unless it is absolutely clear that there can be no leakage or misuse, deliberate or otherwise, of confidential information ...” 27 Pronouncement and order [29] In the nutshell, based on the affidavits and evidence produced in the application, this court not satisfied to allow this application that Messrs Armiy Rais and its solicitors be disqualified from representing Choo Leong and Peng Yat in this action. [30] For the above reasons, the Plaintiffs’ Notice of Application (Encl. 26) is dismissed with costs of RM5,000.00 and subject to allocator. as AZIZAN MD.JARSHAD Judicial Commissioner High Court of Malaya at Pulau Pinang Dated: 10 May 2022 28 Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Tan Swee Cheng, Amanda Lo An Qi SC TAN (PENANG) Unit 7, 9th Floor, Hexagon Tech Park, No. 105, Jalan Gurdwara, 10300 Penang Counsel for the 18t and 2"! Defendants: Afdhal Agib Bin Abd Jalil RAMLI YUSUFF & CO. (PETALING JAYA) C-20-5, Dataran 3 Two Square Jalan 19/1, 46300 Petaling Jaya Selangor Counsel for the 3 and 4" Defendants: Ong Swee Long, Yew Ka Hui, Ong Kang Nyong ARMIY RAIS (PETALING JAYA) No. 1-2B, 1st Floor, J alan PJU 8/3A Damansara Perdana 47800 Petaling Jaya Selangor Counsel for the 5 Defendants: Kanesh A/L Sundrum, Nurul Jannah Binti Zakariah KANESH SUNDRUM & CO. (PRAI) No. 1-1-A, 1st Floor NB Plaza, 3000 Jalan Baru, 13700 Prai, Penang 29 Counsel for the 6", 7 and 8 Defendants: Navaratnam Ponnampalam NAVA & ASSOCIATES (PENANG) 1st Floor, Room B, No. 29, Beach Street, 10300 Penang Cases referred to: 1. KAYLA BEVERLY HILLS (M) SDN BHD & ANOR V. QUANTUM FAR EAST LTD & ORS; (UMA DEVI D/O R BALAKRISHNAN THIRD PARTY) [2003] 6 MLJ 703 2. PP V. VENGADASALAM [1990] 1 MLJ 507; [1988] 2 MLRH 333 3. BORNEO HELICOPTERS S/B V. SABAHAIR AVIATION S/B [2010] MLJU 1633 4. RS MUTHIAH V. PEMBINAAN FIBA SDN BHD [2004] 4 MLJ 78 5. WONG SIN CHONG V. BHAGWAN SINGH [1993] 3 MLJ 679 (SC) 6. LEE KAM SUN V. HO SAU LIN & ANOR [1999] 4 MLJ 509 7. SOO TECK LEE & ORS V. LIM GEOK KIM [2021] 7 MLJ 595 8. QUAH POH KEAT & ORS V. RANJIT SINGH A/L TARAM SINGH [2009] 4 MLJ 293 (CA) 9. TANJONG MARINA MANAGEMENT SDN BHD V. PENANG PORT SDN BHD [2014] 10 MLJ 120 10. SYKT PENGANGKUTAN SAKTI SDN BHD V. TAN JOO KHING T/A BENGKEL SEN TAK [1997] 5 MLJ 705 11. DATO’ AZIZAN ABDUL RAHMAN & ORS V. PINERAINS SDN BHD [2021] 8 CLJ 849 12.MIRZA MOHAMED TARIQ BEG MIRZA HH BEG V. MARGARET LOW SAW LUI & ORS [2009] 4 MLJ 671 30 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. GURBACHAN SINGH BHAGWAN SINGH & ORS V. VELLASAMY PENNUSAMY AND OTHER APPEALS [2015] 1 CLJ 719 YONG & CO V WEE HOOD TECK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION [1984] 2 MLJ 39; [1984] 1 CLUJ REP 251 YEE CHANG & COLTD V NV KONINKLIJKE PAKETVAART, MAATSCHAPPIJ (1958) 1 LNS 97 SYARIKAT PENGANGKUTAN SAKTI SDN BHD V. TAN JOO KHING T/A BENGKEL SEN TAK [1997] 5 MLJ 705. PERAK HANJOONG SIMEN SDN BHD V PERINDUSTRIAN TENAGA MIX SDN BHD [2008] 8 MLJ 567 NG SIEW LAN V JOHN LEE TSUN VU! & ANOR [2017] 2 MLJ 167; [2017] 2 CLJ 245 31